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Abstract 
Taxation today plays a major role in economic activity, as the prime 
source of revenue and as a tool of economic management for government and 
as a major recurrent outgoing for business firms and households. 
Theoretical analysis of the impact of new taxes or changes in taxation 
is usually conducted with reference to investors and business firms exercising 
'rational' profit (or present value) maximising behaviour under conditions 
where all other relevant factors remain unchanged. Empirical evidence on 
business response to taxation is however inconclusive in the case of developed 
economies and sparse in relation to LDCs. 
This thesis examines the impact of taxation on business in LDCs at the 
level of the individual business firm, using the survey technique supported 
by content analysis and ratio analysis of published material. The study is 
carried out with particular reference to Sri Lanka, a typical LDC, but the 
findings are also supported by analysis of business opinion in two other 
developing countries. A separate examination is undertaken of the perceptions 
of and responses to taxation of MNC business operating in LDCs. 
The research results lead to three main conclusions. Firstly, the 
perceptions of business relating to taxation are seen to be non-uniform 
and for the most part are related to organisational characteristics of the 
business entities. 
Secondly, business response to taxation does not always correspond with 
rational profit maximising behaviour on the part of business managers. 
Liquidity objectives appear to be at least as important. 
Finally, perhaps the main conclusion drawn from the research findings 
is that the impact of taxation on business decisions is small and that 
taxation is not by any means a major constraint on business development; 
the main reason being the presence of other more restrictive environmental 
influences. 
(x) 
ABBREVIATIONS 
ABIC Association of British Interests in Ceylon 
ACT Advance Corporation Tax 
BTT Business Turnover Tax 
CRA Convertible Rupee Account 
d. f. degrees of freedom 
DCF Discounted Cash Flow 
DFCC Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon 
DTR Double Taxation Relief 
FEEC Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificate 
GNP Gross National Product 
IRR Internal Rate of Return 
LDC Less Developed Country 
LSD Lump Sum Depreciation 
LSSP Lanka Sama Samaja Party 
NNC Multinational Corporation 
NPV Net Present Value 
PAYE Pay as you earn 
RCE Return on Capital Employed 
SL Sri Lanka 
SLFP Sri Lanka Freedom Party 
UF United Front 
UNP United National Party 
VAT Value Added Tax 
Note: Abbreviations used for ratios in Chapter 11 are 
explained in Appendix 17.1 
INTRODUCTION 
Taxation is a major factor influencing business activity in the 
modern world. Not only is a significant proportion of resources of 
business transferred regularly to the government or governments under 
whose jurisdiction a business organisation operates, but it is also true 
that the manner in which the transfer takes place and the proportion of 
resources transferred are not uniform as between countries, or even within 
a single country as between different business activities or as between 
different types of organisation. In the post-war period, fiscal systems 
the world over have grown and become ever more complicated with a multi- 
plicity of taxes and numerous allowances, disallowable items and incentives 
for development of preferred business activities. Taxation then is not a 
neutral levy; and planning for tax minimisation is an essential part of 
efficient business management. Hence, an understanding of the impact of 
taxation on business is of considerable interest to both the academic analyst 
and the business manager. 
From the standpoint of government, taxation is a major (perhaps the main) 
source of revenue, and tax policy is one of the instruments that may be 
used in the regulation of the economy. Fiscal policy makers are frequently 
called upon to balance revenue needs with other socio-economic objectives 
in the formulation of tax regulations and, in carrying out this task, an 
understanding of the perceptions and responses of taxpayers to various tax 
measures, past and proposed, is an important prerequisite. Business organ- 
isations are the major institutional taxpayers in any country: hence an 
insight into their response to taxation is particularly valuable. 
-2- 
Economic theories concerning the impact of taxation on various aspects 
of taxpayer activity have been empirically tested over the years both by 
means of surveys and by analysis of macro-economic variables. Much of the 
empirical evidence so accumulated is, however, in respect of industrialised 
countries and there is relatively little published material on the impact 
of taxation in less developed countries (LDCs). Given the dissimilarity 
between developed countries and LDCs in many characteristics influencing 
tax policy and/or taxpayer behaviour, such as their institutional infra- 
structures, taxable capacity and the typical types and scale of business 
activity, it cannot reasonably be taken for granted that empirical obser- 
vations made in developed countries will apply equally to LDCs. Independent 
confirmatory evidence from LDCs regarding tax policy/taxpayer interactions is 
needed. This thesis examines the effect of taxation on business development 
mainly with reference to a particular LDC - viz., Sri Lanka (SL). 
Turning to the specific case of SL, two documents dealing at least 
partly with the impact of taxation have been published to date - viz., the 
reports of the Taxation Commissions of 1955(179) and 1968 
180) Both these 
commissions were fairly restricted in their terms of reference, and had as 
one of their objectives the 'promotion and development of new sources of 
revenue'. Though the commissions did collect evidence from the tax-paying 
public, only the reports of the commissioners have been published, and these 
only partially and indirectly assess the impact of certain taxes being 
charged at the time. Hence, for SL, there is very obviously a need for 
current empirical evidence on the effects of taxation on business activity. 
It is necessary at this early stage to acknowledge that some of the 
terms incorporated in the title of the thesis are open to more than one 
interpretation and to define the meanings attached to these terms in this 
work. 
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Firstly, taxation is a compulsory levy that may be charged at many 
levels of government: it may be levied by central government, by state 
governments in federated states or by local authorities at county or district 
level. For our purposes, however, taxation considered would be restricted 
to central government taxes; interest being focussed exclusively on taxes - 
both direct and indirect - falling on business organisations either as legal 
entities or in the persons of their owners. 
Business for this purpose is defined to include all entrepreneurial 
activity in the private sector and to exclude such activity undertaken by 
the government or state owned corporations. 
Definition of an LDC is rather more difficult. In the literature, 
the concept of underdevelopment is vaguely defined and many different 
indicators of the level of development of nations have been suggested; 
such as the level of per capita GNP, size of the traditional agricultural 
sector, level of consumption of animal protein per capita, enrolment for 
education - to be used singly or in combination with other indicators. 
(10) 
Much of the discussion relating to LDCs is, however,. conducted as if there 
was a homogeneous group of countries identifiable as LDCs. No attempt will 
be made here to continue the debate on the appropriate yardstick for measure- 
ment of development: instead, the classification of developed and less 
developed countries used by the United Nations agencies 
(189) 
will be adopted. 
SL, the country studied here in depth, falls under the category of LDCs 
in the UN classification. 
With a subject area as wide as the impact of taxation, a researcher is 
required, at the outset of the investigation, to make a number of decisions 
relating to methodology - in particular, as to the geographical area and 
the aspects of taxation to be covered and the research technique(s) to be 
used. This work is largely a single country study, with broad coverage of 
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all taxes falling on business, the techniques used being the survey method, 
content analysis and ratio analysis. 
The research techniques used have associated with them various merits 
and shortcomings, and these will be discussed later. But a major problem 
in relation to taxation is that it is a most 'sensitive' area of business 
decision making and there is, therefore, the possibility that business 
managers may not talk freely about taxes and their tax-related decisions. 
The multi-technique approach adopted here will, it is expected, reduce the 
possibility of our findings being biased as a result of such reluctance. 
Though the bulk of the investigation of LDC business relates to SL, 
confirmatory surveys, on a smaller scale, have also been carried out in two 
other LDCs - viz. Malaysia and the Philippines. Furthermore, investigations 
into views of managers of western Multinational Corporations (MNCs) relating 
to their interests in the LDCs add another dimension to the analysis. 
The immediate objectives of this investigation are twofold: viz. 
(a) to gain an understanding of the perceptions of business managers 
in regard to taxation, including the various incentives for 
business development offered through the tax system, and 
(b) to ascertain the effects of taxation on major business decisions, 
such as those relating to type of organisation, investment, financing, 
distribution of profits and pricing. 
These two main themes run through the entire study. 
Chapter 1 lays the foundation for the study, with a general review of 
the literature on the effects of taxation and identifies several questions 
for investigation. 
Chapter 2 describes briefly, the socio-economic background of SL, and 
reviews the tax structure and administration of the country within the context 
of which the research has been carried out. 
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Results of a survey of SL business firms are presented in the next 
two chapters. Chapter 3 reports the perceptions of the firms. in regard to 
taxation and the manner in which such perceptions appear to be influenced 
by other organisational characteristics. Chapter 4 discusses the impact of 
taxation on several major business decision areas and the tax-planning 
practices of SL firms. 
A separate survey of SL professional observers, who in the normal course 
of their professional duties would be in a position to observe the impact of 
taxation on business activity, was also undertaken, mainly in order to 
confirm the findings of the survey of business firms. The results of this 
survey are discussed in Chapter 5. 
Some international comparisons based on surveys carried out in Malaysia 
and the Philippines are reported in Chapter 6. 
Chapter 7 discusses the attitudes to LDC taxation of western MNCs who 
are perhaps the single most important source of foreign private investment 
funds to the third world. This discussion is based on a survey of a small 
sample of UK and US multinational firms. The same issue is examined in 
Chapter 8: but the technique used is content analysis and the data come 
from annual reports of UK multinational firms with interests in the LDCs. 
Chapter 9 examines the channels of communication between taxpayers and 
fiscal policymakers in SL. Using content analysis supported by interview 
data this chapter discusses the response of business pressure groups to 
tax measures proposed in annual budgets over a period of 13 years. 
In Chapter 10, the annual accounts of a sample of SL companies are 
studied using ratio analysis, in order to provide confirmatory evidence on 
the impact of taxation on business decisions. 
Finally, Chapter 11 brings together the main findings reported in other 
chapters in a general discussion of the questions for investigation identified 
in Chapter 1. 
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CHAPTER 1. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
This chapter will set out the background for the research with 
a brief review of the literature on the objectives and effects of 
taxation, and conclude by identifying several questions for examination 
in this work. 
Objectives of Taxation 
The impact of taxation on an economy can only be judged against the 
objectives of taxation. The literature of public finance recognises 
several objectives or functions of taxation, the most important among 
these being to provide 
a) a system of payment for social goods, 
b) a means by which income and wealth may be 
distributed in what is considered to be a fair manner, 
c) a tool for the promotion of economic growth, and 
d) a means for achieving short-term economic stability. 
(131, p. 6) 
It is of course possible that a certain amount of conflict may exist 
among these different objectives. For instance, it is possible that a' 
government in pursuance of its economic growth objectives may wish to use 
the tax system to promote the increase of the overall level of savings in 
households. At the same time, its priorities of social justice may require 
the transfer of income and wealth from high income households in which the 
propensity to save is high, to low income households where the propensity 
to save is relatively low. The ordering of fiscal policy priorities to 
-7- 
resolve such conflict is usually a problem dealt with at the political 
rather than the administrative level. The result of attempting to 
reconcile contradictory objectives, however, can often be unnecessary 
complication of tax legislation. 
(104, p. 85) 
The Search for an ideal Tax Structure 
Economists continue to search for the ideal tax system; with many 
writers looking for inspiration in this search to the classic work of 
Adam Smith (165) and his canons- of taxation. Within Smith's ideal tax 
system, taxes would (a) be charged according to ability to pay, (b) be 
known with certainty, (c) be conveniently collected and (d) impose a 
minimum burden on the tax payer. 
The 'ability to pay' principle calls for equality of treatment both 
horizontally and vertically. For Adam Smith, equality lay in taxpayers 
contributing "in proportion to the revenue they respectively enjoy" 
(165) 
but to later writers equality (used synonymously with equity) means 
equality of sacrifice of utility, where equality of sacrifice may in turn 
be defined as equal absolute, equal proportional or equal marginal sacrifice. 
(131,. p"217) The value of utility analysis in guiding fiscal policy is 
however limited by the difficulties of estimating the shape of utility 
schedules and the relevance in the real world of non-utility considerations 
such as political factors, the existence of unofficial (black) markets and 
tax evasion and the importance of power objectives rather than utility 
objectives at upper levels of income. 
(74) 
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In relation to certainty, there is a call for greater stability in 
the tax structure and for fiscal policy to be used less as a tool of 
short-term economic management. The Meade Committee in the U. K. reported 
that 
"an essential need is to put a stop to this bewildering 
process of altering each element in the tax structure as 
soon as the taxpayer gets used to it and arranges his 
affairs appropriately. Uncertainty and lack of confidence 
in the stability of present arrangements are serious 
impediments to the national effort to improve our economic 
performance. " 
(94) 
Neutrality, or the imposition of a minimum burden, is another 
attribute demanded of the ideal tax system. At its minimum, the burden 
of a tax should equal the revenue collected from the tax. If however, 
in addition to reducing the spending power of the taxpayer (individual 
or corporate) by the amount of the tax revenue transferred to the government, 
the tax also distorts economic decisions of the tax payer, there is said to 
be an 'excess burden' or efficiency cost attached to that tax. An excess 
burden will arise when a tax affects relative prices and so leads to the 
substitution of one form of consumption or activity for another. 
(99, p. 21) 
In the case of business firms, a neutral tax is one which will not cause 
the firms to allocate resources in any way different from that which they 
would have adopted in the absence of the tax or not cause them to make any 
other decisions they would otherwise not have made. 
-9- 
Though it is unlikely that any tax can ever be truly neutral, 
(152) 
the view is held by some. writers that at a given level of tax revenue it 
is possible to minimise the distortion of the market by the fisc and to 
increase the freedom of choice among taxpayers by use of an appropriate 
mix of taxes. 
(22) Relative neutrality is one of the main arguments in 
favour of the substitution of personal income tax by an expenditure tax(103) 
and corporate income tax by a cash-flow tax. 
(146) 
Taken to their logical extremes, these criteria for the so-called 
ideal tax structure necessitate the abandonment of all but the pure revenue 
objectives of fiscal policy. Therefore it is unlikely that they will 
influence, to any great extent, the fiscal policy of today's governments. 
This would be particularly true of LDCs where the trend appears to be 
towards increasing, rather than decreasing government interference in 
private sector economic activity. (11) 
Perceptionsof Taxation 
A possibility that is not always considered in discussions of the 
burden of taxation is that the perceived burden of a new tax or a change 
in an existing tax is influenced by the previous tax experience of the 
persons concerned. For instance when income taxes were first introduced 
in the United States in 1913 at rates ranging from 1%-7%, academic opinion 
at the time was that these rates were "clearly excessive". 
(70) By contrast, 
the limitation in 1976 of income tax on earned income in that country to 
50% has been praised as averting problems "posed by very high rates". 
(131, p. 474 
Dalton rightly draws a distinction between the subjective and objective 
burden of taxation and argues that 
- 10 - 
"corresponding to a given objective burden, taxes which 
are 'much felt' impose a heavier and taxes which are 
'little felt' a lighter subjective burden". 
(38) 
Work carried out in developed countries has shown that perceptions 
of taxpayers regarding the burden of taxation can influence the level of 
tax compliance. 
A field experiment in the U. S. by Schwartz and Orleans 
(159) 
showed 
that tax compliance could be influenced by changes in taxpayer perceptions 
brought about as a result of suggestions made by the researchers during 
interviews with individual taxpayers. Survey findings of Strumpel 
(176) 
in Europe indicate that the 'tax mentality' of those subject to tax can 
influence tax compliance. Similarly, in the U. S., it has been found (167) 
that the likelihood of tax evasion by a taxpayer is positively related to 
perceived inequities in taxpayer-government exchange. 
These results raise the question - what causes differences in 
perception within a taxpayer population subject to the same taxes? The 
perceptions of taxpayers in the Schwartz and Orleans experiment were 
engineered by the researchers themselves. In the other two, no attempt was 
made to establish causes underlying taxpayer perceptions. 
Whatever the objectives of fiscal policy, and whatever the priorities 
and conflicts among different objectives, in order that effective fiscal 
policy decisions be made, it is necessary for the decision makers to 
- 11 - 
understand taxpayer perceptions of the impact of fiscal measures. The 
investigation of such perceptions in a LDC context, is one of the main 
aims of this study. 
Effect of taxation on Investment 
The decision by corporate management to commit resources (usually 
financial) to the acquisition of capital assets - the investment 
decision - has been the subject of a wide array of models. These differ 
inter alia in the manner in which they treat taxation. Jorgenson 
(102) 
classifies these various models into three broad groups on the basis of 
the relevant determinants of investment which are: 
"1. Capacity utilization, represented by the ratio of output 
to capacity, difference between output and capacity, change 
in output, sales less previous peak of sales and so on; 
2. internal finance, represented by the flow of internal 
funds, thestockof liquid assets, debt capacity, and 
accrued tax liability; 
3. external finance, represented by interest rates, rates 
of return, stock prices, the market value of the firm. " 
In the first type of model, investment is described as a function of 
both the existing stock of capital and the required stock of capital; and 
taxation does not enter the equation directly. Nevertheless, the required 
stock of capital is determined by capacity and market considerations, and 
- 12 - 
taxation will exert an influence on the level of investment via its 
effect on market demand and supply. 
The availability of internal finance would of course be directly 
reduced by tax payments. However, a point that does not appear to be 
taken into account in many discussions of the impact of taxation is that 
in most countries there is a significant lag in time between the enuring 
of a tax liability and its payment. One empirical study that does 
recognise the demand made on the stock of liquid funds by tax accruals 
is that of Anderson 
(4) 
, which includes the accrued tax liability as one 
of the independent variables in a regression model of investment behaviour. 
Where investment is expressed as a function of rate of return, the 
impact of taxation is felt as a reduction in expected rate of return 
leading to a lower level of investment. Musgrave and Musgrave postulate 
that in a full employment economy, 
"the levels of investment and savings are determined by 
the intersection of the investment and saving schedules, 
with investment determined as a function of the rate of 
interest and savings dependent on both income and the 
rate of interest. " 
(131, p. 493) 
In this model, the impositions of an income tax or an increase in 
the existing rate would result in a downward movement of the investment 
schedule and a lower level of investment at equilibrium. This is of 
course a generalised model for an income tax on all sectors of the economy. 
If the rate of corporation tax increases without a parallel increase in 
- 13 - 
income tax in the unincorporated sector, savings will move from the high- 
tax corporate sector to the low-tax unincorporated sector, and in the 
long term, a new equilibrium for division of savings between sectors 
will be found. 
(81) Harberger has calculated efficiency costs of the 
corporation tax in the U. S. on a two sector model: according to his 
estimates, the gross national product of the U. S. would have been about 
one percent higher in the absence of corporation-tax-induced distortions. 
(82) 
As the various determinants of the level of investment specified by 
different writers are not mutually exclusive, it is not unreasonable to 
assume that taxation could affect investment both directly and indirectly. 
through its impact on rates of return, on liquidity or through changes in 
market demand schedules. Whichever model of investment determination is 
appropriate for a given economy or sector at any given time, an increase 
in the tax burden on any sector is expected to lead, typically, to a 
decline in investment in that sector. 
The analyses of Harberger and others have however been challenged by 
Stiglitz 
(174) 
who argues that they are in error in using the average cost 
of capital rather than the marginal cost of capital, when it is the latter 
which is relevant for investm:; -t decision purposes. According to Stiglitz, 
in the absence of the possibility of bankruptcy, and with full deductability 
of interest costs, the optimal investment decision for a firm remains 
unaffected by the tax structure. His analysis is based on the assumption 
that tax considerations do not affect the decision as to whether the firm 
should be incorporated or not. 
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Empirical evidence on the question is however inconclusive. 
Applying U. S. data to an econometric model of investment behaviour 
in which investment is described as a function of the existing level 
of capital and the desired level of capital, Hall and Jorgenson make 
the following claim: 
"Tax policy can be highly effective in changing the 
level and timing of investment expenditures. Qualitatively 
speaking, a change in tax policy that reduces the rental 
price of capital services will increase the desired level 
of capital stock. This increase will generate net investment 
that eventually brings actual capital up to the new desired 
level ... Even if all the determinants of desired capital 
remain stationary at their new levels, gross investment is 
permanently increased by the higher levels of replacement 
associated with higher levels of capital". 
(77) 
Similar results were obtained for the U. K. by Feldstein and Flemming. 
(62) 
Eisner (53), however, testing directly for tax effects using a revised 
version of the Hall and Jorgenson model 
(77) found that changes in tax 
policy had very little influence on the level of investment in the U. S. 
Bischoff (17) also applying a similar model to U. S. data but using 
different assumptions regarding underlying economic conditions found 
smaller effects and a slower response to tax changes than suggested by 
the results of Hall and Jorgenson. 
(77) 
According to Bischoff 
(17) 
the 
lag in response of investment to tax incentives provides proof of the 
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'putty-clay' hypothesis that changes in relative prices (including those 
caused by tax incentives) affect spending on equipment with a much longer 
lag than do changes of output. This is so because the alteration in 
technology triggered by relative price differences is only possible at 
a very early stage in the investment process. 
In a survey of the post-war development of 36 U. K. firms Mackintosh 
comes to the conclusion that: 
"If the tax burden were lower, 
(i) the rate of development of many firms - probably 
the majority - would not be affected appreciably, and 
(ii) total investment expenditure would rise by a comparatively 
small fraction of the amount by which the tax burden was 
reduced'. 
(120) 
Though empirical evidence is largely supportive of theory as to the 
direction of tax effects on investment there is no agreement on the 
magnitude of the influence. 
Incidence and Shiftinq of Taxation 
The discussion thus far has given no consideration to the concept 
that the effective incidence of taxation need not necessarily match its 
statutory incidence. The term incidence is used fairly loosely in the 
literature to describe the direct and/or indirect effects and short term 
and/or long term impact of taxes on factor suppliers or households. 
(149) 
If the incidence of taxation on business profits is defined as the 
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effect of the tax on suppliers of capital, then the effective incidence 
may differ from statutory incidence due to the shifting of the tax either 
backward to suppliers of other factors of production in the form of 
reduced prices or forward to customers in the form of increased prices. 
A business may of course effectively shift taxes without. changing prices - 
for example, by the reduction in quality of goods supplied. The ability 
of a firm to shift taxes will be determined by a number of factors, the 
most important of which are the structure of the market in which it 
operates, price elasticity of its products, the cost conditions it faces 
and the type of tax concerned. 
The essence of the neoclassical theory of shifting has been summarised 
by Krzyzaniakas follows: 
"In a world of perfect markets or pure monopolies and 
firms dedicated to short-run profit maximization, 
investors have no choice but to pay the (corporation) 
tax out of already maximised profits". 
(113) 
But it is acknowledged that 
"in the short run ... non-profit-maximising behaviour 
combined with the control over price possessed by firms 
in imperfect markets, makes tax shifting easier than it 
would be in a perfect market. " 
(86) 
In the long term, the incidence of taxation can become blurred and 
be difficult to observe because of the effects of changes in other variables 
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related to market, products, technology, etc. However in theory, 
the prediction is that in the long-run even perfect-market firms will 
be able to shift taxes. 
(113) 
There appears to be a generally accepted belief that shifting 
behaviour for direct taxes is different from that for indirect taxes. 
According to Herber, 
"Generally, the more direct the tax, the more difficult 
shifting becomes and the more indirect the tax, the 
greater the possibility of transferring its burden from 
the point of impact to another point of incidence. This 
is explained by the fact that ... direct tax bases in most 
instances are further removed from subsequent market 
transactions after the taxes are imposed than are the bases 
of indirect taxes. " 
(86) 
Musgrave and Musgrave state: 
"As distinct from taxes on net income, (sales taxes) must 
enter into the determination of price and output ... 
When imposing a manufacturers' tax on automobiles 
(the legislators) do not intend the burden to fall on 
the manufacturer. If they wished it to do so, they 
would impose a tax on the manufacturers' profits. " 
(131) 
The implication is that business firms are more likely to shift 
indirect taxes because they treat these as costs and also that they are 
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expected by government to do so. The reasons given for 'non-shifting' of 
a direct income tax imply that, in the short-run, business firms are 
unwilling to or unable to display profit-maximising behaviour in response 
to an increase in income tax, largely on account of an absence of a direct 
relationship between sales and income taxes. 
Empirical evidence on the question of tax shifting is inconclusive. 
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave 
(112), 
applying regression analysis to U. S. data 
have estimated that the degree of shifting of the corporation income tax 
in the short-run exceeds 100%. Their analysis has however been criticized 
on the grounds of its lack of theoretical rationale, implausible results 
and their failure to incorporate all relevant factors into their model. 
(71)(1( 
Cragg, Harberger and Mieszkowski(37)argue that the Krzyzaniak-Musgrave 
conclusions are based on a spurious correlation 
corporation tax during the period studied. Usii 
introducing into the model additional variables 
prosperity or depression in the economy and the 
war years, Cragg et. al., estimate that 100% of 
by suppliers of capital. 
between company profits and 
ig the same data but 
representing relative 
unusual conditions during 
the tax increases are borne 
Davis applying the Krzyzaniak-Musgrave model and other variations to 
the U. K. economy found: 
"None of the main results are consistent with 100 per cent 
short-run shifting of company taxation. Thus even for the 
K-M model, which when applied to U. K. data gave the largest 
estimate of short-run shifting, the instrumental variable 
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results generally suggest that less than half the tax 
was shifted". 
(40) 
Taxpayer behaviour and perceptions on this issue will be examined later 
in this work. 
Taxation and Risk-taking 
It must be recognised that the effects of taxation may be felt not 
only on the amount of investment but also on 
of risk inherent in investments undertaken. 
and Musgrave 
(45) 
postulated that given full 
losses, a proportional income tax (such as t 
increase the overall level of risk-taking in 
its quality or on the level 
In an early paper, Domar 
and immediate offset of 
he corporate income tax) will 
the economy. They state: 
"If losses can be offset,... the Treasury assumes part of the 
risk, as well as the yield ... The investor's income, however, 
has been reduced and to restore it, he will take more risk..., 
(45) 
Feldstein (60) , however, argues that the impact of tax on risk-taking 
depends on the shape of investors' utility functions and that no completely 
general theoretical assertion is possible. 
Stiglitz (172) has shown that, when absolute risk aversion is constant 
or increasing; or when absolute risk aversion is decreasing but relative 
risk aversion is increasing or constant, an increased income tax with full 
loss offset will lead to an increased demand for risky assets. 
Academic argument and the quest for a model that best describes the 
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impact of tax on risk taking still continue, 
(83)(147) but no 
universally accepted model is yet to be found in the literature. 
One point that must be emphasised is that the proposition of 
increased risk-taking is based primarily on the premise that immediate 
and full offset of losses will be available under the tax system. This 
means that this proposition is more likely to apply to established 
business or investors with adequate profits from other sources against 
which to set off possible losses from the investment under consideration. 
In an LDC, where the government seeks to activate enterprise among a 
largely non-entrepreneurial population, taxation is, therefore, a policy 
tool of limited value, whatever the intrinsic shape of investor utility 
schedules. This is particularly true when the likelihood of tax evasion 
to maintain income at pre-tax level is high. 
Tax Incentives 
Incentives for increased investment are offered in most tax systems 
today, and form a major source of variation of the effective tax burden 
on business from the statutory rate. Opinion in the literature is divided 
on the question of the usefulness of tax incentives in general as well as 
on the effectiveness of different forms of tax incentives. 
The effectiveness of an incentive can be judged only with reference 
to the objectives of government in offering it. Generally, the function 
of an investment incentive is expected to be 
a) to promote capital investment levels overall, and/or 
b) to bring about a desired balance of investment in the 
economy. 
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However, the appraisal of the effectiveness of an incentive can be 
complicated by the fact that promotion of investment is not the sole 
or even the main purpose of a tax system and that governments need to 
balance growth objectives against the primary revenue objectives of 
taxation. The task is made more difficult by 
a) the failure of legislators and administrators 
clearly to define the objectives of investment 
incentives as well as those of tax policy in 
general, 
(15) 
b) the tendency for different investment incentives to 
be offered through the tax system and to overlap with 
one another as well as with other non-tax measures 
adopted by government toward the same end, 
(160) 
and 
c) the lack of data regarding costs in revenue foregone 
and benefits of investment induced by specific tax 
incentives. 
(84) 
Broadly speaking, tax incentives can be classified as those 
proportional to profitability such as tax holidays and concessionary 
tax rates; and those related to some other factor, usually the capital 
invested, such as accelerated depreciation. 
(160) The impact of tax 
incentives on investment is expected to be felt in the opposite direction 
to that of taxation itself, and via similar routes: viz. through changes 
in investment returns, changes in liquidity and the availability of 
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internal funds, and through changes in market prices. The impact on 
investment returns of incentives is usually measured in terms of increased 
net present value (NPV). 
When considering an investment, the investor weighs 
the present value of its net income stream against the 
cost of the asset. This present value equals the present 
value of the income streams before tax minus the present 
value of tax payments thereon. The latter in turn may be 
viewed as equal to the present value of the gross tax 
(minus the present value of tax savings due to depreciation. "131, p. 
497) 
Accelerated depreciation allowances enable a firm to postpone tax 
payments and therefore to increase the present value of investment returns. 
In periods of inflation, the faster write-off of depreciation would result 
also in an enhancement of present value in real terms. 
(130) The liquidity 
consequences are no less important: under the most generous form of 
accelerated depreciation allowances, that of free depreciation, the tax 
postponement resulting from the acceleration of depreciation is 
equivalent to an interest free instalment loan from the Treasury to the 
business firm. (69) 
It can be shown that the change in present value and, therefore, 
the benefit of accelerated depreciation depend on 
a) the level of acceleration, 
b) the rate of tax, 
c) the cost of capital at which future cash flows are 
discounted, and 
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d) the length of useful life of investment. 
(18) 
The level of acceleration has to be measured by comparing the 
allowed depreciation with 'true economic depreciation'. True economic 
depreciation would be neutral as to resource allocation in a tax system 
which permitted the deduction of interest on capital. 
(21) 
"If the depreciation rate allowed for tax purposes is 
set too low, elements of cost are unwittingly included 
in the base of the so-called profit tax, and the scale 
of activities affected will in the long-run be contracted. 
If the opposite mistake occurs these activities will be 
subsidised. " 
(178) 
In offering accelerated depreciation allowances, the objective 
is indeed to subsidise. But in order to evaluate the subsidy on a 
particular class of asset it is necessary to calculate true economic 
depreciation on that class of asset. No satisfactory method is known, 
however, for estimating patterns of physical deterioration of capital 
assets. The traditional assumption 
(101) 
of a constant rate of physical 
depreciation has been challenged on both theoretical 
(135) 
and empirical 
grounds. 
(64) In the presence of inflation, the issue is further 
complicated by the need to calculate depreciation at current values. 
(155)(177) The current state of the art does not permit the accurate 
ex ante measurement of the subsidy built into an accelerated depreciation 
scheme. However, it can be said that free depreciation or a 100% initial 
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allowance will be neutral as to resource allocation if the profit tax 
base is defined to include all returns to capital. 
(175) 
The higher the rate of tax, the greater the benefit, in present 
value terms, of accelerated depreciation. This type of incentive is 
most effective under a high-tax regime. It is therefore possible, in 
the presence of accelerated depreciation allowances, for an increase in 
the tax rate to provide a stimulus for increased investment spending. 
(77) 
Similarly, the higher the relevant discount rate, the higher the 
benefit of tax postponement obtained from accelerated depreciation. If 
the discount rate reflects the level of risk attached to the investment, 
the change in NPV resulting from accelerated depreciation would be 
greater for risky investments. It has been suggested by Brown 
(25) 
that depreciation allowances are more certain than pre-tax income and 
should therefore be discounted at a risk-free rate. The relative 
certainty of depreciation allowances referred to by Brown arises from 
the ability of a firm to set off allowances from one investment against 
taxable profits from other investments. But the solution offered by 
Brown of discounting tax savings from depreciation at a risk-free 
interest rate will no more ensure optimum resource allocation than would 
the use of a single rate of discount. The dependence of tax benefits in 
one project on the tax status of other projects presents financial 
management with the additional problem of evaluating benefits and costs 
flowing between different projects, across time. The difficulties of 
capital investment appraisal in the presence of project interdependencies 
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caused by accelerated depreciation and loss off-set provisions of tax 
legislation are recognised in the literature, 
(151) but no satisfactory 
solution has yet been found. 
(75) 
Generally speaking, the longer the life of an asset, the greater the 
present value of benefits from acceleration of depreciation allowances. 
With appropriate cost of capital deductions however it should be possible 
to design accelerated depreciation schedules that are neutral as to asset 
life. (21) 
The determinants of the impact of a 
present values are (a) the tax rate, (b) 
exemption period relative to the life of 
planning horizon, whichever is shorter. 
and the higher the tax rate, the greater 
a tax holiday. As for the period of tax 
or equal to the life of the investment, 
the greater the effect on present value. 
period beyond the life of the investment 
value as perceived by taxpayers. 
(181) 
tax holiday upon investment 
the discount rate and (c) the 
the investment or length of the 
The higher the discount rate 
the impact on present value of 
holiday, if this is less than 
the longer the holiday period 
The extension of the holiday 
horizon has no effect on present 
The above discussion, like much analysis in the economics of tax 
effects and tax neutrality, proceeds on the assumptions that investors 
display economically rational maximising behaviour and that evasion is 
zero on minimal. In the present analysis, rationality is equated to the 
maximisation of net present values. However, empirical data show that 
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even in developed western countries, investment decisions are not 
always made on net present value criteria. 
(109) Internal rate of 
return (IRR), accounting rate of return and payback period are all 
commonly used criteria. There is every possibility that the impact 
of tax incentives predicted by theoretical deduction may. not prevail 
in practice, where real-life investor decision-making behaviour diverges 
from that envisaged in theoretical analysis. For any given firm, the 
method of investment appraisal adopted by it could influence its 
perception of tax influences and therefore its response to tax 
incentives. 
It is well known that even different discounted cash flow methods 
of investment appraisal will not necessarily result in the same ranking 
of investment projects. 
(12) Under conditions of capital rationing this 
could lead to different mixes of investment being accepted under the two 
main methods of discounted cash flow appraisal - NPV and IRR. It has 
been pointed out 
(158) that the post-tax IRR on an asset entitled to 
100% depreciation at the time of acquisition will be equal to the pre-tax 
IRR, whatever the rate of tax. A similar result will however not be 
obtained from NPV analysis, except for a marginal project where NPV = 0. 
The impact of taxation on investment outcomes, under the payback 
criterion is difficult to predict. This method will give full weight 
to incentives received within the payback period, but will ignore 
altogether any benefits accruing after payback on investment has been 
received. Within the payback period itself, this criterion will not 
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recognise timing differences. For instance for an investment project 
with a three year payback period, depreciation allowances of 33.3% of 
cost over three years will carry the same value as a 100% allowance in 
the first year. 
The impact of an investment incentive perceived under the Accounting 
Rate of Return decision rules would be different still, and will be 
influenced by the accounting rules that are used in the preparation of 
Balance Sheets and Accounts. Under current standard accounting practice 
in the U. K., 
(96) 
a tax benefit arising out of accelerated depreciation 
allowances would be treated as a timing difference, and provision would 
be made for tax payments deferred by such allowances, in computing net 
income to shareholders unless the deferral is considered to be more or 
less permanent, on account of recurring accelerated depreciation allowances. 
By contrast, the benefit of a tax holiday would be reflected 
in the profit and loss account immediately in the form of reduced tax 
provision. Accounting practice current in the U. S. would yield similar 
results. According to Hicks: 
"Tax incentives in those forms treated as permanent 
differences affect accounting income concurrently with 
cash flows. Those incentives in forms treated as timing 
differences will affect cash flows differently (typically 
earlier) than accounting income. For a specified level of 
tax incentive, whose present value is equivalent regardless 
of form, the absolute amount of tax benefit and the effect 
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on accounting income will be greater with those 
forms considered to be permanent differences than 
with those considered to be timing differences. " 
(87) 
Though accounting charges will hardly ever be concurrent with cash 
flows as envisaged by Hicks, the fact remains that Accounting Rate of 
Return calculations will not be indifferent to type of tax incentive. 
Moreover it is possible that even where the decision rules actually used 
for investment appraisal are not related to the Accounting Rate of Return, 
accounting profit will nevertheless be a constraint on investment planning. 
51) 
If this is so, the response of business to tax incentives may be influenced 
by current accounting practice in the country. 
Empirical evidence on the effectiveness of tax incentives is ambiguous. 
For the U. S., Hall and Jorgenson have reported on the basis of regression 
analysis of aggregate data that investment incentives have been highly 
effective in that country, and that 
"the liberalization of depreciation rules in 1954 resulted 
in a substantial shift from equipment to structures. On 
the other hand, the investment tax credit and depreciation 
guidelines of 1962 caused a shift towards equipment. " 
(77) 
Eisner and Lawler 
(54) however conclude from survey data that though 
the response to tax incentives is in the direction predicted by Hall and 
Jorgenson, (77) the shift in investment following tax incentives was much 
less than that computed by them. 
-29- 
Moving to an LDC, Bird 
(15) 
reports that: 
"Interview evidence indicates inadequate depreciation 
is not felt as a great problem in Colombia, but inadequate 
liquidity is. " 
Heller and Kauffman 
(84) 
reviewing early results of tax incentives 
in three countries (namely, Mexico, Puerto Rico and the Philippines) 
report that 
1) in all three countries, the increase in investment, 
output and employment that can be attributed to the 
tax-exempt companies is not substantial, 
2) in the Philippines, according to their Central Bank, 
a high proportion of new exempt investment went into 
nonessential consumer goods, and 
3) in all three countries, most tax exempt companies 
have earned extremely high profits, suggesting that 
investment would have taken place even without 
exemption, and further that these high profit 
companies are not in any way high risk companies. 
In a more recent article, Shah and Toye review a number of surveys 
and econometric studies of the impact of incentives in both developed 
and less developed countries and conclude that 
"The most that can be said is that their impact is either 
slight or unknown. " 
(160) 
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Many explanations have been suggested for the low effectiveness 
of tax incentives in LDCs. 
(84) Briefly, the more important of these 
are 
1. Tax incentives may not be material if the tax rates 
are low as the benefits of incentives will'also then 
be low. 
2. Tax incentives will be of little use when the factors 
limiting growth are unrelated to taxation. In LDCs, 
these are most likely to be the low level of development 
itself and the inadequacy of market demand and 
government restrictions of one sort or another. 
3. Tax incentives are less effective when tax-evasion is 
widespread. 
LDC governmentsmay nevertheless. feel compelled to give incentives 
to foreign investors to keep up with other neighbouring countries in 
similar conditions. Shah and Toye 
(160) 
associate this tendency with 
small island or quasi-island states which seek to promote export oriented 
foreign investment. 
Taxation and Financing of Business 
Taxation can have an impact not only on the investment decisions of 
a firm, but also on its choice of a mix of finance. To simplify the 
analysis let us assume that a firm has access to two types of capital - 
debt and equity. The corporation income tax typically allows the deduction 
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of interest on debt capital in computing income whereas returns to equity 
are the after-tax profits. 
The impact of taxation enters the optimal capital structure 
controversy in the form of a market imperfection. The question at issue 
in the controversy is whether or not the market value of a firm is 
influenced by the financing mix of its capital. The separate question of 
the cost of capital will not be considered' here. 
The theoretical extremes in the range of possible bases of valuation 
of the firm have been identified by Durand 
(49) 
as the Net Income' and 'Net 
Operating Income' approaches. The net income method capitalises income after 
meeting interest charges to arrive at the value of equity capital: the value 
of the firm would then be the sum of the values of debt and equity. The 
alternative net operating income method capitalises operating income before 
interest deduction to arrive at the value of the firm inclusive of the 
value of debt. 
If the capitalisation rate were the same for each method, under the 
net income method the value of the firm would increase with increasing 
debt in the capital mix. In contrast, on the net operating income approach 
the value of the firm would be invariant with respect to changes in the 
finance mix. Durand was of the opinion that neither method, strictly 
interpreted, would give an adequate model for the valuation of a firm. 
Later Modigliani and Miller 
(128) in a controversial article produced 
theoretical argument and empirical evidence to support the net operating 
income method of valuation. They hypothesised that at equilibrium the 
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market value of a firm is independent of its capital structure such 
that 
X 
V. = (S. + Dj) _J for any firm j in class k 
Pk 
where, 
V= value of the firm 
S= market value of the equity 
D= market value of debt 
K= expected returns before interest on assets owned by the 
firm, and 
p= the capitalisation rate appropriate for the class. 
They adjusted the above formulation to reflect the tax-deductability 
of interest payments and argued that, in the presence of taxation, the 
value of the firm becomes 
7t 
Vý =t for any firm j in class k, 
Pk 
with Xt (Xj - rDi ) (1 - t) + rDj_ ný + rDi 
where, Xi = expected income of the firm after tax but before interest 
r= rate of interest on Debt 
t= rate of corporation tax 
lit = expected profit to equity after tax 
pt = the capitalisation rate of the appropriate risk class. 
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Hence, even in the presence of taxation, the value of the firm 
would be independent of financial leverage. 
Their proposition and the empirical results have been the subject 
of criticism from many quarters 
(50)(173) 
on a number of grounds - mainly 
that their treatment of tax is incorrect and that they ignore or dismiss 
too many other market imperfections such as bankruptcy costs and the non- 
substitutability of personal borrowing for corporate debt. 
Modigliani and Miller correct the 'error' in the treatment of 
taxation in a subsequent paper 
(129) to arrive at the value of the firm, 
Xt - tR. Xt tr 
vý ipt J+ toi =Pt+ t(ý--t 
) )D 
where, 
R= the interest bill. 
It can be seen that now, the value of the firm is influenced by 
leverage, and would increase with increasing debt provided pt >r. 
If this proposition were true, the optimum capital structure for a company 
could be 99.9% debt. That this is obviously not true of corporate 
financial structures was accepted by Modigliani and Miller, who suggested 
the following as possible reasons, 
"... other forms of financing notably retained earnings, 
may in some circumstances be cheaper still, where the tax 
status of investors under the personal income tax is 
taken into account. More important, there are ... 
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limitations imposed by lenders, as well as many other 
dimensions (and kinds of cost) in real-world problems 
of financial strategy which are not fully compensated 
within the frame-work of static equilibrium models, either 
our own or those of the traditional variety. " 
(129) 
Central to the analysis of Modigliani and Miller was the assumption 
of risk classes; but it has since been shown by Hamada 
(78) that the 
presence of risk classes is not necessary to support their view of 
valuation of the firm which can be equally feasible within a capital- 
asset-pricing model valuation. 
In a more recent paper, Miller 
(126) 
argues 
a) that tax advantages of debt financing are reduced 
in the presence of low effective personal taxes on 
equity earnings arising from low rates charged on 
capital gains and their taxation only at time of 
realisation, and 
b) that though there will be a market equilibrium level 
of gearing in aggregate, that there will be no optimum 
gearing for any individual company, and that each firm 
will attract a clientele of stock holders whose 
preferences match its financing and dividend policies. 
Miller's view of a market-wide equilibrium obtained without optima at 
the level of individual firms has however been challenged by Litzenberger 
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and Van Horne 
(118) 
who argue that it is internally inconsistent. 
Brennan and Schwartz 
(23) 
suggest that uncertainties relating to 
expectations of future tax benefits of debt financing (which will be 
received only if there are sufficient profits to offset interest payments) 
and the increased likelihood of bankruptcy costs would combine to counter 
the tax benefits of gearing so that there will be an optimum gearing 
level for any firm. 
Empirical evidence has been presented by Miller and Modigliani 
(128) 
in support of their proposition. Both their methods and their results 
have however been questioned by Weston 
(192) 
who argues that the lack of 
correlation between the cost of capital and leverage observed by them is 
due to counter-balancing influence of earnings growth on leverage. 
Hamada (79) on the other hand offers support for the M-M proposition 
on the basis of his findings of greater mean values for observed betas 
of levered U. S. firms in comparison with calculated values of beta for 
hypothetical cases. 
In further support of their proposition that tax effects are 
unimportant, Miller states that 
"the debt/asset ratio of the typical non-financial 
corporation in the 1950s was little different from 
that of the 1920s despite the fact that tax rates 
had quintupled. " 
(126) 
Empirical evidence on the low relevance of tax considerations in 
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financing decisions has been presented by Coates and Woolley, 
(33) 
who in a comparative study of tax rates and gearing levels in several 
European countries conclude that there is no clear relationship between 
the rate of corporation tax and the level of gearing. 
It is however generally acknowledged that there is a need for both 
further development of theory and empirical testing in this area. 
(30) 
Taxation and Distribution of Business Profits 
Academic argument relating to the distribution of profit centres 
mainly on two questions: firstly as to whether dividend decisions are 
actively made by companies or whether dividends are residual funds after 
meeting requirements for reinvestment, and secondly, as to whether the 
value of a firm and its share prices are affected by the proportion of 
earnings distributed. 
Miller and Modigliani have argued that 
"... the irrelevance of dividend policy given investment 
policy is obvious, once you think of it ... In a rational 
and perfect economic environment ... values ... are determined 
solely by 'real' considerations - in this case the earning 
power of the firm's assets and its investment policy - and 
not by how the fruits of the earning power are packaged 
for distribution. " (127) 
They further postulate that any shareholders in need of current income 
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can always sell part of their holdings and so substitute home-made 
dividends for corporate dividends or that a company will attract a 
clientele of shareholders whose dividend expectations match its payout 
policies. 
The Miller-Modigliani proposition has been criticised on the grounds 
that market imperfections make it unlikely that it will hold in the real 
world. Taxation is perhaps the most important market imperfection 
impacting on the dividend decision. 
(63) Tax systems in most countries 
assess distributed corporate profits differently from undistributed 
profits. 
(80) Where a company is charged income tax on its profits and 
shareholders are again charged on dividends received, the effect is that 
distributed profits are doubly taxed while retained profits are charged 
only under the corporate profit tax. To the extent that such retained 
profits are reflected in share prices, capital gains will arise. If 
capital gains are taxable, these will usually be chargeable at the time 
of sale of shares, which may of course be at a much later date, and often 
at concessionary rates. There have been calls for integration of personal 
and corporate tax structures to eliminate double taxation and resultant 
distortions in the market process of resource allocation 
(122) 
and many 
European countries have moved in this direction in recent years. 
(140) 
Under the so-called 'classical' taxation system (where corporate 
profits are taxed both in the hands of the company and in the hands of 
its shareholders) and under other systems of partial integration, a high 
retention policy is favoured. However, other market imperfections may 
provide counter-influences in favour of dividend distributions. For 
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instance, Gordon (73) contends that the uncertainty attaching to dividend 
distributions increases with the distance in time when future dividends 
are to be received, with the result that the value of future dividend 
expectations resulting from retentions have to be discounted for greater 
uncertainty. Van Horne 
(190, p. 334) points out that transaction costs 
and the non-divisibility of'securities will deter the sale of shares to 
substitute for dividends by share owners in need of current income. There 
is also the view that there is an informational value attached to dividends 
in the market pricing of shares. 
(145) 
As with other major issues relating to the impact of taxation, 
empirical evidence on this question is ambiguous. 
Fama, (59) testing a number of dividend and investment models on U. S. 
firms, concludes that dividend and investment decisions are independent 
as implied by the Miller-Modigliani analysis. Bar-Yosef and Kolodny 
(9) 
produce empirical evidence in support of the view that dividend policy 
can influence share prices. Black and Scholes 
(19) 
on the other hand find 
evidence to the contrary. 
Again, Elton and Gruber 
(55) find that the implied tax bracket of 
marginal investors varies inversely with the payout ratio, implying a 
clientele effect with reference to investor tax brackets. Feldstein 
(61) 
and King 
(108) 
also report evidence of tax system affecting payout ratio, 
though their estimates of level of influence differ. Briston and Tomkins 
(24) 
however report that the introduction of corporation tax in the U. K. which 
was intended to induce higher overall retentions did not achieve this 
objective. 
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Taxation in LDCs 
The discussion so far has dealt mainly with taxation in the context 
of developed countries. A substantial body of literature also exists 
relating to taxation in LDCs; the writings usually taking the form of 
descriptions of tax structures and recommendations for reform. 
(13)(48)(106) 
The major differences between tax systems of developed countries and LDCs 
covered by this literature can be classified as relating to 
a) fiscal objectives 
b) tax effort and types of taxes charged 
c) tax-payer characteristics and 
d) tax administration. 
In the LDCs where development objectives receive high priority, 
fiscal systems are also geared for the promotion of development. 
"In the underdeveloped economies, taxation is increasingly 
assigned a far more positive role in the process of capital 
formation and technological change. The reason for this is 
implicit in the extremely low levels of income and savings 
which serve as the source of capital formation. " 
(85) 
Because private savings are in short supply the governments find it 
necessary to undertake large investment programmes in the public sector. 
Consequently there is a need for a high level of government revenue to 
finance development programmes. Furthermore in LDCs with a democratic 
form of government, the redistribution of income and wealth has, in recent 
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years, become an important objective, 
of national political stability. 
(28) 
governments 
(188) 
advocated in the interests 
At the same time, for many LDC 
"a major consideration is to prevent the tax system 
from becoming too much of a disincentive on effort, 
initiative or enterprise. Taxes on income make it 
less attractive to undertake work or to risk capital 
in productive enterprise. " 
(104, p. 10) 
As pointed out by Professor Heller. 
"One way out of the dilema [is] to combine high rates 
of taxation in general with preferential treatment 
for categories of desired development activity. " 
(85) 
Most mixed-economy LDCs have, in fact, done just this, and many 
incentives to the private sector have been offered through the tax 
system. 
(97) The bulk of such tax incentives have gone to manufacturing 
industry. 
"Although it is possible to attain a high level of income 
by concentration upon the development of efficient 
agriculture, as is evident from the experience of New 
Zealand and Denmark, there is little question that most 
less developed countries are interested in promoting the 
manufacturing sector above all others. " 
(84) 
However, the result of generous tax incentives combined with other 
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protectionist measures often designed to encourage import substituting 
industries are now recognised to have been not wholly desirable. Subsidies 
offered for capital investment have produced high technology, highly 
capital intensive industries in these nations where unemployment and 
underemployment are high and capital is the scarce resource. More 
recent studies have pointed out the inappropriateness of direct transfer 
of western technology encouraged by investment incentive schemes; 
(194) 
and the greater benefits to be achieved in providing incentives for 
increased employment 
(116) 
and for high utilization of existing industrial 
capacity. 
(32) 
Another way in which the objectives of the LDC fiscal policy differ 
from those of developed countries is that short-term economic 
management, an important objective in developed countries, is less 
relevant in an LDC context. The economic rationale for the adoption of 
stabilization objectives requires the assumptions 
a) "that some part of the capital stock lies idle 
because of generalised lack of demand, whereas 
typically in a poor country unutilised capacity 
results from some particular supply bottlenecks 
which persist despite powerful internal demand for 
those products" and 
b) "the origin of macroeconomic fluctuations lies in 
sagging investment demand following 'loss of confidence' 
by domestic private investors, whereas typically in a 
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poor country macroeconomic fluctuations arise from 
exogenous influences transmitted by foreign trade from 
(184) international economy. " 
184) 
The typical levels and composition of tax revenue in LDCs are 
also reported to differ from those of developed economies. The tax 
yield as a ratio of gross national product is generally lower than in 
developed countries. 
(29) So also is the tax paying population. 
"In the U. K. some 20 million individuals pay income tax 
each year and in the U. S. A. some 65 million - i. e. of the 
order of 30-40% of the total population. In many under- 
developed countries it is a real achievement to reach a 
figure of 5%. " 
(148, p. 34) 
The main differences in the revenue composition are said 
(148) to 
be that in the LDCs, 
a) Consumption based taxes provide 70-80% of revenue 
rather than the 40-50% found in developed countries, 
b) import and export based taxes play an important role, 
c) Corporation taxes are less prominent, 
and 
d) Capital taxes are not common. 
The picture that emerges of LDC tax patterns is one of relatively 
low taxable capacity and tax levels, with the emphasis on indirect taxes - 
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particularly customs duties. Underlying the divergence in the tax 
structures between the two types of countries are differences in the 
economic background, in taxpayer characteristics and in the competence 
of tax administration. Prest declares that LDC tax assessment can be 
extraordinarily difficult 
"when ... weights and measures are far from standardised, 
when one has either an illiterate peasantry which is 
incapable of keeping accounts or a semi-illiterate group 
which is unwilling to do so, and when a large proportion 
of output is not exchanged in the market for money and to 
the extent that money transactions do occur, they are in 
(148, p. 37) cash rather than credit form. " 
LDC tax administrators are believed to be less efficient than 
their developed country counterparts 
(16) 
and their job is said to be 
made more difficult by the greater propensity among LDC taxpayers to 
evade taxes. In the view of a U. K. writer, LDC fiscal scenes are 
characterised by 
a) "the inheritance of a complex tax code from the 
former colonial rulers [which] is usually more than 
the present administration can cope with" and 
b) "a big gap in fiscal morality between expatriate 
companies trading locally either via branches or 
via companies locally registered and controlled and 
the attitudes of local capital. " 
(39) 
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Given such differences, it is appropriate to question whether 
the impact of taxation on business and their response is different 
in LDCs from that predicted by economic theory in the context of a 
developed country background. 
LDC Taxation of International Business 
When a business firm becomes a multinational, a whole new 
dimension is added to the impact of taxation on its activities. On 
the one hand more than one government will have a 'fiscal interest' in 
the income of the firm: as most governments tax income on the basis of 
residence as well as with reference, to the location of source of in come, 
the firm may be chargeable to income (and other) taxes in both its ' home' 
country and the 'host' country. At the same time, the firm has open to 
it greater opportunities for global tax minimisation in moving goods 
and funds between countries. 
(125) The revenue authorities usually 
insist that transfer prices between branches of a firm or members of a 
group be fixed on an 'arms length' basis; but the policing of this 
requirement is difficult, particularly where the transfers are of 
technology or patents or specialised goods with no known comparable 
market prices, and when the revenue authorities concerned are short on 
administrative expertise. 
(142) 
Tax considerations can be, important not only in transfer pricing 
decisions, but also in decisions relating to the locating,. of production 
facilities. 
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"In deciding whether various taxes do or do not interfere 
with the location of production, the key question is 
whether the tax affects the relative prices of home-produced 
and imported goods. If it does, consumers will substitute 
one for the other and the location of production will differ 
from what it would have been under neutral taxes. " 
(44) 
Low tax locations may be used with advantage not only as centres 
for production but also for purely financial purposes. Multinational 
firms looking to minimise their global tax-bill have available to them 
the so-called 'tax-havens' - usually small countries in which little or 
no taxes are charged on all or certain types of business activity. It is 
possible for a multinational investing abroad to route its investments 
via a holding company in a suitable tax haven and to collect income, free 
of home country taxes; or to delay the payment of home country taxes by 
these means. In post war years a whole host of tax havens have sprung 
up around the world offering privileges of little or no taxes to foreign 
business along with freedom from exchange controls, facilities for 
offshore banking and investment as well as confidentiality as regards 
transactions undertaken in such locations. 
Though'tax considerations can, theoretically, influence both locational 
decisions and intra-group transfer prices of MNCs, increasing anti-avoidance 
legislation and other government controls such as import and exchange controls 
limit the scope for tax minimisation. 
(31) Once again, empirical 
evidence is inconclusive. 
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The report on a recent survey of the activities of U. K. 
multinationals abroad suggests that taxation may not be very important 
in locational decisions but that tax considerations are relevant in 
intra-group transactions across national boundaries. 
(91) Market 
potential was found to be the most important 'host country factor' 
affecting location of direct investment abroad by U. K. multinationals. 
By contrast, a survey 
(111) 
of multinational corporations operating 
in Singapore has reported that the political and social stability of 
Singapore was the single most important factor attracting foreign 
investors to that country and that market potential was relatively 
unimportant. Singapore is however well known as a low-tax export 
platform for multinationals and these findings cannot be said by 
extension to have general applicability to all LDCs. 
The Meade Committee in the U. K. (94) suggests that taxation is 
probably not the prime consideration in locational decisions and that 
quite marked differences can exist between national tax burdens without 
these resulting in extensive movement of capital and persons from the 
high tax to the low tax countries. 
Empirical studies 
(2)(100) in South American developing countries 
have concluded that tax incentives have had little influence on multi- 
national investment in this area. Multinational investment in developed 
countries, however, appears to be more sensitive to tax incentives. 
(66)(171) 
The majority of LDCs display mixed attitudes toward MNCs. On the 
one hand the typical LDC offers tax and other incentives 
(35)(153) for 
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incoming foreign investment; but at the same time the MNCs are 
regarded with fear and suspicion 
(136) 
and LDC governments seek to 
control their activities in various ways. 
(154) 
Many LDCs also have in existence double tax relief agreements 
with capital-exporting developed countries. The value to a MNC of 
such agreements however is variable; depending on the relative tax 
rates and bases of the countries concerned. For instance, multinational 
firms based in the U. K., which in any case enjoy unilateral relief-from 
double taxation, (') may not find any particular benefit in a double tax 
agreement unless it also included favourable tax-sparing provisions. 
Fiscal Politics 
The discussion so far has been carried out in terms of economic 
analysis, where all taxpayers make rational economic decisions in 
response to taxation. Much of the theory referred to has been 
formulated in the context of a western developed country underpinned 
by assumptions of perfect or near perfect markets and a rational, profit- 
maximising business sector. Furthermore, this analysis portrays tax- 
payers, be they individuals or corporations, largely in a passive role 
as far as fiscal policy affecting them is concerned; paying their taxes 
when they become due and attempting to achieve their economic goals within 
the constraints imposed by taxation. 
But is this a complete and fair representation of the real world? 
The field of political analysis offers a somewhat different view of the 
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interactions between fiscal policy and business activity. Decision 
making in democratic nations (including fiscal policy decisions) is 
seen as the outcome of a political process wherein all participants - 
voters, politicians and the bureaucracy - attempt to maximise their 
self interest. 
(47)(198) 
With reference to fiscal policy, it is recognised that any policy 
adopted via such processes may leave some taxpayers dissatisfied; as 
whatever the policy, it is unlikely to reflect exactly the preferences 
of every taxpayer regarding the size of the public sector and the method 
of payment for it. 
(131, p. 119) It is expected that persons dissatisfied 
with the policy adopted will form pressure groups to try to influence 
the legislators and the voters in their favour. 
(139) Musgrave and 
Musgrave (131; p. 120) discuss fiscal interest groups active in the U. S., 
but are of opinion that the organisation of consumer and taxpayer groups 
is more difficult than the organisation of industry or union interest. 
Bird and Oldman 
(16) 
are of the view that open discussion on tax 
policy is less common in LDCs and that this is due mainly to a low level 
of tax education among the public. Political researchers however report 
that business pressure groups in general are less well organised in 
developing areas than in developed countries. 
(3ý 
Behavioural Aspects 
Another analytical framework useful in the study of interactions 
between business organisations and government fiscal policy can be found 
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in the literature of organisational behaviour. 
As hypothesised by Thompson, 
"technology and environments are major sources of uncertainty 
for organisations and ... differences in those, dimensions 
will result in differences in organisations. " 
(183) 
If the tax structure is looked upon as an environmental variable 
affecting an organisation, then according to Thompson's analysis it may 
have a bearing upon the way in which business is organised within its 
geographical sphere of influence. Emery and Trist 
(56) 
classify the 
environment according to the degree of order and the degree of stability 
and argue that organisational response will vary with the structure of 
the environment. Hall 
(76) in an extension of the above analysis argues 
that organisations which ordinarily operate under norms of rationality 
may discard these in the face of severe environmental threats. From 
another point of view 
"The attitudes of organisational members towards change 
are crucial in the growth process. They are crucial because 
growth is a type of organisational change and they are 
crucial because a growing organisation must adjust to 
environmental change. In fact, it can be argued that 
growth depends upon the organisation's ability to exploit 
opportunities created by environmental change. " 
(170) 
* The 'environment' for our purposes is defined to include all 
factors affecting business operations which are outside the 
control of managers of a business firm. 
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Within this framework, the response of business to taxation may 
be seen as being conditioned by the harshness of the tax system and its 
variability. A successful business organisation will be one that can 
adapt quickly to changes in the environment including the tax environment. 
Conclusions and Questions 
The ideal tax system will provide necessary government revenue in 
a manner that is fair by all taxpayers, is easy to collect and does not 
distort rational economic choice in the market. But it is conceded that 
virtually any tax, except perhaps a poll tax, could have distortionary 
effects. 
Co-existing with the idea of a fair and neutral tax system is the 
recognition of the uses a tax system can be put to in management of the 
economy - in pursuance of short term stabilizing goals or longer term 
development or distribution goals of the State. Effects of taxes have 
been studied both at the 'macro' or economy level and at the 'micro' 
or taxpayer level: the impact of any new tax or tax change, it is 
agreed, depends on the extent and patterns of shifting of the tax. 
Our concern here is with micro-level effects. In theory, taxpayers 
at this level will make rational economic choices among alternative 
courses of action to maximise their profits or utility functions. In 
the presence of taxation it is the after-tax profits or utilities that 
will be maximised. Theoretical reasoning leads us to expect that taxation 
will influence savings, investment and risk-taking in the private sector, 
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business financing and dividend policies and the valuation of securities - 
virtually all the major decisions of business firms and investors. But 
it is recognised that in LDCs, where types of activity, organisation of 
business, ethical standards, administrative capabilities and accounting 
practices are likely to be different, the taxpayer reactiens may also be 
different. Empirical evidence on most issues relating to the effects of 
taxation is ambiguous in relation to developed economies and'sparse in 
relation to LDCs. 
The foregoing survey enables us to delineate several broad questions 
for study in relation to LDCs: viz. 
(a) Are similar perceptions of and attitudes to taxation 
widely shared among various participants in business 
activity? 
(b) Is the manner in which taxation is incorporated in 
decisions of business organisations consistent with 
rational economic decision-making as envisaged in 
economic theory? 
(c) What effects does taxation have on decisions of LDC 
business firms? 
(d) With reference to multinational corporations, are tax 
conditions and business responses any different between 
developed countries and LDCs? 
(e) What are the implicationsfor taxation policy in the LDCs 
of the answers to questions (a) - (d) above? 
This work reports findings on these questions, mainly with reference to 
one LDC, in an attempt to contribute to a better understanding of the 
effects of taxation on business development in the third world. 
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CHAPTER 2. 
SRI LANKA -A case study 
Most of the research reported in this work has been carried out 
with respect to Sri Lanka on data pertaining to the period 1965-1977 
or part thereof. It is a prerequisite of such in-depth analysis that 
the discussion be conducted in the context of the relevant socio-economic 
conditions of the country concerned. This chapter will 
a) introduce the reader to the socio-economic background 
within which both business and the fiscal system operate 
in SL, and 
b) review the form and administration of taxation in the 
country. 
The Country and its People 
Sri Lanka is a small country - an island 65,000 square kilometres 
in area situated at the southern tip of India. It has a population of 
around 14 million. During our study period it was a welfare state, with 
free rice, free education and free health services being offered by the 
government to its people. Some of the consequences of the welfare 
schemes were a fast growing population with (for a LDC) long life 
expectancy, a high population density, a high literacy rate and high 
and rising unemployment. Some international comparisons of pertinent 
statistics are provided in Appendix 1.1. 
The country has a multiracial and multi-religious society, with 
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the majority community, the Sinhalese (71% of the population) both 
holding political power and dominating the administration. Two 
sizeable minority groups, Tamils (20%) and Moors (7%) who keep their 
separate identities, play an important role in business, particularly 
in the wholesale and retail trades. As in most multiracial societies 
there is an uneasy co-existence between the different ethnic groups. 
The tensions between the Sinhalese and the Tamils have erupted into 
major outbreaks of communal violence twice in the past twenty five years. 
Permeating the social relationships of the two major ethnic groups are 
also caste differences, with political power being concentrated in the 
hands of the majority caste of the majority community. 
The Government 
Sri Lanka gained independence after 150 years of British colonial 
rule in 1948. Prior to the coming of the British, parts of the country 
had been colonised in turn by the Portugese and the Dutch. The influence 
of these western colonisers is still seen in the country - in the form of 
the small and dwindling (through emigration) population of 'Burgher' 
descendents of the Portuguese and the Dutch, the presence of British 
business interests, and the political and administrative systems and 
commercial practices inherited from Britain. 
Since independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has been a lively democracy 
with a high degree of political awareness among its people, and two 
major political parties - the United National Party (UNP) and the Sri 
Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) - alternating in government. The country has 
* 87% of the electorate voted at the last general election. 
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had seven general elections since independence and there have been 
changes of government at all but one of them. 
The only major threats to law and order have come from the out- 
breaks of communal violence in 1958 and in 1977, and the insurrection 
of 1971 in which the participants were mainly Unemployed youth of 
minority caste groups. Academic observers believe that all these 
upheavals had economic grievances as part of their root causes. 
(124)(137) 
Though, prima facie, Sri Lanka is a model of a successful parlia- 
mentary democracy, the very success of the system as seen in regular 
changes of government, the above-mentioned outbreaks of violence, the 
presence of highly vocal groups of left-wing political activists and 
increasing interference by the government in private sector economic 
activity, have contributed to perceptions of political uncertainty among 
businessmen and have consequently proved to be a barrier to private 
investment and a deterrent to the inflow of private foreign capital into 
the country. 
(98) 
The twin main objectives of all governments since independence have 
been economic development and the achievement of a more equal distribution 
of income and wealth in the country. 
(211) In formulating a policy for 
the achievement of their objectives these governments have been faced 
with two main problems, that of balance of payment deficits which plagues 
most developing nations and that of a high level of unemployment. 
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The Economy 
As a typical third world country, Sri Lanka has the main attributes 
which characterise an LDC; viz. a low per-capita national income (see 
Appendix 1.1) and a large proportion of its population (51%) engaged in 
agricultural activity. Despite continuing government effort, economic 
growth has not been notably high, mainly due to the ever-worsening 
international terms of trade. 
The economy is tripartite - with a plantation sector, ýa rural sector 
and an urban sector. The plantations produce the crops of tea, rubber 
and coconut, which provide the main source of foreign exchange earnings 
for the country. The rural sector in which peasant farmers produce some 
of the country's food requirements suffers from low productivity, with 
the consequence that many essential food items have to be imported from 
neighbouring countries. There are some, mainly craft-type, manufacturing 
industries in the rural sector, but the bulk of the manufacturing and 
commercial activity takes place in the urban sector. 
Since the mid-fifties stagnant prices of the main export crops 
coupled with increasing world prices of imported food, capital goods, 
industrial raw materials and petroleum products have resulted in continuing 
balance of payment problems. These in turn have led to the imposition of 
import controls and exchange controls of increasing severity over the years. 
There has also been in evidence an increasing government role in 
economic activity, with activities hitherto in private hands being taken 
over by the public sector. Business nationalisation which began in the 
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late fifties with the acquisition of private passenger transport firms, 
has continued during the tenure of successive SLFP governments. Petroleum 
distribution, insurance, manning of services at the sea ports, the bulk 
of the import trade - have all been acquired by government agencies over 
the years. Finally, with the enactment of the Land Reform Law 
(209) 
the 
ownership of all large plantations also passed into the hands of the State. 
It has been estimated that at the end of the seventies the government 
controlled 60% of the country's industrial output and 70% of its trade. 
(169) 
The existence, in the statute law, of a Business Acquisition Act 
(202) 
giving wide powers of nationalisation to the government is widely believed 
to have been a major disincentive for investment. 
(119) 
Alongside the widespread government controls and despite the 
nationalisations government has offered many incentives for new investment 
and increased economic activity in selected spheres of business. In the 
late fifties and the early sixties, most the incentives offered were for 
import substituting industries. The emphasis shifted in the late sixties 
to agriculture and tourism and again in the seventies to the promotion of 
non-traditional exports. Apart from tax concessions, many other forms of 
incentives and assistance were offered by the government for encouragement 
of these preferred activities. The main non-tax incentives have been the 
following: 
a. Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificates CFEECs] -a 
dual rate currency exchange system introduced in May 1968, 
whereby a premium on the official exchange rate was payable 
to certain exporters, 
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b. Convertible Rupee Accounts [CRAs] - whereby unrestricted usage 
of a percentage of foreign exchange earnings was 
allowed to exporters of non-traditional products; 
and 
c. Cash Subsidies - given mainly to agriculture, for 
replanting plantations, mechanising tea production, 
purchase of fertilizers, etc. 
Another facet of the economy which must be noted is the importance 
of foreign aid to the country which has since the late fifties come to 
rely very much on assistance from the World Bank and other UN agencies 
as well as from Western aid-giving nations. 
The Private Sector 
There are several distinct types of business organisations operating 
in Sri Lanka. Firstly, there are the subsidiaries and associates of MNCs 
which are mainly British-owned though there are also several American 
firms operating in the country. Most of these companies have been 
operating in Sri Lanka since before independence though many of them 
have set up manufacturing establishments only in more recent times, under 
the programme of import substitution. A feature of multinational operations 
in Sri Lanka is that though the subsidiaries in the country are large firms 
by Sri Lankan standards, they form an insignificant part of the total 
operations of the MNCs concerned. 
"... Ceylon Tobacco, although the largest company active 
in Ceylon, accounted for scarcely more than 2% of the 
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parent firm's global turnover in 1967; Lever, a giant 
amongst Ceylon companies, accounted for less than 0.5% 
of the total sales of Unilever (U. K. ) in 1965; in Glaxo, 
the ratio was less than 1% and so on. 
(65) 
The other type of foreign investors operating in the country, the 
individual businessmen, have been leaving the country since independence 
mainly due to government restrictions on their business activities or 
non-renewal of residence permits. 
The government of Sri Lanka has always in principle welcomed foreign 
private investment to the country particularly in manufacturing industry, 
(210) 
though from time to time they have imposed restrictions on outward 
remittances on the existing investments in order to check the continuing 
deficits on the Balance of Payments and also sought to control the 
employment of foreign personnel in the country. An examination of the 
balance of payments figures from 1957 to 1974 
(203) 
shows however that in 
this period the outflow of private funds on transfer payments and capital 
account each year have exceeded the inflows. 
Among the large and medium-sized local businesses, there are the 
professionally managed corporate organisations and owner-managed family 
businesses. Though a clear dividing line cannot be drawn between these 
two types of organisation, at one extreme of the range are the publicly 
quoted limited liability companies managed by indigenous professional 
managers. At the other end of the range of local business are the 
individual entrepreneurs - mostly men of little or no education, known 
as 'Mudalalis', who have started from small beginnings and built up highly 
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successful businesses and who are in full day to day control of their 
respective firms. Among the in-between types of organisation are many 
second or third generation family businesses, often founded by mudalalis, 
but now owned by divided family interests and to the concerned observer 
often seemingly lacking in the vitality evident in the days of their 
founders. 
There is a network of commercial banks and one development bank 
serving the financial needs of the Sri Lankan business community. However, 
the security market in Colombo (operated by the Colombo Brokers' 
Assocation) which has never been large or very active, has in the seventies, 
particularly since the nationalisation of the plantations, been in a more 
or less stagnant state. 
The picture of the Sri Lankan business scene will not be complete 
without a reference to the massive blackmarket which exists side-by-side 
with the official economy. In this blackmarket can be bought goods other- 
wise unavailable because of import controls or goods in short-supply or 
those subject to price control in the official economy. This 'cash- 
economy' also extends to illegal trades such as bookmaking, and dealing 
in foreign currency by persons other than authorised banks, as well as to 
premia on otherwise lawful transactions which are undervalued in the 
official declarations. 
Changes since 1977 
After the end of our study period, sweeping changes have been 
introduced in a number of areas of government control, by the UNP 
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government which came into power in July 1977. Import controls have been 
removed; exchange controls have been greatly relaxed; a part of the 
country has been designated a 'Free Trade Zone' offering a tax haven to 
foreign business. These and many other changes are reported to have had 
widely felt repercussions on the economy, 
(223) 
and could mean that some 
of the problems and constraints on business observed in our research no 
longer apply in this country. 
The Tax Structure 
Taxation is not a new concept in Sri Lanka: even under the ancient 
Sinhala kings there were production taxes and estate duty. 
(43) A 
scheme of 'Rajakariya', or service tenure in lieu of taxes, was also 
operated. 
(36) 
The western colonisers, while retaining most of these taxes added 
more of their own devising. 
(36) The Dutch introduced customs and excise 
duties and the British in their early days experimented with a host of 
taxes - such as the land tax and the 'joy tax' (on jewellery). Later, 
in 1932, during the depression, the income tax was introduced, to make 
up for a fall in revenue from customs duties. 
(36) The rates of income 
tax in the thirties were however low: resident individuals paid between 
5 and 18%; resident companies were charged 15% and non-resident companies 
18%. (207) 
The present system of direct taxation, including individual and 
corporate income taxes, a wealth tax, capital gains tax and a combined 
scheme of gift tax and estate duty was introduced on the recommendation 
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of Nicholas Kaldor, 
(105) in 1957. Since then, however, there have 
been many changes in the bases and rates of both direct and indirect 
taxation. It has been reported 
(180) that between 1953 and 1968, twenty 
one new taxes were imposed, of which only six remained at the end of 
1968. 
The tax with the highest revenue potential, to be introduced since 
1957, is the Business Turnover Tax (BTT), a multistage cascading tax, 
first charged in 1964, at rates of ý% and 1% of turnover but standing 
(206) Another tax of far- in 1977 at rates ranging between 1% and 48%. 
reaching social consequences was the 'Capital Levy' introduced in. 1970, 
(204) 
whereby individuals liable to wealth tax were required to pay between 3% 
and 25% of their wealth as a once and for all lump-sum tax. 
Another source of government revenue, which is in the nature of a 
pseudo-tax is the Sale of Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificates 
(FEECs). This is a scheme whereby importers have to 'surrender' FEECs 
to the government for the right to import non-exempt goods which in fact 
meansthat they pay a premium on the official rates of exchange for such 
imports. This requirement to surrender FEECs is combined with one for 
the issue of FEECs to exporters of specified goods which give the 
exporters more rupees for their exports than their entitlement at the 
official rates of exchange. In effect, the FEEC scheme is a dual exchange 
rate system covering most imports and all exports excluding the major 
'traditional' exports of tea, rubber and coconut. 
During the study period, the maximum rate of individual income tax 
has varied between 50% and 80% and the standard rate of corporation income 
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tax between 50% and 60%. 
(208) Corporate dividends are liable to a 
333% withholding tax. Dividends are charged to income tax in the hands 
of the shareholder (unless the shareholder is a resident company) who 
is entitled to a tax credit on the 33ý% withholding tax. Capital gains 
arising after 1st April 1956 are taxable on realisation, but at a 
concessionary rate. Dividends received by one resident company from 
another are not subject to corporation income tax in the hands of the 
recipient company. Other taxes charged in this period have included an 
expenditure tax imposed twice and removedboth times within a couple of 
years, a bank debit tax also twice imposed and removed, a land tax, a 
share capital tax, and various surcharges on income tax. 
The main group of taxes charged over the period and their contribution 
to government revenue can be seen in Appendix 1.2. 
It can be seen in Appendix 1.3 that total government revenue as a 
percentage of GNP has averaged at about 20% in the years 1968-1977. This 
is somewhat higher than the average for developing countries calculated 
by Prest (148, p. 13) but well below his average for developed countries. 
The proportion of tax revenue in total government revenue has 
remained at a fairly steady level at around 80% throughout the above 
period (see Appendix 1.3). The proportion of revenue contributed by the 
major classes of taxes have also remained more or less the same over the 
period. Production and expenditure based taxes provide the majority of 
tax revenue, but within this category, a change in tax emphasis can be 
observed, whereby Business Turnover Taxes and FEECs make an increasing 
contribution as against relative decreases in the revenue from customs 
duties. 
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Within the category of income based taxes, separate figures for 
corporate and noncorporate income taxes are available only for three 
years (Appendix 1.2). In each of these years, corporate taxes have 
provided more than twice the revenue received from non-corporate income 
taxes. Comparative figures for the U. K. (186) show that non-corporate 
income taxes in this country produce three to four times the revenue 
received from corporate sources. This difference illustrates the 
comparatively low taxable capacity of Sri Lankan individuals and the 
consequently greater reliance placed on corporate income taxes. 
Three main types of incentives have been offered through the tax 
system in this period: viz. accelerated depreciation allowances to all 
business activities and selective tax holidays and investment reliefs to 
both individuals and limited companies. The Sri Lankan government has 
also entered into treaties for the relief of 'double taxation with a 
number of other governments. Unfortunately no statistics are available 
as to the revenue implications of these measures. 
All direct taxes are administered by the Department of Inland Revenue 
functioning under the Ministry of Finance. The Minister of Finance who 
is responsible for fiscal policy of the government usually announces 
intended changes in revenue laws as part of his annual budget speech and 
these are enacted subsequently. In terms of costs of collection, the 
administration of the Inland Revenue Department is fairly efficient. 
The costs of collection have dropped from 1.67% in 1965 to 1.02% in 
1976. (205) Comparative figures for the U. K. show an increase from 
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1.39% in 1969-70 to 2% in 1978-79. (186) 
Statistics of income tax payers and assessments published by the 
Inland Revenue Department however disclose (a) a dwindling taxpayer 
population, (b) mounting tax arrears and (c) a large number of 
disputes between the Department and taxpayers. 
Appendix 1.4 lists the number of assessments issued annually 
(excluding additional assessments) over the study period on the four 
main classes of income tax payer. Not every tax payer receives an 
assessment once every twelve months, as administrative delays can result 
in irregular issues of assessment. Nevertheless the figures in Appendix 
1.4 give some indication of the number of persons liable to pay income 
tax in each category during the study period. It can be observed that 
compared with 1957/58, the number of tax payers was lower in 1977/78 for 
every one of the categories; the steepest fall being witnessed among 
the non-resident companies. The index of income assessed given in Appendix 
1.5 provides further supportive evidence of a decrease in both numbers of 
and income of non-resident tax payers. 
Appendix 1.6 shows a high level of tax arrears continuing throughout 
the study period. Compared to a ratio of taxes in arrears to taxes 
collected of around 55% in Sri Lanka both at the beginning and the end 
of the study period, U. K. revenue statistics disclose a ratio of around 
11% in each of the years 1976-1978. 
(187) It is not possible to ascertain 
from available information the possible reasons for or the consequences 
of such a high level of tax arrears. However it can be seen in Appendix 
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1.7 that a significant proportion of assessments appear to be contested 
by tax payers and that the average appeal seems to take over a year to 
be settled. It is not unreasonable to assume that a concomitant of 
such a high level of tax arrears and appeals against assessments must 
be a dissatisfied tax-payer population, though which is the cause and 
which the effect is not obvious. 
The major problem faced by the tax authorities however is not so 
much the collection of arrears as discovery of evasion. It is generally 
agreed that tax evasion in the country is very high. 
(162) Tax evasion 
coupled with an extensive blackmarket and a well organised network of 
smuggling and unofficial dealings in foreign currency have resulted not 
only in much loss of revenue to the State but also in the undermining of 
control exercised by the government on the economy. 
Several tax amnesties have been offered by successive governments 
since 1964, details of which are given in Appendix 1.8. From the 
statistics available for one of the amnesties (Appendix 1.8) it can be 
seen that evasion appears to take place in almost all areas of economic 
activity and that much of the tax-evaded earnings were held in the form 
of cash or undeclared and undervalued stocks. In a different sort of 
attempt to bring to the open some of the cash hoardings, the government 
demonetised currency notes of high value in 1970. Despite these efforts 
the practice of tax evasion still continues unabated. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Survey of Sri Lanka Business Firms - 
Organisational Characteristics, Growth and Taxation. 
A survey of business firms in Sri Lanka was carried out during 1976/77 
by means of a postal questionnaire followed by personal Interviews with 
some of the respondents to the questionnaire. 
For the postal questionnaire, a sample of 300 business organisations 
was selected from directories of trade. The sample comprised 
a) quoted public companies listed in the Rupee Companies Handbook 
(34) 
and 
b) a sample of other business firms listed in the Ferguson's Ceylon 
Directory. (5) 
An effort was made to omit from the sample, any firm the management 
of which was known to be represented by another firm already in the sample. 
Given the composition of the SL business community, where the big business 
establishments are controlled by a fairly small group of persons with some 
individuals holding control in several companies, it was considered that 
to address several copies of the same questionnaire to any one individual 
would be both unproductive and likely to cause annoyance. The selective 
approach adopted reduced the probability of any one individual receiving 
more than one questionnaire in his capacity as chief executive of different 
firms but in consequence, the sample is not a random sample. Details of 
the response rate are as follows: 
Questionnaires despatched (excluding 
those returned undelivered) 300 
Responses received 74 
Responses/questionnaires despatched 25% 
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Postal surveys of opinion by private researchers are virtually 
unknown in SL. Businessmen do occasionally receive questionnaires from 
government agencies, but responses are generally low even on these. For 
instance, a postal questionnaire sent out in 1974 by the Ministry of 
Industries and Scientific Affairs to registered industrial establishments 
received a response rate of 49% despite penal action being threatened 
against those who did not reply. 
(196, p. 80) Given the unfamiliarity of 
these people with questionnaire-based research as well as the sensitive 
nature of the subject matter, a response rate of 25% is considered to be 
a satisfactory achievement. 
The postal questionnaire was designed to obtain information on 
a) Organisational characteristics - of age, size, management 
and legal form, 
b) Organisation objectives, 
c) Perceptions of business on environmental constraints 
including taxation and incentives offered by the State, 
d) Rates of growth and gearing levels and 
e) Perceptions of business men on the impact of taxation on growth, 
financing and dividend policies of business firms. 
Thirty of the firms responding to the questionnaire (ie. 40% of the 
respondents) were interviewed subsequently with a view to obtaining 
a) clarification of views expressed in response to the 
questionnaire, 
b) further information on how taxation considerations enter into 
the firms' decision processes, and 
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c) insights into the opinion of business management on the 
workings of the tax system and taxpayer response in general. 
A copy of the postal questionnaire is given in appendix 2. This 
questionnaire was drafted after consideration of theoretical expectations 
in the literature as well as the views of a small sample of informed 
persons in SL obtained at preliminary interviews. 
It is however recognised that there are many methodological limitations 
to this type of survey research. Criticism of survey research is made(156) 
(170, p. 33) mainly on the grounds that 
a) information generated would be subjective and probably biased 
by personal attitudes and role idiosyncrasies of the individual 
respondents, 
b) interviewee bias may be reflected in responses to personal 
interviews, 
c) people do not always speak frankly about their goals, 
particularly business goals, and that one is more likely 
to get answers about mores than about motives, and 
d) the ways in which and the degree to which goals, perceptions 
and attitudes. interact with one another and with the environment 
are di ffi cul t to measure. 
An attempt was made however to minimise the shortcomings of survey 
research referred to above. Firstly, all questionnaires were addressed 
to the chief executives of firms, so as to reduce the possible effects of 
role priorities coming through in the responses. However, as far as can 
be ascertained, the responses of a number of firms have come from the head 
* Preliminary interviews were conducted with three managers of large 
business firms in SL, two professional accountants and the Chairman 
of the second Taxation Commission. 
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of the finance or accounting function, and it must be acknowledged that 
if professional backgrounds and role idiosyncrasies of respondents can 
bias results, then such a bias may be reflected in our findings. 
Secondly, all respondents were assured of complete confidentiality 
in the handling of replies. It is reasonable to expect that such an 
assurance of confidentiality offered by an overseas research establishment 
would have encouraged a greater degree of frankness from the respondents 
than they would normally show in their more public utterances. Finally, 
as far as possible, the conclusions drawn from the results of this survey 
will be compared with and verified against other results obtained elsewhere 
in the study. 
Two particular areas of limitation that remain must however be 
acknowledged. Firstly, fcr most questions in the postal questionnaire, 
several likely answers were suggested and the findings may be criticised 
on the grounds that our suggestions may have biased the response. But in 
all such cases, respondents were encouraged to add items of their own if 
our suggestions did not exactly fit their preferences. Secondly, our sample 
of firms is fairly small and in some cases the number of observations is 
inadequate to permit significant results on non-parametric statistical 
tests. As regards significance on statistical tests, it is customary in 
the social sciences to regard as significant results at a level of confidence 
of 0.05 or better, 
(20, p. 125) though the validity of this rule has been 
questioned in recent writings. 
(123) In what follows, the convention has 
been adopted of reporting confidence levels of 0.25 or better, and treating 
as supportive of firm conclusions only levels of confidence of 0.05 or 
better. 
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This chapter analyses the survey responses to identify significant 
patterns in the relationships between (a) firm characteristics, (b) 
perceptions regarding tax and other environmental influences and (c) 
growth. 
Firm Characteristics 
Information obtained in regard to the main activities of the 
respondents, the age of the firms, form of organisation, type of management 
and size of firm measured in terms of the value of total assets are 
summarised in Appendices 3.1-3.5. 
Organisational objectives 
The respondents were asked to state their main objectives (up to 
three) and to indicate the most important from amongst these. The 
responses are summarised in Table 3A, ranked according to choice of the 
most important objective. 
Maintaining a going concern was the most popular objective followed 
closely by maximisation of profits. Maximising employee welfare and market 
share figured as the most important subsidiary objectives. Those objectives 
originally listed in the questionnaire ranked at the top and not many 
respondents added new items to the list. It is not obvious whether this 
is because the objectives in the original list exactly matched the main 
objectives of the responding firms or on the other hand whether the respond- 
ents picked those items from the list that most closely reflect their own 
rather vague and unarticulated organisational goals. Subsequent dis- 
cussions with respondent interviewees, however, point to the latter 
explanation. 
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Table 3A 
Objectives (of Business Organisations) 
Listed in questionnaire 
Number of The Most Important 
References Objective 
Maintaining a going concern 53 " 30 
Maximising profits 51 25 
" market share 24 6 
" owners' wealth 16 3 
value added 9 2 
" employee welfare 26 1 
Added by respondents 
Consumer satisfaction 32 
Growth 31 
Provision of openings in 
business for dependents 11 
Maximising employment 11 
Diversification 2 
Improving product quality 2 
Import substitution 1 
Service to the country 1 
Keeping name in public eye 1 
Remitting dividends 1 
Not stated 2 
74 
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A comparison of our results with the results obtained in two American 
studies of business management objectives discloses several differences in 
(57) 
attitudes. In the first US study by England, 1072 managers were asked 
to indicate organisational goals of high importance against a list of seven 
(42) items put before them by the researcher. In the other, by Dent, chief 
executives or deputy chiefs of 145 business establishments were asked to 
describe their goals and their statements were later classified by content 
analysis. The rankings of organisational objectives in these two studies 
are reproduced in Appendix 4. 
It was seen that maintenance of a going concern is the most popular 
choice of objective among SL business managers, both in their list of three 
objectives and in their choice of the most important objective from amongst 
these. In the Dent study, however, the objective most nearly equivalent 
to the maintenance of a going concern, (viz., to operate or develop the 
organisation) ranked half way down the list, preceded by profit-, product- 
and growth-related objectives. In the study by England, 'organisational 
stability' ranked a joint sixth in a list of eight. 
The prominence given to a maintenance objective in SL in contrast to 
maximising or growth objectives in the USA may be explained as being due 
to a difference in culture and traditional value systems. The relatively 
low interest among SL business in achieving high growth or making more 
profit may, following the work of Mc Clelland( 
121), be viewed as reflecting 
the lower 'need for achievement' observed in the traditional societies of 
less developed countries. 
On the other hand it is possible that this difference stems from the 
greater hostility or instability of the environment in which SL business 
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operates. Organisation theory recognises that when survival of the 
organisation or the bureaucracy becomes threatened, 
"there is a tendency to concentrate on survival 
and maintenance in preference to policy making with 
respect to the substantive goals of the organisation". 
(107) 
At this stage of the analysis it is possible to do no more than 
identify such differences in objectives and possible causal factors; 
but the issue will be re-examined at a later stage. 
One marked similarity is however observed between the results of the 
SL study and that of Dent. Employee welfare is a high ranking item in the 
lists of three main objectives in both studies, but drops dramatically to 
a low ranking when only the most important objective is considered. 
Relationships between organisational characteristics 
The organisational characteristics summarised in appendices 3.1 to 
3.5 when crosstabulated with one another and with organisational objectives 
revealed several interesting relationships, though some of these are only 
to be expected. The main relationships will be listed below and discussed 
in brief here as they have implications for the analyses to follow later 
in this chapter and elsewhere. 
Observation Workings Level of(58) 
in significance 
Appendix 
of X2 
Comment 
1. There has been less interest 
from or opportunity for MNCs 
in new investment in SL 
after independence compared 
with colonial times. 
3.6 0.025 Firm conclusion 
Observation 
2. Older firms are more 
likely to be diversi- 
fied than the newer. 
3. Public companies show 
more interest in 
maintaining a going 
concern while private 
firms prefer task- 
related maximising 
objectives. 
4. Owner-managers tend to 
choose task-related 
objectives while pro- 
fessional managers 
favour maintaining 
a going concern 
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Workings 
in 
Appendix 
3.7 
3.8 
3.9 
5. Business firms tend, with 3.11 
age, to move from owner- 
management to professional 
management. 
6. Professionally managed 3.12 
companies are more likely 
to be public companies 
whereas owner-managed 
companies tend to be 
private. 
Level of 
significance 
of X2 
0.25 
0.05 
0.025 
0.005 
0.005 
Comment 
Tentative conclusion 
Firm conclusion 
Firm conclusion 
Firm conclusion 
Firm conclusion 
Of the seventy four firms replying to the questionnaire, it has 
been possible to identify ten as being either subsidiaries or associates 
of western multinational companies. These companies were either controlled 
by their foreign parents or were dependent upon their overseas associates 
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for their technology. The age of these firms suggests that there has 
been relatively little new interest shown by multinationals in SL after 
it gained independence in 1948. 
About a quarter of the respondent firms are in mixed activities and 
this tendency to diversify increases with the age of the firm, though the 
differences are not statistically significant. Considering that no SL 
firm is a 'giant' by international standards, the high tendency to 
diversify is particularly significant. It suggests that diversification 
has been a dominant response by established, and therefore older, 
businesses to state controls on traditional business activities (especially 
those connected with the import trade and the plantations). Very few, if 
any, of the older firms diversified out of their traditional activities 
in the fifties when import controls were non-existent and selective 
incentives for new activities were negligible. In the sixties, controls 
on traditional business activities were applied with increasing severity 
and a greater variety of incentives were available for new pioneer 
activities. But it was only in the seventies when state controls took 
the form of threats to the very existence of established business that 
these firms hastened to diversify. This reaction to environmental con- 
straints however seems to have been triggered largely among local firms: 
of the ten firms identified as being under multinational control, only one 
had made any serious attempt to diversify. 
As regards objectives, public companies are more interested in 
maintaining a going concern than in maximising profits or similar task- 
related objective, whereas the majority of private companies set themselves 
the latter type of objective. Considering only the two most popular 
objectives, more professional managers prefer maintenance of a going concern 
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to maximisation of profits while the opposite is true of owner-managers 
(Appendix 3.9). This difference between management types is further 
heightened if other task-related maximising objectives allied to profit 
maximisation (ie., maximisation of owners' wealth, growth, market share 
and value added) are included along with profit maximisation and the total 
is compared against maintenance of a going concern (Appendix 3.9). A very 
clear relationship then emerges between management type änd choice of main 
objective: owner-managers chose to maximise profits or similar task- 
related goals whereas professional managers preferred maintenance goals. 
The majority of owner-managed private companies chose profit maximisation 
as their main objective, while professionally managed public companies 
voted overwhelmingly for maintaining a going concern. The preferences 
of owner-managed public companies and professionally managed private 
companies lay between these extremes (Appendix 3.10). 
These results lead us to ask two questions. Firstly, what causes the 
differences in choice of objective between the two classes of management, 
and secondly, could the divergent objectives in turn lead to differences 
in achievement and possibly even attitudes toward external environmental 
influences? 
In answer to the first question, several possible causal factors, 
though by no means an exhaustive list, may be examined. 
1. In the earlier comparison of US and SL business objectives 
it was suggested that the greater hostility and instability 
of the environment may have something to do with SL business 
being so concerned with a maintenance objective. If the two 
types of management in SL faced different environmental 
constraints the same argument could be applied to explain 
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differences between types of management. But there is no 
evidence to suggest that this is true except perhaps to the 
extent that professionally managed companies are largely 
public companies, and may have a greater degree of public 
attention focused on them. It may be argued that under 
these circumstances, public companies would tend to pick 
more socially acceptable goals and a maintenance objective 
would be preferred to a profit maximising objective. But 
it can be seen (Appendix 3.10) that even among public companies, 
professional managers are more concerned with maintenance 
objectives than are owner managers. 
2. In the US-SL comparison it was also suggested that differences 
in culture could be a possible causal factor. Can differences 
in cultural background be an explanatory factor here? It is 
true that most SL businessmen would be nationals of the country 
but as discussed in the previous chapter, some owner managers 
(the mudalalis) come from a different social class from the 
average professional manager and hence the influence of cultural 
or class differences cannot be ruled out altogether. 
3. It may also be argued that what we see is an effect of management's 
role within the organisation reflected in their perceptions of 
organisational objectives. Professional managers may see their 
role and, by extension, the objectives of the organisation they 
control as one of stewardship or maintenance. Moreover, their 
choice of organisational objective may be influenced by their own 
personal interests which are likely to be closer to maintenance 
of the organisation as a going concern (consequently facilitating 
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the maintenance of their power and status in the organisation, 
rather than to maximisation of profits or shareholder benefits. 
4. Finally, differences in decision processes between the two types 
of organisation may contribute to a difference in objectives. 
In the one case we may witness the entrepreneurial objectives 
of an owner-manager while in the other type of organisation, 
decision making by consensus among a number of managers or 
interest groups may lead to the selection of a maintenance 
objective as a 'lowest common denominator' acceptable to all 
participants in the decision process. 
The question as to whether differences in objectives affect business 
achievement and management perceptions of environmental influences is 
considered in the following sections. 
Constraints on the achievement of business objectives 
This section analyses perceptions of the respondent firms in relation 
to the influence of environmental constraints, including taxation, on the 
achievement of business objectives. The main constraints on business 
activity perceived by SL business managers, as can be seen below, stem 
from various actions of government. Market related factors are relatively 
less burdensome. 
Taxation as a problem 
"Would it be correct to say that taxation is or has been a problem 
making it difficult for your firm to achieve its objectives? ": this 
question was answered in the affirmative by 54% of the respondents. Those 
who said that tax was a problem were also requested to indicate the magni- 
tude of the problem. The results are summarised in Table 3B. 
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Table 3B. 
Taxation as a constraint on the achievement of Business Objectives. 
Taxation is No. of responses 
A major problem area 18 
A fairly important problem area 22 
A minor problem area 0 
40 
Not a problem 34 
74 
In relation to surveys of opinion on taxation, it has been suggested 
(15, p. 137) that taxpayers tend to exaggerate the problems and burden of 
taxation. If this were true of the current results, then it is possible 
that the real perceptions of the burden of taxation are even less than 
the above table suggests. 
Whether or not taxation is believed by a business organisation to 
be a constraint on the achievement of its objectives can be said to be 
dependent upon a number of factors. The more important determinants can 
be identified as the following: 
1. The harshness of the tax regime. 
2. Other environmental constraints prevailing at the same time: 
' the existence of greater problems in other areas could reduce 
the impact of tax constraints as perceived by managers. 
3. The objectives of the organisation. 
4. Organisational characteristics such as size or type of activity 
engaged in where the revenue laws incorporate discriminatory tax 
burdens and/or selective incentives and reliefs. 
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The harshness of a tax regime is a concept that is difficult to 
define. Economists have attempted(14) to measure relative harshness of 
tax systems of different countries using selected characteristics of tax 
structures, but an all-inclusive measure of tax structure harshness is 
yet to be devised. For our purposes however, it is reasonable to assume 
that all businesses in SL face the same general tax environment and attempt 
to verify the influence of other factors on business perceptions regarding 
the constraining influence of taxation. 
Other constraints on business 
A question similar to that on taxation was addressed to the respondents 
in regard to other likely problem areas. The 'problem areas' said to cause 
significant difficulty are ranked in Table 3C according to the number of 
firms finding any item to be a problem. The response to the question on 
taxation is fitted into the table at the appropriate level. 
Taxation figures prominently in this ranking, being second only to 
import controls as a constraint affecting respondent firms. This observation 
is, however, subject to one qualification. The respondents knew that the 
whole questionnaire was intended to elicit information on the effects of 
taxation on business. Also the question regarding taxation was asked 
separately while the other constraints were listed under one multiple 
question worded somewhat differently. The stated purpose and layout of 
the questionnaire could have created a halo effect around the question of 
taxation with a consequent bias to the answers relating to its harshness. 
If this was the case, bias affecting one would render the responses 
to the two questions not directly comparable. The possible direction of 
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Table 3C. 
Constraints on the achievement of Business Objectives 
Problem Number of firms % age 
facing problem of total 
Listed in questionnaire 
Import controls 57 77 
Taxation 40 54 
Shortage of finance 35 47 
Price control 30 41 
Market limitations 20 27 
Shortage of technical 
and professional skills 14 19 
Labour relations 13 18 
Problems added by respondents 
Supply problems - material and spares 7 9 
Government intervention 3 4 
Threat of nationalisation 2 3 
Incompetant bureaucracy 1 1 
Corruption 1 1 
Climatic conditions 1 1 
bias, if any, is not known and there is no evidence in the responses 
pointing to the presence of or direction of any such influence. However, 
if we accept the notion referred to above that people usually exaggerate 
the importance of tax as a constraint on economic activity, then taxation 
may in fact drop lower down in the ranking. 
What is clear from these responses, however, is that most businessmen 
in SL consider government intervention of one sort or another to be the 
major obstacle to the achievement of their objectives: market considerations 
are less important. 
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Import controls were first introduced in 1959 and, except for a 
brief spell in the late sixties, were gradually tightened. They rank 
as the single biggest problem, with 77% of the respondents considering 
these to cause them significant difficulty. The single largest item 
added by respondents to the list of problems in the questionnaire 
relates to shortages of material which are often the result of import 
control regulations. Of the seven respondents listing raw material 
problems, four were interviewed subsequently: the raw material problems 
of three of these were said to be due directly or indirectly to import 
controls. 
Ironically, it was import controls in the early period that had 
provided the initial impetus for most manufacturing industries in our 
sample. Under a policy of import substitution adopted by the government 
in the late fifties, protection through import controls was afforded to 
new industrial ventures in two ways: firstly, by the complete banning of 
imported substitutes and secondly, by the liberal issue of import licences 
to the new industries for the importation of machinery and raw materials. 
However, when subsequently faced with continuing balance of payments 
problems, the government sought to cut down even further on imports and 
this led to a gradual reduction in quotas for imported raw materials and 
spare parts available to the newly setup manufacturing industries. It is 
this gradual reduction in quotas that seems to have been the aspect of 
import controls which has made it the major constraint perceived by SL 
business. 
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Analysis of perceptions regarding taxation 
At the interview stage of the survey respondents were asked to 
explain their reasons for their views on taxation as a constraint, and 
the main reason or reasons cited are summarised in Table 3D. 
Table 3D. 
Explanatory Factors for Perceptions on Taxation 
No. of firms 
A. Taxation being a problem 
Burden high on 
Business Turnover Tax and Excise 8 
Income tax 3 
All taxes 3 
Impact of tax on cash flows 
Liquidity problems 2 
Reduction in funds for reinvestment 2 
Reduced debt service capacity 1 
Other 
Inadequate incentives 1 
Compliance costs 1 
B. Taxation not being a problem 
Availability of investment incentives 3 
The presence of other, greater problems 2 
Accumulated tax losses 1 
Unavoidability of tax payments 1 
The practice of tax planning 1 
Lack of interest of top management 1 
Double tax credit in home country 1 
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The main reasons cited are extremely varied and do not lend them- 
selves to easy classification. Nevertheless, it can be seen from the 
above list that Business Turnover tax (BTT) was the most commonly 
mentioned problem area in taxation. As against 8 interviewees referring 
to BTT as the main problem, only 3 firms mentioned direct income taxes. 
A number of firms said that the higher prices necessitated by increases 
in BTT rates had depressed demand for their products. One manager added 
that reduced demand had in their case led to further price increases to 
cover capacity costs. 
Discussion revealed two main underlying causes for the perception of 
BTT as the major constraint. The first was its variability. BTT (which 
is a cascade tax) was introduced in the early sixties, and had increased 
sharply in only a few years to relatively high rates. 
(138) The top rate 
of BTT, which at its introduction was 3%, had risen to 48% at the time of 
the interviews. It can be observed from Appendix 2.2, that in the 10 years 
to 1976, revenue from BTT had risen 18 fold whereas in the same period 
revenue from income taxes had increased only just over 3 fold. In fact in 
1976, the revenue from BTT exceeded the revenue from corporate income taxes. 
The second reason for a higher level of discontent in regard to BTT was 
that some firms felt they were able to influence their income tax payments 
by means of appropriate tax planning whereas the burden of BTT could not 
be influenced by the firms at all. 
What is perceived as a high tax level appears to be determined with 
reference to past tax levels experienced by the firm, though the comparisons 
were often vague and unquantified. In their assessment of SL taxes, inter- 
national tax levels appear to be of no concern to most interviewees; only 
two interviewees (both multinationals) made any reference to tax levels in 
other countries in this context. 
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Liquidity problems caused by tax payments were mentioned by two of 
the interviewees. But answers to other questions pointed to liquidity 
effects being a fairly common problem for SL business. The cashflow 
difficulties relating to taxation apparently stem largely from 'lumpy' 
tax payments which were said to create recurring liquidity crises. It is 
however possible to view these liquidity problems as being caused not so 
much by tax payments (which are made in arrears) but by inadequate cash 
flow planning within the firms. 
A somewhat different perspective of the tax effects on liquid funds 
was offered by one interviewee who said that high taxes restricted debt 
servicing capacity of the business and hence its ability to borrow for new 
investments. This comment reveals an aspect of tax effects on capital 
structure to which little attention has been paid in the literature. 
Discussion of the relevance of taxation in the debt/equity decision 
focuses largely on the tax deductability of debt interest 
90250) 
and 
the resultant advantages to equity holders. It is recognised that bankruptcy 
costs(23) and agency costs 
(132) 
could counter tax advantages of debt; but 
the discussion revolves round the long term optimum capital structure. Even 
if a firm seeks to achieve a long term optimum capital structure, it is still 
necessary for it to be able to service its debt in the short term and to be 
able to meet interest and capital repayments at regular intervals in the 
short run, and liquidity problems (possibly aggravated by current tax pay- 
ments) can prevent a firm achieving an otherwise desirable level of gearing. 
In their comments it was possible to observe widely differing per- 
ceptions on the part of business managers of the same tax system facing 
all of them. For instance, two interviewees explained their reasons for 
considering tax to be a problem as stemming from the fact that taxation 
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reduced capital formation while two others who said that it was not a 
constraint were of the opinion that a system of direct taxation which 
offered many investment incentives was not a problem to a growing company. 
Other examples can be observed in Table 3D. 
We also have an indication that organisational perceptions of taxation 
and other aspects of the business environment may be influenced by organ- 
isational characteristics. The evidence came from a finance manager of a 
family firm where the chief executive and the majority of top management 
were members of an extended family, working only part-time for the company. 
The firm, now in its third and fourth generation of family ownership, was 
only of small financial interest to any of the top management. The inter- 
viewee felt that these members of the family "did not take any problem 
seriously" as their own personal stake in the firm was small relative to 
their other business and professional interests. 
Only one interviewee mentioned compliance costs as a major problem: 
in their case the difficulties were said to be concerned mainly with com- 
pleting annual tax returns. Significantly, this was also the only inter- 
viewee who admitted to tax evasion. The examples of his evading techniques 
given by him however appeared to be extremely short-sighted and may actually 
contribute to his compliance costs in subsequent years when it would be 
necessary to reconcile returns for these years with past declarations. 
On the whole, the analysis in this section suggests that: 
(a) indirect taxes are a greater problem to business than are 
direct taxes, 
(b) liquidity effects of taxation are an important consideration, 
and (c) perceptions regarding taxation may be influenced by characteristics 
of the firm. 
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Organisational characteristics and perceptions of Environmental Constraints 
The analysis which follows suggests that perceptions of business 
managers regarding environmental constraints may be influenced by organ- 
isational characteristics of the firms concerned. The main observations 
in this section are as follows: 
Workings 
Observation in Appendix Basis Comment 
1. The smallest firms are, 3.13 Index of Tentative 
in general, less sensitive sensitivity. conclusion. 
to environmental constraints 
than are the larger firms. 
2. Financial problems are a 3.13 Ranking. Extremely 
greater constraint for the and tentative 
smallest firms when compared 3.14 conclusion. 
with the larger firms: and 
for the newest firms when 
compared with the older firms. 
3. Financial problems trouble 3.15 X2 Sig- Firm 
owner-managers more than nificant conclusion. at 0.025 
they do professional level. 
managers. 
4. Profit-maximising firms are 3.16 X2 Sig- Tentative 
more sensitive to tax prob- nificant conclusion. at 0.25 
lems than those whose level. 
objective is to maintain 
a going concern. 
5. Among owner-managers, profit 3.17 X2 Sig- Tentative 
maximisers are more sensitive nificant conclusion. at 0.1 
to taxation than those who level. 
maintain a going concern. 
(No such difference is observable 
among professionally managed businesses. ) 
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Appendices 3.13-17 set out results of the crosstabulations of 
perceptions of environmental constrains against organisational character- 
istics. Rankings of the different environmental constraints based on the 
perceptions of each class of organisation are presented as well as an index 
of sensitivity 'I', on all constraints, where 
Total of all constraints affecting respondents in class 
um eý6 of respondents in class 
Size v Constraints (Appendix 3.13) 
The smallest (Class 1) firms have fewer problems and different 
rankings of constraints as against other classes. Financial problems 
head the list for the small firms. Import controls which are ranked first 
by the larger firms are not a problem at all to the smallest class. 
Age v Constraints (Appendix 3.14) 
There are marked differences in the rankings of individual problems 
among the newest firms (less than 5 years old) compared with the older 
classes. By far the most common problem among the new firms is the shortage 
of finance whereas import controls rank first among the older firms. 
Shortage of finance is ranked only in the 3rd or 4th place by the older 
firms. Market limitations are another factor which is listed as a problem 
by the older firms while it is not a problem at all to the newest businesses. 
Shortage of finance being a greater problem to new firms and small 
firms may be interpreted to signify 
a. their relative lack of access to sources of finance(7', 
b. the disinclination among bankers to lend on projects rather 
than on collateral 
(8) 
, and/or 
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c. the greater financing needs in the case of new companies and 
their consequent preoccupation with financing problems. 
Taxation is a relatively small problem to the newest and smallest 
firms. Interview discussions suggest that this is likely to be the result 
of the newer firms enjoying either tax holidays or brought forward tax 
depreciation allowances and the smaller firms paying lower rates of tax 
than the larger on account of concessional, small company rates. 
The fact that market limitations are no problem at all to new firms 
suggests that they have gone into areas of activity where ample market 
opportunities existed and that these conditions have not changed in the 
short time since inception. All observations relating to the smallest and 
the newest firms are however of limited significance on account of small 
sample size. 
Management v Constraints (Appendix 3.15) 
The index of sensitivity to constraints is identical for the two classes 
of management, but there are differences of perception in relation to 
individual environmental variables. Taxation and shortage of finance are 
greater problems to owner-managers than to professional managers while price 
controls trouble professional managers more. It must be noted, however, that 
only the differences relating to finance are significant on the X2 test. The 
greater sensitivity of owner-managers to financial problems is partly due to 
the predominance of owner-managers among the smallest and the newest firms. 
Price controls have been instituted in SL mainly on products manufactured 
on a large scale, and the high sensitivity of professional managers to price 
controls is attributable partly to the concentration of these managers among 
larger firms. 
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Corporate objectives v Constraints (Appendix 3.16) 
Crosstabulating constraints against the most important organisational 
objective shows a higher index of sensitivity to environmental constraints 
among profit maximisers when compared to those who seek to maintain a 
going concern. The profit maximisers are particularly concerned about 
taxation and financial problems. 
Further analysis(appendix 3.17)of attitudes to tax problems by 
reference to both the main objective and type of management shows that 
profit maximising owner-managers are more sensitive to tax constraints than 
owner-managers seeking going-concern maintenance. Among professional 
managers, the pattern is reversed, although the difference between the two 
classes of professionals is not statistically significant. 
In summary, differences observed in perceptions of business managers 
in regard to environmental constraints appear, in some instances, to be 
systematically related to internal organisational characteristics. The 
differences observed in sensitivity to taxation, though not very significant 
statistically, are related mainly to differences in type of management and 
their objectives. 
INCENTIVES 
Concurrent with the many controls - fiscal and other - imposed by 
government are a number of incentives offered by the State to private 
enterprise. The results analysed below suggest that SL businessmen have 
found tax incentives offered by government to be more useful than non-tax 
incentives and that within tax-incentives, capital allowances have been 
more useful than tax holidays. 
Respondents were asked to indicate which, if any, of the main business 
incentives offered in SL (described in Appendix 5) had, in their opinion 
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made a significant contribution to the growth of firms in their area of 
business. They were further requested to specify the one or two incentives 
which they thought had been the most useful. The responses are summarised 
in Table 3E, ranked according to relative usefulness as measured by the 
number of times an item was specified as one of the two most useful 
incentives. 
Table 3E. 
Incentives Useful to Business Firms 
Number of respondents who 
believe the incentive 
AB 
Made a contribution Was one of the 
Incentive to business growth. two most useful. 
+ Lump sum depreciation 
+ Tax holidays 
+ Development rebate 
Convertible rupees 
Foreign exchange entitlement 
certificates 
Cash subsidies 
+ Investment relief 
Guaranteed prices and State 
marketing services 
63 39 
41 22 
47 14 
41 13 
32 10 
9 4 
19 2 
52 
SUMMARY %age of positive responses on 
AB 
+ Tax-related incentives 66 72 
Exchange related incentives 28 22 
Other incentives 66 
100 100 
+ indicates tax-related incentives 
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Tax-related incentives head the list and as shown by the summary in 
Table 3E, are believed on the whole to have been much more useful than 
the non-tax incentives. The most popular incentives are seen to be capital 
allowances (lump sum depreciation and development rebate) given on the 
acquisition of fixed assets. Only two non-tax incentives were listed in 
the 'most useful' category by 5% or more of the respondents: both these 
related to concessions on currency exchange controls, while the more 
popular of the two also permitted recipients to overcome some of the 
constraints imposed by import control regulations. 
In comparing the attitudes of business to tax incentives with that 
to exchange incentives, the following relationships are observed: 
Workings 
Observation in Appendix Basis Comment 
1. Owner-managers are 3.18 
more appreciative of 
tax incentives whereas 
professional managers 
find exchange incentives 
to be more useful. 
2. The appreciation of 3.19 
tax incentives relative 
to exchange incentives 
is greater among firms 
who are troubled by tax 
constraints, as against those 
for whom taxation is not a 
problem. 
X2 significant 
at 0.05 level 
X2 significant 
at 0.025 level 
Firm conclusion 
Firm conclusion 
Owner-managers are more appreciative of tax incentives than are 
professional managers, though the tax structure itself does not discriminate 
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between the two types of management with respect to incentives offered. 
Owner-managers were found earlier to be somewhat more sensitive to taxation 
as a constraint on the achievement of their objectives. It is possible 
that in regard to incentives too, the difference lies in the attitudes 
of managers more than in any difference in the tax systems. Owner-managers 
who are more aware of the constraining influence of taxation, may over the 
years have benefitted more from tax incentives largely on account of their 
own efforts at tax minimisation. 
The above inference in regard to differences in attitude between 
management types is reinforced by the fact that, on the X2 test (see 
Appendix 3.19), the firms which find taxation to be a constraint were 
seen to be more appreciative of tax incentives than firms which thought 
taxation was not a problem. What emerges is the general conclusion that 
there is a greater awareness among some managers of tax influences and that 
this awareness extends to the constraints imposed on the business by taxation 
as well as to benefits to be gained from tax minimisation through the use 
of incentives. 
GROWTH OF BUSINESS 
Respondents to the questionnaire were asked to indicate the growth of 
their firms over a five year period. 'Growth' for this purpose was not 
strictly defined; instead respondents were informed that they could measure 
growth in terms of increase in assets, sales, employment or whatever measure 
was most convenient to them. The responses are summarised in Table 3F. 
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Table 3F. 
Business Growth amonq respondent firms 
Growth over 5 years Number of firms 
More than 100% 14 
50 - 100% 13 
10 - 50% 28 
Under 10% 8 
Not at all 11 
Crosstabulating growth record with other variables leads to the 
following-main conclusions: 
Working 
Observation in Appendix 
1. Slow growth firms are 3.20 
more sensitive to both 
environmental constraints 
(including taxation) and 
incentives than the nil 
growth or faster growth 
categories. 
Basis 
Index of senstitivity 
Comment 
Tentative 
conclusion 
2. Owner-managed firms grow 3.21 
faster than the profession- 
ally managed. 
3. Profit or similar task maxi- 3.23 
mising firms grow faster than and 
those who seek to maintain a 3.24 
going concern. 
4. Though owner-managed firms 3.25 
grow faster than those managed 
professionally, the former are 
more likely to feel hampered by 
taxation-in achieving growth 
objectives. 
X2 significant at 
0.01 level 
X2 significant at 
0.1 level 
Firm 
conclusion 
Tentative 
conclusion 
Index of sensitivity Tentative 
conclusion 
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Judging by the Index of sensitivity, slow growing (ie. growth in 5 
years less than 10%) firms seem to be far more sensitive to problems, 
including taxation, than any other group, even the nil-growth category 
(see Appendix 3.20). The slow growth firms are not only the most sensitive 
to environmental constraints, they also show a higher awareness of the con- 
tribution to business development made by government incentives. 
No obvious explanation is available for the high degree of sensitivity 
both to environmental constraints and to incentives shown by the slow growth 
firms. A probable interpretation, however, is that these firms unlike the 
nil-growth firms do not have one overwhelming constraint limiting their 
growth; nor have they benefitted substantially from one or two incentives 
like the higher growth classes. They must struggle against many environmental 
constraints and have attempted to overcome the effects of such constraints 
by using many available incentives without much success; hence their greater 
awareness of both problems and incentives. 
Crosstabulation (in Appendix 3.21) of management type against growth 
shows that owner-managed firms appear to grow faster than those managed by 
professional managers. It was reported earlier that with age firms moved 
from being owner managed to professional management. The relationship 
observed between growth and type of management is however not a mere 
reflection of the high percentage growth levels to be expected among the 
newest firms. Owner-managed firms attained higher growth levels even within 
the individual age groups (Appendix 3.22). 
It is also observed (Appendix 3.23) that firms whose main objective is 
profit maximisation (or maximisation of a similar, task-related objective) 
are more likely to achieve high rates of growth than firms setting out to 
maintain a going concern, though the differences are not significant at the 
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0.05 level ()( 2 significant at 0.1 level). Comparing the highest growth 
group with the nil-growth group, profit and market-share maximising owner- 
managers dominate the high growth class while most nil-growth firms are 
managed by professional managers with maintenance objectives (Appendix 
3.24). 
A further question was asked whether taxation had been an important 
discouraging factor if the respondent firm had not "grown very much" in the 
past five years. What'brown very much"meant in terms of level of growth was, 
however, not indicated in the questionnaire. Eighteen out of the seventy 
four (ie. 25%) respondents, including three firms showing above average 
growth answered 'Yes'. Another interesting management-related difference 
was observed in the answers to this question (Appendix 3.25). The proportion 
of owner-managed firms to those professionally managed among the entire 
sample is a little above 2: 1; but among firms (a) who are dissatisfied 
with their growth performance and (b) who consider tax an important dis- 
couraging factor slowing down growth, the proportion rises to 5: 1. This is 
despite the fact that owner-managers have, in general, achieved higher levels 
of growth than professional managers. 
The differences in attitudes, perceptions and levels of growth achieved 
by the two types of management are seen to be the most significant results 
in this section. It is relevant to question whether these results hold any 
implications for development policy, particularly fiscal policy for develop- 
ment of entrepreneurial activity in SL. 
The theory of economic development states that entrepreneurship is a 
necessary input to the development process. Writers in development economics 
are not however agreed as to whether in the LDCs there is a lack of enter- 
prise among the native population or whether the people of any country could 
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be just as enterprising as any other nation given the right environmental 
and institutional background. 
(114) It is generally accepted however that 
it is the duty of governments seeking economic development for their 
countries to promote entrepreneurial activity and to provide an instit- 
utional framework in which enterprise can be realised. 
Depending on the political philosophy of a government, it may set 
about increasing entrepreneurial activity in the country in one of two 
ways, viz: 
1. the government may itself take on the responsibility for 
entrepreneurial activity with industrial investment in the 
public sector, or 
2. it may seek to provide assistance and encouragement to the 
private sector by making available incentives and other 
facilities including the provision of training facilities 
in professional and technical management skills. 
In this context, more professional management is usually seen as one 
way of promoting greater efficiency and development in the private sector. 
With reference to SL, it has been argued that 
... attitudes brought over from the family business 
inappropriate to a modern enterprise can persist. The 
top executive positions get reserved for a small group 
based on family ties or a common social milieu. These 
factors can retard the growth of the 'company type' 
modern business enterprise. " 
(72) 
In SL owner-managed, family controlled, businesses are discredited 
not only on grounds of traditionalism as above, but also on grounds of 
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contrariety to 'socialist' objectives of government. 
(201.1975) 
In the past two decades the government of SL has adopted both methods 
referred to above, to promote entrepreneurial activity in the country. 
Often with the assistance of western aid-giving nations or international 
organisations, it has undertaken various programmes to promote training 
in modern professional and technical management methods. . 
The tax system itself does not draw a distinction between forms of 
management. It does, however, include minor provisions discouraging family 
ownership (or 'close-controlled' companies) and indirectly promoting broad- 
based ownership which is generally associated with professional manage- 
ment. 
(208, sec. 25(18) and sec. 79) 
The survey results indicate that owner-managers are more likely to 
find taxation to be a constraint on the achievement of organisational 
objectives than their professional counterparts. Nevertheless, they also 
show greater appreciation of tax related incentives. It is very unlikely 
that difference in attitude to taxation as a constraint between the two 
groups of managers can be explained as dependent upon the minor and indirect 
effect of the provisions in the tax law discriminating against 'close- 
controlled' companies. Furthermore, as ownermanagers are more sensitive 
to both the constraints and the incentives of the tax system it is not even 
possible to conclude that they have had their achievements restricted by 
taxation any more than the professionally managed firms. What is apparent 
however is a greater awareness of tax influences and possibly a greater 
degree of adaptation to benefit from incentives in the tax system by a 
group who have also proved to be more successful in terms of achievement 
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of business growth than the group of professional managers who are less 
sensitive to taxation stimuli. 
These results indicate that it may be necessary, for the promotion 
of private enterprise in SL, for the government to 
a) acknowledge the contribution made by individual entrepreneurs 
at the head of family business, and to encourage this more 
efficient sector of private business; 
b) encourage greater professionalism and efficiency in the 
professionally managed sector by promoting a more lively 
share market in which managers of publicly quoted companies 
can be held accountable for the profitability and efficient 
management of such companies. 
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CHAPTER 4. 
EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON BUSINESS DECISIONS - Survey of SL firms 
This chapter examines the results of the survey of SL business firms 
in relation to a number of major business decision areas where taxation 
is likely to have an impact and attempts to draw some conclusions as to 
the manner in which tax considerations enter business decision processes. 
The decision areas examined are those relating to 
1. form of business organisation, 
2. investment, 
3. financing, 
4. profit distribution or retention 
and 5. short-term operating decisions. 
FORM OF ORGANISATION 
The main forms of legal organisation available to business in SL are 
very similar to those in the UK. Business can be carried out by limited 
liability companies (public or private), partnerships or individual 
* 
proprietorships. 
The company law of SL being largely based on the 1929 Companies Act 
of the UK, the terms public and private companies have more or less the 
same meaning as in the UK. The stringent disclosure requirements introduced 
into the UK law in the '60s and '70s are, however, not found in SL. Never- 
the less, every limited liability company in SL is required to have its 
* The co-operative society, another form of organisation, which is 
associated mainly with peasant agriculture has not been studied here. 
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annual accounts audited by an authorised auditor while a public limited 
company is required additionally to file a copy of its audited accounts 
with the Registrar of Companies. 
The limited liability form of business enterprise may be said to 
have several advantages in comparison with other forms of organisation, 
viz. 
1. the benefits to shareholders of limited liability for business 
debt, particularly relevant where all shareholders do not take 
part in management, 
2. the consequent facilitation of equity financing, and 
3. the negotiability of shares in limited companies, though 
restricted to some extent in private limited companies. 
On the other hand, the requirement to maintain and file audited 
accounts may act as a deterrent against incorporation, particularly of 
family businesses where too sharp a distinction may not be drawn between 
business and personal transactions. 
The income tax law in SL discriminates between the limited liability 
company form of business organisation and the personal forms of partnership 
or proprietory ownership in two ways: firstly, the rates of tax charged 
are different (see chapter 2) and secondly a number of tax concessions 
allowed to limited liability companies in the past two decades (see appendix 
6) have not been available to other forms of organisation. Even within the 
company sector, smaller companies have always paid tax at lower rates and 
more recently, people's companies (companies with broad based ownership) 
have been charged at reduced rates. 
The effect of investment incentives offered through the tax law is to 
encourage incorporation; but the effect of differentials in tax rates 
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depends on the circumstances of the organisation. 
For an individual proprietor, operation of a business as a sole 
proprietorship could result in tax liabilities at the highest marginal 
rates of 80% of income. As corporate income tax rates have been between 
50% and 60% for much of the past two decades (with the small company rate 
of tax at around half that) incorporation of his business would have 
resulted in a lower tax liability for a businessman paying personal income 
tax at marginal rates exceeding the corporate tax rate. The advantage exists 
in spite of the fact that there is double taxation of corporate profits paid 
out as dividends, as the option is available to the entrepreneur to withdraw 
whatever income he requires in a form that will be tax deductable for the 
company (e. g. as director's remuneration). For individual proprietorships 
and partnerships earning substantial profits therefore, there will be tax 
advantages in incorporation. 
For the more widely held public companies, however, the position may 
be reversed. For these, the double taxation of corporate profits may dis- 
criminate against the corporate form; but of course the proprietory or 
partnership form of operation will not be a practicable option where wide 
public subscription to the capital of the organisation is required on 
account of the large size of the undertaking or other reasons. 
The analysis of the effects of corporate taxation in the developed 
countries is carried out largely as if the corporate sector is clearly 
separable from the non-corporate sector of business 
(81), 
and as if the 
decision to incorporate a business is uninfluenced by tax considerations. 
(174) 
However, the non-neutralities arising out of the double taxation of corporate 
income are widely discussed. 
(94, Ch. 12) Stiglitz acknowledges that, 
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"the full implications of incorporation and the economic consequences 
resulting from the discouragement of incorporation by the tax treatment 
of a corporation requires further investigation. " 
(174) 
Given the structure of corporate taxation in SL, the effect of taxation 
should be to encourage incorporation of high income businesses of individual 
proprietors and partnerships, and also of those businesses seeking tax 
incentives available only to limited liability companies. The evidence 
analysed below, however, indicates that tax considerations do not greatly 
influence the form of organisation of SL business. 
Over 90% of respondents to the questionnaire are limited liability 
companies (see Appendix 3.3). This result reflects a bias in the original 
sample which was extracted from (a) the list of quoted public companies in 
the Colombo stock market and (b) the business pages of an annual directory 
of local information which lists only the larger, more established organ- 
isations, mainly in the corporate sector. 
The thirty firms interviewed subsequent to the postal survey were 
asked the question 'did taxation in any way influence the form of organ- 
isation of your business? '. The replies are analysed in Table 4A. 
Table 4A 
Influence of Taxation on Form of Business Organisation 
Form of 
organisation Public Private 
Form influenced limited limited 
by taxation company company Partnership Mixed form Total 
Yes 4 421 11 
No 10 5 15 
Do not know/no 
clear answer 1 21 4 
7 TT -SU 
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Looked at in total, a majority of respondents do not believe that 
taxation considerations influenced the form of organisation of their 
firm: but several points of interest are revealed by the analysis. 
1. Both partnership companies interviewed said that taxation did 
influence their form of organisation. One of these said that 
they changed from an individual proprietorship to a family 
partnership for tax reasons (ie. to reduce the overall taxes 
paid on the firm's profits). This had been achieved by an 
individual proprietor gifting partnership shares in his business 
to members of his family. 
The other partnership firm said that 
formed and used a limited company to 
in order to reduce the burden of bus 
firm believed that they had anything 
incorporation. Ownership within the 
ensured tax minimisation for them. 
they had in the past 
handle some of their sales 
iness turnover tax. Neither 
to gain, taxwise, from 
extended family apparently 
2. The limited liability companies interviewed were influenced by 
tax to a lesser extent than non-limited liability companies in 
their decisions relating to form of organisation and the public 
limited companies less so than the private. 
3. Some of the companies who said that tax considerations did affect 
their form of organisation added qualifications to their answers, 
such as, 
a) yes, but not the primary concern, 
b) yes, for new business, but not known for the original 
incorporation, 
c) yes, for one company in the group. 
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4. One interviewee who answered "no" to the question added "... but 
we have enjoyed the advantages of profit retention at company 
tax rates". 
The majority of firms were not influenced by taxation in deciding the 
form of their organisation. Given that the tax system does not treat all 
forms of business organisations equally, under what circumstances are the 
decisions as to form of organisation unlikely to be influenced by this 
environmental variable? Two possibilities can be identified: firstly, 
the promoters of the firm could have been unaware of the tax differentials; 
in the alternative, taxation may have been considered, but the decision 
itself may have been made on the basis of other, greater priorities. A 
'yes' answer however is appropriate only if taxation was (a) considered 
in making the decision and (b) influenced the choice. 
The negative answers to the question came from limited liability 
companies - mainly from public limited companies. It is unlikely that 
persons setting up this form of organisation, or their advisers, were 
unaware of tax influences. The likeliest explanation is that other more 
critical factors had dictated the form of organisation. 
The formation of public limited companies would be discouraged by 
tax-rate differentials (though tax holiday concessions may in some cases 
exert a counter-influence). It is possible that the main reason for the 
low relevance of tax considerations among public companies was the need to 
obtain public contributions to capital. 
The following subsidiary evidence drawn from SL sources sheds further 
light on the question. Statistics on business registrations are difficult 
to come by, but in 1971 it was reported(72)that there were 3275 limited 
liability companies registered in the whole island in comparison with which 
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82,000 partnership and proprietorship businesses were operating at the 
time in the Western province (one of nine) alone. It is of course 
possible that the majority of these non-company business units did not 
pay taxes. However, the published lists of taxpayers reveal that, each 
year, there are a large number of resident individuals who pay taxes at 
the maximum rates and whose income taxes (unless all their income was used 
in personal consumption during the year) could have been reduced substan- 
tially by incorporatingtheir business activities. For example in the year 
1969/70 when the standard rate of company income tax was 50% and the maximum 
rate of personal income tax stood at 80%, it is estimated from statistics 
published by the Inland Revenue, 
(205,1970) that over 800 resident indiv- 
iduals with their income derived mainly from business were assessed to 
income tax at marginal rates reaching the maximum of 80%. 
Another illustration of a slightly different nature is provided by the 
response of business to the "people's company" provisions added to the inland 
revenue law in 1976. The law provided for a 20% reduction in the rate of 
income tax for companies either formed with or converted to broad-based 
ownership. The 1977-78 annual reports of the Commissioner General of Inland 
Revenue (205) show that numbers of people's companies assessed at these low 
rates in the two years following the introduction of the law, were 5 and 2. 
This low response from a population of tax-paying resident companies 
numbering around 700 may have been due to a number of reasons, but one of 
these seems to have been the irrelevance of taxation influences in decisions 
regarding organisational form. Two interviewees mentioned administrative 
problems and ambiguities in interpretation of the legislation, but most 
interviewees were of the opinion that their ownership structure did not 
permit them to take advantage of people's company provisions at the time 
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or even in the future. None of these companies had seriously considered 
the possibility of changing the ownership/management structure to obtain 
the benefit of lower tax rates. 
An important factor in the decision process appears to be the famil- 
iarity of certain businessmen with one form of organisation; tradition seems 
to play a fairly important part in the decision. Those who have always worked 
with limited liability companies will tend to form limited companies for any 
new activities they undertake even if there were advantages in the proprietory 
form of ownership, particularly in the early years of tax losses which can 
be set off against income from other sources. The converse situation is 
even more common among unincorporated business, where the owner-managers 
find the proprietary form with management in the hands of the extended 
family to be the familiar means of doing business. Examples are to be found, 
however, both in our survey sample and in general, of business originally 
carried on by individual proprietors or family partners being incorporated 
on taking up a major new activity, particularly where corporate status was 
a prerequisite for government approval, tax concessions or loan finance. 
On the whole, the above findings suggest that taxation is not a major 
consideration in decisions relating to form of organisation of SL business. 
TAXATION AND INVESTMENT 
This section will (a) outline the provisions of the SL tax system 
which may have a direct bearing on the investment decisions of business 
firms, (b) discuss procedures involved in the making of investment decisions 
and (c) assess the impact of taxation on the decisions and their outcomes. 
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The survey findings analysed below suggest 
(a) that taxation is not in general a significant constraint on 
the achievement of investment plans, and 
(b) that the method of investment appraisal adopted and differences 
in treatment of taxation in such appraisals have no effect on 
the level of growth achieved, though there maybe some influence 
on the type of investment undertaken. 
The SL tax system 
In general, income taxes are charged on business income at standard 
company rates or progressive personal rates depending on form of ownership. 
But within the income tax law are a number of provisions designed to give 
some measure of relief selectively to some kinds of business activity and 
investment. These incentives fall into three main categories: viz, (a) 
capital allowances, (b) tax exemptions or holidays and (c) investment 
relief. 
Quite apart from the impact of income tax incentives, wealth taxes 
charged in SL since the late fifties, are expected(94, p. 
351) to promote 
investment as opposed to the ownership of idle resources. The often 
discriminatory indirect taxes (such as business turnover tax, customs and 
excise duties) may also affect the direction of investment, but the 
variations and combinations of indirect taxes charged on different types 
of business are too complex to be taken specifically into account in a 
general survey of the nature undertaken here. The questions asked of the 
respondents were therefore about taxation in general and not a particular 
tax, either direct or indirect. 
* See Appendix 5 for a description of the incentives. 
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Survey results and discussion 
Thirty of the seventy four respondents were interviewed to ascertain 
how taxation entered into their investment decision processes. The results 
are summarised in Table 4B. 
Table 4B 
Appraisal of Investment Proposals 
Number Taxation in Appraisal Number of firms 
of firms which make allowance 
Method of Appraisal using Included Not Included for possible future 
changes in Taxation 
A. Return on Capital 
Employed 882 
B. Payback Period 11 
C. Discounted Cash Flow 551 
D. (A & B) 11 83 2+ 
E. (B & C) 11 
F. (A&B&C) 11-_ 
27 24 35 
NONE 3 
30 
* Best estimates used 
+ Best estimates used by one firm and sensitivity analysis 
for 5% and 10% changes by the other 
Most (90%) of the firms interviewed carried out some form of investment 
appraisal. The most commonly used decision rule in investment appraisal was 
Return on capital employed (RCE), either by itself or in conjunction with 
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one or more other methods. The other methods used were the payback period 
and discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis. 
The three firms who did not carry out any formal appraisal of invest- 
ment proposals present interesting case studies: 
(a) The first was an associate of a multinational company operating a 
medium-sized business in SL under near monopoly conditions. The 
company accountant who gave the interview said that the firm did not 
carry out any formal appraisals "because the managing director is 
suspicious of figure work". All investments were however said to be 
made with the approval of the foreign associate company. 
(b) The second was a family partnership which had not "needed" any formal 
appraisals in the past ten years "as all major investment has gone 
into stocks". 
(c) The last was again family controlled, but a limited liability company. 
Here the managing director and his co-director/wife did their sums in 
their heads. This firm also admitted to employing more than one method 
of tax evasion. 
None of these firms show any evidence of having suffered by the absence 
of formal investment appraisal procedures. The first two firms achieved 
modal (10% - 50%) growth in the study period while the third did even better. 
Of the twenty seven interviewees who carried out formal investment 
appraisals, the majority (24) took taxation into account in the appraisals. 
However, it must be noted that given the system of accelerated capital 
allowances in operation in SL, there is no satisfactory way of incorporating 
tax effects accurately into a straightforward calculation of RCE. (Appendix 
7 discusses the treatment of taxation in the investment appraisal techniques 
commonly used by SL business firms. ) Discussion revealed that the most 
common treatment as regards profit was for the project returns to be 
calculated ignoring acceleration of capital allowances (ie., using the 
firm's normal accounting calculations for depreciation) and computing tax 
at the appropriate rate on book profits. Capital employed would be taken 
at the initial investment and this would be compared with what is considered 
the typical annual return. 
The payback period, if calculated on estimated after-tax cash flows, 
is capable of bringing into account the advantages of tax incentives which 
affect cash flows within the period; though it does not take into consider- 
ation the time value of cash flows. Any cash flows (including tax cash 
flows) arising after payback would of course be ignored completely. It has 
not been possible to ascertain whether tax cash flows are brought correctly 
into the payback appraisals of survey respondents. If tax cash flows are 
correctly accounted for, then the payback appraisal used alongside RCE will 
to some extent overcome the inadequacies of RCE in dealing with differences 
between book profits and taxable profits. 
The three firms who excluded taxation from their investment appraisals 
were all users of the combined RCE and payback methods. Their reasons for 
non-inclusion of taxation were given as follows: 
(a) "We do not include taxes in our appraisals as we only go for tax 
holiday activities". 
(b) "We have very heavy accumulated tax losses". 
(c) "We do not take taxes into consideration as in any case one has to 
pay tax". 
Underlying these diverse reasons is an extremely short term attitude 
to taxation and tax planning. However, business growth among these firms 
does not appear to be influenced by their failure to take tax into account 
- 112 - 
in investment planning. Only the second firm referred to performed below 
average in its achievement of growth. The first firm falls in the modal 
(10%-50%) growth class while thq third achieved growth at the highest 
(more than 100%) level. 
Of the 24 firms who took taxes into consideration in evaluating invest- 
ment proposals, five firms claimed that in their computations they allowed 
for the possibility that future tax rates may differ from the current. Four 
of these firms used 'best estimates' of future tax burden, while one firm 
said they examined the sensitivity of RCE and payback to changes in the tax 
burden of 5% and 10%. One firm which used best estimates of future tax 
rates described their procedures in some detail and it was disclosed that 
in the past they had "found it necessary" to use rates other than the current 
rates only in respect of indirect taxes. This suggests that indirect taxes 
are perceived by this firm as being more unstable than direct taxes. 
As a point of interest relating to multinationals operating in SL, the 
local subsidiaries and associates in their evaluation of investment appear 
to take into account only local taxes. However, they all liase with their 
parent or associate companies abroad on major investments and it is possible 
that a global view of taxation is taken by the parent company appraisers. 
Another set of questions were asked of the interviewees to establish 
the extent to which tax variables hampered the achievement of their invest- 
ment plans or depressed achievement against forecast results. Twenty four 
(ie. 80%) of the interviewee firms had undertaken at least one new project 
in the previous five years and 12 of these said their results on the last 
major investment were not as expected at the time of investment. The 
reasons for variance are given in Table 4C. 
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Table 4C 
Reasons for variance between expected and actual results on last investment. 
Results below that expected: 
Bureaucratic delays: 
1. Five year delay - mainly at various ministries. 
2. Delay in approval will affect profitability. 
3. Behind schedule due to bureaucratic delays. 
Shortage of material (attributed to Government controls): 
4. Shortage of raw material. 
5. Construction of buildings delayed due to shortage of cement. 
Other Government action: 
6. Nationalisation of plantations. 
7. Changes in import duty rates and currency exchange rate. 
8. Lack of scope due to governmental controls. 
Firm-related: 
9. Management and staff problems. 
10. Incorrect capacity decision. 
Results better than that expected: 
1. Product quality better than anticipated. 
2. Foreign demand greater than estimated. 
Two of the firms had achieved results better than expected. Of the 
ten firms whose results were worse than planned for, only one firm gave a 
tax-related reason for their under-achievement. The tax concerned was an 
indirect tax (viz. import duty) and a change in rates of tax was only part 
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of the firm's reasons for non-achievement of forecast results. 
Delays originating from the State bureaucracy (for three firms) and 
shortage of material (for two firms) were at the top of the list of problems. 
On the whole, 8 of the 10 firms blamed the government directly or indirectly 
for their problems leading to underachievement on investment plans. 
The interviewees were also questioned on other projects considered in 
the previous five years. Twenty six firms had considered other projects and 
eight of these had been undertaken. Twelve firms had a project 'pending' 
at the time of the interviews while five firms had rejected their proposals 
and one had abandoned the project after investment. Explanations were sought 
from those who had rejected or abandoned projects as to their reasons; and 
information on the current state of pending projects was requested from those 
concerned. The replies are summarisedin Table 4D. 
Table 4D. 
Reasons for abandonment or non-implementation of projects. 
Project outcome No. of firms Reasons 
1. Abandoned after 1 Bad management on the one hand 
investment and government takeover of 
machinery on the other. 
2. Pending 5 Awaiting approval/exchange 
allocations. 
4 Still under consideration by firm. 
2 Delayed on account of political 
uncertainty. 
1 Marketing problems. 
1 Financing problems. 
3. Proposal rejected 1 Threat of nationalisation. 
1 Change in-government policy. 
I Government approval refused. 
1 Marketing and raw material problems. 
1 Change in market position due to 
the revaluation of the SL rupee. 
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Once again, government action or uncertainty relating to government 
action and bureaucratic inaction were the major external reasons for 
rejection or delay of investment projects. Market-related reasons were 
less important in comparison, and even when met with, were seen to originate 
mainly from government action of one sort or another. Taxation, however, 
was not a causal factor for the delay or rejection of any of the projects. 
Crosstabulation of the method of investment appraisal with other survey 
variables revealed the following: 
Method of investment appraisal v growth (Appendix 8.1) 
The method of investment appraisal used does not appear to have any 
great influence on the level of growth. Nor does the absence of formal 
investment appraisal have any significant effect on growth. The users of 
RCE as the investment decision rule comprise both the highest growth group 
and nil-growth group. 
Method of investment appraisal v diversification (Appendix 8.2) 
The method of investment appraisal used does have some influence on the 
type of investment undertaken by SL firms. It appears that firms which use 
DCF appraisal criteria, with or without reference to payback period, are more 
likely to diversify than the users of RCE or a combination of RCE and payback. 
Statistical significance on the X2 test is however only at a level of 0.1 , 
and these results must therefore be considered as being tentative. 
All three firms who said they had not attempted expansion or divers- 
ification were users of RCE and payback. RCE in contrast with DCF techniques 
appear, to promote a rather conservative approach to new investment. It is 
in the nature of the RCE method as generally used by the interviewee firms 
(ie., a typical year's earnings compared with the initial investment) to 
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depress returns on investment, particularly those on capital asset 
investments when compared with DCF returns. Working capital investment 
returns are reflected at higher levels and could lead to a preference 
for expansionary investment in working capital as against investment in 
new activities or in fixed capital assets. (Appendix 7 discusses this 
question further. ) 
A variety of approaches to investment appraisal and*to the consideration 
of taxation in such appraisals were seen among the respondent firms. Most 
firms had well established investment appraisal practices, but it must be 
remembered that the respondents come from the larger, more professionalised 
sector of SL business and their methods are unlikely to typify the practices 
of the vast majority of smaller business units in the country. 
A minority of firms either did not use formal appraisal procedures or 
did not explicitly bring taxes into account in their evaluations. They take 
a rather short-term view of the impact of taxation on their activities, but 
do not appear to have been adversely affected as a result in their achieve- 
ment of growth. The results also reveal that the technique of investment 
evaluation used does not appear to influence the level of growth achieved. 
Similar results have been reported for US companies by Klammer who found no - 
consistent significant association between corporate performance and the 
use of sophisticated capital budgeting techniques. 
(110) 
As discussed in appendix 7, taxation is not treated uniformly in all 
the different techniques of investment appraisal; the ranking of projects 
on the basis of investment returns could therefore be very different from 
one technique to another. The RCE technique would tend to discount heavily 
the value of accelerated capital allowances and depress apparent returns on 
investment in fixed assets in comparison with returns on working capital 
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investment. DCF methods which do not discriminate between investment in 
fixed assets and working capital should, in theory, promote relatively 
more investment in fixed assets than would RCE decision rules. It is 
also not unreasonable to assume that, generally, diversification will 
require a higher proportion of investment in fixed assets than would 
expansion. The latter can be achieved also by investment in working 
capital for the more intensive utilisation of existing fixed asset capacity. 
In comparison with RCE criteria, the use of DCF techniques should therefore 
encourage greater diversification of business activity. This proposition 
is supported by the survey findings. 
It must, however, be reported that there appears to be no significant 
difference between the users of RCE and DCF as to their appreciation of the 
usefulness of capital allowances in promoting business development. Capital 
allowances were the most popular incentive among both groups, suggesting 
that though the RCE method of investment evaluation may undervalue the 
contribution of capital allowances to project returns, the avenues for tax 
, minimisation via capital allowances were widely appreciated 
by the SL business 
community. 
Another major conclusion drawn from the analysis in this section is that 
taxation is not a significant constraint in relation to specific investment 
plans or their outcomes. Direct taxation was not a reason for disappoint- 
ment on or delay or rejection of investment projects undertaken or considered 
by any of the interviewee firms in the previous five years. In contrast, 
commenting generally on the tax burden, 54% of the respondents on the postal 
survey found taxation to be a constraint on the achievement of business 
objectives (Chapter 3). 
The apparent inconsistency between the two attitudes is resolved if the 
following aspects of the process of interaction between the tax regime and 
business activity are taken into account: 
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1. the relative stability over time of the burden of business taxation 
in SL (see appendix 1.3) despite the multitude of small changes to 
the law enacted almost every year, 
2. the lowering of the overall tax burden on undertaking a new investment, 
under a tax regime that offers accelerated capital allowances, and 
3. the low sensitivity of project returns to small changes in the burden 
of direct taxation, in the presence of investment incentives. 
It is the opinion of eminent writers in public finance that once a 
tax has been in existence for some time, taxpayers arrange their affairs 
in accordance with the tax, and however burdensome the tax, relative to a 
hypothetical ideal, or taxes in other countries, it is nevertheless an 
acceptable tax within the tax structure in which it is found. In this 
connection, an oft-quoted adage is that "an old tax is a good tax". 
(94, p. 227) 
Under such circumstances it would be possible for a businessman to feel 
constrained by taxation in the achievement of his firm's objectives, though 
taxation may not be a reason for underachievement on any investment under- 
taken in the full knowledge of the tax law. 
For an existing business, the undertaking of new capital investment, 
and the consequent receipt of accelerated capital allowances generally 
mean a lowering of the current tax burden. It has been shown 
(158) 
that 
100% capital allowances will produce tax neutrality in regard to investment 
decisions. Capital allowances (lump-sum depreciation and development rebate) 
in SL during the study period on some assets were as high as 120% producing 
not mere neutrality but a subsidy from the fisc to the taxpayer undertaking 
capital investment. The absence of taxation among constraints on investment 
must reflect the generosity of investment incentives operating in SL at the 
time. It may even be possible to interpret these results as signifying the 
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success of a high burden/high incentive tax system in promoting new 
investment, or at the least in not discouraging new investment in the 
private sector. 
The primary limiting factors on the successful undertaking of new 
investment appear to originate in various governmental controls; and 
taxation is not a significant constraint. 
TAXATION AND FINANCING 
Much of the discussion in the literature on the effects of tax on the 
capital structure of business is conducted in a world of efficient markets 
and arbitraging investors. In this world, if debt charges are deductable 
in computing taxes, then both the value of the firm and benefits to equity 
could be maximised by increasing the level of debt finance up to the point 
where the risks of bankruptcy begin to outweigh the expected benefits of 
tax savings (see chapter 1). 
This section examines the perceptions of SL business on the importance 
of tax considerations in financing decisions, and seeks to ascertain the 
extent to which taxation influences financing decisions in a LDC with a 
stagnant share market and lacking in the financial infrastructure available 
in a developed country. 
The results discussed below indicate that as perceived by business 
managers, taxation considerations have no significant influence on financing 
decisions of SL firms. 
The SL tax system 
In theory, SL tax laws can influence both the quantity and quality of 
finance available to business. 
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In regard to the quantity of finance, economic theory recognises 
the cash flow effects of taxation, whereby the funds available for 
investment in the private sector are reduced by taxation. Additionally, 
in SL, two other provisions of the law may have a bearing on finance 
available for business. Firstly, preferential tax exemptions are available 
for deposits in state-owned savings banks and on investment in treasury 
bonds, and consequently funds may be channelled away from business into 
these investments for tax reasons. Secondly, the wealth tax charged in 
SL is expected to encourage investment and to increase funds available 
for the financing of investment. 
Furthermore, the tax law, by its discriminatory provisions leaves room 
for tax minimisation via financing alternatives. The following provisions 
favour the use of debt capital in preference to equity: 
1. The tax deductability of interest payments favours the use of 
debt finance in preference to equity. 
2. The provisions under which small companies (ie., companies with 
issued share capital of less than Rs. 250,000 and annual profits 
of Rs. 50,000 or less) are taxed at roughly half the standard 
company tax rate, favour the use of debt at the margin to retain 
small company status and thereby gain tax savings. This benefit 
may be used not only by individual investors but also by limited 
companies. The law permits a large company not normally entitled 
to small company benefits to reduce its taxes by hiving off parts 
of the business to 'small-company' subsidiaries. 
3. Investment in some fixed assets (for instance, motor cars bought 
for use of executives) does not attract capital allowances. In 
such cases, it may be more profitable (tax-wise) for a firm to 
lease these assets as the lease charges are an allowable expense. 
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(The use of leasing, however, has been restricted by retroactive 
legislation introduced in 1974, whereby the leasing of fixed 
assets to tax holiday companies, sale and leaseback arrangements 
and leasing between 'connected persons' could result in loss of 
capital allowances to the lessor. ) 
On the other hand the benefits of tax-free dividends during a tax 
holiday and investment relief (to both individual and corporate investors) 
are available only on equity investments: these considerations may out- 
weigh the benefits of debt financing described above when the investment 
being financed is in an activity entitled to a tax holiday or investment 
relief. 
Survey results and discussion 
"Has taxation been a consideration in your general borrowing policy 
decisions? " The answers to this question are summarised in Table 4D. 
Table 4D' 
Relevance of Taxation in Borrowing Policy Decisions 
Taxation a relevant consideration No. of firms 
Yes 17 
No 51 
No answer 6 
74 
Only a quarter of the firms replying to this question said that they 
considered taxation in their borrowing policy decisions. At subsequent 
interviews some of the firms taking taxation into account were asked to 
clarify their procedures and it appears that the main aspect of taxation 
considered by them is the effect of tax payments on the firm's liquidity and 
consequently its ability to service debt. The main object apparently is not 
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to minimise the tax liability by using a suitable borrowing policy, but to 
base borrowing policy on ability to service debt from after-tax cash flows. 
Some of the interviewee firms had used leasing facilities to minimise taxes 
or to optimise on after-tax position, but these remain a small minority. 
To judge the importance of tax influences against other possibly 
relevant factors, several variables which may affect financing decisions 
were listed and the respondents to the postal questionnaire were asked to 
comment on the relevance of these. The answers are summarised in Table 4E. 
Table 4E 
Factors Relevant in Financing Decisions of Business Firms 
Number of firms to whom the factor is relevant 
Listed in Questionnaire Always Sometimes Total 
1. Borrowing is preferred to fresh 
equity in order to maintain 
owners' control 29 12 41 
2. It is quicker to borrow than to 
obtain owners' capital 18 20 38 
3. Collateral requirements of 
lenders are a problem 14 18 32 
4. Interest rates are unacceptably 
high 8 20 28 
Added by respondents 
5. Exchange control restrictions 11 
6. Central bank restrictions on 
lending institutions 11 
7. Liquidity preference among 
investors 11 
A comparison of the above considerations with the relevance of taxation 
in financing decisions must be made with caution as the wording of the two 
questions concerned was slightly different. Nevertheless, the response 
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suggests that taxation considerations influence financing decisions to a 
lesser extent than any of the other four factors listed in the questionnaire. 
Respondents were also asked to indicate the level of debt finance 
compared to equity finance used in their firms on a scale provided in the 
questionnaire. The responses are summarised in Table 4F. 
Table 4F 
Use of Finance other than owners' capital 
Level Number of firms 
Greater than owners' capital 21 
About the same as owners' capital 13 
Somewhat less than owners' capital 8 
Much less than owners' capital 18 
Negligible or nil 10 
70 
No answer 4 
74 
Owners' Capital is defined to include all reserves 
and retained profits. 
Crosstabulation of gearing levels with the main factors relevant in 
borrowing policy decisions disclose the following relationships: (workings 
in appendix 8.3) 
1. Ease of access to debt finance relative to equity funds is 
associated with high gearing (X2 significant at 0.005 level). 
2. Similarly an interest in maintaining present owners' control 
tends to be associated with high gearing ()C 
2 
significant at 
0.05 level). 
The two most relevant variables (ease of access to debt and owners' 
control requirements) both appear to promote borrowing in preference to equity 
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financing as evidenced by the increased importance of these variables 
at the higher levels of gearing. In contrast, whether or not taxation 
is a consideration in making financing decisions appears to have no 
significant influence on the level of gearing (appendix 8.3). 
At the subsequent interviews respondents were questioned on the mix 
of finance used in their latest investments and the reasons for using the 
particular mix indicated, in order to verify, indirectly, the extent to 
which taxation entered as a consideration in decisions relating to capital 
structure. 
Twenty-three of the interviewees were able to give us rough proportions 
of the different types of finance used in their last major investment, where 
one had been undertaken within the past five years. The proportions of finance 
used on average (ignoring differences in size) are given in Table 4G. 
Table 4G 
Average Proportions of Finances used for New Investments 
Internal - Retentions of profit and 
depreciation funds 51 
New share issue 5 
Debt - Development banks 19 
Commercial banks 15 
Public deposits 3 
Mixed borrowing 7 44 
100 
- 12 5- 
More than half the finance for new major investments came from 
internal sources. This finance mix of debt to equity of roughly 4: 5 
matches the pattern of the overall gearing listed in Table 4F, suggesting 
that there has been no marked change in business gearing patterns in recent 
years. 
The interviewees were also asked to name the major determinants of 
their particular capital structures. Only one firm referred to taxation as 
a relevant factor in this context. They said, 
"In order of preference, we use 
Commercial banks - as they are the cheapest, 
Debentures - for their tax advantages, 
Deposits from staff - as a service to them. " 
Public deposits are used mainly by financial firms who, by law, are 
not allowed access to commercial or development bank borrowing. Many firms 
chose commercial bank borrowing for its convenience, ease of access or 
suitability to their needs, when such needs were short-term or fluctuating. 
For instance, a firm in the tea export trade using commercial bank borrowing 
as the only form of debt finance said, 
"Commercial bank finance is the easiest to obtain and it 
suits the nature of our trade. " 
Development finance is most often used either because commercial bank 
finance is not available for the period (usually long term) required or 
because a loan from the Development Finance Corporation of Ceylon is the 
only means of getting foreign exchange. Two of the interviewees said, 
however, that they had rejected loans from the development bank because of 
the bank's requirement of a place on the board of directors. A typical 
remark is quoted below. 
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"Commercial bank loans are available only for working capital. 
We have used the DFCC for long term finance. " 
- an industrial company 
Several (5 out of the 30) interviewees in commenting on the mix 
of finance, expressed a preference for internally generated funds. One 
of these said that political uncertainties made them unwilling to take on 
a heavy debt burden. 
The picture that emerges is one of business firms generally concerned 
about the supply of finance, but guided as much in their borrowing policy 
decisions by internally imposed limits and preferences as by the availability 
of finance. In theory, for a firm maximising profits or shareholder welfare, 
taxation should be a relevant consideration in decisions relating to capital 
structure; though it is acknowledged that other market imperfections may 
counter the influence of taxation. The survey results disclose that firms 
rarely recognise the tax advantages of gearing as having an influence on 
borrowing policy, or explicitly plan for tax minimisation via optimum usage 
of different types of finance. Even where taxation is a relevant consider- 
ation in borrowing policy, this fact has no apparent influence on the level 
of gearing. 
TAXATION AND PROFIT DISTRIBUTIONS 
As discussed in chapter 1, taxation is seen in the literature as a 
market imperfection which will result in dividend policy influencing the 
value of the firm. A classical system of taxation is expected to promote 
a high retention policy in a company seeking to maximise the value of the 
firm. 
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Empirical evidence relating to developed countries does not, however, 
wholly support the above proposition; and this is usually attributed to 
the presence of other market imperfections which counter the influence of 
taxation. In an LDC, the absence of a well developed share market is a 
major factor which may moderate the impact of taxation on dividend decisions 
of limited liability companies. 
SL tax law relating to profit distributions 
Taxes are charged on corporate profit in SL on the so-called classical 
system with double taxation of distributed profits. Dividends are taxable 
in the hands of recipient individuals at their marginal rates, and a with- 
holding tax at a standard rate of 33ý% is collected from the company as a 
tax at source. 
Retained profits, on the other hand, are taxed in the shareholders' 
hands only when these are realised. Furthermore, such income is taxable as 
'capital gains' and is chargeable at a relatively low rate: the maximum 
rate of tax on capital gains for much of the past two decades has been 25%. 
A company can, therefore, reduce shareholder taxes under SL law by 
maximising retentions, but the extent to which this can be done by closely 
controlled companies is limited as the revenue authorities have the power to 
'deem as distributed' certain undistributed profits of such companies. 
There is, however, one exception to the rule that dividend minimisation 
also minimises taxes - that is in the case of companies enjoying tax holidays 
which entitle them to distribute tax-free dividends out of income arising in 
the tax holiday period. In these cases, if no distribution is made during 
the holiday period, the retained profits, as far as they give rise to capital 
gains on realisation, will be taxable at a later date. A ceiling has been 
placed on tax free dividends allowed to tax-holiday companies from 1976, but 
the principle still holds, within the ceiling. 
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A tax differential between distributed and retained profits does not 
arise at all in the case of partnership or proprietory businesses, as the 
profits of these organisations would be taxed as the income of the prop- 
rietors, whether distributed or not. 
Survey results and discussion 
The results of the survey discussed below show that-taxation is a 
consideration in the distribution decision of many SL firms. But there is 
no evidence to indicate widespread use of dividend policy manipulation to 
achieve tax minimisation or share value maximisation. Liquidity effects 
appear to be the most important aspect of taxation influencing dividend 
decisions. 
"Is taxation of the firm or its owners a relevant consideration in 
your distribution of earnings to proprietors? " The answers of survey 
respondents to this question are summarised in Table 4H. 
Table 4H 
Relevance of Taxation in Profit Distribution Decisions 
Taxation a relevant consideration No. of firms 
Yes -a very important consideration 28 
-a somewhat important consideration 14 
-a minor consideration 2 
44 
No 26 
No answer 4 
74 
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SL firms reveal a relatively high sensitivity to tax considerations 
affecting profit distributions - higher than their sensitivity to tax 
effects on investment or financing decisions. The only tax related 
question in the postal survey to receive a response indicating greater 
sensitivity was that relating to the usefulness of accelerated capital 
allowances. Respondents' comments at the subsequent interviews indicated 
that their main concern was with the effect of taxation qn liquid funds 
available for distribution. 
An unexpected response regarding taxation influences in distribution 
decisions came from the non-limited liability company respondents. Four 
out of the five partnership/proprietorship firms said that tax was a 
relevant consideration in their profit distribution decisions. One of these 
firms was subsequently interviewed and they explained that taxation of 
business income (which in law is charged against the proprietors in person) 
was a cash flow of the firm which had to be provided for before distributions 
(or withdrawals) of funds could be made by the partners. It is the cash flow 
effects of tax payments on funds available for withdrawal, rather than any 
tax advantage accruing as a result of distribution policy, that was'important 
to this firm. 
Respondents to the postal questionnaire were also asked to comment on 
other factors relevant in distribution decisions: the three main non-tax 
factors listed by respondents are summarised in Table 41. 
Table 41 
Main Non-Tax Factors relevant in Distribution Decisions 
Relevant 
Factors (important and otherwise) Important 
Availability of liquid funds 55 45 
Maintaining a steady level of distribution 45 30 
Income requirements of proprietors 25 18 
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Liquidity is apparently the most important consideration in distrib- 
ution decisions, but the need to maintain a steady stream of dividends is 
also a relevant consideration to the majority of respondents. Comparing 
the data in Table 41 with the relevance of taxation (Table 4H), it can be 
seen that taxation, though relevant to the majority of respondents, is a 
consideration less important than the 'availability of liquid funds'. 
Crosstabulation of the above responses with other survey variables 
(appendices 8.4 and 8.5) revealed that the maintenance of a steady dividend 
was more important to public companies than to private companies and also 
of greater interest to professional managers than to owner managers. (X2 
significant in each case at 0.005 level. ) These results are however not 
unexpected: the informational value of a stable dividend is more likely to 
be important in companies with wide share ownership. 
In contrast, the income requirements of the major shareholders should 
be of greater relevance in the owner-managed family firms. This was indeed 
seen to be the case among survey respondents with the concern for owners' 
income requirements being greater among owner-managed firms than among those 
managed professionally 
2 (X significant at 0.025 level). The relevance of 
tax consideration was, however, not systematically related to any other 
variable. 
If taxation considerations influence dividend policy and, as previously 
discussed (chapter 1), dividend policy can in turn affect share valuations, 
then it will be true that taxation may have a bearing on corporate market 
valuations, via its influence on dividend policy. In order to investigate 
this issue, a set of subsidiary questions was asked at the interview stage. 
On being asked if their dividend policy in any way affected the valuation 
of the company in the share market, ten interviewees commented on the 
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relationship between dividend policy and share prices: the others had no 
publicly quoted shares. Of the ten companies who commented on the influence 
of dividend policy on market values, seven companies believed that their 
level of distribution was reflected in the share valuations. However, on 
being asked whether their share valuations could be varied by changing the 
dividend payout ratio, all seven replied that they did not think this was 
possible. Further questioning disclosed that in their opinion, earnings 
rather than dividends were the main determinant of market prices. 
These apparently mutually inconsistent statements can be interpreted 
as implying that in the opinion of these interviewees, 
a) dividends are important in the market valuation of shares for 
their information content regarding company earnings, but 
b) a change in the proportion of earnings distributed will not 
influence market valuations other than to the extent that it 
signals possible changes in future earnings. 
Three public companies interviewed said that their share prices were 
not affected by dividend policy. The reasons given for their views were as 
follows: 
1. "... changes in dividend have no effect on share prices as the 
market for our shares is very small and transactions are few in 
number. " 
2. "Dividends are unimportant. There are hardly any dividend 
expectations today. Asset values are more important. " 
3. "Dividends do not affect prices much. The majority of our shares 
are owned by four or five individuals: though dividends have been 
poor nobody is willing to sell, probably because they are awaiting 
better times. " 
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The above remarks reflect the imperfect nature of the market for the 
shares of these public companies as well as the stagnant state at the time 
of the share market in general. On the whale, there was no evidence to 
suggest that any of the ten companies attempted to influence share valuations 
via dividend policy. The majority of these companies had, however, at the 
first stage of the survey said that taxation was a consideration in dis- 
tribution decisions. Remarks at the interviews on the subject indicated 
that their main concern was with the extent to which corporation income tax 
reduced profits and liquid resources available for distribution. 
Two of the private limited liability companies interviewed, however, 
practised an extreme form of dividend minimisation (viz. a policy of non- 
payment of dividend) so as to achieve tax minimisation. Both were family 
owned, and in both companies all shareholders were directors. The share- 
holders' income from the business was drawn in the form of directors' fees, 
salaries or bonus. Companies with wider ownership, particularly the public 
limited liability companies where ownership is divorced from management, 
were not particularly interested in attempting tax minimisation via dividend 
policy. 
Apart from the availability of distributable profits, the main con- 
sideration in dividend decisions is the availability of liquid funds. The 
influence of taxation on dividend decisions is exerted largely via its 
effects on liquidity. 
Organisational Levels of Decision-making 
Another interesting finding emerging from the survey relates to the 
level in the administration hierarchy at which investment, financing and 
distribution decisions are made. Although these major decision areas are 
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interconnected in many respects, the decisions in all three areas are not 
always taken at the same level in the organisation, as seen in Table 4J. 
Tabl e 4J 
Organisational Levels of Decision-making 
Number of firms in which decisions are 
usually taken by 
Board with Board of 
Parent Co. Members of 
Intervention Proprietory Chief Head of 
Decision family Executive Finance 
Investment 5 16 6 
Financing 7 17 3 
Distribution 22 5 
The questions to which the responses in Table 4J were received were 
intended to ascertain the level at which decisions were made in fact and 
not where legal responsibility for the decisions rests. It is however 
possible that the legal requirements that dividends be proposed by the 
directors and subsequently approved by shareholders may be a factor which 
causes a high proportion of distribution decisions to be reported as being 
made at board level. 
Financing decisions are taken largely at the executive level by the 
chief executive or the head of finance, while investment and distribution 
decisions are made mainly by the boards of directors. It is possible that 
this apparent separation of the three types of decision would lead to the " 
inadequate consideration of interdependencies (including tax-related inter- 
dependencies) between the three areas. 
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On the whole, the influence of taxation is greater on distribution 
decisions than on financing decisions. This difference, viewed together 
with the fact of the high degree of separation of the financing and 
distribution decisions at the administrative levels of decision making, 
indicates that in fact these aspects of financial management, which in 
theory have a large element of interdependence are treated by many SL 
business firms as distinctly separate decisions. It will not be unreason- 
able to suggest that such compartmentalisation of inter-related decision 
areas must increase the likelihood of suboptimum decisions in each area. 
The evidence from the present survey, however, does not permit any more 
definite conclusions. 
TAXATION AND OPERATING DECISIONS 
In the literature of public finance (discussed in chapter 1), the 
impact of taxation on operating decisions, particularly pricing and 
production level decisions, is hypothesised to be determined by the type 
of market in which the -firm operates and on whether the tax in question is 
a general or special tax. For instance, it is argued that in the short-term 
a new or increased corporation income tax cannot be passed forward in price 
by monopolists or by firms in a perfectly competitive market. Under con- 
ditions of oligopoly where prices may not have been fixed on supply-demand 
interactions the possibility of prices and output being adjusted by pro- 
ducers to reflect changes in income taxation is recognised. It is also argued 
that direct taxes which are based nearer market transactions are more likely 
to be shifted than income taxes on which the base is further removed from 
the market. 
Viewing the same issue from another perspective, the main decision 
criterion offered in the management accounting literature relating to cost- 
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volume-profit decisions at the level of the individual firm is that 
incremental benefits arising from the decision should exceed incremental 
costs. Costs and benefits discussed hardly ever explicitly refer to taxes 
and income taxes are generally implied to form a part of required return. 
(46) 
Even when taxes are discussed with reference to short term decisions, income 
taxes are merely depicted as a percentage adjustment to the required income 
such that, 
"Income before income taxes = 
Target after-tax net income (90) 
- tax rate 
This treatment would no doubt be satisfactory if all business profits were 
chargeable to tax in a uniform manner. But given the many incentives, 
disallowable items and the benefits of set-off incorporated in today's tax 
structures, the exclusion of income tax considerations from operating 
decisions or even a simple percentage adjustment to required return such 
as that described above could lead to suboptimum results. 
The results of the survey of SL firms discussed below suggest 
a) that those firms who do not budget for taxation are more 
likely to feel taxation to be a burden than those who regularly 
prepare tax-inclusive operating budgets, and 
b) that income taxes are not a direct information input to 
pricing decisions of most SL firms and, therefore, they 
are unlikely to attempt to shift changes in income tax in 
the form of price increases in the short-term. 
Survey results and discussion 
The thirty firms interviewed were questioned on their operations 
planning procedures - specifically their budgetary procedures and the extent 
to which taxation entered into their annual and medium term budgets. The 
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responses are summarised in Table 4K. 
Table 4K 
Taxation in Operatin g Budgets of SL firms 
In no. Cumulative 
Budgetary Practice of firms %age %age 
1. Both medium-term and annual budgets 
are prepared with all taxes 4 13 13 
2. Both medium-term and annual budgets 
are prepared, but all taxes only in 
annual budgets 2 7 20 
3. Only annual budgets are prepared, 
but with all taxes 12 40 60 
4. Annual budgets are prepared with sales 
taxes but not income taxes 3 10 70 
5. Annual budgets are prepared with no 
taxes 3 10 80 
6. No budget prepared 6 20 100 
30 100 
Seventy percent of the firms interviewed take indirect taxes into 
account in their annual budgets while 60% take both income tax and sales 
taxes. As far as can be ascertained, taking taxation into account in 
budgeting means that appropriate tax provisions would be included in profit 
forecasts and estimated tax payments would be recorded as outflows in cash 
budgets if these were prepared. 
The answers relating to budgetary practices were crosstabulated with 
organisation characteristics disclosed in the postal survey, but no signifi- 
cant relationships were discovered which could explain the differences in 
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practices among respondent firms. It is found (Appendix 8.6), however, 
that firms who prepare annual budgets inclusive of income taxes are less 
likely to find tax to be a constraint on the achievement of their objectives 
than firms who do not use budgets at all or who do not include income taxes 
in their budgets (X2 significant at 0.01 level). The above result suggests 
that the inclusion of income taxes in regular operations planning through budgets 
could contribute to a reduction in the burden of taxation perceived by business 
managers. In contrast, where income taxes are not built into budgets (or no 
systematic budgetary planning is done at all), taxation is likely to be seen as 
a series of difficult problems to be faced at regular intervals, year after year, 
In order to verify the manner in which taxation entered into pricing 
decisions of SL firms, the interviewees were questioned as to the main 
determinants of prices charged for their products. Twenty eight of the 
thirty interviewees were able to provide answers to this question and each 
person gave one or two factors as the main determinants of product prices 
for his firm. The responses are summarised in Table 4L. 
Table 4L 
Main Determinants of Product Prices 
No. of firms referring to item 
As main As one of Total 
determinant two main 
of prices determinants 
of prices 
A. Market demand 8 6 14 
B. Price control regulations 3 5 8 
C. Policy of State corporations 1 - 1 
D. Political factors - 1 1 
E. Operating costs 4 7 11 
F. Indirect taxes 2 1 3 
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Three of the respondents said that indirect taxes were a major 
determinant of prices in their firms. These were all firms for whom either 
BTT or excise or both formed a substantial part of total cost of sales. 
Income taxes were not referred to as a determinant of prices by any of the 
respondents. The respondents for whom operating costs were a major deter- 
minant of prices were asked if taxes were considered to be part of their 
costs. None of these firms included income taxes in operating costs: 
instead, income taxes were expected to be covered by the mark-up. All but 
one firm, however, specifically included indirect tax payments such as BTT, 
excise duty and import duty, in their computations of 'cost'. 
The practices of these firms clearly do not correspond to pricing 
behaviour of business described by Krzyzaniak and Musgrave in support of 
their theory of full short-run shifting of income taxes. They claim: 
"The businessman ... has been skeptical regarding the 
entire approach of marginal pricing. His position has 
been that taxes are treated as a cost when determining 
prices, be it as part of a 'full-cost-pricing' rule, by 
application of a conventional mark-up rate defined net 
of tax, or by pricing to meet a net of tax 
target rate of return. According to these formulae, 
a change in tax rate leads to an adjustment in price. 
The profits tax becomes a quasi sales tax. " 
(112, p. 2) 
The firms interviewed, even if they apply cost-plus pricing rules, 
work on a pre-tax mark-up, which implies that prices will not change as 
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an immediate response to a change in income tax. Their behaviour does 
however support the view of Herber 
(86) 
that income tax bases are further 
removed from market transactions than are bases of indirect tax, thereby 
leading to a difference in the treatment of the two sorts of tax in pricing 
decisions. 
Regarding income tax as part of the mark-up may mean that a change in 
the tax rate is not followed by an immediate adjustment to price, but it 
does not preclude periodic adjustment of the mark-up to take account of 
changes in income tax or other business outgoings covered by the mark-up. 
The analysis of SL company accounts in Chapter 10 suggests that tax-shifting 
has indeed been practised by business firms. 
Examining the determinants of product prices from a different perspect- 
ive, it may be argued that, if the main determinants of a firm's prices are 
costs or indirect taxes (items E and F in Table 4L), such a firm is relatively 
free to pass taxes forward in prices compared to a firm in one of the classes 
A-D, which will have its price levels determined largely outside the firm. 
Crosstabulation of firms which fell clearly into one or the other group 
against their sensitivity to taxation disclosed no significant difference 
between the groups in their perceptions of taxation as a constraint upon the 
achievement of their objectives (Appendix 8.7). The degree of freedom a firm 
has to determine its product prices and hence to shift taxes does not apparently 
influence the perceptions of management as to the burden of taxation. This 
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conclusion is, however, arrived at on the basis of a small sample of 
responses and must therefore be accepted with caution. Nevertheless, 
viewed together with results presented earlier in this thesis (in which 
sensitivity to tax constraints was seen to be related to organisational 
characteristics such as objectives and type of management), these results 
suggest that economic criteria alone will not satisfactorily measure the 
burden of taxation on business as perceived by business m4nagers. 
TAX PLANNING 
Finally, a number of questions were put to the interviewees in order 
to discover the extent of tax planning undertaking by SL firms. The majority 
of firms claimed to carry out some form of tax planning, but there was no 
evidence, for most of these firms, of systematic and comprehensive tax 
planning for the minimisation of taxation in the long term or for the 
exploitation of incentives or inequalities in the tax structure in the 
achievement of corporate objectives. 
Replies to the question 'do you actively practise tax-planning for 
minimisation of taxes? ', are summarised in Table 4M. 
Table 4M 
Tax Planning in SL Firms 
Tax planning practised Number of firms 
Yes 22 
No 8 
30 
Of the 22 companies who said they practised tax planning, three firms 
added "but not adequately", or words to that effect. Two of the eight firms 
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who said they did not practise tax planning explained that they had no 
need to do so on account of brought-forward tax losses. The remarks of 
these two firms again illustrate the short term view of taxation influences 
taken by some SL firms, and their apparent failure to recognise the time- 
value of tax losses and tax allowances. 
Examples of tax planning activities described by interviewees fall 
roughly into four broad classes, viz: 
1) planning tax-free benefits for management, particularly for 
owner-managers, 
2) planning for capital allowances, often an 'end-of-year' 
exercise in order to reduce current taxes, 
3) planning related to new major investments, and 
4) planning undertaken as a response to new tax laws. 
The overall impression gained at the interviews was that most firms 
from time to time attempted to minimise taxes with reference to a particular 
aspect of their activities, but that there was no effort made by the majority 
to co-ordinate such tax planning exercises to achieve long term optimisation 
on all aspects of tax influences. 
The previous section discussed budgetary practices and the treatment 
of tax in the operating budgets of interviewee firms. Tax planning, when 
carried out, is not usually a part of operations budgeting processes and 
appears to be undertaken on a rather more ad hoc basis. It was reported in 
the previous section that the use of tax inclusive budgets was associated 
with a lower sensitivity of respondents to the constraints of taxation. 
Active tax planning, however, does not show a similar association. On the 
contrary, firms who practice tax planning are seen to be more sensitive to 
tax constraints than firms who do not (appendix 8.8). This is, however, a 
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rather tentative conclusion as X2 significance is only at a 0.1 level. 
No conclusive evidence is available as to the reason for this difference. 
It is, however, not unreasonable to suggest that the regular routine of 
budgeting for taxes could reduce the uncertainties associated with taxation 
and therefore lead to a reduction in the perceived burden of taxation. Ad 
hoc tax planning exercises could very well be a response to perceptions of 
a high burden of taxation: hence the positive relationship observed between 
these two variables. 
rnnrl tic i nns 
On the whole, the effects of taxation on major business decision areas 
appear to be not as great as anticipated in theoretical analysis. Where the 
influence of taxation is observed, it appears to be related largely to its 
immediate cash flow effects. Rational maximising behaviour in response to 
taxation that is expected in theory is less in evidence. In most cases the 
low relevence of tax influences can be attributed to the presence of other 
more critical factors (market imperfections) which over-ride the tax con- 
siderations. Finally, a difference is observed between the treatment of 
income taxes and the treatment of indirect taxes in pricing decisions 
suggesting that the traditional hypothesis of pricing behaviour whereby 
changes in income taxes will not be shifted in the short-term may apply to 
SL firms. 
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CHAPTER 5 
SURVEY OF PROFESSIONAL OBSERVERS IN SRI LANKA 
OBJECTIVES AND METHODS 
The main objective of this survey was to obtain independent 
professional opinion in regard to business response to taxation stimuli. 
Such opinion on general questions not related to the experience or 
practices of particular business firms, it was expected, would 
a) provide a secondary source of information on the attitudes 
of business firms, and 
b) provide us with relatively impartial views on the response 
of business to taxation. 
The survey method was similar to that adopted for firms. Questionnaires 
were sent out to 200 professional persons, whose names were extracted from 
a SL directory of trade and general information "(5) The addressees were 
mainly accountants (i. e. members of the two main professional accounting 
bodies in the country), but also included lawyers, bankers and senior 
members of the department of inland revenue and trade chambers. A copy of 
the questionnaire sent out to professional persons is to be found in appendix 
9. 
Of the 200 persons circulated, 80 replied to the questionnaire, a 
response rate of 40%. The postal survey was carried out in 1976/77 and was 
followed by personal interviews with 20 of the 80 respondents. 
Not all respondents in the postal survey disclosed their occupation, 
but over 75% of those who replied were accountants. Of the twenty inter- 
viewees, 8 were accountants in public practice while 5 were accountants in 
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management positions in industry. The other interviewees were the chief 
executive of a multinational company, a lawyer, and three senior officers 
of the department of inland revenue. 
A number of questions similar to those in the questionnaire to firms, 
but with more generalised wording, were asked in the postal survey of 
professional observers. The responses are analysed below. 
CONSTRAINTS ON BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT 
On the whole, professional observers and business managers agree on 
the relative importance of the main constraints on business development. 
However, two major differences were observed: 
a) In the view of professional observers, income tax is a greater 
constraint than indirect taxes, whereas business managers tend 
to believe the opposite to be true; 
b) political uncertainty appears to be less important to business 
managers than is believed to be the case by professional 
observers. 
Taxation as a constraint 
Answers to the question 'from your experience of business activity 
in your country, would you say that corporate or personal taxation has proved 
in the past to be a factor inhibiting business development? ' are summarised _ 
in Table 5A. 
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Table 5A 
Professional opinion on Taxation as a Constraint 
Is taxation a Constraint? 
No. of responses % 
Yes -a major constraint 19 24 
-a fairly important constraint '48 60 
-a minor constraint 45 
71 89 
No 9 11 
80 100 
A large majority of respondents felt that taxation has been a 
constraint on business development. The response from business firms to a 
similar but more specific question was reported in chapter 3. Business 
firms were asked 'would it be correct to say that taxation is or has been 
a problem making it difficult for your firm to achieve its objectives? ': 
only 54% of the respondents said yes. It can be seen that the professional 
persons making general statements about the private sector feel more strongly 
about taxation as a constraint than do business managers answering on behalf 
of their firms. 
Later in this section it will be seen that all questions relating to 
possible environmental constraints were answered positively by a higher 
proportion of professional observers in comparison with business managers: 
such a difference is indeed to be expected if it is recognised that profess- 
ional observers are likely to be generalising from particular client experience. 
At the subsequent interviews, respondents were requested to state the 
main reasons underlying their views on taxation as a constraint on business 
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development. The replies are summarised in Table 5B. 
Table 5B 
Explanatory Factors for views on Taxation 
No. of respondents 
Taxation is a constraint because of 
Burden of income tax (corporate & personal) 11 
Burden of indirect taxes 2 
Uneven distribution of incentives 2 
Uncertainty of taxation 1 
Taxation is not a constraint because of 
Availability of double tax relief and 
small company relief 2 
Presence of other more important constraints 1 
Widespread tax evasion 
The burden of income tax, both personal and company, appears to 
professional observers as the major tax constraint on business development. 
According to one interviewee, 
"To understand the impact of taxes on business, it is necessary 
to realise the total rate of tax that is effectively extracted 
from income. In the case of foreign companies doing business 
here, there is first a 60% company tax, then a 6% tax, then a 
11 1/9% tax, which comes to 77 1/9%. Even after that, profits cannot 
be remitted without paying 65% FEECs; with the result that the total 
impact, on profits, of taxes amounts to 85%. This is not taxation 
but confiscatory legislation. When you take into account other 
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disallowable items and the risks involved, it certainly inhibits 
investment. " 
This interviewee included FEECs, a pseudo-tax, payable on remittances 
overseas as part of taxes borne by foreign investors but no reference 
was made to sales taxes or other indirect taxes on business. 
Corporate income tax which at the time of the interviews was being 
charged at a rate higher than the maximum income tax rate on individuals 
was referred to as the major constraint by many interviewees. Two typical 
remarks are quoted below: 
"Company taxation appears to be out of alignment with individual 
taxation, as the company rate of tax of 60% is higher than the 
marginal rate of tax on individuals. " 
"Company taxation discourages the formation 
the formation of companies comes a certain 
disciplined way of doing business, even to 
preparing accounts every year and having t 
Only two professional interviewees referred 
of companies. With 
amount of control, a 
the minimum extent of 
hem audited. " 
to indirect taxes among 
the main reasons why taxation is a constraint on business development. One 
of them pointed out that, 
"... Business turnover tax has affected the turnover of a number 
of companies. This in turn has retarded their development plans. 
It is ironic that a number of industries that started with tax 
holidays were of the luxury or semi-luxury goods type and that these 
were subsequently saddled with high BTT rates. " 
In contrast, sales related taxes were referred to as the most 
troublesome aspect of the tax structure by 8 of the 30 business managers 
interviewed. Income taxes on the other hand were referred to as the major 
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problem by 11 of the 20 professional interviewees and only 3 out of 30 
business managers. 
Discussion revealed that professional observers are not unaware of 
the high level of business turnover tax (BTT), but that the difference in 
views between them and business managers stems from their belief that BTT 
can be, and is, shifted to consumers with little effect on the level of 
business activity. One interviewee went so far as to say; 
"Because BTT is a hidden tax, we find people exploiting this by 
building into their prices something more than the actual BTT. " 
The pricing practices of interviewee firms reported in chapter 4 indicate 
that these firms do attempt to shift BTT in prices. Nevertheless, this 
indirect tax remained the major problem area in taxation for business 
managers. 
The respondents were also requested to compare the tax burden on 
business at the time, with that 8 to 10 years ago, that 2 to 3 years ago 
and that expected to prevail 2 to 3 years hence. The responses are 
summarised in Table 5C. 
Table 5C 
Tax burden at present is 
Much Somewhat About the A little Much 
higher higher same lower lower 
Compared with 
Taxes 8-10 years ago 34 26 763 
Taxes 2-3 years ago 4 18 33 17 6 
Taxes expected 2-3 
years from now 1 10 44 16 2 
- 149 - 
Table 5C shows that the majority of respondents believed that the 
burden of taxation at the time was higher than the burden 8-10 years ago 
but was about the same as that existing 2-3 years previously and that 
expected to prevail 2-3 years hence. The tax burden expected 2-3 years 
hence was believed to match the current tax levels closer than taxes in 
the past. 
These responses indicate expectations of little or no change in tax 
levels in medium-term future. Professional opinion in this respect matches 
the treatment of taxation in investment appraisals carried out by business. 
It was disclosed in the survey of business firms (reported in the previous 
chapter), that most investment appraisals by SL business are done on the 
assumption that current tax levels will prevail during the life of the 
investment project. Professional observers take very much the same view of 
the future and this is done despite their majority belief that the tax 
burden has risen over the past ten years. 
Other constraints 
Professional respondents were also asked to comment on the list of 
six possible problem areas other than taxation: their answers are summarised 
in Table 5D, with the response to the question on taxation inserted to show 
its relative importance against other constraints. 
As in the case of the question on taxation, there is a higher positive 
response from professionals on every environmental constraint listed in the 
questionnaire, but the rankings are fairly similar between the two groups 
(Spearman's r=0.857; significance level = 0.01 ). The only major 
difference in ranking relates to the problem of labour relations which is 
- 150 - 
Table 5D 
Professional opinion regarding Constraints on Business 
Professiona l respondents Responses 
considering each factor to similar 
to be a sig nificant questions 
constraint addressed to 
business firms 
As %age of total as %age of 
No. responses total responses 
Problem area 
Import controls 75 94 77 
Taxation 71 89 55 
Price controls 67 84 41 
Shortage of finance 58 73 47 
Labour relations 49 61 18 
Market limitations 41 51 27 
Shortage of technical 
or professional skills 28 35 19 
ranked last by business firms but higher up in fourth place by professionals. 
No obvious explanation for this difference is available, but it is possible 
to speculate that labour problems are probably not a constraint encountered 
by many firms, though when they do occur, they are a constraint of considerable 
magnitude. The relative placing of taxation as a constraint is the same in 
both surveys lending support to the view that businessmen surveyed did not 
exaggerate the ill-effects of taxation to any great extent. 
Many professional respondents to the questionnaire added further items 
to our list of environmental constraints. These are summarised in Table 5E. 
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Table 5E 
Additional Constraints listed by Professional Observers 
Referred to by No. of As %age of total 
Constraint Respondents responses 
Political uncertainty 17 21 
Risk of nationalisation 12 15 
Exchange controls 34 
Government monopolies 34 
Cultural factors 34 
Overbureaucratization 23 
Lack of enterprise among businessmen 23 
Social criticism 11 
Decrease in value of SL currency 11 
Several interesting observations can be made in relation to the 
additional factors perceived as constraints on business development. 
Firstly, the item 'political uncertainty' added to the list by 21% of the 
professional respondents was not mentioned by a single business firm. On 
the whole more constraints were added to the list by professional respondents 
than by firms. Other constraints listed by professionals and not by firms 
were a) lack of enterprise among business men, b) social and cultural 
influences and c) the decline in the exchange value of the SL rupee. 
The last item, the decline in the value of the SL currency, was listed 
by the local chief executive of a multinational who explained that with 
reducing rupee exchange value, the apparent profitability of local operations 
was reduced when converted to the currency of the parent company. 
It is not to be expected that business managers will consider their 
own lack of enterprise to be a constraint on their business; but it is not 
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immediately clear why political uncertainty should appear a constraint to 
so many outside observers but not at all to the firms themselves, or why 
social/cultural factors referred to by professionals (though not to the same 
extent as political uncertainty) should not be thoughtof as a problem by 
business firms. 
Subsequent interview discussions however revealed that some of these 
problems were perceived by business managers as falling under the more 
direct and specific environmental limitations listed by them, such as import 
controls or threat of nationalisation. For instance, one newly established 
firm awaiting ministerial approval as a 'pioneer industry' for tax holiday 
purposes admitted to being worried that if the approval was not received 
before the election, a change of government, or even a change of finance 
minister, may jeopardise their approval. But they did not include political 
uncertainty as a problem in their list of constraints. 
On the whole, the opinionsof professional observers match the views of 
business managers in that the main environmental constraints on business are 
seen by both groups as originating in government action. Market factors are 
relatively less important. 
TN(. FNTIVFS 
Professional respondents were asked in the questionnaire to comment on 
the same list of incentives as business firms. The professional respondents 
were asked to pick the one or two incentives considered to have been most 
effective in encouraging business development. Table 5F summarises the 
replies and provides a comparison with the response of business managers to 
a similar question. 
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Table 5F 
Professional opinion on Investment Incentives 
Ranking Profes sionals Firms 
by prof- Most effective incentives Most useful incentives 
essional No. choosing %age of %age of observers Incentive incentive Total Total Ranking 
1 Tax holidays 54 68 30 2 
2 Convertible 
rupees (CRAs) 40 50 18 4 
3 Lump sum 
depreciation 19 24 53 1 
4 FEECs 18 23 14 5 
5 Investment relief 7 9 3 6 eq. 
6 Development rebate 3 4 19 3 
7 eq. Cash subsidies 2 3 3 6 eq. 
7 eq. Guaranteed prices 
and state market- 
ing services 2 3 3 6 eq. 
The rankings by the two groups are not very close in this instance 
(Spearman's r=0.58; not significant at 0.05 level). Tax holidays are 
ranked by professionals as the most effective incentive offered by government. 
Convertible rupee accounts rank second while lump sum depreciation and FEECs 
are listed next, but a long way behind the first two. In contrast, business 
firms on being asked to pick the two most useful incentives voted for lump 
sum depreciation as the most useful item on the list, followed some way 
behind by tax holidays. Ranked in third place by business managers was 
development rebate, which was picked as one of the most effective by only 
4% of the professional observers, which gave it a very low ranking in their 
list. Another major difference is seen in respect of CRAs, ranking in 
second place in the professional list with 50% of respondents picking it 
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but ranked fourth below both lump sum depreciation and development rebate 
by business managers. In other words, capital allowances are valued as 
the most useful incentives by business firms whereas tax holidays and CRAs 
are believed by professional observers to have been the most effective. 
Are the two sets of responses inconsistent with one another? Under 
a given tax regime, can the most effective incentive for business develop- 
ment be anything other than that which is most useful to businessmen? This 
apparent inconsistency between the two sets of responses can be explained 
if we consider the nature of the incentives and the timing of their offers. 
Lump sum depreciation (an accelerated depreciation allowance) and to 
a limited extent development rebate (an additional capital allowance given 
selectively) had been available since the late fifties on acquisition of 
capital assets whether by new business or old and for both commencement of 
business and expansion. Though tax holidays had been on offer for even 
longer, these were only available at commencement of business for a limited 
period of time to approved firms or activities fulfilling a number of pre- 
conditions laid down by statute. CRAs (a more recent offer of free exchange 
of a percentage of foreign exchange earnings) were only available to 
exporters of non-traditional products. 
In judging effectiveness of one incentive against another, it is very 
difficult to discern the impact on investment of an incentive such as 
accelerated capital allowances which are available universally to all 
business activities. In contrast, with tax holidays, investment in a given 
sector after the offer of the holiday can be assessed with comparative ease 
against investment in that sector prior to the offer. Similarly with CRAs, 
export statistics are available indicating spectacular increases in gem 
exports after the offer of liberal CRA facilities to this activity. 
(143) 
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From the point of view of business firms, not every firm has 
received tax holidays or CRAs but, without exception, every business 
investing in capital assets other than land in the past two decades 
would have benefitted from capital allowances. Furthermore, capital 
allowances are available for investments undertaken at any time, whereas 
tax holidays are available only for a limited period after the commencement 
of an approved activity. An existing firm undertaking a new activity in a 
tax holiday area would have to choose between the tax holiday and capital 
allowances on initial investment in capital assets. Capital allowances 
could be set off against current profits from other activities, whereas 
the benefit of a tax holiday has to be drawn over the holiday period as 
taxes saved on the profit on the new activity. For a firm already in a 
tax-paying position, therefore, there is a distinct current cash flow 
advantage associated with capital allowances which is not found with a 
tax holiday. 
However, evidence from the survey suggests that some professional 
observers outside business firms may not appreciate the cash flow benefits 
of accelerated capital allowances to a growing company; e. g., an accountant 
in public practice said, 
"Tax holidays are far more valuable than lump sum depreciation. 
One doesn't pay any tax at all under a tax holiday. " 
The survey evidence also reveals a belief among some professionals that 
accelerated capital allowances are not an incentive at all, but one of many 
methods of deducting depreciation in computing profits. A lawyer special- 
ising in tax law told us that 
"Contrary to popular belief accelerated depreciation does not 
save tax. On the contrary, it increases the burden subsequently. 
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Particularly with progressive taxation, it increases the burden 
of tax by allowing the income in later years to be subject to 
higher rates of taxation. " 
His argument would be valid for personal income tax payers who are 
charged at progressive rates, but ignores both the time-value of 
accelerated allowances and the fact that in a continuously growing firm, 
the postponement of tax arising from the acceleration of capital allowances 
is not a short-term postponement. Theoretically, if the firm continues to 
invest in capital assets year after year, the postponement can be for an 
infinite period. 
It is relevant in this discussion also to note that in the last two 
decades in SL, tax holidays and CRAs have been offered to favoured act- 
ivities as part of a package of benefits. Approval for tax holiday 
purposes has usually been accompanied by import permits for machinery and 
equipment and generous quotas for raw material imports during the initial 
years. Under such circumstances, it is possible that tax holidays which 
are more easily identified with a given activity than most other benefits 
usually given by administrative decision could be credited with attracting 
investment to that activity. This possibility was referred to by an accountant 
in industry: 
"Tax holidays in my view are not very effective as generally 
in the commencing years business makes very little profit and 
more often than not makes losses ... But ... where business was 
approved for tax purposes, while there was no particular tax ad- 
vantage over the commencing years, in my experience there was an 
advantage in that special attention was paid to such business and 
it was possible to obtain import of necessities and relaxation of 
other restrictions more freely. " 
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Though professional observers are generally of the opinion that tax 
holidays have been more effective in promoting business development than 
capital allowances, most of them were critical of either the concept of 
tax incentives for development or its application in SL or both. The main 
arguments are listed below. 
1. Whether tax incentives are a necessary catalyst in promoting 
business development was questioned. For instance, 
"Every country is trying to outbid the others by giving 
incentives. All these incentives have not brought us much 
by way of foreign investment. What people really want is a 
favourable investment climate. Tax incentives cannot com- 
pensate for an unfavourable investment climate and are not a 
substitute for a basic tax structure that is fair and reasonable. " 
"What has really made a difference is CRA. Taxes - people know 
they can always avoid or evade. " 
2. The effectiveness of incentives was thought to be reduced by the 
uncertainty attached to them. 
"Incentives are given on a rather ad-hoc, short-term basis, 
except, that is, for lump sum depreciation. " 
"One finance minister gives some incentive which another 
finance minister withdraws. " 
3. The uneven distribution of incentives was criticised. 
"There are many enterprises who have had relatively extended 
periods of tax holidays. These thrive at the expense of 
others which are not getting these benefits .. so that growth 
is very uneven. " 
4. Incentives through the tax system are hidden subsidies to business, 
and undesirable as their benefits cannot be assessed against their 
costs. 
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"If it is politically desirable to encourage hotels then let 
the ministry of tourism pay out of its funds the cost of 
hotels or 50% of the cost of hotels ..., the tax assessor 
is not an evaluator of benefits of the hotel industry. " 
5. Tax incentives are not ui 
funds could be chanrelled 
"The position today is 
investment, but there 
that investment could 
understand the byways 
iderstood by the public at large, whose 
into business investment. 
that people have a lot df funds for 
is no investment opportunity or knowledge 
recoup dividends. The average man doesn't 
and alleyways of tax holidays. " 
6. The multitude of incentive schemes have created administrative 
problems for the inland revenue department. 
"In fact tax assessors are called upon to spend a large part 
of their time in computation of reliefs as opposed to quanti- 
fication of income. " 
7. Selective tax holidays are believed to have created opportunities 
for tax evasion in other activities. 
"Shifting income from taxable to tax-free areas is also a 
problem of some scale. " 
There are on record instances of such action to evade taxation or 
rather to bring back income earned in the black market with tax evasion into 
the mainstream of legal funds. For instance, CRA-cum-tax holiday benefits 
to the gem industry are reported to have been used to bring into the island 
illegally earned foreign currency funds. 
(143) 
The main difference observed in this section between the views of 
professional observers and those of business managers related to the role 
of capital allowances. These are believed by professional observers to have 
- 159 - 
been less effective in promoting investment than other incentives offered 
by the State. Business managers, however, are of the view that capital 
allowances have been the most useful incentive they have received. 
The official government view of capital allowances since the mid- 
seventies has also been similar to that of the professional observers, 
and has led to the withdrawal of all capital allowances in 1981. The 
present minister of finance of SL, who proposed in his 1978 budget speech 
to remove this benefit, speaking at the Commonwealth Institute in London in 
early 1979, explained the reason for his proposal as "an attempt to curb 
the widespread abuse of these provisions. " He went so far as to say, 
"It is fairly common for businessmen to buy tractors or similar 
equipment only to get the capital allowances and then to keep them 
locked away, unused in their warehouses. " 
Views on budget provisions 
As a further test of professional opinion on tax incentives and dis- 
incentives, the respondents were asked for their views on some of the 
proposals in regard to taxation announced in the latest budget speech. 
(201, p175) 
They were requested to indicate against each of seventeen proposals, the 
effect it was likely to have on growth of business in Sri Lanka on a five 
point scale. The points on this scale were described as (a) a major 
incentive, (b) a minor incentive, (c) a neutral provision (d) a minor 
disincentive and (e) a major disincentive. The responses are summarised 
and ranked in Tables 5G and 5H. 
It will be seen from Table 5G that a proposed reduction in upper rates 
of individual income tax was ranked first in the list of incentives. Indeed, 
this was the only proposal believed by the majority to be a major incentive 
for business development. In contrast, a proposed reduction in the rate of 
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Table 5G 
Budget Proposals considered to be incentives for business development 
Rankin Description of proposal Score 
1 Reduction in maximum rate of income tax payable 
by resident individuals from 75% to 50% with 
effect from the year of assessment 1976/77.122 
2 Subject to a specified ceiling, where a person 
carrying on an undertaking in Sri Lanka has in 
the year preceding any year of assessment 
commencing on or after 1.4.76, brought foreign 
exchange into the country for the purpose of 
that undertaking, he will be entitled to a 
deduction from the income tax payable by him 
for that year of assessment, of an amount equal 
to the amount of foreign exchange brought in or 
20% of the income tax attributable to the income 
from such undertaking for that year of assessment 
whichever is lower. 91 
3A company falling within the definition of a People's 
Company will be liable to income tax at a reduced 
rate of 40% of taxable income, with effect from 
the year of assessment 1976/77.90 
4 The definition of an approved investment for 
purposes of investment relief under section 16CC 
of the Act, has been extended to include (among 
others) any sum invested on or after 1st April 1975 
continued.... 
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Table 5G (continued) 
Ranking Description of proposal Score 
in the purchase of new ordinary shares in a 
company approved by the Minister and engaged 
solely in the construction and sale of houses. 90 
5 Subject to a specified upper limit, a company, 
investing in any undertaking on or after lst 
April 1976, in accordance with investment plans 
approved by the Authorities, will be entitled 
to a deduction from income tax payable for that 
year of assessment of an amount equal to the 
investment or 10% of taxable income for that year, 
whichever is lower. 
6 Where any person carrying on an undertaking in 
agriculture, fishing, mining or manufacture, has 
after 1st January 1976, increased the number of 
persons other than executives employed in that 
undertaking, such persons can claim a deduction 
(of an amount specified in the law) from income 
88 
tax attributable to that undertaking. 72 
7 Earnings in foreign exchange in the course of any 
profession, vocation or employment carried on or 
exercised abroad by a resident person is exempt 
from income tax with effect from the year of 
assessment 1976/77, provided such earnings less 
reasonable expenses are remitted to Sri Lanka. 71 
continued.... 
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Table 5G (continued) 
* The 'Score' in Tables 5G and 5H is computed 
as follows: 
Major incentive 2 
Minor incentive 1 
Neutral 0 
Minor disincentive -1 
Major disincentive -2 
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Table 5H 
Budget Proposals considered to be disincentive for business development 
Rankin Description of proposal Score 
a. Increase in the maximum rate of personal tax 
by 10% to give effect to a proposal in the 
previous budget -97 
1 b. Removal of exemption of profit on sale of gems 
through the State Gem Corporation, för com- 
panies incorporated after 6th November 1974. -97 
c. Dividends declared by gem exporting companies 
out of earnings after Ist April 1975 will not 
be exempt from dividend tax. -97 
4 Dividends declared after 1.4.74/ordinary shares by 
gemming companies will be exempt from dividend 
tax only up to 10%. -85 
5 Dividends declared by gemming companies after 
1.4.74 on shares other than ordinary shares 
will not be exempt. -83 
6 Exemptions from income tax of an entertainment 
allowance received by an employee is withdrawn -40 
7 Introduction of an expenditure tax. -35 
8 Income of co-operative societies from some 
previously exempt sources will become liable 
to income tax. -34 
9 Withdrawal of tax free travelling allowances to 
employees of business firms. -33 
10 Every business firm is required to close accounts 
on the 31st March of each year. -10 
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company income tax for companies qualifying as peoples companies (ie. 
companies with broad-based ownership) was ranked third and believed by 
the majority to be only a minor incentive for business development. 
The high ranking given to a reduction in personal income tax rates 
indicates the importance of personal income tax to the business sector in 
a country where (a) most business units are organised as individual 
proprietorships or partnerships, and (b) even among limited companies, 
the majority are controlled by a small number of individuals, usually 
from the same extended family. 
The fact that the introduction of a lower rate of company tax was 
believed to be a minor incentive, is however, not to be interpreted as 
indicating company taxes to be altogether unimportant: subsequent inter- 
view discussions suggest that the qualifying conditions stipulated were 
believed to limit the value of this tax reduction to business firms. The 
company tax reductions were conditional upon ownership of the company being 
broad-based. Owners' control requirements and the inactive state of the 
share market were believed to preclude advantage being taken of this offer 
by most companies. The fact that administrative approval of individual 
applications was necessary before the tax reductions would be allowed was 
also considered a drawback. In general the value of an incentive was 
believed to be reduced by the requirement to obtain administrative approval. 
Many instances were cited of delays in obtaining approval for tax holidays 
and similar conditional incentives and of alleged discrimination in granting 
approvals. 
Among otherproposals in the budget listed as incentives were three 
types of investment relief, a tax exemption tied to an increase in employ- 
ment of non-executive staff and another exemption from income tax for 
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foreign earnings of professional persons. None of these were believed 
to be more than minor incentives. 
Among the provisions believed to be disincentives (Table 5H), not 
one was thought to be a major disincentive. However, ranked in joint 
first place was a provision relating to personal income tax rates. This 
proposal required personal taxes to be raised for one year, to give effect 
to an announcement made in the previous budget speech. Its ranking as one of 
the proposals to have the greatest negative effect on business development, 
albeit as a minor disincentive, reinforces our conclusion arrived at with 
reference to the ranking of incentives, that personal taxation has an 
important impact on business activity in SL. It would not be unreasonable 
to suggest that the same would be true of many LDCs, where the majority of 
business units were unincorporated. 
Ranked in equal first place under disincentives, along with the 
provision relating to personal tax rates, were two provisions proposing 
to withdraw tax holiday benefits granted in the early seventies to gem 
exporting companies. It was suggested by some interviewees that the 
withdrawal of tax holiday benefits may have adverse repercussions beyond 
the immediate effects on gem exporters, in that any incentives offered in 
the future could be viewed with suspicion by businessmen who would not 
expect the incentives to last beyond the term of office of the minister of 
finance offering them. 
An expenditure tax re-introduced after a lapse of more than fifteen 
years was believed by about half the respondents to be a minor disincentive 
for business growth. The government's objective in introducing an expend- 
iture tax was stated in the budget to be the curbing of consumption expend- 
iture: but some of the professional respondents appeared to believe that 
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it would be a minor disincentive to business development as well. The 
exemption limits for purposes of this tax (ie. allowable expenditure) 
were set at fairly high levels and not many persons were expected to be 
affected by it. 
On the whole, apart from the proposal to reduce upper levels of 
personal income tax, no other budget proposal was seen to have a major 
influence on business development. The results reflect the generally 
held view among professional observers that a low tax rate is superior 
to tax incentives as a means of promoting business development. 
Financing Decisions 
The response of professional persons was very similar to that of 
business firms in regard to their opinion on the impact of taxation on the 
financing of business activity. Table 51 summarises the views of professional 
respondents: 
Table 51 
Professional opinion on relevance of Taxation in Financing Decisions 
Tax considerations play 
a significant part in Number of 
Borrowing Policy decisions of responses 
All firms 3 
The majority of firms 26 
Some firms 37 
A few firms 9 
No firm 3 
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In the previous chapter, on the analysis of responses of business 
firms, it was concluded that: 
1. taxation was not an important consideration in decisions relating 
to borrowing policy of most firms; 
2. when tax was taken into account, the main factor considered 
relevant was the effect of tax payments on liquidity and debt 
service capacity, and 
3. planning for minimisation of tax by suitable gearing arrangements 
did not appear to be widespread. 
These conclusions are supported to a large extent by the views 
expressed by professional observers. Firstly, in the opinion of the 
majority of professional observers taxation is not a significant consider- 
ation in borrowing policy decisions of most firms. 
In explaining their views on the subject at the interview stage of 
the survey, none of the interviewees mentioned tax deductability of interest 
payments as a relevant consideration in financing decisions. However, an 
officer of the Department of Inland Revenue alluded to the possibility as 
follows: 
"In the last two or three years, I have noticed, speaking with 
accountants and people like that, that they not only prepare 
accounts of past activities but that they give advice on tax 
planning. So if the client is sensitive enough and listens to 
his adviser, then he will get educated so to speak and begin to 
look at tax as a factor which ought to control his activities. 
I think the bigger firms do consider tax in financing decisions. " 
Judging by the views of professional accountants interviewed, however, 
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tax advantages of gearing did not appear an important consideration to 
them. 
One accountant explained that SL businesses borrow as much as they 
can; 
"... especially in the areas where there are virtual monopolies, 
where they can sell without price controls - what is 12% on 
interest to such people. When, say, the ratio of debt to capital 
is about 5: 1, what is 12% on the 5 when the whole balance comes to 
the 1. " 
The fact that the net of tax cost of interest would be lower than the 
12%, said to be the average commercial bank lending rate at the time, did 
not appear to be appreciated by this interviewee. 
Four of the interviewees commented specifically on the relevance of 
tax-deductability of interest payments. Only one of the four thought this 
would be a relevant consideration but he too added "... not that it is the 
major consideration. " 
Where taxation was taken into account, the impact on debt servicing 
capacity was believed to be the main consideration. Some illustrative 
remarks of interviewees are quoted below: 
"... if you are going to pay a 12% rate of interest (that is the 
average interest rate), and you have to pay back the capital after 
paying tax, that is difficult. " 
".... when there is a tax holiday or a mitigated incidence of tax 
they find it easier to repay loans, and instead of asking for more 
capital they are prepared to borrow, with the hope that they can 
repay and replace the borrowing. " 
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Two other aspects of tax influences were described as follows: 
"Liberal investment allowances enable ready collection of 
ordinary share capital. " 
- An officer of the Department of Inland 
Revenue. 
"... there is a very large percentage that borrow just for tax 
purposes. They have the money, but from January tQ March they 
are running around from bank to bank, borrowing as much as 
possible to show in their books at year end; so as to show 
where they got money and to reduce their wealth tax liability 
and to cover up massive evasion that had been going on over 
the year .... They come in and say "You know I have the money, 
but I'd like to have this for tax purposes": and of course we 
are quite happy to lend to him because we know he won't default. " 
-A banker, discussing lending to 
personal borrowers. 
The observations of professional observers support our conclusions on 
the survey of firms that the advantages of gearing for tax minimisation 
are not adequately appreciated by the SL business community. The impact of 
taxation on liquidity appears to be the main consideration when taxes are 
taken into account in financing decisions. Factors other than taxation are 
however believed to be more important. 
The professional interviewees were invited to comment further on the 
determinants of financing policy among SL business firms. The main points 
emerging from the discussions are summarised below together with illustrative 
extracts from interview transcripts. 
1. The Colombo share market was believed to be inactive and inefficient 
both as a secondary security market and as a source of new equity funds. 
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"We don't have a proper share market as such. Today we 
find it difficult to sell a share: sometimes you have to 
wait more than a month to find a buyer. "- 
"You know the share market is dead, so it is hardly noticed. 
It will be the rare person who will go through a company's 
dividend record. Investment may today be not so much for 
dividends as for capital gains, using the company as a sort 
of haven. " 
"The share market has not made much impact, because even in 
the case of quoted companies they are closely controlled. 
The people who invest in shares feel that there are too many 
other factors in the way of the market expressing their views 
on performance of companies. The fact is that our Companies 
Ordinance is so outdated that the information to be disclosed 
is very little. " 
2. In the presence of an inefficient share market, borrowing from 
commercial banks is seen as the easiest alternative to finance 
from family funds. 
"Dependence is mainly on finance by family units and bank 
borrowing. " 
"There is no well-developed capital market for the generation 
of funds for investment as in the west, so that the banks are 
a very important source. " 
3. The requirements of banks for collateral and their unwillingness to 
lend on the profitability of projects was criticised. 
"Apart from established business and the newer men who have done 
very well, others still find it difficult to get finance. The 
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banks are very demanding and their procedures are very 
cumbersome. But for established business they can get 
what they want for the asking on a mere telephone call 
to the bank. " 
"Our banks don't lend on a viable proposition; but on 
security. You have to prove that you are worth a million 
before they give you ten thousand. " 
4. There was no agreement among interviewees as to the borrowing 
preferences of SL business. Many interviewees believed that SL 
business has traditionally been slow to borrow. Owners' control 
requirements were seen to be one reason for not wishing to have 
outside participation in capital. 
"The average Ceylonese businessman is rather conservative and 
seems reluctant to get into debt... that may be one reason 
why they find it difficult to grow. " 
"The sector that I work in prefers to use their own money and 
then their own bankers .. the idea of getting other people's 
money and operating on it is not the norm.... Even the very 
successful businessmen - in the business they started they 
want to have control. " 
5. Another, more recent influence on borrowing policy was pointed out 
to be the Business Acquisition Act. (202) 
"Businessmen borrow as much as they can when there is a risk of 
take-over. " 
Financial theory states that the higher the commercial and operating 
risks facing a firm, the less able it is to undertake the financial 
risks of gearing. For example, 
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"with greater stability in sales and earnings, a firm can 
incur the fixed charges of debt with less risk than it can 
when its sales and earnings are subject to periodic declines; 
in the latter instance it will have difficulty in meeting its 
obligations... leverage may be used to boost stockholders 
returns, but it is used at the risk of increasing losses if 
the firm's economic fortunes decline. "(( 
93, p. 686) 
But here we see a different influence of anothermore extreme form 
of uncertainty on borrowing policy. In the presence of uncertainty 
relating to operating returns, the optimal course of action in regard to 
the financial structure may be to lower borrowing: but when the uncertainty 
relates to the survival of the firm, such as when there is a non-negligible 
probability of nationalisation, then the interests of shareholders are best 
served by maximising gearing. 
The views of professional observers summarised above support, to a 
large extent, the findings of the survey of business firms that 
(1) owner's control requirements are a major consideration in decisions 
relating to capital structure, 
(2) borrowing from commercial banks is perhaps the easiest form of 
finance where owner's control requirements or inefficient capital 
markets rule out access to equity, and 
(3) tax effects on financing of SL business are felt mainly via 
liquidity considerations. 
PROFIT DISTRIBUTIONS 
On the question of profit distributions, the professional respondents 
believed, by and large, that the majority of firms took taxation into 
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consideration in such decisions. The responses are summarised in Table 
5J. 
Table 5J 
Professional opinions on the relevance of taxation in Distribution Decisions) 
Tax considerations play a 
significant part in dis- 
tribution of profits to No. of 
owners of responses 
All firms 11 
The majority of firms 44 
Some firms 13 
A few firms 7 
No firm 3 
The response of the professional observers supports the response 
from business firms in so far as taxation is thought to be a consideration 
for more firms in making their distribution decisions than with respect to 
financing decisions. 
A number of aspects of the impact of taxation on distribution 
decisions were enumerated at the subsequent interviews. Firstly, the 
method of profit distribution in a private or owner-managed company was 
expected to be influenced by taxation in the presence of a non-refundable 
corporate income tax. For instance, 
"In a small private company, the directors would decide whether 
to take income as salary or dividends. " 
This ability to choose the method of profit distribution offers, to 
some extent, an alternative to tax minimisation via increased gearing. As 
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interest on personal borrowing is allowed for tax purposes, personal 
gearing may be substituted for corporate gearing. If at the same time 
corporate profits can be withdrawn in the form of management remuneration, 
then the net effect would be equivalent to that of corporate gearing. 
The practice of timing dividend distributions to achieve tax mini- 
misation was discussed by many interviewees. For instance according to 
an inland revenue official, 
"Distribution policy was affected by the earlier high rates 
of taxes. Companies tended to drop dividend rates or shift 
dividends to lower tax years; for example avoiding the high 
tax 1975/76 year of assessment. " 
This interviewee did not specify whether this practice was common to all 
companies or whether there was any noticeable difference between public 
and private companies. The analysis of published accounts of a sample of 
SL public companies (reported in Chapter 10), however, suggests that such 
a practice was not common among public companies. 
The examples quoted by most professional respondents to illustrate 
their view of taxation as a consideration in distribution policy related 
to high dividend distributions by firms enjoying tax holidays, when 
dividends declared during the tax holiday period were exempt from personal 
income tax in the hands of the recipient. For instance, 
"... private companies which are family concerns, especially 
under tax holidays, paid dividends for tax reasons. Even 
some multinationals did this. They changed their depreciation 
policies in order to enable higher dividends to be paid and 
did not even mind qualifications in their audit reports. " 
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Only one interviewee referred to the impact on liquidity of tax 
flows as affecting distribution decisions, by reducing funds available 
for distribution: this aspect of taxation was however the main tax 
influence referred to by business firms. 
On the whole, the opinion of professional observers agrees with 
that of business firms that taxation is relatively more important in 
distribution decisions than in financing decisions, thus'implying a 
separation of the two decision processes among SL firms. But the 
liquidity effects of taxes which were important to business firms were 
not referred to by many professional observers: dividend manipulation 
for tax minimisation gets more attention from the professional observers. 
The combined responses, however, suggest that tax minimisation via 
distribution policies is more common among owner-managed firms than among 
the professionally managed. 
On the whole, the survey of professional observers confirms many of 
the results of the study of business firms. However, two exceptions have 
been observed: firstly, the appreciation of investment incentives appears 
to be different between the two groups, and secondly, the two groups 
emphasised different aspects of taxation in regard to its influence on 
distribution decisions. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Taxation and LDC business - some international comparisons 
The bulk of the literature dealing with the impact of taxation in 
LDCs falls into one of three categories. The first category takes the 
form of broad generalisations supported by particular, often isolated 
examples; such as the work of Prest(49) Then there are the 'country 
studies' concentrating in depth on the tax law and response of taxpayers 
of a selected country; for instance the study of India by Chelliah, 
(28) 
that of Colombia by Bird(15) and studies on a number of countries by 
Kaldor. '106) The third category comprises comparative economic analysis 
of particular features of fiscal systems of different countries; such 
as the study of tax incentives by Heller and Kaufmann 
(84) 
and that of tax 
effort in LDCs by Chelliah et. al. 
(29) As far as can be ascertained no 
one has attempted an empirical investigation in which complete tax systems 
and their impact on taxpayers have been compared on an international basis. 
Any international comparisons are usually limited to one aspect of the tax 
legislation. Indeed, this is not surprising given the variety of taxes, 
tax bases, exemptions, incentives, surcharges, payment methods, etc., 
found in today's fiscal systems around the globe. 
The analysis in the present study is mainly of the second form with 
particular reference to SL. The preceding three chapters reported the 
responses of SL business managers and their professional advisers to . 
corporate taxation, and their perceptions of 4 variety of issues arising 
therefrom. It can rot, however, be claimed that the same responses and 
perceptions would be true of their counterparts in all other or even a 
majority of other LDCs. The findings of the SL surveys may very well be 
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unique to that country; having been caused by or largely shaped by 
historical and cultural influences and the combination of social and 
economic backgrounds peculiar to that nation. The influence of the 
socio-economic background on perceptions of taxation is recognised by 
Tripathy, writing on India: 
"The hostile popular approach to taxation in India is born partly of 
the political history of the country. Before Independence, 
taxation used to be looked upon much more as an instrument of 
political and economic domination over the country .... Even 
after Independence, this attitude has tended to persist. " 
(222, p. 367) 
Yet it is also possible that some of the observations made in the 
last three chapters may be applicable to other LDCs or other countries 
in general. This chapter reports some international comparisonsof business 
attitudes to verify the extent to which the attitudes and behaviour patterns 
observed in the SL survey may be true of other LDCs. Surveys similar to 
that conducted in SL were carried out (though on a smaller scale) in 
Malaysia and the Philippines and comparisons are made in this chapter 
between the findings of these surveys. 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Sri Lanka have a reasonably similar 
development history, but as can be seen in Appendix 1.1, SL lags behind 
the other two countries in per capita income. Its rate of growth in the 
early and middle seventies is reported to have been lower than that of 
the Philippines. Comparative data are not available for Malaysia. 
The comparisons undertaken here are intended to ascertain whether the 
conclusions drawn from the survey of SL business in regard to business behaviour 
and their response to taxation are equally applicable in Malaysia and the 
Philippines. In particular, an attempt will be made to answer the following 
questions: 
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1. Are there any similarities in the organisational characteristics 
of business in the three countries? 
2. Can any generalisations be made as to the perceptions of and 
responses to taxation among business in these countries? 
As background to the discussion, Appendix 10 provides a comparative 
listing of several important aspects of the tax law in the three countries. 
Methods 
The data used in the comparison were collected by surveys of opinions 
among the business communities of Malaysia and the Philippines carried out 
in 1977. Questionnaires similar (but not identical) to those used in SL 
were sent out to smaller samples of businessmen and professional accountants 
in Malaysia and the Philippines. The sample for Malaysia was a random 
selection from names and addresses of business firms and professional 
accounting firms made available by the Malaysian Trade Centre in London. 
For the Philippines, the sample of business firms was extracted from a list 
of leading business firms supplied by a professional contact in that country 
while the sample of professional observers was randomly selected from the 
membership list of the Institute of Certified Public Accountants in that 
country. Table 6A lists details of questionnaires sent out and the responses. 
Table 6A 
Survey Response - Malaysia and the Philippines 
Returned 
Questionnaires Despatched Undeliv'd Responses 
Business firms - Malaysia 99 4 18 
- The Philippines 46 27 
Professional - Malaysia 99 10 9 
Accountants 
- The Philippines 83 10 9 
Responses as 
% of question- 
naires deliv'd 
19 
16 
10 
12 
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The response rate for both Malaysia and the Philippines is lower 
than in SL. This low response is believed to be attributable at least in 
part to the fact that no follow-up action was taken after the despatch of 
questionnaires to Malaysia and the Philippines whereas the questionnaires 
in SL were followed by reminders where no replies had been received within 
three weeks. 
The Malaysian and Philippine responses are analysed below. 
ANALYSIS OF RESPONSES 
Business firms replying to the questionnaire from Malaysia and the 
Philippines differed somewhat in organisational characteristics from the 
SL respondents. 
Age 
The SL business responses were dominated by old firms established more 
than 30 years ago: the Malaysian and Philippine responses came from newer 
firms (Appendix 11.1). It is possible that some of the difference may be 
attributed to non-uniform sampling methods: but a review of recent economic 
history of the three countries suggests that what we see here is a reflection 
of differences in levels of new private sector activity in these countries. 
Organisation 
The distinction between public and private limited liability companies 
is not relevant in the Philippines; the law of this country provides for 
one type of 'corporation'. The Malaysian sample included a higher proportion 
of private limited liability companies than was found in SL but the difference 
is not significant and probably reflects a bias introduced by the sampling 
procedures adopted (Appendix 11.2). 
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Management 
The distribution of management in the Philippine sample is very much 
the same as in SL, but the Malaysian respondents include a much smaller 
proportion of owner managers (Appendix 11.3; X2 significant at 0.025 
level). It is worth noting that the smaller proportion of owner managers 
in Malaysia comes from a sample which includes a relatively greater number 
of private limited companies. Although this cannot be taken to be con- 
clusive evidence in view of the small samples involved, it is possible to 
hazard a guess that these results reflect a higher level of professionalism 
in the management of Malaysian companies. 
Organisation objectives 
The most interesting difference in organisation characteristics between 
SL and the other two countries relates to the choice of business objectives. 
The majority of SL firms included 'the maintenance of a going concern' as one 
of their three main objectives and over 40% of SL respondents chose this as 
the most important objective of the organisation. The Malaysian and 
Philippine firms in contrast overwhelmingly vote for maximisation of profit 
or similar task-related objectives (Appendix 11.4). Only one Malaysian firm 
out of 18 picked the maintenance of a going concern as its main objective: 
no Philippine firm chose this as its main objective. This difference between 
SL firms on the one hand and Malaysian and Philippine firms on the other in 
their choice of main organisational objective is statistically significant 
on the X2 test at a 0.005 level. 
In Chapter 3 the objectives of SL firms were 
firms reported in two separate studies. The main 
US and SL firms was also the high priority placed 
in the latter whereas in the US there was a distil 
firms for 'maximising objectives'. 
w 
compared with those of US 
difference noted between 
on 'maintenance objectives' 
ict preference among business 
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The preference among business firms for 'maximising objectives' 
reported in the US studies is apparently not an isolated example peculiar 
to that country. A study of objectives of UK business carried out by The 
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales(95) reported 
findings similar to those of the US studies with 58% of respondent firms 
choosing profit related primary objectives as against only 10% who pre- 
ferred survival related objectives. In Malaysia and the, Philippines we 
again see objectives similar to those prevailing in the UK and USA. 
What then is the explanation for the difference in business objectives 
observed in SL? The distinction between western developed countries and 
LDCs of Asia in their historical and cultural background, which was 
proposed as a possible causal factor in explaining the difference between 
US and SL business objectives can no longer be applicable. In Malaysia and 
the Philippines, both Asian LDCs, the objectives appear to be very similar 
to those of western developed country business. The Philippines differs 
from SL in its more recent colonial history with the colonial influences 
on the country coming from Spain and the USA whereas the western colonial 
powers influencing SL and its economic activity were the Portuguese, Dutch, 
and the British, in that order. The western influences on Malaysia are 
however similar to those on SL. One difference between SL and the other 
two Asian countries lies in the Chinese influence on business which is 
strong in Malaysia and the Philippines but absent in SL. Whether these 
sociological differences have anything to do with the differences in 
business objectives is however not known. 
A major difference between SL and the other countries at the time of 
our survey was the attitude of government to private enterprise. SL had 
the most left wing government in all five countries with a coalition of 
- 182 - 
parties including the local communist party and a Trotskyist political 
party in power since 1970. The State had during the seventies given 
itself a monopoly position in a number of business activities previously 
carried out in the private sector and also carried out the nationalisation 
of the majority of the country's plantation sector as well as a number of 
leading industrial establishments. Although the tax law and other admin- 
istrative procedures included many general or selective incentives for 
private sector investment and business development, the official political 
stance of the government was 'socialist'. The other four countries discussed, 
in contrast, openly (though not all to the same degree) encouraged the 
development of local private enterprise with little or no politically 
imposed constraints or uncertainties affecting survival of private sector 
business. The hostility of government to private enterprise at the time 
evident in SL is probably the main reason underlying the greater interest 
of SL business in survival oriented maintenance objectives. 
It was reported in Chapter 3 that in SL, firms with maintenance 
objectives tended to be professionally managed and were also seen to have 
achieved lower growth levels than firms with maximising objectives. There 
is no indication that this would be equally true of Malaysia, where the 
only business firm to choose maintenance of a going concern as its main 
objective was owner managed and also achieved growth of over 100% in a five 
year period. Inadequate sample size however precludes any significant con- 
clusions. 
Whether the apparently low interest in maximising objectives among 
SL business is reflected in their performance relative to business in the 
other two countries is a question that remains to be answered. 
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Constraints on business 
Parallel questions asked in the three surveys regarding taxation as 
a constraint on business elicited similar responses. A comparative 
tabulation of responses is given in Table 6B. 
Table 6B 
Comparative Perce ptions of the Burden of Taxation 
Taxation as a Constraint No of Firms on the achievement of . 
business objectives SL Malaysia Philippines 
Yes 40 9 5 
No 34 9 2 
74 18 7 
Roughly half the respondent firms in SL and Malaysia perceive taxation as 
a constraint on the achievement of their objectives. The proportion of firms 
finding taxation to be a constraint in the Philippines was somewhat higher 
than in the other two countries but the difference is not significant given 
the low total response from the Philippines. 
The position regarding comparative perceptions on the impact of 
taxation becomes clearer when perceptions of taxation are compared with 
perceptions of other possible environmental constraints listed in the 
questionnaires. Table 6C summarises the responses on non-tax constraints 
and provides a ranking of all constraints. 
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Table 6C 
Ranking of Environmental Constraints 
Non-tax Constraints No. of Firms who find item to be a constraint 
listed in Questionnaire SL Malaysia The Philippines 
Import Controls 57 7 3 
Shortage of Finance 35 5 4 
Price Controls 30 3 3 
Market Limitations 20 11 4 
Shortage of skills 14 9 2 
Labour relations 13 2 1 
Ranking of all Constraints SL Malaysia & Philippines 
Import Controls 14 
Taxation 22 
Shortage of Finance 35 
Price Controls 46 
Market Limitations 51 
Shortage of skills 63 
Labour relations 77 
Spearman's r=0.25 
A comparison of ranking of all constraints including taxation shows major 
differences in ranking of constraints by SL firms when compaired with firms 
from the other two countries taken together: but taxation is ranked similarly 
in both groups as the second most common constraint. 
As regards the other constraints, the major differences between SL 
and the other two countries relate to (a) import controls, (b) market 
limitations and (c) shortages of technical and professional skills. As can 
be seen in the workings given in Appendix 11.5 all these differences are 
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statistically significant at levels better than 0.05 . 
Import controls were the main problem for SL business. Malaysian and 
Philippine business were not troubled much by this factor: instead, market 
limitations were their main constraint. Shortages of technical and pro- 
fessional skills, though ranking further down, were more of a problem to 
Malaysian and Philippine firms than to SL firms. Shortage of finance was 
a relatively greater burden to Philippine firms in comparison with the other 
two countries, though the small sample size precludes statistically signifi- 
cant conclusions. 
The main variations in perceptions of constraints again seem to reflect 
differences in levels of governmental controls between SL and the other 
two countries. The highly restrictive import controls in SL are probably 
seen as the limiting factor on business activity by a majority of SL 
business managers: but the protection afforded by such import controls 
against competing imports (and sometimes against competing local manufacturers) 
have made market considerations less of a problem to SL firms. In the more 
open economies of Malaysia and the Philippines, market limitations become 
a greater constraint. The differences in perceptions relating to shortages 
of skills too may very well be due to differences in the level of market 
competition: in more open economies, where the market is the main deter- 
minant of the success of a firm the technological and professional skills 
required to be successful in business are bound to be greater than in a 
stagnant and protected market. 
Two further items were added by Malaysian firms to the list of con- 
straints, viz: (a) increasing governmental bureaucracy and (b) corrupt 
officials. These echo views of some SL respondents who also added similar 
items to their list of constraints. 
In Chapter 3 it was reported that owner-managers were somewhat more 
sensitive to taxation as a constraint than professional managers; but the 
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differences were not statistically significant on the X2 test at the 
0.05 level. Similar results are seen in the combined Malaysian and 
Philippine sample (Appendix 11.6). 
Tnrcntivac 
Investment incentives offered through the tax systems of the three 
countries are not identical as can be seen in the tabulation in Appendix 
10. As there appears to be even less in common between incentives offered 
outside the tax system in these countries, a straightforward comparison of 
relative usefulness of all incentives is not likely to be very meaningful. 
The difficulty of classifying the numerous tax incentives into clearly 
defined categories commonly applicable to all three countries meant that 
we were not able to compare the relative usefulness of all tax incentives. 
This section will analyse the perceptions of business relating to the two 
major tax incentives; viz. tax holidays and accelerated depreciation 
allowances. 
The survey responses (Appendix 11.7) show that the level of appreciation 
of the two incentives is different between countries: SL business appears 
to find accelerated depreciation allowances to be more useful whereas 
Malaysian and Philippine business show a greater appreciation of tax 
holidays ()C 2 sig tificant at a 0.025 level). These two types of incentive 
are however the most popular investment incentives in all three countries 
and head the list of the two most useful incentives in each country group. 
The explanation for the difference in ranking observed between SL and the 
other two countries probably lies within the tax systems of these countries. 
As can be seen in Appendix 10, in SL accelerated depreciation allowances are 
freely available to all types of business whereas in Malaysia and the 
Philippines acceleration of depreciation allowances comes as a selective 
privilege. In Malaysia accelerated depreciation allowances are available 
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as an alternative to pioneer status and in the Philippines these are 
offered only to 'preferred non-pioneer' business. Tax holiday benefits 
in Malaysia and the Philippines on the other hand appear to be more generous 
than those on offer to SL business. 
A further factor contributing to the lower ranking of tax holidays in 
SL is probably the fact that in benefitting from a tax holiday a firm would 
be forgoing capital allowances otherwise available to it pn its heavy 
initial investment. Hence a tax holiday which is a selective incentive is 
devalued to the extent of the opportunity cost of accelerated depreciation 
allowances forgone. Malaysian tax law, by contrast, permits 'Pioneer 
Industries' claiming tax holidays to treat their purchases of capital assets 
during the pioneer period as acquired immediately after the end of the 
pioneer or holiday period. Depreciation allowances (though not accelerated) 
can therefore be claimed in respect of a pioneer firm's initial investment,. 
against profits arising after the tax holiday period. In the Philippines 
each incentive is offered to a different type of preferred activity. 
It is also possible that the high proportion of older firms in the SL 
survey sample was another contributing factor to the lower ranking of tax 
holidays by these firms, many of whom would have commenced business long 
before tax holidays were offered in that country. 
On the whole, the main conclusion to be drawn from the above analysis 
is that tax related investment incentives are highly appreciated by business 
managers in all three countries. Yet, there is no agreement among these 
country samples as to the usefulness of tax holidays and accelerated capital 
allowances relative to one another. The differences in perceptions as to 
relative usefulness of the two incentives seem to be the result of variations 
in benefits offered under these incentives in the three countries. 
Comparing these results with other studies of effects of tax incentives, 
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however, we observe wide variations in both techniques and results. US 
studies of tax incentives were discussed in chapter 1: it was seen there 
that econometric models estimate significant increases in investment as a 
result of tax incentives, 
(77) 
while interview evidence points to a somewhat 
lower order of impact. 
(54) Ift 
Survey studies in LDCs have also produced contradictory results. In 
a study of regional incentives in Brazil, Goodman(217) has reported that 
tax incentives have had a significant impact on investment location. But 
other studies in Pakistan 
; 200) Jamaica(215) and Mexico 
(220) in which survey 
respondents were questioned about the extent to which particular investment 
decisions were influenced by tax incentives have reported that investment 
would not have taken place in the absence of tax incentives only in a very 
small proportion of firms. 
Our survey questions, in contrast to those referred to above, were 
designed to ascertain views of businessmen in general regarding the relative 
usefulness of tax and other investment incentives; and the results show 
that businessmen have found tax incentives to be the most useful among the 
array of incentives offered by their respective governments. These results 
can be reconciled with those of other studies showing a low impact of tax 
incentives on specific investment decisions if we accept the possibility 
that tax incentives may be useful in channelling investment into preferred 
activities or locations, but that the main determinants of investment levels 
lie outside the tax system. 
Growth of Business 
Achievement of growth by Malaysian and Philippine firms exceeds that 
of the SL firms surveyed (Appendix 11.8). SL has proportionately more nil 
and low growth firms (X. significant at 0.1 level) and the lowest growth 
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index of the three countries. The difference between SL and Philippine 
firms also corresponds to the difference in growth of per capita income 
referred to earlier. 
The analysis of SL survey results in Chapter 3 indicated that firms 
with profit maximising or other similar maximising objectives achieved 
higher growth levels than did firms whose main objective was the maintenance 
of a going concern. As reported earlier, none of the Philippine firms and 
only one Malaysian firm had the main objective of maintaining a going concern. 
These two relatively high growth samples voted overwhelmingly for task- 
related maximising objectives. Though direct evidence is not available, it 
would not be unreasonable to suggest that both the emphasis on maintenance 
objectives and lower business growth levels observed in SL are at least 
partly caused by the tighter control over private sector activity exercised 
by the government and the greater environmental uncertainty created by 
actions of the State in that country. 
It was reported in Chapter 3 that among SL business, owner-managed 
firms tended to grow faster than those managed by professional managers. 
The corresponding data for the Philippines is too small to draw any con- 
clusions: but it is observed that in the Malaysian sample, the pattern is 
reversed and professionally managed firms achieve higher growth levels than 
do the owner-managed. This observation is based on comparative growth- 
indexes (Appendix 11.9) and must be treated as tentative. 
That there may be differences between management types in their decision 
making processes 
(166, p. 382) and achievement 
(216) is however acknowledged in 
the literature. Western, developed country experience appears to be that 
in large corporate organisations in high technology activities, professional 
management is generally more successful than owner-management. Galbraith 
(216) 
gives many examples in the US context. 
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According to our results the corporate growth record in Malaysia 
matches US experience; but the pattern in SL is the reverse of this. 
Researchers into the history of entrepreneurial behaviour argue that 
entrepreneurial activity can be a function of many socio-economic influences 
from the environment. 
(199) One such variable affecting entrepreneurial 
activity is said to be the stability of the investment climate. As already 
discussed, unlike in Malaysia, the business environment in SL in the years 
preceding the survey had been both unstable and increasingly hostile. No 
attempt has been made here to identify all causal factors for variations in 
corporate growth. However, one possibility that cannot be ruled out is that 
when environmental conditions (particularly socio-political conditions) are 
stable, then professional bureaucracies work at their most efficient; but 
that they are less able than individual entrepreneurs to cope with unfavourable 
changes in political background or with hostile social influences. Though 
it may be true that professional management is more efficient in large high- 
technology industrial corporations in market economies, for an LDC with low 
technology small industries, and a high level of governmental control, the 
traditional forms of proprietory business may prove to be more adaptable and 
efficient in the early stages of development of the country. The growth 
record of SL business supports this proposition. 
Though no interviews were carried out in Malaysia and the Philippines 
one Malaysian firm (owner-managed and reporting no growth in five years) 
enumerated, by letter, their particular problems in achieving expansion of 
business. Two main constraints were mentioned by this firm, viz. (a) 
corruption in official circles and (b) discrimination on religious and 
ethnic grounds. As regards corruption, the owner-manager of this firm 
wrote 
"... if you are prepared to consider rampant corruption as 
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being 'taxation' in one form or other, then I feel that 
this should be included in your findings. We, as a firm 
have consistently refused to corrupt in any way, with the 
result that some of our competitors, including the previously 
respectable British firms with worldwide connections, are 
able to import on the one hand through the Custom Department 
here, goods wrongly declared and therefore attracting lower 
import duties. These firms are also increasing their sales 
turnover by developing important sales to State Government 
supported corporations by corrupting purchasing officers of these 
organisations. All these of course effects our own sales 
turnover and is partly responsible for our continuing lack 
of growth. " 
As regards discrimination, he believed that a British engineer employed 
by him had had his work permit cancelled on account of his connections 
with a Christian organisation in this Islamic country and that the firm 
itself was being discriminated against as it was owned by a European immigrant. 
The SL government was similarly accused in the SL survey of discrim- 
ination against ethnic minorities in that country; but it must be recognised 
that the discrimination that the above respondent complains of is part of 
official policy in Malaysia where the government as part of its development 
plan is attempting to raise the economic standing of the country's native 
population (the Bumiputra) relative to the Chinese, Indian and other 
immigrant communities who have dominated Malaysian economic activity for 
many decades. In any event, the perception of such constraints, whether 
justified or not, will almost certainly mean that taxation is not the limiting 
factor on the growth of the firm. 
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Financing Decisions and Profit Distribution 
Perceptions of business managers regarding the influence of tax 
considerations in financing and distribution decisions are summarised in 
Table 6D. 
Table 6D 
Relevance of Tax Considerations in Financing and Profit Distribution Decisionsl 
Country. SL Malaysia The Philippines 
Taxation is a relevant 
consideration in 
(a) Borrowing Policy decisions 
(b) Profit Distribution 
decisions 
(a) Borrowing Policy decisions 
(b) Profit Distribution 
decisions 
In Number of firms 
16 53 
44 84 
As %age of Total in Sample 
23% 29% 43% 
59% 44% 57% 
The responses in the Malaysian and Philippine samples correspond to 
those in SL in that in all countries the relevance of tax considerations 
is higher in respect of profit distributions than for borrowing policy 
decisions. 
Though the small sample size precludes statistically significant 
conclusions, the Philippine sample was seen to display a number of 
characteristics relating to financing decisions which set it apart from 
the other two samples. Firstly, the gearing level of Philippine firms was 
the highest among the three groups (Appendix 11.10); secondly taxation was 
a consideration in the borrowing policy decisions of proportionately more 
Philippine firms than among firms from the other two countries (Table 6D). 
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Furthermore, all Philippine firms who took taxation into consideration in 
their financing decisions were in the highest gearing category. No 
relationship was seen however in the SL and Malaysian samples between the 
relevance of tax considerations in financing decisions and the level of 
gearing (Appendix 11.11). Also, it was seen earlier (in Table 6C) that 
shortage of finance was a more common constraint for Philippine business 
than for firms in the other two countries. 
Viewed together these differences suggest that perceptions and practices 
of Philippine businessmen in the financing of their firms differ from those 
of their SL and Malaysian counterparts. As far as can be ascertained, the 
financial institutions and markets in the Philippines are better developed 
than in SL and at least as well developed as in Malaysia 
! 8)(154) Nor is 
there any material difference between the Philippines and the other two 
countries in the law relating to tax deductability of interest payments154)(208) 
The indications then are that the differences observed in the survey reflect 
variations in financing practices rather than differences in the tax or 
institutional environment. Further investigations would, however, be 
necessary before firm conclusions can be reached. 
Though taxation is more relevant in the distribution of profits than in 
financing decisions for all country samples (Table 6D), it can be seen (in 
Appendix 11.12) that the degree of relevance is lower in Malaysia than in 
SL or the Philippines. However, the statistical significance of this obser- 
vation is low (X2 significant at 0.25 ) and it must therefore be treated 
as tentative. 
Nevertheless it is possible to speculate that the somewhat lower 
relevance of tax considerations in Malaysia reflects the fact that no tax 
cash flows arise on payment of dividends in that country. There is no 
withholding tax on dividends in Malaysia whereas dividend taxes of 33 -% 
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and 35% are payable in SL and the Philippines respectively. In all three 
countries, however, dividends are liable to tax in the hands of shareholders 
(except in the cases where special tax holidays apply), and from a combined 
company-cum-shareholder point of view the absence of a withholding tax 
makes no difference to the ultimate amount paid in tax on dividend income. 
Double taxation of distributed corporate profits is a part of the tax law 
in all three countries, but there will be no tax cash flows associated with 
dividends in Malaysia. 
Conclusion 
Given the small sample size in Malaysia and the Philippines and as no 
interviews were possible in these countries to clarify answers to the 
postal questionnaire, it is not possible to draw many strong conclusions 
from the results discussed in this chapter. The postal questionnaires 
completed by professional observers in Malaysia and the Philippines (9 in 
each country) have not been discussed separately, but the responses of the 
professional observers (summarised in Appendix 11.13) are broadly in agree- 
ment with those of business managers. 
Subject to these generalisations some similarities have been observed 
among the country samples in business perceptions of taxation. The views 
are fairly similar in the three countries in regard to the influence of 
taxation on the achievement of business objectives and on the relative 
importance of tax considerations in decisions relating to financing and 
profit distributions. 
At the same time many differences were observed between countries. In 
relation to taxation, the main difference is seen in the appreciation of 
tax incentives, with SL business favouring accelerated capital allowances 
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while Malaysian and Philippine respondents were more appreciative of tax 
holidays. The underlying causes for this difference seem to lie within the 
tax systems; in the variations of the magnitude of benefits offered via 
each type of incentive. 
Many differences were also observed in organisational characteristics 
and achievement among the country samples. For instance the sort of con- 
straints on SL business differed from those restricting £he activities of 
Malaysian and Philippine firms. Dissimilarities were also observed in the 
achievement of growth both in total and according to management type between 
countries. 
Perhaps the main conclusion emerging from the foregoing analysis is 
however that it is not possible to generalise for all countries on the basis 
of results of a study of one country into the characteristics of business 
firms or the impact of environmental constraints on business performance. 
Taxation does not exist in a vacuum, but its impact on business decisions 
will be felt alongside those of other socio-economic variables from the 
environment in which a business firm operates. If organisational character- 
istics of firms tend to differ between countries and if non-tax environmental 
influences are also different (both phenomena were observed in this chapter), 
then generalisations on the impact of taxation across countries are unlikely 
to be wholly tenable. Nevertheless, the results of Malaysian and Philippine 
surveys analysed above support the conclusions arrived at on the SL survey 
that taxation, though perceived as a constraint by many business managers, 
is unlikely to be a limiting factor on business activity primarily because 
other greater environmental constraints are present. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Response of Multinational Corporations to Taxation in LDCs - An Enouir 
Foreign private investment is of sizeable magnitude today in most LDCs 
outside the communist world. Many of these countries indeed vie with one 
another to attract foreign investment. As discussed in Chapter 1 tax 
incentives are a device commonly used in this race to draw foreign capital 
investment. The welcome to foreign investors is however not unconditional 
and many restrictions on their activities are concurrently imposed by most 
developing countries. 
The last four chapters discussed attitudes to taxation of business 
management in LDCs. Some of the survey data used in that discussion related 
to LDC subsidiaries of western multinational companies (MNCs), but in each 
case the questionnaire was completed and the interview was granted by the 
management of the local subsidiary. Their experience in most cases and 
their perspective, as indeed the questions asked of them, related to the 
local situation: their replies, therefore, are not expected necessarily 
to reflect parent company attitudes and perceptions in regard to the 
developing world in general. 
Most if not all of the local subsidiaries were founded some number of 
years ago, when corporate perceptions of taxation (even in developed countries) 
were less sophisticated, and when the foreign investment decisions by MNCs 
were taking place in political and economic environments significantly 
different from those of today. It does not at all follow that, because a 
MNC has a subsidiary or close associate in a certain LDC now, it would even 
wish (much less necessarily be permitted) to establish such an investment de 
novo in the hypothetical absence of that subsidiary. Even the continuation 
of operations of an existing subsidiary might well reflect world-wide 'public 
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relations' considerations or the desire to avoid book losses associated 
with an abandonment decision, rather than the existence of an economically 
worth-while venture now or in the foreseeable future. The current attitude 
of MNCs to individual developing countries (or to third world investments 
in general) will be formed in the light of comparative current and expected 
future conditions and opportunities in all parts of the world. Therefore, 
a study of the effects of LDC taxation on MNC decisions must include an 
examination of relevant attitudes of the parent company swell as those of 
local management. 
This chapter seeks to answer the questions: 
(a) is taxation, particularly host country taxation (including tax 
incentives) a significant decision variable in MNC decisions to 
invest in developing countries?; 
(b) what are the important factors discouraging or constraining MNC 
activity in these countries?; and 
(c) how important a consideration is taxation in operating decisions 
such as financing and pricing decisions of MNCs in the third world? 
Western multinationals are not the only source of private foreign 
investment in the LDCs. There have at all times in history been some 
private investment by LDC investors in other LDCs and an increase in such 
investment has been reported in recent years. 
(". 5) More recently, Japanese 
multinationals have been showing an increasing interest in LDC investments. 
(185) 
Nevertheless, western multinationals are perhaps the single most important 
source of private investment funds and technology to LDCs and it is the 
intention here to discuss their attitudes and perceptions. 
Methods 
The method of enquiry adopted is again a survey. A survey was carried 
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out in 1976/77 of a sample of UK and US multinational companies operating 
in LDCs. 
The sample comprised, 
1. all UK and US multinational companies known to have been operating 
in SL in recent years, and 
2. a random sample of UK and US MNCs listed in the directory 'Who Owns 
Whom? '195) as operating in Malaysia or the Philipptnes. 
A short questionnaire (reproduced in appendix 12) was addressed to the 
Finance Directors of 57 UK companies and 64 US companies selected as above. 
Subsequently seven of the UK multinationals were interviewed and seven 
including most of those interviewed completed a further questionnaire 
relating to their activities in LDCs. Relevant remarks of interviewees 
will be quoted extensively in this chapter. 
The questions posed to MNC managers probably touched upon some of the 
more 'sensitive' policy variables of corporate decision-making. The enquiry 
which is reported in this chapter was remarkable for the willingness of 
major corporate executives to discuss them, with an openness which was even 
more appreciated than it was unexpected. Even so, a substantial degree of 
discretion was plainly called for: and within the time constraints and 
with the resources available, of necessity only a limited exploration of 
these important questions could be undertaken. 
Response 
Statistics of responses to the main questionnaire are summarised in 
Table 7A. 
Table 7A 
Statistics of Survey Responses 
UK USA 
Questionnaires despatched 57 64 
Responses received 32 19 
Responses received expressed as percentage 
of questionnaires despatched 56% 30% 
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Of the 32 UK companies replying, one company claimed not to have any 
investments in developing countries. The responses to the main questionnaire 
analysed below therefore relate to 31 UK companies and 19 US companies 
totalling 50 in all. 
Analysis of Responses 
Tax consideration in LDC investment 
The respondents were asked whether in their experience they had found 
taxation in the host country to be a significant consideration in deciding 
to invest in developing countries. The answers are summarised in Table 7B. 
Table 7B 
Relevance of Tax Considerations in LDC investment Decisions 
Taxation in the host country is a 
significant consideration. 
UK US As %age 
Companies Companies Total of Total 
Always 11 6 17 34 
Often 3 4 7 14 
Sometimes 11 4 15 30 
Seldom 5 5 10 20 
Never 1 - 1 2 
50 100 
From the data in Table 7B it can be observed that: 
(a) there is considerable variation of experience among respondents 
as to the relevance of LDC taxation in investment decisions, but 
(b) there is no apparent difference between the distribution of responses 
of UK firms and US firms. 
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This response raises a further question: why is there such a wide 
spread of experience among MNCs in regard to LDC taxes? More than 20% of 
the respondents seldom or never find taxation to be a significant factor 
while a third of the sample always do. Subsequent interviews with some of 
the UK respondents suggested several possible explanations: these are 
discussed below. 
LDC taxation can be perceived as being non-significant if the company 
practice is to exclude taxation considerations from its investment appraisal 
processes. For instance, investment decisions may be based on criteria 
other than profitability or on pre-tax profitability. This however is a 
possibility that can be eliminated with some confidence (a) as all seven 
companies completing the second questionnaire replied that they did carry 
out appraisals of economic viability of investment proposals and that they 
included host country taxations in such appraisals and (b) as all respondents 
were large MNCs which can be expected to have the expertise necessary to 
evaluate the impact of taxation on investment decisions. Therefore it is 
not unreasonable to assume that where taxation is said to be seldom or never 
a significant consideration, the view reflects the lack of significance of 
taxation variables in the decision process and not the company's failure to 
consider the impact of taxation. 
Statements made by MNC officers interviewed subsequently also support 
the notion that taxation is taken into account in investment appraisal as 
a factor affecting investment returns. For instance; 
"What is important about taxation is whether as a factor 
it helps to inhibit a proper D. C. F. return: 
the high tax rate may be compensated by tax holidays or 
accelerated depreciation, etc. " 
It may however not be possible for a head-office manager of an MNC to 
clearly perceive or comment on the significance of LDC taxation if tax is 
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just one of many inputs to the computation of investment returns and the 
significance of the tax factor is not separately tested and reported. 
According to one interviewee, 
"It is difficult to describe (the part played by taxation in 
economic analysis) because the advantages of using a computerised 
corporate financial model are such that you can afford to in effect 
give equal priority to all aspects; because you do cover every 
single one. " 
This statement is remarkable in that the use of a computerised corporate 
financial model would normally be expected to facilitate the asking of 'what 
if' questions in order to ascertain the sensitivity of corporate performance 
to changes in major input variables including taxation. It does, however, 
imply that in the experience of this company, taxation has been a relatively 
stable environmental variable with the result that project sensitivity to 
variations in taxation are not normally reported to top management. 
The one UK company which asserted that taxation was never a significant 
consideration is a manufacturer of specialised equipment largely for industrial 
and commercial use. They face no competition in most countries where they 
have established themselves and their investments in LDC manufacturing 
operations have been made mainly for the purpose of retaining local markets 
threatened by government restrictions of one sort or another. Because they 
deal in a specialised industrial product and not mass consumption items 
they are unaffected by price controls and find that in markets with little 
competition and no price controls, they can operate at a profit whatever 
the taxes. In their case, 
"... the main inhibition against capital 
investment in any of these countries (LDCs) 
is the demand for the product... You've 
got very high taxation in India; it works 
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out on your accounts (declared profits as opposed 
to the tax computation) at about very nearly 80% 
of the profits before tax. But because of that, 
profit before tax tends to be very high so that 
when you look at your net returns on capital employed 
it's not so very far wrong. " 
In other words this company's experience in the LDCs is that taxation 
whatever its level can be shifted and hence is not a significant consideration. 
The only company interviewed which was primarily a finance company 
rather than a manufacturing organisation said: 
"Tax in a host country is not a reason for 
going into a country: but it can very well 
be the reason for not going into a country. " 
In contrast with other interviewees they see themselves as having a 
greater degree of flexibility in choosing locations for and methods of 
investment. Nevertheless, favourable tax conditions alone would not attract 
this company to any country. 
To the majority of interviewees taxation in the LDCs was only a 
secondary consideration in making investment decisions. For example, 
"Taxes certainly would be a consideration, but 
not a main consideration. " 
"We don't go in and say its got a tax situation 
that makes everything alright. Taxation comes along 
the line. " 
"You don't do things for tax reasons: you get the 
tax right. You cut the tax coat to fit the person. " 
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"... Providing we have gone into a situation 
that looks like there is progress ... we are 
going to get a fairly good deal on the taxation 
side. " 
Above we see several points of view regarding the significance of 
taxation considerations. Most interviewees find taxation to be a 
relevant consideration in their decisions relating to LDCs: but none 
of them regards taxation in LDCs as a primary influence on investment 
decisions. 
In order to ascertain whether or not taxation is a significant con- 
straint on MNC operations in LDCs, we need to look at taxation in relation 
to other problem areas faced by business. For this purpose respondents to 
the main questionnaire were asked three further questions: 
- the first designed to ascertain what host country-related 
problems troubled the multinationals investing in LDCs, 
- the next to measure the sensitivity of respondents to these 
problems, and 
- the third to rank other problems relative to the difficulties 
caused by taxation. 
Common Problems in LDCs 
Eight problems associated with LDC investments (representing the 
synthesis of theoretical expectations and prior informal discussions with 
three multinational managers) were listed in the questionnaire and respond- 
ents were requested to indicate if in their experience they had found each 
of these to be relevant (a) in a number of countries, (b) in two or three 
countries or (c) rarely or never. 
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The responses where the problems were relevant in two or more 
countries have been summarised and ranked in Table 7C. In attaching scores 
to these responses a weight of 3 has been given to problems relevant in a 
number of countries, a weight of 1 to problems relevant in two or three 
countries and a weight of zero to problems which are relevant rarely or 
never. Many respondents added further constraints to the list in the 
questionnaire and these are listed separately in Table 7C. 
Table 7C 
Environmental Constraints on Multinational Activity in LDCs 
Constraints Score* Ranking 
Listed in Questionnaire UK USA-Total UK 'USA Total 
Political Uncertainty 80 45 125 1 1 1 
Currency exchange controls 73 39 112 2 2 2 
Administrative red-tape in 
obtaining approval. 65 38 103 3 3 3 
Import Controls 58 34 92 5 4 4 
Scarcity of technical and 
Managerial skills 60 27 87 4 7 5 
Threat of nationalisation 43 32 75 6 6 6 
Inadequacy of commerical 
& financial services 28 33 61 7 5 7 
Difficult labour relations 23 24 47 8 8 8 
(Items added by respondents 
Pressure to increase local 
ownership 10 
Home country regulations 9 
Price controls 7 
Different ethical and 
moral standards 33 
Prohibitive demands by 
host govts. 3 
Export requirements 3 
Restriction on borrowing 3 
Hostility to foreign 
investment 3 
Poor management of host 
economies 3 
Personal safety of 
expatriate staff 3 
Uncertainty on validity 
of regulations 3 
Restrictions on land 
ownership 1 
Language/mentality 1 
Venal officials 1 
* Score = [No. of firms for whom problem is relevant in a number of 
countries x 31 + [No. of firms for whom problem is relevant 
in two or three countries] 
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The most common constraint faced in the third world by both UK and 
US multinational companies is political uncertainty, followed by currency 
exchange controls and administrative red-tape in obtaining approval for their 
activities. The importance of political stability in the host country has 
been established for Singapore by Koh(l11) and for a group of South American 
LDCs by Stevens. (221) 
Import controls which were the most common problem in the SL local 
survey are found only in fourth place in Table 7C. Further down the list 
is found the only major difference in ranking between the UK and US samples: 
scarcity of technical and managerial skills in LDCs was a more common problem 
for UK companies than for American firms. As no US firms were interviewed 
the reason for this difference has not been ascertained: interviewees in 
the UK however indicated that the difficulties of shortages of skills are 
exacerbated by host country requirements to transfer local management to 
nationals of the country. 
It is always a possibility with this type of question that responses are 
conditioned by the suggestions made in the questionnaire itself and that 
other equally or more common problems not included in the questionnaire will 
not be commented upon by respondents. This question however provided for 
respondents to add any other problems they were faced with and twenty items 
were added to the list. Interviewees at the subsequent interviews were 
invited to comment on items added by other respondents and their remarks 
indicate that none of the new items added to the list were more important 
than the three or four leading items from the list in the questionnaire. 
Statements of respondents at the interviews, confirmed the questionnaire 
results that the stability of the political climate is seen by most MNCs as 
the primary non-commercial environmental criterion relevant in making a 
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decision to enter into a new LDC investment. If the political climate is 
favourable and stable, then it is believed that other conditions cannot be 
too burdensome. For instance, the following remark, 
"The economics you can work out almost on the back 
of an envelope. But it's the political future and 
stability that one is concerned about. " 
Though political instability may deter an MNC from investing in an 
LDC, once the first investment is undertaken, and a commitment is made to 
a particular country, MNCs appear to be willing to take a fairly long-term 
view and to deal with political instability and other constraints as best 
they can. For example: 
"One day the conditions in Ghana will improve: 
it won't be in my lifetime but then we'll be there. " 
"We don't look short-term. Even now we are re-investing 
in certain of our countries where we haven't got dividends 
out ... you look 10 or 20 years ahead in our business. " 
The only exception to this rule among the interviewee firms was the 
finance company referred to earlier which took an extremely short term 
view of their interests in LDCs. To them, 
"What happens in 20 years is irrelevant: what 
happens next year or the year after or in three 
years time is absolutely critical to the vast 
majority of projects. " 
The common practice of multinationals in using long planning horizons 
must further enhance the problems of political uncertainty. In some LDCs 
where they operate, their planning horizons will be as long as, or longer 
than, the independent history of the nation state. In the newly independent, 
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often newly created states where both political and other institutions are 
being formed anew or shaped to suit the aspirations of the new state and 
its citizens, cycles of political and institutional change are likely to 
be shorter than the planning horizons of MNCs. This would necessarily lead 
to uncertainty about the political environment being a major worry for the 
companies. 
By contrast, political uncertainty did not appear as" troublesome to 
local businessmen in the three LDCs discussed earlier. Even the managers 
of LDC operations of MNCs participating in the earlier local surveys were 
most concerned about problems of import controls and market limitations. 
Political uncertainty was however mentioned as a constraint by several 
professional observers in the LDCs. 
One possible explanation for the difference in sensitivity to political 
uncertainties is that LDC business managers on the spot who are exposed to 
the political environment of only one country do not see changes in the 
environmental conditions originating from government sources as a consequence 
of the overall political climate or instability, but more as specific con- 
straints such as import controls hampering activities of the company. 
Therefore, any uncertainties relating to the future existence or levels of 
these controls or levies are also likely to be seen as problems stemming from 
the specific regulation in question. On the other hand, observers in MNC 
head offices looking at environmental constraints globally, appear to 
attribute these same uncertainties to political causes. 
Governmental administrative regulations and procedures are also a 
common irritant to most MNCs. As illustrated by the following remarks, 
these are found to apply not only in obtaining approval but in relation to 
all contact with government agencies including the inland revenue authorities. 
The cause of irritation lies in official indecision as well as in the com- 
plexity of the procedures. For example: 
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"Price control has been itemised separately; 
but an element of this is red-tape; as it would 
appear that procedural delays are often an 
intended part of the control of prices. " 
"Red-tape is usually more annoying (in the LDCs) 
because one is in more of a hurry when one is 
overseas. " 
"... slowness in settlement (of taxes) can be worse, 
especially if it is accompanied by demands for tax 
payments as the cash flow arises and before profits 
can be computed. " 
"Indecision among tax authorities is a major problem. 
Often you can argue for days with local tax men without 
obtaining a decision : and then you see a white face, 
ypu tell him your problem, and a decision is made then 
and there. " 
Similar results have been reported by Reuber. 
(219'p'll5) 
Another group of difficulties added to the list arose from cultural 
differences between the LDCs concerned and the MNC home country, and were 
described variously as problems of language, mentality, different ethical 
and moral standards, etc. Some of the difficulties cited as examples of 
red-tape were also capable of being classified under cultural differences. 
This is however a problem area peculiar to MNCs that has long been recog- 
nised in the literature on management. According to Lawrence and Lorsch, 
a multinational company has 
"not only to span the necessary differences among 
functional and product specialists, but also to 
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bridge unavoidable differences among cultures. ' 
2l8, p"230) 
The impression gained at the interviews was that the older, more 
established MNCs appeared to be less worried by these problems, suggesting 
that this is a class of difficulty which is reduced in significance with 
time and familiarity and with the building up of close business relationships 
with individuals or organisations in the host countries. 
It was evident from statements made at the interviews that not all 
companies operating in the MNCs had similar objectives and therefore not 
all environmental constraints were commonly experienced. For instance, 
restrictions on local borrowing imposed by host governments were a problem 
to some of the interviewees, but not to others. One company which specialised 
in providing minority finance for foreign investment, in fact, found this 
requirement to work to their advantage. Similarly, regulations imposed by 
host governments requiring a minimum level of participation in the investment 
by local capital was a problem to a number of firms: but one MNC said that 
in their case local participation was desirable for commercial reasons and 
was actively sought by the group. 
Many of the items added to the list of constraints by respondents reflect 
special characteristics of their organisation or operations. For instance, 
an MNC operating in a large scale extractive industry said that they found 
prohibitive demands by host governments to be the problem and that they looked 
at and sometimes found the 'whole package' to be unacceptable. This attitude 
probably reflects the fact that their kind of operations for the exploitation 
of natural resources in host countries are often so large and so important to 
the countries in question that special packages of regulations and levies are 
put together for them. 
Another company in the clothing industry found export requirements of 
LDC governments to be a problem. This type of company is often allowed access 
to cheap labour in LDCs and offered free trade facilities provided all or the 
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bulk of output is exported. Export requirements can, under these conditions, 
appear to be a major constraint; particularly if there is. considerable 
untapped demand within the country of manufacture. The majority of MNCs 
whose investments in LDCs were generally meant to satisfy local demand did 
not face this difficulty. 
Harshness of Constraints 
The next question in the main questionnaire required respondents to 
name the one or two problems causing them the most difficulty in the LDCs 
(as opposed to the most common problems discussed in the previous section). 
The responses are summarised in Table 7D. 
Table 7D 
Ranking of environmental problems causing the most difficulty in LDCs 
Score* Ranking 
Constraint UK US Total UK US Total 
Political uncertainty 11 12 23 2 1 1 
Exchange controls 15 7 22 1 2 2 
Scarcity of skills 9 2 11 3 4. eq. 3 
Administrative red-tape 8 2 10 4 4eq. 4 
Threat of nationalisation 3 3 6 6 3 Seq. 
Import controls 5 1 6 5 8 5eq. 
Difficult labour relations 2 2 4eq. 7eq. 
Inadequate services 2 2 4eq. 7eq. 
* Score = Number of times listed as the most difficult or 
one of two most difficult problems. 
It can be seen in Table 7D, that the two most common problems, viz. 
political uncertainty and currency exchange control, also cause the most 
difficulty. Both UK and US multinationals rank these two problems at the 
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top of their list a considerable distance above other problems. There are 
minor differences between Tables 7C and 7D in the ranking of problems at 
the lower end, but the scores on these are well below those of the top two 
Taxation v other constraints 
A separate multiple answer question seeking a ranking of the other 
main constraints with reference to the problems of taxation in LDCs gave a 
somewhat different ranking to that in the previous question: but also 
provided overwhelming evidence of the unimportance of taxation as a constraint 
facing foreign investors in LDCs. Respondents were required to state whether 
taxation was (a) a more important problem, (b) an equally important problem 
or (c) a less important problem than each of the other constraints listed 
in the questionnaire. The responses are summarised in Table 7E. 
Table 7E 
Ranking of LDC related environmental problems with reference to 
Tax Constraints 
Score* Ranking 
UK US Total UK US Total 
Political Uncertainty 17 11 28 1 1 1 
Threat of Nationalisation 10 8 18 3 4eq. 2 
Exchange Controls 14 3 17 2 8 3 
Scarcity of skills 6 10 16 5 2 4 
Import controls 7 8 15 4 4eq. 5 
Labour relations 5 9 14 6 3 6 
Administrative red-tape 4 48 7 6eq. 7 
Inadequate services -3 41 9 6eq. 8 
Taxation 0 00 8 9 9 
* Score 
'T. Taxation or Problem equally important as taxation =0 
2. Problem more important than taxation =1 
3. Problem less important than taxation =-1 
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In the ranking in Table 7E taxation appears at the bottom of the 
list overall and in the US sample. Among UK firms tax problems edge their 
way to a position just above problems of inadequate services. In a previous 
section we reported that there was a wide divergence of opinion among MNCs 
as to the significance of taxation considerations in LDC investment decisions. 
The resultshere suggest that even where taxation is a significant consideration, 
in most cases it is unlikely to be a major constraint. 
For MNC investors LDC taxes are not a big problem. In contrast, in 
each of the LDC business surveys (though the ranking was obtained on the 
basis of answers to slightly different questions) taxation was a common 
problem perceived as a constraint on the achievement of business objectives 
by the majority of respondents. In the SL survey tax problems ranked second 
only to import controls in the list of constraints on business. In the 
Philippine and Malaysian surveys too tax constraints ranked second but this 
time below market limitations which headed their list of problems. 
Reasons for low sensitivity of MNCs to LDC tax constraints 
The interviews with UK MNCs suggested several possible explanations for 
the low level of sensitivity among MNCs to LDC taxation problems. The main 
reason appears to be the presence of fairly high taxation at home. In the 
case of UK multinationals only profits remitted back to the UK as dividends 
from foreign subsidiaries are subject to UK tax. Against the UK tax however 
is allowed the deduction of all underlying tax paid abroad on the dividends 
received. Therefore the presence of overseas taxation will have no effect 
on the parent company's tax bill unless the average of all overseas tax 
rates paid on profits remitted exceeded the effective tax rate in the UK. 
Companies can, however, find themselves paying higher taxes because of the 
UK rules for relieving Advance Corporation Tax. (Appendix 13 explains the 
UK tax law relating to overseas earnings of MNCs. ) For instance, 
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"In our case taxation abroad is not a problem 
because UK taxation has always been high. In 
most of the countries we have been trading tax 
rates haven't been any higher than in the UK: 
with the exception of two or three countries 
where the level of profit is high. Then the 
level of taxation wouldn't worry us. " 
The view that taxes in LDCs are not a burden because profit levels 
were high in these countries was shared by other companies. One of these 
said, 
"The returns in developing countries can also 
be higher than in some of the developed countries; 
certainly higher than in the UK in terms of return 
on assets. " 
A company that had no UK income against which relief on ACT could be 
claimed provided the only instance where overseas taxation was a burden. 
"Overseas taxation is much more of a worry than UK 
taxes because of the extent to which you can get 
relief. We are however a special case because we make more 
money overseas. We could get tax relief, on our UK taxes, 
if we had some but we haven't any. " 
It is, of course, possible that overseas taxes may have become a more 
common problem for UK multinationals since then. With the growth of over- 
seas operations and losses in UK activities becoming more common, overseas 
taxes may come to be more important to many more MNCs. 
Another factor which may explain why overseas taxes are not a great 
problem to MNCs, is that these companies are in a position, within limits, 
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to shift profits between countries via appropriate transfer prices in 
order to minimise taxes globally. One company said of high LDC taxes: 
"... obviously we would then seek to maintain 
our returns in some way and if the tax rate is 
high it would presumably have to be through a 
consultancy or technical service fee. " 
One MNC in a highly capital intensive industry explained that in 
their case high depreciation charges in the accounts meant that they have 
a generous cash flow cushion protecting them against adverse short-term 
fluctuations in taxation. 
"... the tendency is to say that being a capital 
intensive industry we also have a fairly good cash 
flow (we have high depreciation on the whole) and 
therefore we are not hit very hard, very quickly 
with any changes in turnover, inflation or taxation. 
We tend to rely on muddling through until the companies 
that are more exposed than we are collectively persuade 
the government to change their taxation policy, until there 
is a change of taxation policy for any other reason or 
in some cases where we ourselves can manage to get a 
decision changed. Because we have this time lag before 
it hits us hard, I think on the whole we would sit it out. " 
A variety of reasons, then, were given as to why LDC taxes were not a 
major problem relative to other constrainst facing MNCs in these countries. 
The reasons differ from firm to firm but there is more or less general 
agreement that taxation ranks very low among constraints on Multinational 
business operating in the LDCs. 
14 
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Sensitivity to Tax Constraints and Management Type 
In the previous chapter it was reported that owner-managers in the 
three LDCs under discussion were more sensitive than professional managers 
to the problems of taxation. Among MNC managers we see a much lower level 
of sensitivity to taxation as a problem than among either type of manager 
in the LDCs. It must be acknowledged that the tax environment facing MNC 
managers is somewhat different to that experienced by LDC managers operating 
within one country. Nevertheless, these results raise the possibility that 
the level of sensitivity among business managers to problems of taxation is 
reduced with increasing professionalism of management or the increasing 
complexity of the organisation structure. 
Organisation theory acknowledges that complex organisations set up 
boundary-spanning activities to buffer the rest of the organisation from 
uncertainties originating from the task environment. 
(183, Ch. 6) The 
presence of specialist professionals dealing with tax problems and uncert- 
ainties and opportunities created by taxation can accordingly be expected 
to reduce the sensitivity of general management to tax constraints. It 
would therefore not be unreasonable to suggest that differences in the 
structure of organisational management can contribute to the variations 
observed in the sensitivity of business managers to tax problems. 
The rest of the chapter examines the impact of LDC taxation on a number 
of specific decision areas. 
LDC Taxes and Investment Decisions of Multinational Corporations 
This section examines MNC investment decision processes and the effect 
of taxation on their decisions. 
The decision processes relating to investment are to some extent 
determined by the objectives of MNCs in making LDC investments. Interviewee 
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comments indicate that generally, the prime reason for investments in a 
third world country is the gaining or retaining of access to a market. 
There were exceptions however: e. g. in one company in the extraction 
industry, the rationale for going into any country was to gain access to 
its mineral resources, and another apparently used LDCs as bases for 
manufacturing for export. To the majority, 
"The main consideration in making an overseas 
investment decision is the market. " 
"It's in the nature of an international company 
that it wishes to be where it can sell its product... " 
"We want representation of the company there (in LDC 
markets). We can do this by exporting, by having 
a franchise or by having a subsidiary or even an 
associate company. " 
These results are in accordance with the findings of Nayyar that access to 
markets was the main reason for the presence of MNC manufacturing establish- 
ments in LDCs, though manufacturing for export has become an increasingly 
important function in recent years. 
(133) 
It is however necessary to make two qualifications to the above analysis. 
Firstly, though the main reason for going into a foreign country is its market, 
the main decision criteria relate to economic viability, viz., profitability 
and cash flow. For example: 
When atsessing a project from our point of view, first of 
all we want to establish its economic viability: but whether 
or not we invest, to a large extent, is a matter of the revenue 
that we see: not our earnings proportions but our dividends 
received. " 
Secondly, though the views discussed above related to new or 'greenfield' 
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investments in LDCs, some of the MNC investment in these areas will involve 
the reinvestment of retained earnings. 
(219, p, 72) Such investments can very 
well be influenced by factors other than market considerations. For example; 
local controls such as exchange controls on remittance of earnings may force 
a MNC to reinvest part of their earnings in the host country, or then again, 
tax avoidance objectives may lead to 'turntable' investments in host countries 
directly or via suitable tax havens. 
(44, p. 12) 
Seven of the UK respondents to the main questionnaire agreed to complete 
a further questionnaire dealing with the manner in which tax considerations 
entered into their investment decision processes. Their responses are 
summarised in Appendix 14. 
Of the seven firms, five firms used DCF techniques to evaluate invest- 
ment proposals. Two of the above used the payback technique alongside DCF 
calculations. Of the two remaining firms, one used the payback technique 
and the other, Return on capital employed. 
Taxation in the host country was said to be taken into account in the 
computations of the performance measure in every case, though rough and 
ready calculations at the initial stages of project analysis were done on a 
pre-tax basis by some of the firms. As discussed previously, the impact of 
taxation on the performance measures implied in the different techniques will 
not be the same. However, it is in the very nature of all the above invest- 
ment evaluation techniques that the performance of an investment project is 
expressed as a single numerical figure to be compared with a pre-determined 
required level of performance. For instance, the DCF techniques would 
require a given minimum Internal Rate of Return or a positive Net Present 
Value at a pre-determined cost of capital. None of the project cash flows 
(including tax cash flows) forming input data for the calculation of 
Internal Rate of Return or Net Present Value would be visible in the final 
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results of the DCF computations. It is therefore unlikely that the 
investment decision-makers (who will not necessarily be the technical 
personnel carrying out the calculations) will actually perceive the 
impact of taxation on project returns unless they had been advised of the 
hypothetical project returns before taxes as well as the post-tax returns, 
and/or the results of sensitivity tests on hypothetical variations in 
taxation. 
If the computation of project returns is carried out at the offices 
of the host country branch or subsidiary, then the detailed input data 
are even further removed from the head-office or parent company decision- 
makers. Among respondent firms, calculations for and appraisal of proposals 
for expansion or replacement investment are done jointly by group head-office 
and local office. Some of these firms explained at later interviews that 
the usual procedure for this type of investment was for subsidiaries to 
carry out all necessary computations locally, with review and approval at 
head office for major investments or when additional funds were requested 
from the parent company. 
In three of the seven firms, local. host country offices were said to 
be involved in the appraisal of the initial investment proposal as well. 
The apparent inconsistency regarding the involvement of host country officers 
in making the initial investment in a foreign country is resolved when one 
considers the usual steps in the investment process where most MNCs tend 
to look for access to an LDC market via exports before making an investment 
in manufacturing facilities. When an investment is considered, therefore, 
they would already have a branch office or an agent representing them locally 
in the foreign country. 
There is little doubt that LDC taxes enter as a relevant variable into 
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the investment appraisals of MNCs. (All seven companies contributing 
to the data included host country taxes in their appraisals. ) But at 
the same time, as illustrated by a remark quoted earlier in this chapter, 
it may be difficult for the decision-maker to assess the impact of taxation 
on the investment because many other relevant factors are also encompassed 
in the performance measure on which the investment decision is largely 
based. 
All but one of the seven firms said that they included host country 
income - and remittance - based taxes as well as home country income-based 
taxes in their investment appraisals. This suggests that a predetermined 
profit distribution and dividend remittance policy is built into the cash 
and income flows used in the appraisals. Whether or not these estimates 
are adhered to in practice is, however, not known. 
In discussing the impact of corporate taxation on the decisions of 
MNCs to invest in developing countries, it would be possible to compare tax 
structures of different countries, in order to rank countries according to 
tax burdens or benefits, only if all other environmental influences were 
equal. But the remarks of survey firms indicate that MNCs themselves 
(except in occasional and essentially theoretical exercises) do not approach 
international investment decisions in this way. 
"You can compare these (taxes in different countries) 
only if everything else were equal; which they are not. " 
One instance where the impact of taxation is relevant, and needs to 
be separately calculated and reported, is when a change in the tax burden 
in any given country could affect the outcome of a proposed investment. 
Although all MNCs interviewed were of the opinion that there was much 
uncertainty attached to the future tax burden on LDC investments, only one 
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of the seven firms contributing to the data in Appendix 14 regularly in 
their investment appraisals took into account the possibility of future 
changes in the tax structures. This firm, however, did no more than 
consider all possibilities in arriving at single figure 'best estimates' 
for tax flows. One other firm which did not regularly allow for uncertainty 
relating to taxation in their investment appraisals used sensitivity analysis 
to test the effect on project DCF returns of specific changes in the tax 
structure 
"where the change is virtually certain. " 
The other companies all do their evaluations on the basis of the tax 
structure at the time of appraisal. 
"You look at taxation as it stands at the moment 
you are working on the project. You cannot normally 
predict how it will change. You work the whole thing 
out on the system as it stands now and trust to luck 
that it does not alter to such an extent that it alters 
dramatically the result of what you are doing. " 
"Tax considerations are usually less worrying, one 
because they are changing all the time. " 
The very changeability of tax burdens apparently triggers the response 
in the decision-makers to ignore the uncertainty ... Small changes in the 
tax rate or burden are expected to occur regularly but because of the high 
level of uncertainty involved, the MNC decision-makers choose to overlook 
the fact. This view is supported by the findings of Schall and Sundem(157) 
that, 
"Firms in less certain environments tend to use 
less sophisticated capital budgeting methods. " 
It is probably the experience of the MNCs that ordinarily, although 
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there are many frequent changes in tax rates and structures in most 
countries, the overall effect on the total tax burden is not very large 
or significant in the short term. As one interviewee said, 
"Changes in tax structures are frequent: 
the rates go up about 5% every now and again. " 
Excluding major changes in the tax structure which are a part of a 
change in the total investment environment precipitated by a major political 
upheaval, in the main what is true of tax systems the world over is that the 
changes in the law are frequent but that any increase in the burden of 
taxation occurs by a slow process of creeping up over many years rather 
than by single sudden leaps. 
The fact the MNCs tend to ignore uncertainties of taxation and that 
they do not find taxation to be a major problem does not, however, mean 
they will not take steps wherever possible to minimise taxation. The 
investment in an LDC may itself not be undertaken for tax reasons, but all 
the firms have procedures for the arrangement of their investments in such 
a way as to minimise taxes within the group's overall aims and preferences. 
However, again this seems not be an overwhelming consideration. For instance, 
one interviewee said, 
"..., one of our directors, ... is quite a 
great expert on tax. If they say don't do 
it quite like that, do it this-a-ways, then 
we do it. But if we say, if we do it that-a-ways 
its going to create stresses or management problems, 
they say well, okay, forget it. " 
The interviewees were unanimous in their opinion that they found tax 
incentives offered by LDCs to be useful and that these could (through their 
impact on investment returns), influence investment decisions. Nevertheless, 
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they were emphatic that normally, no investment decision would be made 
purely for tax advantages. 
"Tax incentives will be unlikely to alter a 
major decision on their own because these 
things can change. " 
"I don't think tax holidays affect the primary 
decision that you go and invest money. It's 
quite likely to affect how you do it. " 
"We would take advantage of tax incentives, but 
they wouldn't tip the scale. " 
Another device often used by LDCs to encourage investment by private 
foreign capital, viz. double tax relief (DTR) agreements received a mixed 
response. Some interviewee companies saw no great benefit accruing to 
them from DTR agreements between the UK and LDCs, because of the system 
of unilateral relief which operated in the UK in any case. 
"Double tax relief agreements are not very significant. " 
"A double tax agreement would normally determine the 
share of revenue between governments. Our profits would 
receive relief from UK tax even without a double tax 
agreement. " 
Several others, however, perceived DTR agreements differently, 
"Double tax relief treaties are important. " 
"I think probably the one (tax related variable) 
that may prompt us to lose interest in any given 
country is the loss of double taxation relief. The 
creation of an agreement, the ratification of a treaty 
for double taxation, would not in itself make us look at 
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a country with a view towards investing, but 
where we have an investment and double taxation 
relief is withdrawn we could well decide to pull out. " 
The divergence of opinion probably reflects differences in experience 
between companies with regard to double taxation relief on the one hand and 
possibly also to some extent the unfamiliarity of the interviewees with the 
complex provisions for double taxation relief in the UK. - The belief that 
double tax relief agreements would largely determine the sharing of taxation 
between governments and that a UK company would in any case receive unilateral 
relief on its overseas income would have been correct before the UK authorities 
began introducing "tax-sparing" provisions (see appendix 13) in the middle 
seventies to their double tax relief agreements. However this statement 
could still describe the position of an old established multinational which 
has not in recent years received any major tax exemption or investment 
incentives in countries with which tax-sparing arrangements have been made 
by the UK Inland Revenue. 
The results discussed so far indicate that taxation is not a major 
reason for a multinational investing in an LDC. Access to the LDC market, 
we were told, is the prime consideration. In order to get a better idea of 
the sort of countries in the third world that interest MNCs, the respondents 
in the main survey were asked if they had investments in six selected LDCs, 
including the three countries with reference to which the sample of MNCs 
were drawn. The replies are summarised in Table 7F. 
The US firms were seen to have a far greater interest in the Philippines 
than the UK MNCs, whereas the UK firms showed a greater presence in the 
other five, all ex-colonial commonwealth countries. 
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Investment by 
Table 7F 
Respondent Firms in Selected LDCs 
Number of Companies with investment in 
UK firms US firms 
Jamaica 10 2 
Malaysia 25 5 
Nigeria 20 1 
The Philippines 10 15 
Sri Lanka 15 - 
Zambia 12 - 
Number of firms in sample 31 19 
It is possible that these results reflect to some extent, the methods 
of sample selection whereby companies known to have investments in SL, 
Malaysia and the Philippines were selected to receive the questionnaire. 
Nevertheless, they clearly suggest that MNCs show a greater interest in 
countries coming under the political influence of their home country, with 
UK firms in the sample dominating commonwealth countries and the US firms 
showing a greater presence in the ex-US-colonial possession, the Philippines. 
The respondents who had no investments in SL were asked to state 
reasons for their absence from that country. Nineteen firms supplied reasons 
and these are summarised in Table 7G. 
Table 7G 
Reasons for not holding investments in Sri Lanka 
By 
UK firms US firms 
The possibility of investing has not 
been considered 38 
The possibility of investing was considered 
but a decision was made against investing 42 
Investments were held in the past 2- 
'9 TU 
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It can be seen in Table 7G that eight out of the ten US firms had not 
even considered the possibility of investing in SL whereas five of the nine 
UK firms had either held investments in SL or had considered the possibility 
of doing so, sometime in the past. This greater interest in SL by UK firms 
relative to US firms, even in the group that had no investments in that 
country (a member of the Commonwealth) supports the proposition made earlier 
that MNCs show a greater interest in LDCs with which their home country has 
historical or current political ties. 
Comparing the attitude of the MNCs to LDC investments with that relating 
to developed country locations, the interviewees believed that their attitude 
would be no different: but several areas of difference often encountered 
in the two types of country were mentioned. These are listed below. 
1. Quality of product is more important in developed countries. 
Therefore, competition from low-quality low-priced local products 
is less common than in LDCs; 
2. But it is more difficult to break into markets in developed 
countries. 
3. Return on investment tends to be higher in the LDCs. 
4. Political factors are more important in the LDCs than in developed 
countries, whereas commercial considerations tend to be the limiting 
factors in the developed countries. 
In no case did the interviewees think that their response to taxation 
would be any different between LDCs and developed countries. However, their 
ability to earn higher returns in LDCs must make multinational corporations 
generally less concerned about taxation in these areas, compared with developed 
country locations. 
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Taxation and Financinq Decisions 
Most of the companies interviewed had some idea of a finance mix 
they would like to see in overseas investments, but they all agreed that 
given the differences between countries - for example in interest rates, 
exchange control regulations and host government regulations relating to 
borrowing by foreign firms - each case in each country needed to be looked 
at separately. 
"Very roughly speaking, I think what we do in Malaysia 
is probably the ideal. We put up about a quarter of the 
capital that was needed: we guaranteed to banks for them 
to lend to the local company a half and we then had a public 
issue for the other quarter ... " 
"We would follow an order of preference for a subsidiary 
which is wholly owned, we would first try to get them to 
borrow locally without any ties with the UK. If that is not 
possible the second thing we would consider is borrowing 
locally but with some sort of support from the UK, ... the 
next is giving that company a loan from the UK - and charge a 
market rate of interest. We would not borrow internationally 
for funds to be used by subsidiaries, except where the need 
arises for a particular currency in which we want to invest. " 
"Whether we borrow would depend on the rate of interest and 
the rate of exchange. " 
"... in many of our overseas companies in terms of pure balance 
sheet analysis we could do with gearing up. This we seek to do 
wherever we can, but it is not always possible for political 
reasons. " 
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Six of the interviewees provided clear answers to the questions 
relating to the influence of taxation on financing decisions. Taxation was 
acknowledged by all these firms to be a relevant consideration in decisions 
relating to financing of overseas investment, but it was not thought by 
three of them to be a decisive factor. Those firms who believed tax con- 
siderations influenced financing decisions said: 
"Financing preferences are tax-related. If there is 
a very high withholding tax we would suffer ... one 
has got to get a balance. " 
"Sometimes there are tax advantages in debt financing 
because the interest is allowable against tax. " 
"Tax advantages of certain types of financing are used. " 
On the whole, the MNC managers interviewed were more aware than SL 
managers of the ways in which tax considerations would influence financing 
decisions. 
Taxation and dividend remittances from foreign subsidiaries 
On decisions relating to remittances to the UK of profits and dividends, 
the companies interviewed were at that time restricted by Bank of England 
requirements that 2/3rds of overseas earnings should be remitted back to 
the UK. One of the seven companies interviewed, however, saw this regulation 
not as a restriction but as a requirement that happened to match exactly 
their group preferences. 
Even within these regulations most interviewees attempted to minimise 
taxes globally by using an appropriate policy for the remittance of overseas 
earnings. Several strategies for tax minimisation were mentioned. For 
example: 
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1. Subsidiary companies may be formed overseas to collect earnings 
outside the UK. As UK taxation is only payable on dividends 
received in the country from overseas subsidiaries, the creation 
of foreign holding companies to collect overseas earnings and to 
undertake 'turntable' investments is a useful tax-planning device. 
As one interviewee explained, 
"An overseas subsidiary can serve as'a vehicle for 
holding funds when you don't want to remit them. " 
2. It is possible for the subsidiary to pay the parent company's share 
of net income in a form other than dividends, and where the effective 
tax on dividend income is higher than on other forms of income, this 
option is often exercised. 
"We are able to choose between different types of income 
very, very occasionally: the flexibility is not very great. 
Presumably, tax is the reason why we are doing it. " 
"If the tax rate is too high, we would seek to maintain our 
returns in some other way, ... it would presumably have to be 
through a consultancy or technical services fee. " 
3. As UK unilateral DTR provides for the deduction 
lying foreign tax on income received in the UK, 
UK MNCs (within limits) to choose to bring into 
from high-tax countries in preference to income 
tax rates. There is evidence that this practic 
least of the interviewees, 
from UK taxes of under- 
it is advantageous for 
the country income 
from countries with low 
e is adopted by some at 
"For instance if you have a tax-free area you don't bring 
money out of that one because it means paying tax when it comes 
here, which it has to when one is declaring it as a dividend. " 
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Only one of the seven companies interviewed said that taxation was 
irrelevant in their policy relating to remittances from overseas subsidiaries 
and this was because the company followed a policy of requiring a standard 
minimum percentage of earnings to be remitted unless local restrictions 
necessitated lower levels of remittance. All others agreed that tax con- 
siderations were important in the distribution decision, even though some 
of them had said that taxation was not very important in financing decisions. 
Why this should be so when the two types of decision are closely inter- 
related is not clear; but a similar response was seen in the LDC surveys 
as well, although the level of importance of tax in distribution decisions 
of LDC managers was considerably lower. 
One possible explanation (though not proven) for the greater relevance 
of tax considerations in distribution decisions relative to financing 
decisions may be that the significance of non-tax influences is greater in 
the latter decision area. If other market or governmental influences are 
so important as to be limiting factors on the finance mix, tax considerations 
may be subordinated. If the firm has greater flexibility in regard to profit 
distributions (and this would be particularly true of dividends of MNC sub- 
sidiaries, which are mainly intra-group transfers), then tax considerations 
and tax minimisation objectives are likely to become more important. 
On the whole UK multinational managers show a higher awareness of the 
relevance of taxation. It must be noted however that the UK law relating 
to dividend distributions, with payment and recovery of Advance Corporation 
Tax and the various rules for group taxation and group relief, is far more 
complex than the laws of the three LDCs studied. The complexity of the law 
itself could very well increase manager perceptions as to the importance of 
taxation considerations in distribution and other corporate decisions. 
In a previous section it was reported that most multinational companies 
interviewed seemed to have dividend policy estimates built into their 
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investment appraisal calculations. The remarks relating to tax effects 
on distribution remittance policies however indicate that the policy is 
reviewed regularly and how much is remitted back to the UK from any one 
source is determined by a number of variables, including profits available 
from alternative sources, government restrictions, re-investment requirements 
and UK dividend payments of the parent company. The companies appear to 
attempt to put together a mix of remittances to meet all the above require- 
ments as well as to minimise the global tax bill and maximise UK double 
tax relief. 
Taxation and Pricing Decisions 
The interviewees were also questioned on the relevance of tax con- 
siderations in their pricing decisions in the LDCs. Corporation Tax appears 
to be treated differently from indirect taxes in pricing decisions of the 
MNC interviewees. This result agrees with the findings of the SL survey 
on the pricing practices of firms in that country. Views of MNC interviewees 
discussed in this section relate to the pricing of their products to 
customers and not to transfer pricing within the group of companies. 
All but one of the interviewees argued that they either as a matter 
of policy or of necessity included all indirect taxes such as customs duties 
and value added or sales taxes in their costing for pricing purposes, but 
that income taxes were not a consideration in pricing decisions. For 
example: 
"We always work on pre-tax profits: but there are other 
taxes like VAT in the UK and, in some foreign countries, 
sales tax. Obviously that would be added to the price 
to the consumer. But you can't always earn the margin that 
you want because of competitors' activities. " 
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"Our costing is a landed cost approach ... landed cost 
plus customs duties. We never take income taxes as a 
cost. An increase in corporation tax would come off 
profit. If not you'd price yourself out of the market. " 
"Provided we are able to make a profit, corporation tax 
comes below the line. So presumably there is a slice 
for the government and a slice for us. " 
Taken together, these comments imply that the behaviour of MNCs 
matchestheexpectations of traditional economic theory in that indirect 
taxes are shifted by business firms in the short-term while income taxes 
are not. Cost-plus pricing behaviour as envisaged by Krzyzaniak and 
Musgrave, (112) wherein income taxes are treated as part of costs, is not 
the norm in this sample of companies. 
It will be recalled, however, that all seven companies completing the 
second questionnaire stated that they took taxation (including income taxes) 
into account in their project appraisals. Yet when it comes to pricing 
decisions they do not seem to (with one exception) pay any attention to 
the level of income taxes. 
Several possible explanatory factors can contribute to this apparent 
inconsistency in the treatment of income taxes. Firstly, it is possible 
that the pre-income tax margins that the MNCs seek to achieve or maintain 
are fixed for each country so as to cover income taxes and therefore in 
their short-term pricing decisions all that is necessary is to earn the 
'required' margin. This possibility is supported by the fact that two 
interviewees commented in another context that in high-tax LDCs they tend 
to earn high pre-tax profits, and therefore the high level of taxation in 
these countries is not a particularly difficult problem. The companies 
are probably able to price on 'required' margins in the short-term because 
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income tax rates do not change drastically in the short term within any 
given country. The indications, however, are that in the long term, tax 
differentials between countries would be reflected in the required margins 
and in product prices. 
Another possibility is that MNCs operate in third world countries under 
conditions of either monopoly or perfect markets, and as envisaged in 
economic theory, are unable to pass on income tax in prices to consumers 
without moving from a profit maximising position. The presence of import 
controls and protected markets in many LDCs makes market conditions in 
these countries highly conducive to monopoly operations. 
A third possible factor contributing to the responses received may be 
the perceptions of social responsibility among MNC managers who may believe 
that socially responsible companies would not shift increases in income tax 
to consumers. There is, however, no direct evidence in this survey to 
suggest that this factor has influenced the survey response. 
Functional bias of respondent 
This section reports the results of a test carried out separately 
from the main survey to check on the possibility that the view of taxation 
obtained in the survey may have been significantly influenced by functional 
specialisms of the officers answering the questions. 
The first questionnaire was addressed to the finance directors of the 
selected companies but replies in some cases came from officers in the 
group planning function or officers in charge of LDC operations. The name 
and designation of the officer replying was not indicated in all responses 
but as far as can be ascertained from information available none of these 
came from the firm's tax adviser or the officer directly in charge of tax 
management. All replies to the second questionnaire and the interviews were 
similarly with senior officers in general management or the finance function. 
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The replies, therefore, may with a reasonable degree of confidence 
be said to represent the views of general and financial management and 
not that of persons immediately responsible for taxation management. 
In order to check the possibility that the analysis of the foregoing 
sections may be rendered invalid by our inability to introduce a control 
for the source of response within a firm, a test was carried out in one 
of the firms responding to the questionnaire whereby seven managers of 
the same firm were asked to complete the questionnaire independently and 
on behalf of the firm. 
Of the seven respondents from the firm studied, one was the firm's 
tax manager: the others were all senior managers in charge of overseas 
investments in different parts of the world. The answers of these res- 
pondents to the relevant questions are summarised in Table 7H. 
The analyses in Table 7H show 
(a) that there were differences between managers as to their 
perception of taxation and other environmental influences on 
the activities of the firm in LDCs, but 
(b) that the most marked difference was between the tax manager 
of the firm and the others in relation to questions pertaining 
to taxation. 
The tax manager was the only respondent in this sample to say that 
taxation was always a consideration and he was also the only person to 
believe that the problems of taxation were more important than the majority 
of other difficulties listed in the questionnaire. In his opinion political 
uncertainty and lack of managerial and technical skills in the LDCs were 
the only problems more important than taxation. 
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Table 7H 
(A) 
(B) 
Sensitivity to Taxation - Tax Manager v other managers 
Taxation in the host country is a significant 
consideration in LDC investment Decisions 
Always 
Often 
Sometimes 
Seldom 
Depends on Country and Time 
No reply 
Tax Manager Other Managers 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 6 
Problems of Taxation compared 
with other Constraints 
Score* 
Tax Manager 
Investment Manager 1 
Investment Manager 2 
Investment Manager 3 
Investment Manager 4 
Investment Manager 5 
Investment Manager 6 
+4 
-4 
-5 
-7 
-8 
-8 
* Score = Number of problems less important than taxation 
- Number of problems more important than taxation. 
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At a subsequent interview with one of the respondents it was learnt 
that the familiarity with LDC investment of the other managers varied both 
in regard to geographical areas covered and the length of experience in 
dealing with LDC affairs. Despite these differences all the managers 
other than the tax manager were of opinion that the majority of difficulties 
listed were more important problems than taxation. 
The statistical significance of the above results is necessarily 
limited by the fact that the data have been collected within a single firm. 
Nevertheless, the differences observed permit some tentative conclusions. 
The differences between the replies of the tax manager and the others 
viewed as a group may be explained as probably being due to the 'halo-effect' 
in regard to tax problems on the perceptions of the tax manager whose 
functional specialism and day to day activities increase in his eyes the 
importance of tax problems, relative to others. 
The differences among the investment managers of the firm may be 
viewed as providing evidence that the replies to a survey of this nature 
could indeed be influenced by personalities and experience of the responding 
officers as well as by their functional or professional specialisms. However, 
the fact that the differences of opinion in regard to taxation among the 
non-tax-specialist managers are not as great as the difference between 
them and the tax specialist can be reasonably interpreted to mean that on 
the whole the replies from general and financial managers relating to the 
impact of taxation on MNC activities are not likely to be biased sharply one 
way or the other. 
rnnrlim innc 
One of the main conclusions that can be drawn from this survey is that 
MNCs are not attracted to developing countries merely because tax incentives 
are being offered. Nor do they appear to be anxious to give up their 
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activities in high tax countries. This raises the possibility that 
developing countries offering tax incentives to multinationals for the 
setting up of import-substituting industries may perhaps have been over- 
generous in their offers, particularly if the new industries were also 
protected by import controls or tariff barriers. This argument however 
does not apply to tax exemptions offered in free-trade-zones for manufacturers 
for export. 
Market considerations were seen to be the main reason for the presence 
of MNCs in third world countries. There was evidence, however, that MNCs 
appeared to concentrate their interests in geographical areas with which 
their home country had some political or historical connections. 
Political uncertainty appears to be the main constraint on MNC 
activity in LDCs. Taxation is seen by MNC managers as a low-order problem 
causing less difficulty than any other environmental constraint listed in 
our questionnaire. Though many reasons were given as to why taxation is 
not a major constraint in LDCs, perhaps the main explanatory factor appears 
to be the presence of taxation in the home country of an MNC. 
Judging by the results of all the surveys, multinational managers 
appear to 
(a) be more aware than LDC managers of the ways in which taxation 
can influence business decisions, 
(b) be less constrained than the latter by problems of taxation, 
and 
(c) use tax-planning for the minimisation of their tax bill to a 
greater extent. 
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CHAPTER 8. 
UK Multinational Corporationsin LDCs - Analysis of Company Reports 
The preceding chapters reported and analysed the results of surveys 
carried out to investigate the impact of taxation on business decisions in 
LDCs. Although the survey is the main method of investigation adopted in 
this research, the technique has a number of limitations'as discussed in 
Chapter 3. One major problem with questionnaire- and interview-based surveys 
is the possibility of bias originating from functional specialisation or 
personal_characteristics of the interviewee or officer completing the 
questionnaire. Evidence of this phenomenon was seen in the results of the 
test carried out within one firm, reported in the last chapter. 
In order that our conclusions are not rendered invalid by the limitations 
the survey method of research, it is intended to investigate the same issues usi r 
other data and techniques wherever possible. This chapter will analyse annual 
reports of UK MNCs to ascertain the factors reported as either promoting or 
constraining the activities of the companies in different geographical areas. 
It is not contended that statements in reports accompanying annual 
accounts are to be taken as forming full and exhaustive listings of factors 
affecting operations of companies. However, these statements provide the 
main opportunity (in some cases the sole opportunity), that directors of 
public companies have of expressing their views on the activities for a given 
year to the shareholders, their investment advisers and other interested 
parties outside the companies. It is therefore reasonable to assume that any 
factors making a special contribution to the achievement of company objectives 
and others of significance hampering the achievement of corporate goals would 
be referred to in these reports. 
Company reports will be analysed here to seek answers to the following 
broad questions: 
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1. What are the main factors promoting or constraining MNC activities 
in the third world? 
2. How important is taxation among these factors? 
3. Are the factors influencing activities in the LDCs any different 
from those in the home country or in other developed countries. 
4. What specific aspects of taxation - particularly LDC taxation - 
do the companies 
(a) feel constrained by or 
(b) consider to be favourable to them? 
Method 
The method adopted in the study of company reports is 'Content Analysis'. 
Broadly speaking content analysis can be defined to include 
11 ... any technique for making inferences by 
objectively and systematically identifying 
specific characteristics of messages. " 
(89) 
More specifically, in practice it 
"... is a way of asking a fixed set of 
questions unfalteringly of all of a pre- 
determined body of writings in such a way as 
to produce countable results. " 
(26) 
The technique was first developed as an aid to communications research 
but has its applications both in the liberal arts and the social sciences. 
In enabling a researcher to classify the content of communications in a 
countable form it provides a vast improvement on impressionistic reading. 
As used in our research it involves analysing answers found in the selected 
published information to questions posed about factors affecting multinational 
operations. 
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The main communications analysed here are the annual reports of 24 UK 
multinational corporations with investments in LDCs for the year 1978 or 
the accounting year ending in 1978. The reports were a random selection 
from the collection of Company Reports held by the Warwick University 
Library. Most of the 24 companies are mainly in manufacturing industry: 
but mining, agricultural, shipping and agency services are also represented 
within the sample. 
For each Company the following reports (if included in the annual 
report or circulated with it) were read and analysed: 
a. Chairman's review, 
b. Directors' report, 
c. Report of non-executive directors and 
d. Review of operations for the year. 
The main question posed in the content analysis was 'What factors promote 
or constrain the achievement of company objectives? ' 
For this purpose unless specifically stated in relation to a given 
influencing factor, company objectives were assumed to be 
a. maximisation of profits, 
b. maximisation of sales and 
c. growth of investment. 
The causal factors referred to in the reports were classified separately 
for the UK, other developed countries and LDCs as internal or external factors 
promoting or constraining the achievement of corporate goals. As depicted 
in Figure 8.1, each class was further subdivided into categories with ref- 
erence to the detailed causes given and countries to which the comments 
related. 
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Figure 8.1 
Classification used in Content Analysis 
Classified over Causal Factors 
Area UK Other developed countries LDCS 
Type of influence 
Promoting Constraining 
Achievement Achievement 
Origin of influence 
External Internal 
source source 
Factor Market Political Unrest 
Country 
India SL 
* Similar classification done for other areas as well. 
A number of rules were devised to facilitate the analysis: 
1. Only comments relating specifically to a named country or geographical 
area identifiable as a collection of developed countries or LDCs were 
extracted. 
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2. Only factors referred to as causes for the company's failure or 
success in achieving its objectives in a particular area were 
extracted. For example, if the report thanked the management 
and staff for their hard work during the year (and most reports 
did) no account was taken of it. Again, if an acquisition was 
reported and no indication was given of its effect on the above 
objectives, no account was taken of that either. If however an 
acquisition was reported to have led to increased profits in a 
named country, then that was recorded as a factor promoting 
corporate achievement. 
3. All comments on Rhodesia were ignored: most companies with interests 
in Rhodesia stated that the parent company in the UK had no influence 
over the operations in Rhodesia and hence Rhodesian results were not 
consolidated. 
4. In the separation of internal from external variables, internal 
variables were defined as those factors within immediate control 
of management while all other influencing factors were treated as 
external variables. 
5. A reference or several references in the same report to any one 
causal factor for performance in a named country or geographical 
area identifiable as a collection of developed or developing 
countries was given a score of one point under the appropriate 
category. For example, if a chairman's report stated that the 
poor profits in India were due to a prolonged strike by workers 
at the Indian factory, then this would carry one point under 
industrial relations problems and be classified as a constraint 
faced in LDCs. 
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Discussions of the technique of content analysis in the literature 
emphasise two areas of possible limitation associated with it: 
(a) the suitability for analysis and completeness of the material 
analysed, and 
(b) the quality of the questions asked and the relevance of categories 
for analysis as determined by the researcher. 
Both these possibilities have been given due consideration in 
selecting the material for study and the questions posed. The questions 
asked are simple and straightforward and capable of being answered precisely. 
The material studied has been prepared by the companies for a uniform 
purpose, viz., informing the public and shareholders of the activities of 
the company for the year under review. It is not unreasonable to regard these 
statements as providing the best available public communications of company 
management relating to the activities of their companies during that period. 
Statements made in the annual reports differ from survey responses in 
two material respects. Firstly the former are public statements whereas the 
latter are private and confidential communications made to the researcher. 
Secondly, as already discussed, it is possible that survey responses to some 
extent represent a personal view of the respondent and may be conditioned by 
his functional specialism or personal experience. Statements in annual 
reports by contrast are statements made by top management of the company; 
the ideas in the statements often passing through the hands of and being 
discussed by many of the management team before publication, and may be 
taken to be a better indicator of the corporate point of view. 
Two important features of the material studied, which introduce possible 
sources of bias, must however be noted. Firstly, it was apparent that some 
companies provided shareholders with more detailed reports than others. The 
length of reports circulated and the extent of detail discussed appear to be 
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partially at least a function of the house style of reporting of the 
company concerned. The analysis carried out here would recognise internal 
strengths and weaknesses of companies and external constraints and 
advantages only if these were specifically referred to in the 1978 annual 
reports. We would therefore pick up only factors which were sufficiently 
important or different in the eyes of the company management to require 
mention in the reports. Also, our results would be likely to emphasise the 
problems and advantages of companies producing more detailed reports. 
Secondly, the type of comment in the reports and hence in our results are 
also dependent upon: 
1. the geographical spread of investments of the companies in the 
sample (for instance, if a company's only overseas investments 
are in LDCs, then its report will not have any comments at all 
about overseas developed countries), 
2. the importance for group results of the investments in a particular 
country or area (for instance if the investment of a company in SL 
is very small in comparison with its total capital employed globally, 
it may not refer to conditions or performance in SL in its annual 
report whereas a much larger interest in, say, India maybe discussed 
in detail). 
Despite these limitations it is believed that the sample used is large 
and representative enough to provide reasonably good evidence on factors 
affecting MNC investments and performance. 
Analysis of Results 
The results of the content analysis are summarised in Table 8A. 
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Table 8A 
Summary of Factors Influencing Achievement of Corporate Goals 
Type of Influence 
Promoting Constraining 
Source Internal External Total Internal External Total 
Area 
UK 37 8 45 0 56 56 
Other Developed 
Countries 37 15 52 6 97 103 
LDCs 13 14 27 0 84 84 
Total 87 37 124 6 237 243 
The summary in Table 8A shows that company reports referred to about 
twice as many constraining factors as those promoting the achievement of 
organisation goals. Both external and internal causal factors were mentioned 
but by and large external factors were constraints whereas the internal 
factors mentioned were mostly favourable. This difference between internal 
and external influences is statistically significant at a level of 0.001 
(Appendix 15.1). This is not an entirely unexpected result when we consider 
that the annual report has, at least partly, a public relations objective: it 
is unlikely that management will volunteer detailed information on internal 
deficiencies and inefficiencies in a report seeking to maintain or increase 
the confidence of the shareholders and the public in the abilities of 
management. At the same time, it is not unknown for corporate management, 
to use annual reports to try to influence public opinion or the government 
in an attempt to remove or reduce some of the constraints faced by the company; 
thus introducing a bias towards reporting external constraints. 
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Looking at the factors promoting corporate achievement separately 
for the three areas, differences are observed in the balance between 
internal and external factors. Internal factors dominate the list of 
favourable influences in the UK. A shift to external factors is observed 
among overseas developed countries while in the LDCs external factors gain 
even more in relative importance. These differences are significant on the 
X2 test at a 0.01 level (Appendix 15.2). 
It can be seen in Table 8A that companies refer to very few internal 
constraining factors in their annual reports. In this sample less than 3% 
of constraints referred to were of internal origin, and all these internal 
constraints related to developed countries outside the UK. Inadequate cell 
frequencies, however, preclude significant results on the X2 test. 
On the whole, LDC operations appear to be those affected most by external 
factors. Viewing the combined influences of factors promoting achievement 
and those constraining achievement external factors are relatively more 
important in the LDCs. The relevance of external factors as against internal 
is somewhat lower in developed overseas countries and lower still in the UK. 
The differences are significant on the X2 test at a 0.005 level (Appendix 
15.3). This relatively high frequency of references to external factors in 
LDCs might well reflect a greater dependence of MNCs on environmental in- 
fluences in these areas than in developed countries. 
Tables 8B and 8C list details of factors promoting corporate achievement 
and constraining corporate achievement respectively, classified as to source 
of influence (ie. internal or external) and ranked according to frequency 
of references. 
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Table 8B 
Analysis of Factors Promoting Cor porate Achievement - 1978 
Internal Other 
Developed 
UK Countries LDCs Total 
Productivity/cost reduction/ 
rationalisation etc. 10 10 1 21 
Acquisitions/mergers/other 
similar arrangements. 3 10 4 17 
New design/product development 8 8 1 17 
Management effort/planning 5 5 4 14 
Expansion 3 2 3 8 
Marketing effort 5 1 - 6 
Diversification 2 - - 2 
Divestment 1 1 - 2 
External 
Market - demand/supply/prices 8 13 8 29 
State of the economy - - 4 4 
Fluctuation in currency 
exchange rates - 1 - 1 
Relaxation of price controls - - 1 1 
Relaxation of exchange controls - - 1 1 
Improvement in balance of 1 - 1 
payments - 
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Table 
Analysis of Factors Constrainin 
8C 
g Cor porate Achievement - 1978 
Other 
Developed 
Internal UK Countries LDCs Total 
Poor management - 2 - 2 
Excess/shortage of capacity - 2 - 2 
Teething troubles - 1 - 1 
Production problems - 1 - 1 
External 
Market - supply/demand/prices 16 33 13 62 
State of economy - 21 9 30 
Industrial relations 14 4 8 26 
Fluctuations in currency 
exchange rates 7 10 3 20 
Availability of supplies 
and resources 1 4 11 16 
Weather/climate 5 3 3 11 
Requirements for local 
participation - - 11 11 
Political-uncertainty/unrest - 2 8 10 
Price controls 4 3 3 10 
Government intervention 4 5 - 9 
Taxation 1 2 4 7 
Difficult trading conditions 1 4 - 5 
Devaluation - 2 2 4 
Balance of payments problems - - 3 3 
Import controls - 1 2 3 
Inflation 1 1 - 2 
Quality standards - 2 - 2 
Exchange restrictions - - 2 2 
Credit problems - - 1 1 
Dividend control 1 - - 1 
Common Agricultural Policy 
of EEC 1 - - 1 
Compulsory acquisition - - 1 1 
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Examining first the detailed factors promoting corporate achievement 
(Table 8B), 1978 appears to have been a year for concentrating on improvement 
of efficiency in both the UK and other developed country operations. Devel- 
opment of new products and designs is also important in the developed areas. 
Neither of these items however is particularly important in LDCs. This is 
again perhaps a predictable observation as much of any innovation and new 
developments in technology in a multinational can be expected to take place 
in a developed country environment with the new technology being transferred 
subsequently to LDCs. 
Expansion of operations of multinationals has taken place in all areas 
including the LDCs, but successful merger activity is reported largely in 
respect of developed countries. 
The only favourable external factor common to all areas related to the 
state of the market. This was also the largest scoring item among favourable 
factors. Though the availability of a market appears to be important in all 
areas, marketing effort by the company contributing to increased sales was 
only mentioned under the UK and developed countries, again supporting the 
survey evidence that a greater marketing effort is needed to capture and 
hold developed country markets. 
Taxation or tax incentives were not mentioned by any of the companies 
as factors conducive to achievement of corporate goals. There were however 
seven references to taxation under factors constraining corporate achieve- 
ment. Nevertheless, as seen in Table 8C, taxation was by no means a globally 
important constraining influence. It appears half way down the ranking of 
22 external constraints referred to in the 1978 reports, carrying a score 
of 7 in a set of values ranging from 62 to 1. The aspects of taxation 
perceived as constraints will be discussed later in this chapter. 
It can be seen from Table 8C that market factors are the most important 
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item under constraints as well as under factors promoting corporate 
achievement. Numerous statements were made in the reports regarding the 
'state of the economy' of various developed and under-developed countries: 
this phrase or an equivalent was however not used with reference to the UK. 
It is possible however that as both the interest and awareness of the public 
are likely to be greater about the impact of the UK environment on corporate 
achievement, specific aspects of the UK economy would be referred to rather 
than the state of the economy in general. Industrial relations appear to 
have been a constraint creating greater problems in the UK than in any other 
part of the world in 1978. 
The content analysis disclosed several typically LDC constraints such 
as (a) Government requirements for local participation, (b) shortage of 
supplies and services, (c) political uncertainty or unrest and (d) exchange 
restrictions. All these items echo the results of the survey in regard to 
LDC related constraints. However, political uncertainty in LDCs which 
loomed very large among the worries of survey respondents does not occupy 
the same high ranking among constraints referred to in company reports. It 
is, of course, possible that political uncertainty is an ever-present long- 
term problem in LDCs which will not necessarily have any special impact on 
the results of the year under review in most areas. It is reasonable to 
assume that company reports will not refer to this item year after year 
unless there was a particular impact in any year on the results in a 
specific area. The relatively low ranking of this item cannot therefore 
be interpreted to mean that political uncertainty does not exist in many 
LDCs or where it does that it is not perceived as a constraint by multi- 
national business. 
An attempt was made to classify external constraints faced by MNCs into 
3 categories: viz, 
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1. Market and resource related, 
2. General country or economy related, and 
3. Government controlled. 
The results are detailed in Appendix 15.4 and a summary is given in 
Table 8D. 
Classification of External 
Table 8D 
Factors Constraining Cor porate Achievement - 1978 
Other 
Developed 
UK Countries LDCs Total 
Market and Resource 
related factors 32 45 32 109 
General Country and 
Economy related fact ors 13 37 27 77 
Government controlled factors 11 15 25 51 
The classification is in all probability not wholly accurate as 
available information was insufficient to fit some items into any one of 
the above categories with certainty, (eg. 'difficult trading conditions' 
may come under item 1 or item 2), while some others may be merely the 
secondary manifestations of other primary causes (eg. political unrest 
may arise from an unpopular measure of government control or vice-versa). 
Subject to the above qualifications, the classification of external 
constraints using available data, discloses that of the three categories, 
'market factors' are most important in the UK; that 'economy or general 
country related factors' are prominent in other developed countries and that 
government controls are most important in LDCs. The differences between 
geographical areas are significant on the X2 test at a 0.05 level 
(Appendix 15.4). These results add support to the survey findings that 
multinational corporations find government controls of one sort or another 
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to be the major constraint in LDCs, whereas commercial factors are found 
to be the major constraints in developed economies. 
Test for continuity 
The foregoing content analysis provides evidence of factors influencing 
the performances of UK multinational companies in the year 1978. A further 
question arising from the analysis is - 'would the results for 1978 be 
applicable in general for all periods in time? ' 
In order to establish the extent to which the results for 1978 may be 
used to draw generalised conclusions, a similar content analysis was carried 
out for 4 companies, selected at random from the main sample of 24, for the 
three years, 1972,1974 and 1976. 
The results of this second analysis are detailed and compared with the 
results of the first analysis in Tables 8E and 8F. 
Table 8E lists factors promoting corporate achievement, classified as 
to source of influence and ranked according to number of references in the 
1978 study. Table 8F provides a similar ranking of factors constraining 
corporate achievement. 
These two tables show clearly that on the whole, factors affecting 
performance in the 4 company/3 year analysis are similar to those in the 24 
company/1 year study. The second analysis added only one item to the list 
of constraints in 1978; viz., government red tape which was referred to 
once in the second set. Several items were, however, added to the list of 
factors promoting achievement; but these for the most part referred to 
reversals of factors listed under external constraint. Most items listed 
in the tables are common to both sets of data. The rankings in the two sets 
are not identical but there is some general agreement as to which items are 
the more common causal factors. 
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Table 8E 
Comparison of Factors promoting corporate achievement 
4 Companies 
for the years 1972/4/6 
Internal 
Productivity, cost reductions 
etc. 13 
Acquisitions etc. 4 
New design/product development 7 
Management effort/planning 5 
Expansion 6 
Marketing effort 14 
Diversification 1 
Divestment - 
External 
24 Companies 
for 1978 
21 
17 
17 
14 
8 
6 
2 
2 
Market 17 29 
State of the economy 13 4 
Fluctuation in currency 
exchange rates 2 1 
Relaxation of price controls - 1 
Relaxation of exchange controls - 1 
Improvement in balance of payments - 1 
Government assistance 1 - 
Improvement in availability 
of supplies and resources 2 - 
Improvement in industrial 
relations 1 - 
Tax reductions 2 - 
Relaxation of dividend control 3 - 
Relaxation of import control 1 - 
Improvement in political 
situation 1 - 
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Table 8F 
Comparison of Factors constraining corporate achievement 
4 Companies 24 Companies 
for 1972/4/6 for 1978 
Internal 
Management - 
Capacity excess or shortage - 
Teething troubles 1 
Production problems - 
External 
Market 31 
State of the economy 16 
Industrial relations 4 
Fluctuations in currency exchange rates 6 
Availability of supplies and resources 16 
Weather/climate 8 
Requirement for local participation 2 
Political uncertainty/un rest 9 
Price control 17 
Government intervention 8 
Taxation 4 
Difficult trading conditions 5 
Devaluation 1 
Balance of payment problems - 
Import controls 4 
Inflation 12 
Quality standards - 
Exchange restrictions 3 
Credit problems 2 
Dividend control 4 
Common agricultural Policy - 
Compulsory acquisition 1 
Government red-tape 1 
2 
2 
1 
i 
62 
30 
26 
20 
16 
11 
11 
10 
10 
9 
7 
5 
4 
3 
3 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
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Figure 8.2 
Venn-diagram showing country-related factors 
affecting the performances of four companies in 3 years 
11 778 
28 
934 
i 
36 
63 9 74 
19761 
Although there is general agreement between the results of the two 
studies as to factors influencing corporate achievement, it is not often 
that any company reports on any one causal factor for a given country year 
after year. Figure 8.2 shows that in a4 company/3 year analysis, with a 
total of 180 causal factors, in only three cases was the same item repeated 
in respect of the same country in all three years. The majority of items 
were not repeated at all for any country by any one company. These results 
suggest one or both of the following possibilities: viz, 
1. the influence of some causal factors are only felt in the short-term 
in any given country and they cease to be relevant after a short time 
either because companies take action to overcome disadvantages flowing 
from that source or because the source itself ceases to exist, and/or 
2. the influence of some causal factors - internal or external - may 
I continue in a country from year to year for long periods of time, but 
the company may not report them every year, particularly if other short- 
term factors come to the fore in the period under review. 
PAGE 
NUMBERING 
AS 
ORIGINAL 
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Views on taxation 
It has been reported already that taxation did not occupy an 
important place among comments in company reports relating to factors 
contributing to or hampering corporate achievement. In the main content 
analysis of reports of 24 multinational corporations for 1978 we came 
across 7 comments relating to taxation. In the second study of 4 companies 
for the three years, 1972,1974 and 1976, there were 6 references to tax. 
This section will analyse both sets together to discover the aspects of 
taxation to which companies are most sensitive. All comments in the 
reports relating to taxation are analysed in Table 8G. 
There were two references to taxation as a factor promoting corporate 
achievement, both of which related to reductions in tax rates in LDCs. 
In the remaining eleven comments, taxation was said to be a constraint: 
eight of these referred to indirect taxes; one referred to tax on profit 
distribution and two to tax rates in general. 
Seven out of the eleven adverse comments on taxation dealt with 
developing countries and both favourable comments also related to the same 
area. Though the number of observations is small, it appears that multi- 
national corporations are on the whole more concerned about LDC taxes than 
that in developed countries. The major irritant within the tax structure 
seems to be indirect taxation: these results correspond to the findings of 
the SL survey where high indirect taxation was the reason most commonly 
offered to explain why taxation was a constraint on the achievements of 
business in that country. 
One interesting comment on indirect taxation which differs from the 
rest was made by a company with interests in Argentina. They found that 
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Table 8G 
Analysis of Comments relating to taxation 
A. Factors Promoting corporate achievement 
Comments referring to 
Study Area Country Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes or general 
4Co. /3 year LDC India - Reduction in rates of Corporation Tax 
Pakistan - Reduction in rates of tax 
B. Factors Constraining corporate achievement 
Comments referring to 
Study Area Country Indirect Taxes Direct Taxes or General -J 
24Co. /l year UK 
Developed 
UK 
Denmark 
Australia 
India 
Thailand 
Argentina 
India 
Increase in VAT 
Increase in Excise 
High Import Duties 
High Import Duties 
Low Tariffs allow 
competing imports 
Change in tax rate 
LDC 
4Co. /3 year UK 
LDC 
UK Increase in Excise 
Sri Lanka - 
Malaysia Increase in Excise 
and new Sales Tax 
Lebanon High Import Duty 
C. Summary of All Comments 
Type of Tax 
Area 
UK 
Other Developed Countries 
LDCs 
Crippling State and 
Central taxes 
High tax on distributed 
profits 
Indirect Direct & General Total 
202 
112 
5 4* 9 
85 13 
* Includes 2 favourable convents 
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low indirect taxes on imports were permitting competing imported products 
into the country. This kind of problem, however, is not frequently encountered 
in most LDCs where governments are usually quite willing to provide tariff 
protection to import-substituting industries. 
Overall, therefore, taxation appears to be a matter of small concern 
to multinational companies, but judging by comments in annual reports, the 
companies seem to find LDC taxes to be somewhat more irksome than taxes 
elsewhere. 
It will be recalled that some multinational interviewees were quoted 
in the previous chapter as saying that though tax rates were very high in 
some LDCs, they were able to earn higher profit margins in these areas. As 
a check on relative profitability of operations in LDCs against those in 
developed economies, all information on three items of financial data - viz, 
profits, turnover and capital employed - given on a geographical basis was 
extracted from the 24 company reports for 1978. Thirteen of the reports 
carried geographical analyses, though only a few of these produced analyses 
for all the items of data required. The geographical areas covered were not 
uniform for all reports: quite a few of the reports gave data for several 
continents in one figure. Nor was there uniformity in the definitions of 
the financial data reported. Profits reported in each case, however, were 
pre-tax profits. 
Using available information, two indicators of profitability were 
calculated: viz. average ratio of profit to capital employed and average 
ratio of profit to turnover. The results are summarised in Table 8H. All 
items which could not be placed in any one geographical area (eg. results 
for "The Americas") were excluded from the computation. The schedule shows 
that both the ratio of profit to capital employed and the ratio of profit to 
turnover are higher for the geographical areas where LDCs are predominant. 
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Table 8H 
Indicators of Profitability 
Average Ratio of Number of 
Area Profit/Capital Employed Profit/Turnover observations 
(A) (B) forming average in 
% % (A) (B) 
South America 21.8 20.6 3 2 
Asia 21.2 13.6 3 6 
Africa 13.2 15.1 4 8 
North America 11.7 3.6 4 8 
Australasia 10.8 9.6 4 9 
U. K. 10.6 7.4 4 11 
Europe 8.3 5.7 5 10 
* Average = unweighted arithmetic mean. 
It must be acknowledged that under Asia may be included results of operations 
in Japan and under Africa those of South Africa, neither of which are devel- 
oping countries. (The results for South Africa reported separately by one 
company have however been excluded from the results reported. ) The above- 
mentioned qualifications limit the significance of conclusion drawn from 
the averages presented in Table 8H. Nevertheless the wide and clear pattern 
of differences between the developed and developing areas of the world 
provide supportive evidence of the ability of multinational companies to 
earn higher (pre-tax) profits in the LDCs. This result placed alongside 
other evidence discussed hitherto permits us to draw some tentative con- 
clusions. 
Firstly, if pre-tax profits of multinational corporations are larger 
in the LDCs than in developed countries, then. the companies may not find 
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direct taxes to be a material constraint in the LDCs, even if the 
effective tax rates in some LDCs were higher than normal. 
Furthermore, the "pre-tax trading profits" reported by UK companies 
would normally be computed after charging indirect taxes such as sales 
taxes, customs duties and excise. Reported pre-tax profits are therefore 
only "pre-direct-taxes". It was reported earlier that it was the indirect 
taxes in the LDCs more than direct taxes that appeared to trouble multi- 
national investors. If profits after charging indirect taxes are higher 
in the LDCs than elsewhere, then even higher indirect taxes may be tolerable. 
Speaking generally therefore, it is possible to conclude that taxation could 
not be a factor reducing the economic viability of LDC investments to 
unacceptably low levels. 
From another point of view, however, if profit levels are high in any 
area, then tax outflows will also be high even at moderate rates of tax. It 
is therefore possible that high pre-tax profits in the LDCs and the con- 
sequent magnitude of the tax-bill may make taxes an item for special executive 
attention in these areas, and hence an item to be commented upon in annual 
reports. 
Finally, another possibility which may explain why MNCs show greater 
concern about LDCs taxes, even when profitability is higher in these areas, 
is that the companies may, in fact, be seeking higher profits in the LDCs 
than in developed countries. Higher profits and quicker payback may be 
sought in order to compensate for higher political (or other environmental) 
risks perceived by the companies in less developed areas. 
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Conclusions 
The findings reported in this chapter are, on the whole, supportive 
of the survey results discussed previously. The main conclusions drawn 
from the content analysis of MNC annual reports are summarised below. 
1. MNC performance is subject to greater influence of external factors in 
the LDCs than in the developed countries. 
2. Differences were observed between developed areas and LDCs in the 
type of external influences affecting MNC performance. Governmental 
control has a relatively greater influence on LDC performance, 
whereas commercial factors dominate in the developed countries. 
3. Taxation is not an important external influence in any part of the 
world, but available evidence (which is admittedly limited) indicates 
a somewhat higher sensitivity among MNCs to taxation in LDCs relative 
to that in developed areas. No such tendency was apparent in the 
questionnaire-based survey of MNC companies, however; and it is 
possible that what we see here is an indirect reflection of the 
relatively lower importance of other considerations in determining 
performance in LDCs. 
4. From the limited data available it appears that indirect taxes are 
a greater irritant than direct taxes -a tendency observed in the 
SL survey as well. 
S. Pre-tax profitability of MNCs appears to be higher in LDCs than in 
developed countries, indicating a relatively higher capacity to 
bear taxation in the former areas. 
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CHAPTER 9 
Fiscal Politics in Sri Lanka 
In the preceding chapters, the analysis of LDC business opinion 
reflected a fairly high degree of sensitivity to taxation among firms in 
the three countries studied: roughly half the business firms surveyed 
found that they were constrainted by taxation in the achievement of their 
objectives. In all three countries taxation was among the more commonly 
encountered environmental constraints. Nevertheless, LDC business firms 
did not appear to expend very much effort in tax planning; nor did they 
seem as aware of the implications of taxation for investment and financing 
decisions as the western Multinational corporationssurveyed. The MNCs were 
less worried by taxation as a constraint but both more aware of and more 
ready to adopt tax minimisation practices. 
Turning back to the LDCs again, we may ask the question: how does the 
business community of an LDC (as a social entity rather than as individuals 
or separate firms) react to taxation? Do LDC business men passively accept 
any and all taxes that are imposed on them, or do they in anyway try to 
exert influence in the shaping or reshaping of tax policy? 
The literature of public finance acknowledges that fiscal policy is 
as much a product of political processes as of national economic priorities; 
(68) 
and that fiscal policy is formed through the interactions and the balancing 
of interests of all parties concerned. - mainly the politicians, the public 
and various pressure groups. 
(141) 
It has been argued that the democratic process of fiscal policy form- 
ation has an in-built bias leading to a size of public sector and level 
of taxation different from the sum of preferences of all participants. 
The theoreticians are however not in agreement as to the direction of the 
bias, (131, p. 
116) Some believe that a downward bias is present, because 
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individuals take into account only direct personal benefits accruing to 
them from the public sector and ignore all social benefits derived by 
society at large. Therefore in balancing the value of social goods against 
private goods, the former are systematically undervalued; the result being 
a downward bias in the size of the public sector and tax levels. 
On the other side it is argued that the bias is towards expansion of 
taxation. Because the benefits of public sector goods may accrue to 
particular sub-groups in society while taxation is borne by all members of 
the society, it is argued that the sub-groups benefitting from public 
services will vote for a higher level of these services in the knowledge 
that their share of payment in taxes will be less than the value of benefit 
accruing to them. 
Modern democracies, however, do not work in this simple and straight- 
forward fashion. Further complications are added to the model by represent- 
ative democracy where it is a body of elected representatives who make 
fiscal decisions. The politicians acting out of their own self interest 
will put forward programmes that will win them votes, and the voters, also 
from selfish ends, will back the party with programmes that satisfy their 
needs. 
(47) Under this system, whether or not there is an in-built bias 
towards overexpansion or underexpansion of taxation, there are bound to be 
some members of society whose preferences will not match the policies adopted 
via the democratic processes. These members may find the size of the public 
sector and the level of taxation fixed at a level either above or below their 
own preferences. If sufficient numbers of such dissatisfied members of 
society get together, they may form pressure groups to try to influence the 
policy-makers to change their minds, or even to attempt changing the policy- 
makers. 
(52) 
Business firms are one such interest group who in most communities work 
collectively to make their views on matters affecting their interests known 
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to the government and the public. In the United States, per Musgrave 
and Musgrave, 
"Various taxpayer groups organize to represent their interests,... 
and the congressional tax committees .... are under great pressure 
from such groups whether it be the oil industry arguing for 
depletion allowances or the real estate lobby wanting faster 
depreciation ,,,, 11(131, 
p. 120) 
Not all pressure groups however will react to taxation in the same way; 
nor is it anticipated in theory that the persons subjected to such pressure 
will respond in a uniform manner in all circumstances. Bird and Oldman(16) 
believe that a low level of tax education among the public in LDCs will 
lead to less discussion of fiscal policies in these areas relative to 
developed countries. Peters 
(149) identifies four different types of inter- 
action between pressure groups and the bureaucracy, viz. 
1. "Legitimate" relationship - where there is required consultation 
between the pressure group and the administration. 
2. "Clientela" relationship - where an interest group for whatever 
reason is accepted as a natural representative of a social 
sector, and becomes the reference point for administrators. 
3. "Parentela" relationship - where there are kinship or close 
fraternal ties between the pressure group and the government. 
4. "Illegitimate" relationship - where pressure group activity is 
outside the normal process of political action, but occurs 
anyway. 
On the question of taxation, whatever the type of relationship between 
the pressure group and government, if the response of the pressure group 
to changes in taxation can be measured, it would enable an opinion to be 
formed of the sort of impact taxation has on the group. As our study 
focuses on the impact of taxation on private sector business as an interest 
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group, it would be necessary to identify, on the one hand, changes in 
taxation proposed by the government and on the other the relevant 
pressure groups representing business, and their response to new taxation 
proposals: this is the subject of discussion in the present chapter. New 
taxation measuresproposed by successive governments in Sri Lanka over a 
period of years will be analysed along with the response of business 
interest groups to such proposals in an attempt to understand the way in 
which Sri Lankan business is affected by taxation. 
Methods 
In this chapter, content analysis, supported by interview data will 
be used to study changes in tax policy in Sri Lanka and business response 
to such changes in the period 1965-1977. 
Three different governments were in power in Sri Lanka in the period 
under review and the country had four different finance ministers in this 
thirteen year period. The fiscal policy of any of the governments is not 
to be found in one explicit policy statement, but can be gathered from 
many sources, the chief among which is the annual budget speech . 
(201) 
This speech also lists new revenue proposals and other changes in the tax 
structure which the finance minister intends to enact in the near future. 
The taxation measures proposed in each budget speech in this period will 
be analysed below. 
The response of business to taxation will be measured as reflected in 
the following sources: 
1. the annual reports of the Taxation Committee of the Ceylon 
Chamber of Commerce, 
(27) 
2. all issues of 'The Ceylon Taxpayer', 
(92) described as 'the official 
organ of the Income Tax Payers' Association of Ceylon', and 
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3. the comments of leading businessmen, speaking as representatives 
of various business associations and trade chambers, reported in 
the national morning English language newspapers 
(5)(93)(182) 
on the two days after each budget day. 
The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce is only one of many business associations 
in Sri Lanka: but it is the oldest, best organised association and has in 
its membership most of the large corporate business firms in the country. 
It is the only association with a separate taxation committee reporting 
annually to its membership. 
Of the many other business associations in the country, several such 
as the Planters' Association of Ceylon and the Ceylon Tea Traders' 
Association are affiliated to the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and operate 
more or less as part of the latter. Several other groupings have been 
created since independence to represent chiefly the small business sector 
and the individual entrepreneurs (the mudalalis) who for a number of reasons 
have not become associated with the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce. These 
groupings are however not as well organised as the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce, 
and as far as can be ascertained, do not have any published material on 
taxation spanning the period under review. 
The Income Tax Payers' Association of Ceylon is the only organised 
pressure group in the country dealing exclusively with taxation matters. 
It has in its membership both business firms and individual taxpayers. 
The publications of these two institutions and the post-budget comments 
in newspapers of representatives of these and other business interest groups 
are the only regular and recurrent published material available reflecting 
business response to taxation. These data will be analysed below. 
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Analysis and Discussion 
Firstly the budget speeches made during the period were analysed 
to provide answers to the following questions: 
1. How many tax proposals leading to changes in tax revenue are 
included in the budget speech, and 
2. Would each such proposal lead to a higher or lower burden on 
the tax payer? 
Each revenue proposal was also classified according to the type of 
tax measure involved. 
Not all proposals put forward in the budget speech were brought into 
the analysis: the following were excluded: 
1. Non-tax proposals, 
2. Tax proposals dealing mainly with administrative matters such 
as the introduction of a PAYE scheme, and 
3. Measures proposed to check tax evasion, with no immediate or 
direct impact on revenue. 
In the analysis, any tax proposal leading to a change in the burden on 
the taxpayer is given a value of 1: with each proposal producing an increase 
in the tax burden being given a negative value (i. e. -1) and a proposal lead- 
ing to a decrease in taxes being allotted a positive value (i. e. +1). It is 
not expected that all measures proposed would produce changes in the tax 
burden of equal amounts. It is not even believed that the changes in the 
burden would be of similar orders of magnitude for the different proposals. 
However, as no reliable estimates are available of the consequences of 
individual tax proposals, equal weighting of all proposals is the only 
satisfactory, objective basis for content analysis. Any attempt to attach 
weights to individual proposals would introduce subjective judgement of the 
researcher into the count and, hence, this alternative has been rejected. 
Overall, it is believed that the single weight counting system adopted will 
not yield distorted results as major and minor revenue proposals are fairly 
evenly spread over the years. 
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The results of the analysis are summarised in Tables 9A and 9B 
and details of tax measures concerned are given in Appendix 16.1. The 
annual totals of the number of revenue proposals in Table 9A provide an 
index of change in the tax structure (disregarding direction of change) 
brought about by successive budget speeches during the period. It will 
be observed that, in general, finance ministers tend to effect the largest 
number of changes to the tax structure in their first year of office. 
In this case 1965,1970,1975 and 1977 (all first years öf office for the 
respective finance ministers) saw a high level of change in the tax 
structure. Other years, with two exceptions (viz. 1968 and 1974), had 
relatively few changes. 
Of the two exceptional years, the 1968 budget speech contained many 
proposals as it announced the acceptance for implementation of a number of 
recommendations made by the Commission on Taxation appointed by the 
government, the intention to appoint which had indeed been expressed in 
the first budget of that government in 1965. The second exceptional year, 
1974, had 19 proposals in the budget, but only 12 of these were subsequently 
implemented. This year was exceptional also in that cabinet opposition to 
some of the harsher tax measures proposed in this budget is believed to 
have led to the removal from office of the finance minister. 
The tendency for new governments and new finance ministers to introduce 
many changes to the tax system. shaped by their predecessors in office was 
also commented upon by several business and professional interviewees in 
Sri Lanka. At the time of the interviews in 1977, a general election was 
pending and a number of interviewees said they expected tax rates and 
incentives to change if there was a change of finance minister after the 
election, irrespective of whether the government also changed at the polls. 
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Table 9B 
Budget Proposals 
Analysed with respect to Finance Minister 
Finance Minister ABCD 
Number of years 5521 
Effect on taxpayer 
Type of Tax Measure 
Income Tax - Individual 
- Corporate 
Capital Taxes 
Other Taxes 
Incentives 
+-+-+-+- 
8 1 9 5 3 1 3 1 
2 - 1 5 1 1 - - 
3 2 2 3 - 1 - - 
6 9 4 13 2 2 3 1 
6 2 7 5 7 2 6 6 
25 14 23 31 13 7 12 8 
C+ve Observations]= C-ve Observations] 
1.79 0.74 1.86 1.5 
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The ratios of positive observations to negative observations for each 
type of tax change (final column of Table 9A) indicate that over the period 
under review there have been more reductions in the burden of personal 
income taxes than increases and that the taxpayers have had the benefit of 
a number of savings and investment incentives as well. The picture on 
corporate taxation, capital taxes and indirect taxes appears to be worse 
at the end of the period than at the beginning. From Table 9B it can be 
seen that this worsening of the tax burdens took place mostly in the period 
of office of Finance Minister B, a Trotskyite minister in a coalition of 
left of centre parties. 
Details of the type of changes proposed (given in Appendix 16.1) show 
that during the study period, much of the benefits to individual tax payers 
have been in the form of personal and family allowances designed to enable 
them to keep up with inflation; and several concessions in capital gains 
taxes have also been made mainly for similar reasons. Corporate tax payers 
have faced several changes in their tax rates and have also received a 
number of incentives during this period. The increasing reliance of the 
State on new indirect taxes is also highlighted by these results. The 
results of the content analysis of budget proposals will be reviewed below 
against the response of business to these proposals. 
If the Sri Lankan business community believed that new tax proposals 
made in the budget speeches would constrain their activities and if 
combinations of business interests formed pressure groups to press for 
the alleviation of the tax burden, content analysis of responses to the 
budget proposals should provide supporting evidence of this fact. The 
analysis now moves on to the three sources of data selected as reflecting 
business response to changes in tax policy of the government. 
The first source analysed is the response to budget proposals reported 
in the national English language morning newspapers on the two days after 
each budget day; and the results are summarised in Table 9C. 
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Table 9C 
Analysis of Newspaper reports on Response of Business Community to Budget Proposals 
Year 1965 1968 1970 1974 1975 1977 Total 
COMMENTS ON EFFECT OF 
BUDGET PROPOSALS* +- + - + - +- +- + + - 
ON G SONS 
BUSINESS 
Private Sector 1 1 1 1 4 - Small Investors and 
Small Business 1 1 2 3 1 
Importers and Exporters 1 1 2 
Tea Producers 1 1 
Ceylonese Traders 1 1 
Hoarders 1 1 
LABOUR 7 6 
Workers or Working Class 21 1 1 1 5 1 
INDIVIDUALS 
Common Man/Consumers/The Masses 1 1 3 4 1 
Lower Income Groups 1 1 1 1 4 - 
High Income Groups 1 1 
The Middle Class 1 1 
9 2 
21 9 
ON ECONOMY 
Development/Production 2 2 1 1 3 8 1 
Prices/Cost of Living Inflation 2 1 1 1 1 3 7 2 
Employment 1 1 1 1 4 - Savings 1 1 1 1 2 
Capital Formation 1 1 2 
Exports 1 1 2 
Availability of Goods & Supplies 1 1 
Government Revenue 1 1 
Ceylonisation of Trade 1 1 
Industrial Relations 1 1 
Free Trade 2 2 
28 7 
GENERAL REACTION 
General Statement of Approval 
or criticism 6 6 7 6 4 6 13 41 7 
TOTAL COMMENTS 16 1 12 15 12 5 8 10 32 2 90 23 
*+ Favourable Comments 
Unfavourable Comments 
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Budget day in Sri Lanka is an annual event in which there is much 
public interest. The proposals of the finance minister to bridge the 
inevitable budget gap are, as in the UK, a well guarded secret until they 
are announced in the House, and UK practice is followed both in the 
presentation of the budget and discussions which follow both inside and 
outside parliament. Westminster tradition is imitated down to the 'black- 
box' in which the budget speech is carried by the finance minister. On 
budget day and days immediately following there is wide press and radio 
coverage of discussions of the proposals and the newspapers as a rule 
carry comments on the budget from representatives of business, trade unions 
and members of the public. 
The persons interviewed on behalf of business interests are usually 
the presidents or other officials of trade chambers representing various 
business interests. For instance in 1965 (a fairly typical year), the 
following persons were interviewed: 
1. Chairman of the Employers' Federation of Ceylon; 
2. Secretary of the Ceylon Merchants Chamber; 
3. President of the Ceylon Importers and Exporters Association; 
4. Secretary of the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and 
5. President of the Sinhala Merchants Chamber. 
These associations represent most of the major business interests in 
the country, but one observation that can be made about the interviewees is 
that in none of the years studied did they include any of the highly 
successful individual entrepreneurs known as mudalalis, or the top 
executives of local subsidiaries of MNCs. Though it is known that both 
Mudalali-owned and Multinational businesses are members of some of the 
above associations they do not appear to play leading roles in their 
respective associations. 
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Most comments on the budgets made by representatives of business 
(Table 9C) were of a general nature - being expressions of approval or 
disapproval of the budget proposals. A large proportion of the remarks 
referred to the likely impact of the budget on specific aspects of the 
economy such as price levels or economic development. Only a minority of 
comments (13 out of 113) dealt with the impact of budget proposals on the 
business sector. More attention was paid by the interviewees to how the 
budgets would affect other groups in society such as 'the workers' or 'the 
masses'. As against 13 remarks relating to business, 17 dealt with the 
impact of the budget on workers and other individuals. 
On the whole, favourable comments far outweighed the adverse (90: 23); 
but viewing the different groups of remarks in Table 9C separately, there 
were more adverse comments in the group relating to business compared with 
the other sections. Of the six adverse comments made relating to business, 
one, in 1970, referred to 'hoarders'. The interviewee in this instance, 
however, seemed to imply that hoarders, who were seen as an anti-social 
element in society, had been dealt with justly and that the Minister had 
merely demanded "his pound of flesh from the hoarders.... " In all of the 
113 remarks, only once was the impact of the budget on business profitability 
mentioned: this was in 1977 and related to the government's failure to 
reduce the burden of indirect taxation on tea producers. 
In 1974, a year when a large number of budget proposals were made to 
increase income tax rates and to remove or reduce various tax benefits 
available to business, the representatives of the business community did 
not publicly acknowledge any possibility of an adverse impact of the budget 
on their activities. 
As explained before, there were four different finance ministers in 
office in the period 1965-77 and two different political parties were in 
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power - the right-wing UNP from 1965 to 1969 and then again in 1977 and 
the more left-inclined SLFP with its coalition allies (forming the UF) 
from 1970 to 1976. If budget proposals and remarks of business interests 
are analysed over the periods in office of the two different parties 
(Appendix 16.2), it will be seen that: 
(a) the majority of OF/SLFP budget proposals led to increases in the tax 
burden whereas the majority of UNP proposals were for tax reductions 
(difference significant at 0.025 level), 
(b) there were more than twice as many remarks made on the three UNP 
budgets than on the three from the UF/SLFP, 
(c) there were also relatively more adverse remarks on the UNP budgets 
(though significance of X2 is only at 0.25 level), and 
(d) the relatively high number of adverse comments under the UNP regimes 
were however made in response to a set of budgets with fewer adverse 
proposals than in the UF/SLFP budgets. 
Not only were the budgets presented under UNP governments relatively 
more favourable to taxpayers, the policies of the government in general were 
more sympathetic to private enterprise, and non-tax measures announced in 
the budgets were also more generous to business under the UNP. The extracts 
from the first budget speeches of the different finance ministers quoted 
below illustrate 
(a) the difference between the two parties in their attitude to private 
enterprise and 
(b) the apparent confusion in the objectives of the second UNP government 
whose aims for a free economy are expressed side by side with a desire 
to control 'capitalist' activity. 
The apparently 'anti-capitalist' objectives of recent governments are 
believed to reflect the necessity (real or not) perceived by all politicians 
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in the country to adopt socialism (vaguely defined in its many shades of 
meaning) as a major campaign objective to gain or retain popular electoral 
support. This is however not a phenomenon unique to SL: in many other 
developing nations in Asia and Africa, businessmen have become a target for 
political hostility, often replacing in this function the former western 
(8) 
colonial rulers. 
To quote from the budget speeches in support of the inferences drawn 
above, the first budget speech of the 1965-70 UNP government stated: 
"The principal objective of the National Government is to achieve 
a higher rate of economic growth than in the past ... The multiplicity 
of taxes and the high incidence of taxation in Ceylon have resulted 
in a reduction in personal and corporate savings ... A scheme of 
taxation which leaves in the hands of the private sector funds for 
the purpose of development and ensures that such funds are, in fact, 
used for development is thus an essential requirement. " 
U. B. Wanninayake - Budget Speech 9.8.1965. 
By contrast, the SLFP/UF budget in 1970 gave no encouragement to the 
private sector: 
The programme of the UF ... assumes as its thesis that a developing 
country cannot leave development at the mercy of the inter-play of 
forces which are motivated solely by the profit instinct. It 
recognises that at this juncture private enterprise has a part to 
play in building up and exploiting the resources of the country but 
the leading part must be in the hands of the public sector. " 
N. M. Perera - Budget Speech 25.10.1970. 
After the break-up of the United Front in 1975, the new SLFP finance 
minister who followed Dr. Perera offered several concessions to private 
enterprise, but his policy objectives were decidedly against 'big-business'. 
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He said: 
"Our policies must ensure adequate incentives to work, investment 
and risk-taking in that part of the economy which is not directly 
State-controlled" (but) "It is essential that the system contain 
some form of in-built mechanism to prevent the abuse that goes with 
the unhampered concentration of wealth in a few hands and help build 
a new sector of medium and small-scale enterprises and co-operatives 
which lack some of the parasitic qualities which distinguish today's 
private sector. " 
Felix Dias-Bandaranayake - Budget Speech 5.11.1975. 
The UNP government which came, back to power in 1977 is pledged to 
establish a free economy but their objectives as expressed in the budget 
speech are somewhat confused as regards their attitude to private enterprise. 
On the one hand their main policy objective in the budget is, 
"... to effect the transformation to a free economy as a necessary 
foundation for growth and development" 
but at the same time they 
"... are determined to remove the ugly face of unbridled capitalism 
and to have a fair and just society based on democratic socialism. " 
R. de Mel - Budget Speech 15.11.1977. 
Some typical remarks made by representatives of the private sector 
in response to the above budget speeches will help to illustrate the non- 
critical public posture adopted by most of them. 
. 01 
1965 "Mr. J. Abeywickreme, Hony. Secretary of the Ceylon Merchants' 
Chamber stated that the budget on the whole could be considered 
satisfactory. It had provided for some measure of capital 
accumulation in the private sector. " 
Ceylon Daily News 11.8.1965. 
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1970 "Mr. Francis Wanigasekere, Vice Chairman of the Ceylon National 
Chamber of Industries: A Herculean task well done by the Minister 
of Finance, who should be congratulated on a budget about which 
no one can grumble. " 
Ceylon Daily News 27.10.1970. 
1975 "It is a sane, sensible and reasonable budget and the relief granted 
all round is most welcome and much needed, said Mr. Conrad Dias, 
Secretary of the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce. " 
Ceylon Daily News 27.11.1975. 
1977 "Mr. H. R. Fernando, President, Federation of Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry of Sri Lanka .... We welcome the more liberal policies 
which will activate the economy... " 
Ceylon Daily News 18.11.1977. 
On the whole there was more praise than criticism of budget proposals 
from the private sector throughout this period. It is however noticeable 
that businessmen are more ready to criticise the budgets of a sympathetic 
government than those of a regime antagonistic to private enterprise. 
The other sources of data analysed below provide evidence of a gradual 
decline in activity on the part of associations of business interests in 
making known to their members, the government and the public their views on 
fiscal policy. 
The Ceylon Chamber of Commerce publishes annually a detailed report of 
its activities providing also statistics on most aspects of the economy and 
business activity. Included in the Chamber's annual reports are subsidiary 
reports of its Taxation Committee. Table 9D summarises the content analysis 
of expressions of this Committee's views on budget proposals and represent- 
ations made to government by the Committee as reported in its annual reports. 
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It can be seen from Table 9D that 
(a) general expressions of opinion on the budget and tax policy are 
very few and that all these are confined to the earlier years of 
the study period, and 
(b) representations made to the government on taxation matters are 
greater in number in the earlier years. 
The one exception to the low level of activity in later years in 
presenting the Association's view to the government is found in 1974, the 
year when a number of budget proposals were not implemented. The Chamber 
appears to have made an unusual (for them at the time) effort to represent 
views of business to the government in this year. The non-implementation 
of some of the more adverse proposals made in the 1974 budget suggests that 
they did manage to exert some influence on the government in this instance. 
It must however be noted that in this year there was not a single adverse 
comment made in public about the budget in the post-budget discussion in 
the daily press analysed in Table 9C. 
It is possible of course that the relatively high level of activity on 
the part of the Tax Committee of the Chamber in the years 1966 and 1967 may 
have been encouraged by the fact that there was a government-appointed 
Commission on Taxation sitting at the time. Only one of the representations 
of the Chamber was to the Commission in these years: nevertheless the 
possibility that 1966 and 1967 were unusual years because of the interest 
in taxation matters aroused by the very appointment of the Commission cannot 
be discounted altogether. 
However, the next source of data analysed - the journal of the Income 
Tax Payers' Association of Ceylon - provides further supportive evidence of 
a gradual decline of interest in taxation matters or an increasing unwilling- 
ness of businessmen to express their views on taxation in public. The results 
of the content analysis of this imirna1 arc ciimmaricoý in Tah1o QG 
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Table 9E shows that during the study period the variety in con- 
tributions to the journal had dropped considerably. The number of 
articles per issue too dropped over the years until in late 1976 the 
journal ceased publication altogether. The first item to disappear 
from the contents of the journal was the editorial: no editorials were 
published after 1969. No official statements of the views of the 
association appeared in the journal after 1970. Gradually over the years 
the journal of the Income Tax Payers' Association became a vehicle for 
giving wider circulation to new tax legislation and to administrative 
circulars of the Department of Inland Revenue. The views and opinions 
expressed in the journal in later years were mainly those of officers of 
the Inland Revenue Department or the Ministry of Finance. It must however 
be added that the President of the Association was interviewed in 1979 and 
his view was that the Association had become inactive in the 1970's because 
of the lack of interest of its office bearers at the time and the incom- 
petence of its staff. He added that the Association was being reorganised 
and that the journal would commence publication in the near future. Never- 
theless it is undoubtedly true that the trend of decreasing level of activity 
in this Association coincided with similar trends in other pressure group 
activities as well. 
Taken together, the response to taxation in all three sources of data 
studied, indicates a decline in the 1970's of the level of activity by 
business pressure groups attempting to influence fiscal policy via public 
discussion or through direct representation to government. It is however 
not evident from the above analysis why this should be so. Has taxation 
ceased to be a problem to business or reduced in significance as a constraint 
on SL business over the seventies? Or has SL business learnt to live with an 
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adapt themselves to a background of high taxes? Alternatively is it that 
SL business was just as sensitive to taxes and that taxes were at least as 
much a constraint in the later years as in the earlier but that the channels 
of communication between business and the government had gradually narrowed 
during this period leaving a highly taxed and highly dissatisfied private 
sector - dissatisfied not only on account of high taxes but also their 
inability to discuss their problems with the authorities; 
It is hypothesised here that the formal channels of communications 
between associations of business interests and the government had indeed 
been slowly stifled since the mid-fifties due to increasing reluctance on 
the part of governments to be seen to be sympathetic to owners of capital, 
and that this did lead to discontentment among certain sections of the 
business community. However it did not mean that there was no communication 
at all between government and business; nor that the business community had 
no influence whatsoever on government policies or administrative action of 
the authorities. The private sector had instead come to rely more on 
personal contact with members of the government as a means of communicating 
their views. 
In the colonial times a number of very strong groups of business 
interests such as the Ceylon Chamber of Commerce and the Planters Association 
of Ceylon (dominated by British expatriate businessmen) wielded considerable 
influence over the colonial administration. Their relationship with the 
administration involved regular open consultations and were of the types 
described by Peters 
(149) 
as 'legitimate'or 'clientela'. 
After indeperdence, control over these associations passed into the 
hands of SL businessmen who for the first 7-8 years of independence enjoyed 
a continuing open dialogue with the authorities. It was during the SLFP 
governments in the late fifties and the early sixties that the relations 
between government and associations of business interests began to deteriorate. 
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At the beginning of our study period (in 1965) we see the business 
associations relieved at the return to power of a UNP government attempting 
to open a dialogue of the sort that existed with the previous UNP regimes. 
By then however the aspirations of the voters had changed considerably 
and as a consequence so had the priorities of the politicians. There was 
less willingness on the part of government to consult with business interests 
or to give in to their public demands and so be held before the electorate 
as protectors of the privileged few. Therefore though the 1965-70 UNP 
government did much to liberalise the economic environment in which the 
private sector operated, to simplify the tax structures and to reduce the 
tax burden on business, they were not as willing as in the past to engage 
in open dialogue with business interests. The ideological differences 
between business interests and the SLFP/UF government were even greater 
and this was perhaps the main reason for the sharp decline in business 
pressure group activity witnessed in the seventies. 
As observed by Howard Wriggins in his discussion of Asian and African 
political systems 
"For the man in power, the resources and energies of entrepreneurs 
can be an important political asset. But a political leader may 
run substantial risks in conspicuously associating with the business 
community, because it is so widely looked down upon and distrusted. 
Where politics is an open, competitive affair and where opposition 
can be politically articulate and active, leaders are likely to 
avoid open alliance with businessmen ... Indeed it is most likely 
that the political' leader will adopt public positions critical of 
the excesses of selfish business interests. Nevertheless, he may 
at the same time have tacit associations with particular elements 
of the business community. " 
(197, p. 82) 
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It appears that with the decline in open dialogue between business 
interests and the State, the traditional and everpresent personal networks 
of communications began to be even more important to SL business. There 
would be few business firms or individuals who were not able to or not 
willing to gain access to individuals in the establishment through personal 
contacts. In a small country, with a very small business elite connected 
in numerous ways with the elites of politics and the admipistration it 
would be quite out of character for a SL businessman not to use the 
traditional channels of personal communication to obtain a sympathetic 
hearing for his views. Information collected at interviews discussed below 
also supports this proposition. 
Of the 30 business firms interviewed as part of the survey of business 
opinion, 21 firms commented on their channels of communication with the 
government. The method of communication used by these firms in making 
representation to government on taxation and similar matters are given in 
Table 9F: 
Table 9F 
Channels of Communication between Business and Government 
Channel No. of firms using 
Communication through business associations 3 
Representation by firm or through personal contacts 1 
Both channels 17 
21 
The seventeen firms using both business associations and other means 
were asked - "In your experience, which is more effective in making 
representations to government: business associations or personal lobbying? " 
Fifteen firms out of the seventeen replied that personal lobbying had been 
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more effective, while the remaining two firms were of opinion that neither 
channel had been effective for them. Of the two firms replying that 
neither means was effective, one was the local subsidiary of a large 
multinational group and the other a firm with substantial British share- 
holding. The chief executive of the MNC firm said: 
"... of course you must communicate, but in the situation in SL, 
I would not want to do it myself officially, or get one of the 
others (company executives) to do it officially. I'd much rather 
work through some Association like the Chamber of Commerce or one 
of the various bodies existing: where it isn't (the Company) 
speaking but it is manufacturing industry speaking. That's partly 
for political reasons. " 
There were a few firms among the interviewees who were either unable 
to or unwilling to use any but the organised channels of communications 
offered by their trade association, but they too were far from satisfied 
with the results obtained for them by the associations. One of these was 
of the opinion that: 
It appears that even the Chamber prefers to toe the government 
line and not rock the boat too much ... " 
Most firms benefit from personal contact with members of the government 
or the administration or both, and find these means to be more effective than 
the channels offered by trade associations in obtaining required results. 
Some companies, however, expressed the opinion that not all firms will be 
in a position to use personal influence over the authorities, or to do so 
to the same extent. The following are some illustrative remarks: 
"On principle, I think communication should be through the chambers. 
But we often use personal contacts. Often we do much of the work for 
the Association. The Association moves too slowly. " 
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"The chambers are incompetent.... " 
"For this company personal lobbying is much more effective. " 
"Personal relations with officials in departments are very useful. 
'We avoid such relationships with politicians. " 
The personal communications are, as can be seen above, not only with 
politicians: some firms have closer connections with the public administration 
and manage to obtain concessions at this level. The networks of communications 
originate from many different sources. Firstly, and the most important, is 
the network of the extended family. But there are many more communication 
channels criss-crossing the entire fabric of social and economic activity 
of the country; concentrated of course in the centre of political power 
and business activity - Colombo. To mention some of the more common 
communication channels - as an extension of the family there are the wider 
caste affiliations, 'old school ties', common religious affiliations, 
common political loyalties, connections that originate from common ancestral 
villages, present day neighbourhood, membership of clubs or charitable 
organisations, as well as networks of professionals: all these and many 
others are available to the businessman to use in correcting an injustice 
or obtaining a favour. In some spheres of government control and failing 
all channels of personal contact, there is the possibility of purchasing 
concessions with campaign contributions to politicians or with more direct 
and of course illegal bribery at various levels. This however is an area 
not covered by our investigations and it is not possible to comment on this 
aspect of SL life; except to note that several professional observers 
commented on the relatively uncorrupt administration in the Inland Revenue 
Department in comparison with other government agencies. 
In order to obtain an understanding of the processes of communication 
between business and the government from the point of view of political 
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decision-makers, two senior politicians who have been involved in fiscal 
policy making in government were interviewed in 1979. Their views quoted 
below support the hypothesis of declining influence of organised business 
associations and increasing reliance on personal lobbying. 
The first interviewee who was independent Ceylon's first finance 
minister, a senior member of all UNP governments since then and presently 
the President of the Republic appeared to have the same eonfused attitude 
to the private sector observed in the first budget speech of his finance 
minister. But his views substantiate the belief that much of the communi- 
cation between business and the government takes place at a personal level. 
According to him: 
"There is less communication between us and business than what 
was found under the old UNP ... We are about the same as the SLFP... 
We do not encourage capitalist development except in the free trade 
zone... The private sector and the ministers all come from the same 
group. Ministers are related to businessmen who make their views 
known to the government in this way... In the preparation of a 
budget the finance minister does not take into account the opinion 
of the private sector. I did not, when I was finance minister... 
Many of my relatives are in business. I get to know their views 
when I meet them at various functions or parties and so on. Ronnie's 
(the Finance Minister's) family are also in business. We don't 
need business to make representations to us. " 
The other interviewee, the deputy finance minister between 1970 and 
1975 and the main spokesman on economic affairs for the Trotskyite party 
the LSSP, said 
"... there is the Association of British Interests in Ceylon, the 
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Chamber of Commerce and similar chambers .. that function only 
as spokesmen for particular lobbies... The ABIC exerts a lot of 
influence on the British government who negotiate on their behalf.. 
The other channel is personal communications. Lots of people are 
related to other people and, Ceylon being a small country, that 
type of communication takes place more readily than in many other 
countries. The war-time and post-war rich had also entered the 
elite and they too are able to communicate at a personal level. " 
On being asked what part pressure from the private sector 
associations had played in the non-implementation of many of the 1974 
budget proposals and the subsequent loss of office for the finance minister 
and his deputy, both interviewees answered that it was internal cabinet 
opposition that blocked the implementation of this budget and not formal 
representation made by various associations. 
fnnclusions 
The first main conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing analysis 
is that if SL business is becoming increasingly constrained. in their + 
activities by taxation, there are no outward signs of this fact reflected 
in their pressure group activity. The case in SL is not one where there 
has never been any organised pressure group activity among private sector 
business. What is observed is a gradual decline in pressure group activity 
in their attempt to influence taxation policy. 
The evidence points to not a complete breakdown in communication. 
between government and business relating to taxation and other matters, but 
a switch from organised pressure group activity to the more traditional 
practice of personal communication with those in authority. This switch 
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from a 'legitimate' or 'clientela' relationship to a 'parentela' relationship 
appears to have been found to satisfy most persons among both businessmen 
and politicians. 
Though the practice of personal communication may suit the preferences 
of many of SL's business firms it by no means obtains satisfactory results 
for the business community as a whole. Those particularly inconvenienced 
by this change are the professionally managed, large, old established 
companies who have been unable to or unwilling to exert influence among 
politicians. Appointments in the seventies to the directorate of such firms 
of relatives of senior politicians in the ruling party of the time (the SLFP) 
were however believed by some professional observers interviewed, to be 
attempts to open channels of communication between business of this type 
and the SLFP where few had existed previously. 
Two groups of business interests who do not appear to have made any 
public effort to influence public opinion or politicians in their favour 
have been the individual entrepreneurs (the mudalalis) and the MNCs. The 
most likely reason for the behaviour of the mudalalis is that they have at 
all times preferred and effectively used the traditional methods of personal 
communications or, failing that, resorted to buying their privileges. In 
the case of the MNCs, they perceive a greater threat toward themselves 
from the public and the politicians than that which is directed to local 
business. Feeling more vulnerable than the rest of business they prefer to 
keep a low profile in all public discussion and pressure group activity. 
In matters of major importance however they will use their home country 
government (who as western 'aid-givers' carry considerable influence) to 
negotiate on their behalf. These negotiations conducted at the diplomatic 
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level or higher are not well documented in published sources, but in 
recent times both the US and the UK governments are known to have 
intervened on behalf of multinationals operating in SL. On the national- 
isation of petroleum distribution in SL the US government suspended all 
aid to SL until a quantum of compensation acceptable to the petroleum 
companies was agreed upon. The British government in more recent years 
diverted some of its aid funds to grant a loan to the SL government to be 
used in paying compensation to British owners of nationalised plantations. 
The above observation that MNCs prefer to keep a low profile on 
matters of conflict with the government may, however, not be universally 
true of all MNCs. On the basis of interview evidence, Negandhi and Baliga 
have claimed that 
"there is considerable difference in the modes of handling conflict 
by US, European, and Japanese multinationals. " 
(134) 
Managers of US multinationals are said to be the most aggresive of the three 
groups whereas European and Japanese - especially Japanese - MNCs are said 
to adopt a low profile in situations of'conflict with host governments. 
It is possible that the high level of sensitivity to taxation as a 
constraint, observed among business in SL (and the other LDCs), is partly 
the consequence of an absence of open dialogue between business and 
government on matters of fiscal policy. The gradual decrease in the level 
of open dialogue in matters of fiscal policy, however, suggests that the 
reason for lack of discussion in SL at least is not the low level of tax- 
payer education as hypothesised by Bird and Oldman: 
(10) 
a higher level of 
public hostility to the business community is a more likely explanation. 
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CHAPTER 10. 
TAXATION IN SRI LANKA COMPANY ACCOUNTS 
The discussion so far has indicated that though taxation is seen as 
a constraint on their activities by the majority of SL business firms, there 
is by no means general agreement as to the impact of taxation on business 
decisions. The verification of some of the findings of the survey by means 
of an examination of company accounts is the objective of this chapter. 
Published accounts are, in any country, the major source of information 
to outside analysts about the performance of business firms. These statements 
can usually be further analysed to provide additional insight into management 
policies and practices in the world of business. 
Taxation is reflected in the final accounts of a business firm as a 
charge in the profit and loss account and a liability in the balance sheet. 
If the firm also provides for taxes deferred by capital allowances or other 
reasons, the deferred tax provisions too will appear on the balance sheet. 
The impact of taxation on company accounts need not, however, be limited to 
these directly tax-related items. If, as anticipated in theory, pricing 
policies, investment, financing, etc., of business are influenced by taxation, 
then the effect of taxes may be observable in other accounting variables as 
well. 
What follows is an analysis of published annual accounts of a sample 
of SL business firms in an attempt 
(a) to ascertain how taxation charges are reflected in these accounts, 
(b) to study the relationships, if any, between taxation charges and 
other accounting variables, and 
(c) to verify some of the views expressed in the survey of SL business 
on the impact of taxation on business policies and performance. 
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Methods 
The method of study used in this chapter is Ratio Analysis: accounting 
statements of 20 firms over a period of 11 years have been analysed. 
The sample comprises firms in manufacturing and service industries, 
all of which are public limited liability companies quoted in the Colombo 
Stock market. 
The source of data for the study is the Rupee Companies' Handbook, 
published annually in the period under review by the Colombo Brokers' 
Association ! 34) The handbook for each year gives summarised balance sheets 
and profit and loss accounts of all quoted companies for the previous year. 
Apart from the plantation firms which formed more than two-thirds of 
the quoted companies in this period and which ceased to operate during our 
study period, there are not enough firms in any one activity to permit 
separate 'industry' samples to be picked for study. The number of firms in 
'non-plantation' activities whose shares were quoted in the Colombo share 
market throughout the study period total less than 25: of these, twenty 
firms for which much of the information was available have been selected for 
study. Sub-samples of (a) manufacturing and engineering firms included in 
the main sample and (b) firms excluding those reporting pre-tax losses in 
any of the years have also been analysed. 
The period covered is 11 years from the income tax year of assessment 
1964/65 to year of assessment 1974/75. Expressed in terms of financial years, 
this gives a coverage of the 11 years commencing with the year ended 31st 
March 1964, or any accounting year-end falling within the preceding 12 months. 
A financial ratio is merely a relationship between two financial 
variables: its main use is in providing a means of standardisation of 
financial information so as to facilitate comparison, aggregation or 
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observation of trends or relationships between variables in either inter- 
company or inter-temporal analysis. Such secondary information may, in 
turn, be useful in predicting future behaviour or performance of a company 
or groups of companies. 
(67) 
The technique of ratio analysis in general and/or its particular 
applications have however attracted criticism on various grounds. These 
grounds for criticism can be divided into two main classes: firstly, those 
dealing with the deficiencies in the accounting data measurement or classi- 
fication (for example, those originating in historical cost accounting 
valuations or the non-standard content or presentation of accounting 
statements), and secondly those relating to shortcomings in the mechanics 
of the analysis itself. 
(117) 
It must be acknowledgedat this early stage that our analysis in this 
chapter suffers from both types of shortcomings. For instance, there may 
have been material differences in accounting practice between companies 
in the sample. It is however not possible to ascertain the nature of any 
such differences or to adjust the data to produce comparable accounting bases. 
The accounting values used have been drawn from a secondary source, the Rupee 
Companies handbook, and though the compilers of the book had made an effort 
to present the accounts in a more or less standard format, all references to 
accounting methods and bases of valuation had been omitted. Moreover, the 
extent of undervaluations in the accounts due to historical cost accounting 
Y 
is notknown: though it can be assumed that this is almost certainly not 
the same for all firms. Inadequate information however precludes the adjust- 
ment of accounting values to current values. 
Another weakness associated with accounting data used in statistical 
analysis is that the distributions of such values are not generally of the 
normal form. Tests for skew and kurtosis Carried out on the accounting 
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variables used below indicate that the present data base is no exception. 
Most of the data distributions analysed were found to violate the conditions 
necessary for accepting approximation to normality. 
(67, p"170) Much of the 
analysis of relationships between variables in this chapter has, therefore, 
been carried out by means of non-parametric correlation tests, using Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient which is not underpinned by assumptions of 
normally distributed data. 
It is a feature of accounting ratios that many ratios will have common 
components, often as a result of the mechanics of double entry accounting 
practices. Many different sources of correlation between any two accounting 
ratios, may, therefore, be present. This possibility has in fact been given 
due consideration in the analysis in this chapter. 
The small size of the sample used, the fact that all companies in the 
sample do not operate in the same industry and non-random method of selection 
of sample provide other avenues for criticism of this study. These limitations 
would have to be borne in mind in drawing any conclusions from the following 
analysis. 
Two ratios reflecting taxation in company accounts and a number of other 
ratios designed to test a priori expectations regarding business response to 
taxation have been calculated for every firm in the sample in respect of each 
year of the study period. Inadequacies in the source data have, however, 
meant that there are some missing values in the ratios, particularly in 
respect of ratios measuring corporate growth and new investment. Definitions 
of the ratios studied and conventions used in their computation are detailed 
in Appendix 17.1. Cross-sectional annual averages of all the ratios and 
their respective standard deviations are summarised in Appendix 17.2. 
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ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
The Corporate Tax Burden 
In theoretical discussions of the burden of corporate taxation, there 
is no agreement as to the correct measure of the burden, as to whether it 
should be only the corporation income tax or whether taxation of corporate 
income should be viewed as including taxes charged on shareholders on 
receipt of dividends and capital gains. 
(99) In empirical investigations, 
the issue is further complicated by the fact that the effective tax charges 
on company accounts may not correspond to the statutory rate of tax due to 
the presence of various investment incentives. It is acknowledged that the 
actual payment of corporate taxes will normally lag behind the year in which 
the profits subject to tax are earned, but it is generally assumed that the 
tax provisions in company accounts will reflect the statutory rate of tax 
(adjusted for appropriate investment incentives). 
(40) 
The analysis which follows suggests that there is some flexibility in 
making tax provisions in SL company accounts such that changes in the 
statutory rate may not be reflected in accounting tax provisions in the 
short-term. 
Figure 10.1 offers a comparison of average tax provisions (TX) in 
company accounts in each of the years of the study period with the statutory 
rate chargeable for the year. 
A priori expectations are that the average value of TX (which is the 
tax provision in the profit and loss account expressed as a percentage of 
profits before tax), would correspond to the statutory rate for the year. 
It is true that investment incentives, disallowable expenses, etc. will lead 
to differences between these two rates. Nevertheless, unless there are 
- 297 - 
FIG. 10.1 Tax charged in accounts v Standard Rate 
of tax 
FIG. 10.2 Tax charged in accounts v Standard Rate 
lagged by one year 
actual average rate 
.......... standard rate 
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major changes in such 'adjusting' items (and as far as can be ascertained, 
this has not been the case here) any changes in the statutory rate should 
be reflected in the accounting rate of tax (TX). It can be seen in Figure 
10.1, however, that this is not true of SL company accounts. Tax charges 
in company accounts seem to take some time to catch up with changes in the 
standard statutory rate. 
The main reason for such a delayed response, of course, lies in the 
operation of the tax system whereby changes in tax rates for any tax year 
are announced in the budget speech made during the year of assessment and 
the necessary legislation is enacted several months later. As corporate 
income is chargeable to tax on a 'preceding year' basis, this means that 
most companies would have finalised their annual accounts for the relevant 
year and probably even published them, by the time the new tax rate becomes 
law. Even if company accounts are published after the announcement by the 
finance minister of a change in the tax rate, there is no legal obligation 
on the company to provide for taxation at the proposed rate: strictly, the 
legal obligation arises only on the enactment of the new rate. In the inter- 
vening period, whether the new rate or the old rate is used in providing 
for the taxation liability appears to be entirely at the discretion of 
company directors with neither Company Law nor current auditing practice 
requiring otherwise. 
Figure 10.2 provides a comparison of annual average tax provisions in 
company accounts with the statutory rate of tax lagged by one year, to allow 
for the delayed announcement of rate changes. This correction reveals a 
significant difference in the response of corporate tax provisions to the 
two changes in the statutory rate made during the study period. The 
accounting provisions for the first two years in Figure 10.2 are strictly 
not comparable with the other years as the former are based on reduced samples. 
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On examining the rates for other years, it can be seen that after the 7% 
reduction in the lagged statutory rate in year 3, the effective rate appearing 
on the accounts corresponded fairly closely to the statutory rate in each 
year of this low tax period. However, the 10% rise in the lagged statutory 
rate in year 8 did not work its way into company accounts until year 10. 
When the effective rate did catch up with the statutory rate in the last 
two years, it stood well above the statutory rate indicating an attempt by 
companies to make up for the earlier underprovisions. 
The differences in corporate tax provisions between years under the 
high tax regime in years 8- 11 are statistically significant. 
(168) The 
average provision in year 8 is significantly different from those in years 
10 and 11 at a 0.05 level of confidence. The average provision in year 9 
is significantly different from that in year 11 at a 0.1 level of confidence. 
During the period of lower taxes (years 3-7), however, no one year has an 
average tax provision significantly different from any other in that period. 
It is of course possible that unusually high investment incentives in 
any year will push down the effective tax rate relative to the statutory 
rate. The additions to fixed assets in years 8 and 9 are however no larger 
than in the previous five years (see Appendix 17.2) and unusually high 
capital allowances are therefore unlikely to be a major contributory factor 
to the low tax charges in the 8th and 9th years. It is more difficult to 
establish that the charges in these two years were not reduced on account 
of tax holidays. However, tax holidays available in this period extended to 
more than two years and hence do not provide an adequate explanation for a 
dip in the tax charge for only two years. 
The main reason for the delay in alignment of the effective rate with 
the statutory rate on the second change is the unusual delay in enactment 
of the tax increase. This increase which was first announced in year 7 as 
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a compulsory savings levy on companies (and a few months later changed by 
administrative decision to an increase in the standard rate) was enacted 
only in year 9. It appears that in the intervening period, the directors 
of some companies at least, preferred to exercise their discretion to make 
lower provisions at the old rate of tax. 
Another possible contributory factor to this apparent flexibility in 
making tax provisions is that at the time of providing for the tax liability 
in the annual accounts, a company accountant or tax advisor is often called 
upon to make subjective judgements on the tax treatment of a number of issues 
such as disallowable expenses, asset category under which claims for 
accelerated depreciation allowances are to be made, likely outcome of 
additional assessments being contested and/or appeals pending in respect 
of prior years. Under conditions of such uncertainty, there is a likelihood 
that conservative provisions will be made in years when the profit position 
is good and that in years of poor profits, provisions would be biased in the 
opposite direction. The flexibility available to a company in this respect 
is limited as auditors would be unlikely to approve wide variations from 
year to year. Nevertheless, the possibility exists for a modest tax-buffer 
or a small back-log of tax provisions to be accumulated over the short-term. 
The foregoing analysis does not provide conclusive proof as to the 
reasons underlying the apparent flexibility displayed in making corporate 
tax provisions, but it does show that the statutory rate of tax is not 
necessarily reflected in corporate tax provisions in the short-term. 
The rest of this chapter will analyse accounting ratios reflecting 
corporate behaviour in a number of major business decision areas in order 
to verify some of the findings of the survey of SL business opinion. 
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Taxation and Corporate Profits 
As discussed in Chapter 1, traditional theory of public finance 
envisages that the relationship between business profits and corporate 
taxes depends on the market conditions under which the firm operates. 
(131) 
It is argued that, in the short term, a firm operating under either perfect 
market conditions or monopoly conditions will not be in a position to shift 
corporate income taxes and that any increase in taxation will result in a 
reduction of earnings to capital. The position of firms operating under 
oligopolistic market conditions may be different: these firms may be 
merelysatisficing on profits and if so, will be able to shift the burden 0 
of additional taxes, in the short-term, so as to maintain their profits at 
desired levels. It is, however, acknowledged that in the long-term market 
supply and demand changes may result in the shifting of taxes in all types 
of firm. 
An exception to these traditional views is to be found in the work of 
Krzyzaniak and Musgrave 
(112) 
who argue that business firms treat taxes as a 
cost when determining prices and a change in the tax rate would therefore 
lead to an adjustment in prices. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, empirical evidence in developed countries 
is not wholly supportive of either of the above positions. 
(112)(40)(191) 
The survey evidence in SL (reported in Chapter 4) disclosed that though 
turnover taxes (BTT) were an important consideration in the pricing decisions 
of SL fines, the same was not true of income taxes. The prices of firms not 
restricted by price control or international commodity prices appeared to be 
based on costs including BTT plus a standard mark-up; with the mark-up 
providing for both- profits and income tax. This practice implies that the 
firms are unlikely to attempt shifting of an increase in income taxes in the 
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short-term, but does not necessarily preclude long-run shifting by adjustment 
of the required mark-up in cost-plus pricing. 
In the literature on tax-shifting, the short-term is defined as the 
period during which the possibility of capacity changes in response to a 
tax are excludedc112) On the other hand, the short-term in relation to 
pricing decisions is best defined as the period during which prices may 
change but not overall pricing policies: and it must be 
äcknowledgebthat 
the short-termin the two different contexts need not necessarily coincide. 
The analysis in this section suggests that 
(a) SL business have been able to shift taxes in the long-term, and 
(b) shifting has been practised even in the short-term but this appears 
to have become more difficult in the later years of the study period. 
The impact of taxation on profits of companies (whatever the corporate 
response to taxes) should be observable in the annual accounts. Let us assume 
firstly that shifting is defined in terms of returns to holders of equity 
capital (i. e. if a company is able to shift taxes, it will attempt to 
maintain returns to equity by shifting action), and, secondly, that in the 
absence of corporate income taxes, firms have similar potential returns to 
capital employed. Then, on the one hand if income tax is shifted, 
(i) a positive correlation should be observed between the ratio of 
tax charge to profit before tax (TX) and profits before tax 
expressed as a percentage of capital employed (PBT), and 
(ii) there should be no systematic relationship between TX and profits 
available to equity holders expressed as a percentage of equity 
holders' interest in capital employed (RTO). 
However, on the other hand, if income tax is not shifted, 
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(i)a negative correlation should be observed between TX and RTO, and 
(ii) there should be no systematic relationship between TX and PBT. 
The assumption made above that, in the absence of income taxes, there 
is equivalence of profitability among companies, is a major limitation in 
the analysis. It is extremely likely that profits of individual firms in 
the sample will be a function of a variety of non-tax influences. Nevertheless, 
it is not unreasonable to expect that evidence of business response to income 
taxes will be observable in a test of correlation between taxes and profits. 
A correlation test will not, however, indicate the degree of shifting. Nor 
will it disclose the mechanisms by which tax shifting, if any, comes about. 
Limitations in the availability of data preclude the investigation of these 
questions. 
The tax and profit ratios examined are all annual values (or study-period 
averages of annual ratios) and should therefore reflect both the short-term 
and the long-term response to taxes. 
The results of cross-sectional correlation tests based on Spearman's 
rank correlation coefficient are summarised in Tables l0A and 10B. The 
results in Table 10A relate to tests on averages for the 11 year study period 
carried out for the whole sample as well as for two restricted samples: viz., 
(a) manufacturing and engineering firms and (b) firms which did not report 
losses before tax in any of the years in the study period. 
It can be seen in Table 10A that for all three samples there are positive 
correlations between average ratios of PBT and TX, significant in each case 
at a level better than 0.05. In contrast, the relationship between average 
ratios of TX and RTO is not significant at the 0.05 level, though some positive 
correlation between these two variables is seen in all three cases. 
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Table 10A 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients between Profits and Taxes 
- For Average Ratios 1964-74 
Variables N= Samp le Size Spearman's r Level of significance 
(A) TX v PBT 
(i) All firms 20 0.64 0.01 
(ii) Manufacturing and 
Engineering Firms 14 0.72 0.002 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 16 0.55 0.01 
(B) TX v RTO 
(i) All firms 20 0.29 0.11 
(ii) Manufacturing and 
Engineering Firms 14 0.19 0.26 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 16 0.39 0.07 
Table 10B 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients between Profits and Taxes 
- Summary of Annual correlations 
Variables Total Number Significant at Significant at 
of correlations level of 0.05 level of 0.1 
or better or better 
+ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve(years) 
(A) TX v PBT 
(i) All firms 9 
(ii) Manufacturing and 
Engineering firms 8 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 10 
(B) TX v RTO 
(i) All firms 3 
(ii) Manufacturing and 
Engineering firms - 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 5 
23171 (year 11)I 
33151 (year 11) 
12-7- 
8-3-3 
(years 
9-11) 
11 -2-3 (years 
2) 
10 &11 
years 6-4-4( 8-11) 
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Subject to the limitations of ceteris paribus assumptions underlying 
the analysis, the significant positive correlation between TX and PBT can 
be interpreted as being indicative of the ability of business firms, by and 
large, to earn high profits to cover high taxes and to shift the burden of 
high taxes away from the owners of capital. The absence of a negative 
correlation between TX and RTO suggests that by and large, in the study 
period, owners of equity have not been called upon to bear the burden of 
taxes falling on the companies liable to high taxes. The fact that the 
above observations have been made in respect of averages over an 11 year 
period indicates that the correlations are not merely the result of short- 
term flexibility in making tax provisions discussed in the previous section. 
The evidence, on the whole, therefore points to the presence of some tax 
shifting in the study period. 
Turning next to the results of correlation tests for individual years, 
summarised in Table 10B (detailed results are to be found in Appendices 
17.3 to 17.13), the overall picture in regard to the presence of tax 
shifting is not changed, but a feature of further interest emerges in that 
the later years of the study period appear to be different from the earlier 
years. 
Table 10B discloses the following: 
(a) Correlations between PBT and TX are predominently positive 
and the majority of these are statistically significant at a 
level of 0.1 or better. The only statistically significant 
negative correlations between these two variables are to be 
found in year 11; and 
(b) as between RTO and TX, negative correlations are predominant, 
but only those in later years are statistically significant at 
levels better than 0.05 (though one negative correlation in the 
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second year is significant at the 0.1 level). 
As discussed in the previous section, the early part of the study 
period was a relatively low-tax period, as the statutory rate of tax had 
been reduced by 7% in Year 2. In the latter part of the study period there 
was a 10% increase in the statutory rate, resulting in a gradual increase 
in tax charges in company accounts. The statistically significant negative 
correlations between RTO and TX in the later years are indicative of the 
firms' inability (or reduced ability) to shift taxes following the rise in 
tax rates. This raises the possibility that tax-shifting behaviour may be 
different as between an increase and a decrease in taxation. 
The appearance of significant negative correlation between PBT and TX 
in the last year, however, suggests that both pre-tax profitability and the 
ability to shift taxes may have been influenced by other, non-tax, factors. 
Though positive proof is not available in company accounts, it is possible 
to speculate that price controls introduced in the early seventies (and 
emerging in the survey of SL business opinion as a significant constraint 
on the achievement of business objectives) may have been a causal factor 
contributing to the negative correlations observed and the apparent inability 
of firms to shift taxes in later years at the levels existing in earlier 
years. 
As stated before, the analyses in this chapter have been carried out 
largely in terms of non-parametric correlation tests on account of the non- 
normal distribution of much of the data analysed. Pearsonian correlation 
tests have, however, been carried out and these were seen to support the 
findings of the rank correlation tests detailed above. Results of Pearsonian 
correlation tests on average ratios for the main sample are given in Appendix 
17.14. 
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The above analysis did not enquire into the causes for variation 
in the effective tax burden (as measured by TX) among companies facing 
the same tax environment. The main tax-related reasons for such differences 
among going-concern firms will be (a) differences in asset structures and 
consequently in book depreciation charges which are disallowable for tax 
purposes, (b) differences in the levels of other disallowable expenses 
which will not be deductable in the computation of taxable income, (c) tax 
holiday benefits or receipt of tax exempt income, (d) differences arising 
from the receipt of accelerated capital allowances on the acquisition of 
depreciable assets and (e) the presence of brought-forward tax losses. 
The possibility that the presence of loss-making companies in the sample 
may bias the results of correlation tests has been recognised and the tests 
have been run for the sample excluding firms reporting pre-tax losses in 
any of the years. It can be seen from Tables 10A and 10B that the exclusion 
of loss-making firms from the sample did not greatly alter the pattern of 
relationships observed. 
As regards tax holidays and tax-exemptions, though it is true that the 
receipt of tax-exempt income can distort the value of TX, there is no reason 
to suspect that the presence of such income will be associated with any 
particular level of income so as to introduce a bias to correlation results. 
Differences relating to accounting depreciation and capital allowances 
for tax purposes will (under conditions, observed in the next section, of 
positive correlation between additions to fixed assets on the one hand and 
measures of profitability on the other), induce negative correlations between 
TX and both measures of profitability. The presence of disallowable expenses 
in income statements would also tend to bias the relationship between tax 
and profitability in a similar direction. However, any correction for such 
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bias could only improve the significance of our results in reflecting the 
shifting of income taxes: and, therefore, the inability to introduce a 
control for such bias should not detract from our conclusions. 
On the whole, therefore, the evidence points to the presence of short- 
term as well as long-term tax shifting (though apparently diminished in 
later years): the short-term being defined in the context of tax shifting. 
The question then arises as to how these observations could be reconciled 
with the claims of business firms interviewed, that income tax is not treated 
as a cost in cost-plus pricing. As suggested in Chapter 4, the most likely 
explanation is that the mark-up on cost (which was said to provide for income 
taxation as well as profits) must be adjusted at regular intervals such that 
there is in effect short-term, even if not immediate, tax-shifting following 
a change in tax burden of income tax. 
Taxation and Investment 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the theory of public finance envisages a 
negative correlation between the burden of taxation and business investment 
under a tax regime in which all costs of capital are not tax-deductable. 
Empirical evidence, though largely supportive of the direction of the 
relationship, has tended to suggest a not very elastic response of the level 
of investment to changes in taxation. 
The survey results on the influence of taxation on business growth and 
investment discussed in Chapter 4 indicated a low sensitivity to taxation 
in this area of business decision-making among SL firms. Taxation was not 
a major reason for the non-achievement of investment plans, and a majority 
of survey respondents did not find taxation to be a constraint on business 
growth. However, tax-related investment incentives were considered to be 
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the most useful forms of incentive on offer. Even among those who found 
taxation to be a constraint on growth, management type, rather than level 
of growth, appeared to be the dominant determinant of sensitivity to 
taxation. 
The following analysis of company accounts shows no strong relationship 
between investment and taxation. 
If theoretical expectations are realised, it should to possible to 
observe a significant negative correlation between tax charges and investment. 
Table 10C summarises the results of correlation tests carried out between 
measures of investment on the one hand and measures of profitability and 
taxation on the other. Investment for our purposes has been measured using 
two separate ratios, viz: 
(a) additions to fixed assets in a year expressed as a percentage 
of fixed assets at the beginning of the year (AFA), and 
(b) the increase in total assets in a year expressed as a percentage 
of total assets at the beginning of the year, (ITA). 
For a majority of cases in the sample, data relating to measures of 
investment were unavailable in respect of one or more years. Averages for 
the study period have therefore not been used in this section. Details of 
the correlation results summarised in Table 10C are to be found in Appendices 
17.3 to 17.13. 
It can be seen in Table 10C that in the total sample, there appears to 
be no systematic association between tax (TX)and the measures of investment 
(AFA and ITA), whereas positive and mostly significant relationships are 
observed between the measures of profitability (PBT and RTO), and measures 
of investment. Restricting the sample to profit-making firms makes little 
or no difference to these results, but a negative shift to all relationships 
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Spearman's Rank 
Table 1OC 
Correlation Coefficients relatin g to Investment 
- Summary of Annual Correlations 
Total Number of Significant at level Significant at level 
Variables correlations of 0.05 or better of 0.1 or better 
+ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve 
AFA v TX 
(i) All firms 5 6 - 1 - 1 
(ii) Man. & Eng. firms 4 7 - 3 - 4 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 7 4 - - - 1 
ITA v TX 
(i) All firms 6 5 - 2 - 2 
(ii) Man. & Eng. firms 4 7 - 2 - 2 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 5 6 1 1 1 2 
AFA v PBT 
(i) All firms 11 - 3 - 6 - 
(ii) Man. & Eng. firms 7 4 - 1 1 1 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 10 1 4 - 4 - 
ITA v PBT 
(i) All firms 11 - 3 - 4 
(ii) Man. & Eng. firms 9 2 4 - 5 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 11 - 5 - 9 - 
AFA v RTO 
(i) All firms 10 1 3 - 7 - (ii) Man. & Eng. firms 9 2 2 - 3 1 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 10 1 5 - 5 - 
ITA v RTO 
(i) All firms 11 - 4 - 7 - 
(ii) Man. & Eng. firms 10 - 3 - 4 - 
(iii) Firms not reporting 
losses 11 - 5 - 7 - 
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tested is observed in the sample of manufacturing and engineering firms. 
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that, overall, no strong negative relation- 
ship of the sort expected on the basis of theoretical analysis is observable 
for these firms. The absence of significant negative correlations between 
TX and measuresof investment, however, matches the findings of the SL survey 
that taxation was not a major constraint on business investment and growth. 
Why the theoretical expectations of negative correlations should not 
be realised for these firms is not immediately clear from these results. 
Many different factors could have contributed to the results observed, but 
one possibility, that is supported by the positive correlations observed 
between investment and profitability as well as by the relationships between 
tax and profitability observed in the previous section, is that taxation is 
not an inhibitor of investment because it has largely been shifted during 
the study period. If taxes are shifted so that they do not affect levels 
of profitability, then they will exert no influence on investment via 
investment returns and there will be no significant negative correlations 
between TX and investment (though longer term influences felt via changes in 
market supply/demand conditions cannot be predicted). 
It must be acknowledged that the annual tests of correlation of the 
sort carried out here are not ideal for testing the influence of profitability 
on investment, as short-term fluctuations in these variables may produce 
values not strictly representative of long-term trends. Two separate 
analyses have, however, been carried out between average profits for three 
year periods and investment in the third year of each period and results 
obtained were seen to correspond to those of the annual tests. 
Annual correlation tests are, however, particularly relevant for 
testing one aspect of the relationship between taxation and investment - 
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i. e. the effect of accelerated capital allowances on the tax burden. 
Given the system of accelerated capital allowances operating in SL, the 
absence of significant negative correlation between TX and AFA is difficult 
to explain. One possibility is that timing differences are adjusted for in 
the accounting tax charges by means of provisions for deferred taxation. 
However, SL company law does not require deferred tax provisions to be made 
and only 5 of the firms in the sample made any provisions termed 'deferred' 
or 'future' tax provisions. The exclusion of these firms' from the sample, 
made no significant difference to the results. Another possible explanation 
for the absence of negative correlations between TX and AFA, though unproven, 
is that capital allowances are largely equal to or proportional to book 
depreciation allowances so as to eliminate significant correlation between 
TX and AFA. The improved significance of negative correlation between TX 
and AFA in the relatively more homogeneous sample of manufacturing firms, 
however, offers some weak evidence of the effect of accelerated capital 
allowances on the tax burden. 
On the whole, there is no strong evidence in the above results of 
taxation inhibiting investment, thus lending support to the findings of 
the survey of business opinion. The results, however, cast doubt on the 
effectiveness of investment incentives offered through the tax system, 
despite the views expressed by business managers that these were the most 
useful form of incentives on offer. 
Taxation and Financing 
In the presence of a tax system in which interest payments are 
deductable in computing taxable income, theoretical analysis leads us 
to expect increased gearing to produce increased returns to owners of 
equity. As discussed in Chapter 1, theoreticians do, however, acknowledge 
that real life market imperfections will exert contrary influences such that 
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the maximum benefits of the tax-shield on financial gearing may not be 
availed of. 
The survey of SL business opinion (in Chapter 4) disclosed that 
taxation was not a major consideration in financing decisions of firms in 
that country. Only a minority of respondents believed that taxation 
influenced their financing decisions, and even these firms were more 
concerned with the influence that taxation imposed via its effects on 
liquidity than with the advantages of the tax shield on gearing. 
The analysis below shows no apparent profit advantages to gearing, 
though taxation and gearing levels are seen to be systematically related. 
Several new ratios have been used in this section. These are, 
(a) LS, a measure of gearing, which is non-tax liabilities at the 
end of the year expressed as a percentage of total assets held on 
that date, 
(b) TP, which is tax payable at the end of the year expressed as a 
percentage of total assets. 
(c) CI, which is cash and bank balances and short-term investment 
held at the end of the year expressed as a percentage of total 
assets, and 
(d) DRS, which is total debtors at the end of the year expressed as 
a percentage of total assets. 
If theoretical expectations regarding profit advantages resulting from 
the tax shield are realised, we would expect to find a positive correlation 
between gearing (LS) and measures of profitability (PBT and RTO) though it is 
by no means claimed that these variables will not be influenced by other 
factors. The tax shield will not however produce any systematic relationship 
between tax charges in company accounts (TX) and gearing levels (LS). 
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If, as claimed by survey respondents, there is a liquidity-based 
connection between taxation and gearing, a correlation may be observed 
between TX and LS. As taxation was believed by respondents to limit 
borrowing capacity by reducing the debt-servicing capacity of firms, a 
priori expectations are that negative correlations should be observed 
between TX and LS. 
Correlation tests were carried out between relevant variables both for 
study period averages and annual ratios. The results are surmnarised in 
Tables 100 and 10E. 
S pearman's 
Table 1OD 
Rank Correlation Coefficients relating to Corporate 
Gearing - For average ratios 1964 - 1974 
All Firms N= 20 
Variables Spearman's r Level of Significance 
LS v PBT -0.26 0.14 
LS v RTO -0.10 0.34 
LS v TX -0.39 0.05 
LS v TP -0.65 0.001 
LS v Cl -0.53 0.008 
LS v DRS 0.24 0.15 
TP v TX 0.62 0.002 
TP v Cl 0.42 0.03 
TX v CI 0.44 0.03 
Tables 10D and 10E summarise results of correlation tests only in 
respect of the total sample. Similar tests have, however, been carried 
out for the two restricted samples and the results were seen to be in general 
agreement with those pertaining to the total sample. Details of annual 
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Table 10E 
Sp earman's Rank Correlation Coefficients relating to 
Corp orate Gearing - Summary of Annual Correlations 
Total Number Significant at level Significant at level 
Variables of correlations of 0.05 or better of 0.1 or better 
+ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve 
LS v PBT 1 10 - 1 4 
LS v RTO 2 8 - 2 - 2 
LS v TX - 10 - 1 - 3 
LS v TP - 11 - 11 - 11 
LS v CI - 11 - 8 - 9 
LS v DRS 11 - 9 - 10 - 
TP v TX 10 1 9 - 10 - 
TP v CI 11 - 7 - 8 - 
TX v CI 10 1 1 - 2 - 
LS v AFA 10 1 1 - 4 - 
LS v ITA 10 1 3 - 3 - 
Spearman's rank correlation results for all samples and the results on 
average ratios for the restricted samples are given in Appendices 17.3-17.13 
and 17.15 respectively. Pearsonian correlation tests were also carried out 
on these variables and the results were seen to be in general agreement with 
those of the non-parametric tests. The Pearson's correlation results in 
respect of study period averages for the total sample are summarised in 
Appendix 17.14. 
The results in Tables 10D and lOE disclose no significant positive 
correlations between level of debt (LS) and the two measures of profitability 
(PBT and RTO): instead the relationsip between these variables is negative 
in most years of the annual tests as well as on the test of study period 
averages. The absence of positive correlations between these variables means 
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that there is no evidence of profit advantages in gearing for this sample. 
The evidence before us, however, does not provide any explanation as to 
why positive correlations should be absent on these tests. One possible 
explanation that needs to be checked is that the cost of debt is so high 
as to negate advantages of the tax shield. Commercial bank interest rates 
in the study period are, however, reported 
(203,1974) to have averaged at a 
little over 10%, which is about the same as average RTO for the period. At 
the rates of tax obtaining in the study period, interest rates which are 
about the same as RTO are compatible with positive correlations between 
RTO and LS, and hence this explanation has to be rejected. Another possible 
explanation which cannot be disproved, however, is that borrowing is an 
alternative to internally generated funds (arising mainly from profits) 
and hence would lead to negative correlations between profitability and 
gearing. As conceded elsewhere in this chapter both profitability and 
gearing are likely to be influenced by many other variables as well, and 
therefore the results observed permit no more than a tentative conclusion 
that at the levels of gearing present in the sample, differentials in tax- 
shield are not large enough to influence profit levels. 
Negative correlations are observed between the measure of gearing (LS) 
and tax charges in accounts (TX), though on the annual tests most of these 
correlations are not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the presence 
of negative correlations between these two variables is prima facie 
supportive of the position of survey respondents that tax considerations 
in financing decisions have more to do with the impact of taxation on debt- 
servicing ability rather than with the tax-shield on debt. 
Significant negative correlations were observed also between the tax 
liability (TP) and other debt (LS). These correlations do, of course, reflect 
the fact that in double entry accounting tax payable and non-tax liabilities 
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together with ownership interest will equal total assets. Nevertheless 
these highly significant correlations indicate that the level of total debt 
(i. e. tax payable plus non-tax liabilities) varies within fairly narrow 
limits among the sample. A natural consequence of such limits - whether 
externally imposed or internally determined - would be to reduce the capacity 
of a firm for non-tax borrowing, when the tax-debt is high. 
Significant negative correlations were observed between the measure of 
gearing (LS) and the level of liquid funds (CI). CI was also positively 
correlated with both tax-related variables (TX and TP), which in turn showed 
a close positive correlation with each other. This set of correlations is 
rather more difficult to explain. However, one scenario which to some extent 
matches the survey findings supposes that a high proportion of end-year 
liquid funds are earmarked for payment of the tax-bill: hence the positive 
correlation between TP and CI. This would in turn explain the positive 
correlation between CI and TX as a secondary relationship reflecting the 
correlation of each with TP. The negative correlation between CI and LS 
would also be a secondary relationship arising from the operation of fairly 
narrow limits for the level of total debt. High taxation could, then, be 
said to inhibit other forms of borrowing. 
LS, the level of non-tax liabilities, also showed several other notable 
correlations. These were all positive correlations and were observed with 
(a) level of debtors and (b) investment as measured by both additions to 
fixed assets and increases in total assets. The positive correlation with 
debtors (highly significant from year to year but not significant at the 0.1 
level on average) probably reflects the fact that trade debtors are often 
financed by means of commercial bank credit. As regards the correlations 
of LS with the measures of investment: it was seen in the survey of SL 
business (in Chapter 4) that roughly half of all major investments by existing 
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business firms were financed by various forms of debt. The positive (though 
not very significant) correlations observed are therefore only to be expected. 
Returning to the relationship between taxation and financing of business, 
the above results can be said to be broadly supportive of the findings of the 
survey of business opinion that taxation was, in general, an inhibitor of 
debt financing. 
Dividend Policies of SL Public Companies 
Theoretical discussion on the impact of taxation on dividend policy 
centres mainly around the issue of double taxation of distributed profits 
and its consequences for dividend policy and share valuation. SL public 
companies interviewed during the survey did not however appear to be much 
concerned about tax minimisation by means of appropriate dividend policy 
(see Chapter 4). 
In any event, the available information in company accounts is not 
adequate for the investigation of this question, nor does it permit any 
meaningful analysis of any other effects of taxation on dividend policy. 
The analysis in this section will therefore be limited to the verification 
of one aspect of dividend policy said to be important to the public companies 
participating in the survey of SL business. 
If dividend maintenance objectives are important to public companies, 
this fact should be reflected in a cross-sectional corri 
form of negative correlations between the proportion of 
capital distributed as dividends (DOE) and the earnings 
ordinary share capital (RTO). Table 1OF summarises the 
these two variables in respect of study period averages 
ratios. 
? lation test in the 
earnings to ordinary 
attributable to 
relationship between 
as well as annual 
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Table ]OF 
Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficients between Profits 
and Dividend Payout 
A. For Average Ratios 1964-1974 
Variables 
DOE v RTO 
(i) All Firms 
(ii) Manufacturing and 
Engineering firms 
(iii) Firms not reporting losses 
B. Summary of Annual Correlations 
Variables 
DOE v RTO 
(i) All Firms 
(ii) Manufacturing and 
Engineering firms 
(iii) Firms not reporting losses 
N Spearman's r Level of Significance 
20 -0.37 0.06 
14 -0.43 0.06 
16 -0.41 0.06 
Total Number Significant at Significant at 
of level of 0.05 level of 0.1 
correlations or better or better 
+ve -ve +ve -ve +ve -ve 
1 10 -7- 10 1 
- 11 -4-5 
1 10 -8- 10 
Details of the annual correlations summarised in Table 1OF are to be found 
in Appendices 17.3-17.13. Results of a Pearsonian correlation test supporting 
the findings of the non-parametric tests on average ratios is given in 
Appendix 17.14. 
The results in Table 1OF show significant negative correlations between 
DOE and RTO. The presence of such negative correlations can be interpreted 
as confirmation of the survey findings that dividend maintenance is an 
important objective to SL public companies. 
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Conclusions 
The main conclusions of the analysis of accounting ratios of SL 
companies are summarised below: 
1. Changes in the rate of income tax may not be fully reflected in 
accounting provisions for taxation in the short-term. 
2. There appears to be at least some tax-shifting among SL firms both 
in the short-term and in the long-term; though the practice of 
shifting may have become more difficult in later years. 
3. The level of investment by companies does not show a significant 
relationship with the level of taxation - thus supporting the findings 
of the SL surveys that taxation was not a major inhibitor of corporate 
growth. 
4. There is no indication that tax-shield advantages of financial gearing 
influence returns to equity to any great extent: but gearing levels 
are negatively correlated with the level of taxation, lending some 
support to the views expressed in the SL survey that high taxation 
tended to reduce borrowing capacity. 
5. The finding of the SL survey that dividend maintenance objectives were 
important to public companies is confirmed by the ratio analysis. 
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CHAPTER 11. 
SOME CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter returns to the questions raised at the end of Chapter 1 
and attempts to provide some answers to those questions in the light of the 
research findings. It is not intended to summarise here Ml the results and 
conclusions reported in earlier chapters. Rather, what follows will be a 
general discussion of the main research results, and their implications 
without necessarily going into qualifications and research problems discussed 
previously. 
Perceptions and attitudes to taxation 
Are similar perceptions of and attitudes to taxation widely shared among 
various participants in business activity? 
This question was raised at the end of the review of the literature in 
Chapter 1 and judging by the findings of this study, the answer to it must be - 
no. The mere observation of some diversity of perceptions of taxation would 
not be particularly remarkable in itself, but what is notable is that the 
perceptions of taxation (as well as of other environmental variables impinging 
upon business performance) appear to be systematically related to some organ- 
isational characteristics within the firms. For instance, among SL firms, it 
was seen (Chapter 3) that newer and smaller firms were less sensitive to 
environmental constraints than older and larger firms. Also, firms adopting 
profit maximisation as the main objective are more sensitive to taxation as 
a constraint than are firms with the main goal of maintaining a going concern. 
Owner-managers appear to be more sensitive to taxation and tax incentives 
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than professional managers; and firms growing at a very slow rate are more 
sensitive to environmental constraints (including taxation) than are those 
achieving high growth or no growth at all. 
It was reported in Chapter 1 that studies on developed countries had found 
that perceptions of taxpayers regarding taxation could influence their 
behaviour, but no theories are offered in the literature as to the manner in 
which such perceptions are formed. The survey of SL business firms conducted 
as part of this study (Chapters 3& 4) throws some light on this issue: the 
results indicate that differences in perceptions regarding taxation and other 
environmental variables among business firms operating in the same environment 
are associated with and could very well be influenced by organisational 
characteristics internal to the firms themselves. 
Perceptions in regard to environmental influences were also seen to 
differ as between the three developing countries studied - SL, Malaysia 
and the Philippines. Import controls were perceived as the main constraint 
on SL business, whereas market limitations headed the list of constraints 
in the other two countries. Though tax incentives for investment were seen 
by business firms in all three countries as the most useful form of incentive 
offered by their respective governments, differences of opinion did emerge as 
to the relative usefulness of the two main types of tax incentive. Most 
divergences in perception were, however, attributable to differences in the 
business environments or the tax regimes among the countries. 
Perceptions of taxation in SL differed also as between business firms 
and their professional advisors (Chapter 5). These differences in perception 
between groups subject to the same tax regime appear to a large extent to 
stem from their different roles in business activity. Predictably, professional 
observers tend to concentrate on tax effects observable from outside the 
business organisations. For instance, in attributing reasons for taxation 
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being a constraint on the achievement of business objectives, the firms 
themselves referred to business turnover tax as the most burdensome tax 
whereas professional observers believed that direct income taxes were 
the main constraint. This divergence in perceptions may very well arise from 
the fact that indirect taxes, however high the financial burden associated 
with them, rarely give rise to administrative or computational problems on 
the scale that is normal with direct taxes. It is with the latter, therefore, 
that most professional advisors and tax assessors will be concerned. 
Further differences of opinion were observed between business managers 
and professional persons in SL concerning the variety of investment incentives 
offered in SL through the tax system and via other means. For example, 
professional observers believed that tax holidays had been a much more 
effective incentive than accelerated depreciation in promoting increased 
investment. On the other hand, business managers have found accelerated 
depreciation allowances to be the most widely useful incentive offered to 
date within or outside the tax system. That tax holidays have led to new 
investment in preferred activities is indisputable, but the evidence here is 
that the role played by accelerated capital allowances in promoting replace- 
ment investment appears to be undervalued by professional observers. The 
consequence of these perceptions on the part of persons outside business 
firms appears to have been a number of attempts over the past decade to remove 
the benefits of accelerated capital allowances. The scheme for granting 
capital allowances in SL has finally been completely withdrawn as from 1981: 
an investigation into the effects, if any, of this action is an interesting 
subject for future study. 
In a minor experiment carried out within one firm, variations in 
perceptions were also observed between persons within the same organisation. 
The differences in perceptions which appeared to be related to the role of 
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the individual in the organisation were greatest)in regard to taxation) between 
the firm's tax manager and other managers. His involvement in tax matters 
appeared to have heightened the sensitivity to taxation of the tax manager. 
In general, therefore, it is possible to conclude that many perceptions 
relating to taxation and other environmental influences are systematically 
related to organisational characteristics as well as to the role of the 
individual in business activity. 
The surveys also revealed that perceptions of survey participants as to 
the severity of taxation were formed with reference to their past tax 
experience; and if this experience was in a single tax jurisdiction, no 
comparisons were usually made with tax regimes in other countries. This is 
not a surprising result given the general immobility of business organisations, 
whether due to governmental controls or societal pressures or other reasons. 
But it does have implications for fiscal policy makers in that any new tax 
measures will be judged by taxpayers not with reference to international tax 
levels but against their own past local tax experience. 
Effects of taxation 
Is the manner in which taxation is incorporated in decisions of business 
consistent with rational economic decision making as envisaged in economic 
theory, and what effects does taxation have on business decisions of LDC 
firms? 
As regards investment decisions, the prediction in theory is that invest- 
ment is reduced by the introduction of a tax or an increase in an existing 
tax and encouraged by tax incentives for investment which counter the effects 
of taxes. Empirical evidence in the literature (Chapter 1) is generally 
supportive of theoretical expectations but the effects of taxation and tax 
incentives on investment are not always found to be significant. Evidence 
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on SL gathered in this study (Chapters 3& 4) points to the usefulness of 
tax incentives, but taxation is by no means a limiting factor on investment. 
Though some SL managers believe themselves to be constrained by taxation 
in the achievement of their objectives, most firms do not appear to have 
taxation-imposed limitations on growth. Only a small minority of managers 
believed that taxation had hampered growth in their firms and specific 
investment plans were generally not adversely affected by'taxation. Further- 
more, high growth firms in SL were less constrained by taxation than the slow- 
growing, indicating possible influence of tax incentives in reducing the tax 
burden of a growing firm. 
The analysis of company accounts (Chapter 10), however, does not show 
any strong systematic relationship between taxation charges in company accounts 
and corporate growth. Nevertheless, business managers are emphatic in their 
view that tax incentives have been very useful to them. They are particularly 
appreciative of the cash flow benefits that arise from accelerated capital 
allowances. 
Yet, the dominant constraint on business activity in SL in the period 
studied was import control. In a market which was well protected against 
competing foreign goods by import control, and which was characterised by 
high demand and scarce supply of goods, profitability was largely a function 
of level of activity. The level of activity was in turn dependent on the 
availability of import permits. In the presence of this limiting factor, 
taxation and hence tax incentives were a secondary consideration. In the 
circumstances, one side effect of tax holidays which have enhanced their value 
to business, has been the fact that approval for tax holidays was usually 
accompanied by relaxation of import controls for the organisationsconcerned 
at least for some time. 
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Though it is clear that taxation was not a major constraint in SL on 
account of the presence of another more burdensome problem - import control - 
which was the major limiting factor on business activity, the presence of a 
less stringent regime of import control does not necessarily mean that the 
burden of tax as perceived by business managers is enhanced. As seen in the 
surveys of Malaysia and the Philippines, where import controls are not the 
major constraint, the position of prime limiting factor appears to be taken 
by market considerations (Chapter 5). 
Another expectation generated by theoretical analysis of investment 
decisions (Chapter 1) is that the decisions may be influenced by the technique 
of investment appraisal used, partly at least on account of differences in 
treatment of taxation. 
Among SL business, it was possible to see (Chapter 4) some influence of 
the technique of appraisal on the type of investment undertaken, but the 
levels of growth achieved by individual firms appear to be unaffected by the 
technique of appraisal used: growth rates of users of RCE are no different 
to those of firms using the more sophisticated discounted cash flow techniques. 
Nor did the treatment of taxation in investment appraisals have 
any influence on the level of growth. Firms taking a very short- 
term view of taxation and apparently planning for short horizons did not 
suffer in their growth achievement as a result. The use of short planning 
horizons might well be a reaction to a relatively uncertain external environ- 
ment. But the absence of a systematic relationship between level of growth and 
level of sophistication of investment appraisal technique reflects the state 
of the investment climate in SL, wherein the limits to growth are set by the 
lack of technically and commercially feasible investment proposals which will 
not be hampered by governmental controls. Under such circumstances what 
matters is the firm's ability to obtain preferred status for its activities: 
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differences between appraisal methods which may affect marginal investment 
decisions have little impact. 
On the financing decisions of SL firms too, the influence of taxation 
is minimal. Other considerations, particularly the relative access to 
different forms of finance and owners' control requirements, appear to be more 
important in the formulation of financing policies. 
Only a minority of the SL firms surveyed found tax considerations to 
be relevant in financing decisions (Chapter 4). Even among these firms, the 
main aspect of taxation considered relevant was its impact on debt-servicing 
capacity (or its liquidity effects) rather than the advantages of tax-shield 
on gearing. The analysis of company accounts (Chapter 10) provides support 
for the survey findings. Ratio analysis disclosed no profit advantages to 
equity following increased gearing. Instead, negative correlations were 
found between taxation and the level of debt, thus lending support to the 
survey findings that taxation inhibited borrowing and also indicating the 
maintenance by SL firms of fairly narrow limits to the level of total debt 
(ie. borrowing and tax debt). 
Turning next to dividend decisions, theoretical predictions are that 
under a fiscal system which charges dividends to tax differently from retained 
earnings, taxation considerations should influence the proportion of earnings 
distributed. Empirical evidence on the question in developed countries, 
however, is inconclusive (Chapter 2). 
The survey evidence on SL (Chapter 4) discloses that the majority of 
business managers believe tax considerations to be relevant in making 
decisions relating to distribution of profits: but liquidity considerations 
and dividend maintenance considerations are relatively more important. 
Though some closely controlled family firms evidently chose their profit 
distribution policies to minimise taxes jointly for the firm and owner-managers, 
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tax-minimisation via dividend policy was not a universally important consid- 
eration. The impact of taxation on liquid resources available for distribution 
was the aspect of taxation considered relevant by most firms. 
On the whole, taxation was not perceived by business managers as having 
any great influence on the above three areas of business decision-making. 
Even when tax considerations were relevant in decision-making, the manner in 
which tax inputs enter decision processes was not wholly consistent with the 
primacy of present-value or profit maximising objectives which underpin much 
of the theoretical analysis of the effects of taxation. Instead, liquidity 
considerations and the impact of taxation on liquidity, which are factors not 
usually emphasised in the literature, appear to be at least as prominent. 
Pricing decisions are another area of business decisions where available 
empirical evidence in developed countries does not lead to definite con- 
clusions about the treatment of taxation (Chapter 1). The survey evidence 
on SL (Chapter 4) indicates that BTT and other indirect taxes are seen by 
business managers as part of costs to be recovered in prices, whereas income 
taxes are viewed as being provided for by the mark-up in cost-plus pricing. 
Prima facie this treatment implies that business firms will attempt short 
term shifting of indirect taxes, but not income taxes. The analysis of 
company accounts (Chapter 10), however, provides a possible explanation for 
the difference. The analysis reveals that a change in the statutory rate of 
corporation income tax could take more than a year to work its way through 
into company accounts and possibly even longer to influence tax cash flows. 
There is strong likelihood that here again the difference between the treat- 
ment of direct and indirect taxes is related to the liquidity effects of the 
two types of tax. The former, taking more than a year (and possibly several 
years) to have any impact on cash flows, is not a consideration in short term 
pricing decisions, whereas indirect taxes which have a more immediate impact 
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on cash flows enter into pricing decisions even in the short term. Ratio 
analysis of company accounts suggests that business firms do attempt to 
shift even the income-tax by the time its impact is felt on the firm's 
reported profits, though such shifting appears to have become more difficult 
during the era of extended price controls in the 1970s. 
Another area of decision making, that relating to the legal form of the 
business entity organisation, also appears to be largely uninfluenced by 
taxation. The reason again is that other considerations are relatively more 
important. 
All in all, the empirical evidence in SL, supported by the restricted 
studies of Malaysian and Philippine business, is indicative of a not very 
decisive influence of taxation on business decisions. The limited influence 
it has is seen to be related in most cases to short-term liquidity issues. 
The evidence in the present study, however, does not permit us to say whether 
the prominence of liquidity considerations is a typically LDC phenomenon 
(arising from the greater imperfection of capital markets in these countries) 
or whether similar responses to taxation are to be found also in more developed 
economies. 
The insignificance of the influence of taxation on business decisions 
relative to theoretical expectations is, in most cases, traceable to the 
existence of other limiting factors. This exposes a major weakness in 
theoretical analysis which is usually conducted under assumed conditions of 
ceteris paribus. Where one or more other factors exert more restrictive 
influences than taxation so as to become limiting factors on any business 
decision, then the analysis of tax effects assuming that all other conditions 
remain equal and hence irrelevant, may not lead to realistic predictions. 
Viewing the response of business to taxation more generally, in their 
operations planning business firms may include taxes as an outgoing in routine 
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budgets or treat taxation as an item requiring special planning for mini- 
misation, or both. By and large, SL firms are seen (Chapter 4) to adopt 
one or the other of these methods. 
The differences in treatment of taxation are also seen to be associated 
with differences in perceptions of tax constraints. Those who are more 
sensitive to taxation appear to carry out special tax planning, whereas 
routine budgeting for tax is associated with lower sensitivity to taxation 
constraints. This provides another example of a relationship between tax- 
payer perceptions and behaviour, but no evidence is available as to which is 
cause and which is effect. 
In another example of taxpayer behaviour (Chapter 9), pressure group 
activity was seen to be related to the attitude of society (and its political 
leaders) to the tax-paying sector. The indications are that the level of 
pressure group activity is related not so much to level of taxpayer education 
as implied in the literature, but more to the level of social hostility to the 
business sector. 
Multinational corporations in LDCs 
Next, with particular reference to multinational business in LDCs, we 
have posed the question - are tax conditions and business responses any 
different between developed countries and LDCs? 
This study discloses (Chapter 8) that the performance of multinational 
firms in LDCs is subject to external influences to a greater extent than in 
developed countries. These external influences originate mostly in govern- 
mental action of one sort or another, but taxation is not a very common cause 
for concern. In developed economies, by contrast, commercial factors, 
especially market considerations, are of primary importance. 
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The reaction of MNCs (Chapter 7) to direct taxes as opposed to indirect 
was very similar to that of SL firms. Indirect taxes caused more problems 
for MNC firms than direct taxes: the former were also more directly relevant 
to pricing decisions. 
MNC managers were on the whole more aware of the impact of taxation 
on business decisions (Chapter 7), and this might well be in consequence of 
the fact that their organisations operate under many different tax regimes, 
so that the influence of taxation is variable with location. Nevertheless, 
taxation or tax incentives were not factors that had a major influence on 
decisions relating to the location of MNC operations. As was the case with 
LDC firms, the most common reason for taxation not being a major consideration 
is the presence of other more important limiting factors. Access to LDC 
markets, which is often conditional upon local manufacture, is perhaps the 
main factor attracting investment from most MNC firms, while access to LDC 
resources is important to some. Political uncertainty is the major problem 
faced by MNC managers in their operations in the third world. 
Content analysis of annual reports of MNCs (Chapter 8) revealed that 
though taxation is not a major problem to these firms, it is certainly a 
greater irritant in LDCs than in more developed areas. This is not to say, 
however, that the total tax burden in LDCs is in fact greater; tax effort 
ratios are on average lower in these areas than in developed countries. In 
any case, MNCs appear to be able to earn higher profits in LDCs and therefore 
should be in a position to bear a higher burden of tax in these locations. 
Perhaps the major factor which neutralises the effect of host country 
taxes and tax incentives on a MNC is the existence of taxation in the home 
country which (in the absence of special tax sparing agreements) will be 
charged on foreign income either at time of earning or on remittance. With 
operations being carried on across many tax frontiers, however, MNCs have 
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available to them far more opportunities for tax-planning than firms 
operating under a single tax jurisdiction. There is evidence that MNC 
managers are aware of these possibilities and do take advantage of them, 
though tax-minimisation remains a secondary consideration subordinate to 
market objectives. 
Implications for fiscal policy 
Some of the main implications for fiscal policy makers in LDCs, and 
particularly in SL, arising out of the findings of this research are 
summarised below. 
Taxpayer response to taxation measures - whether they be new taxes, tax 
increases or incentives offered through the tax system - can be influenced 
by their perceptions. The perceptions of business firms were, in turn, seen 
to be influenced by organisational characteristics of the firms. The 
effectiveness of fiscal policy (both from the point of view of revenue and 
as a tool of economic management) can therefore be maximised by understanding 
and responding appropriately to differences in perceptions and likely behaviour 
between various taxpayer groups. Failure to recognise taxpayer perceptions, 
particularly in a system where there is no open dialogue between taxpayers 
and fiscal policy makers, leads to a danger of dysfunctional consequences of 
tax measures. 
Though taxation does impose constraints on the activities of business 
firms, it is by no means a limiting factor. Other environmental factors, 
particularly various physical controls imposed by government, are the major 
constraints on business in LDCs. The encouragement of entrepreneurial 
activity in these areas will therefore need more than tax incentives. In 
many areas of business activity, special tax incentives may be unnecessary: 
all that is required may be the elimination of other bottlenecks to private 
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sector activity imposed by government. Tax incentives could, however, serve 
a useful function in displaying the commitment of government to promoting 
and assisting selected areas of business activity. 
Low taxation or tax incentives are not in general an important reason 
for multinational firms investing in LDCs. Nor do high taxes seem to bother 
them very much, particularly as they appear to be able to earn high profits 
in less developed areas, and probably as taxes have to be-paid in their home 
countries on all income including income from LDCs. In these circumstances, 
special tax incentives may be ineffective in attracting MNC investment to 
LDCs, and could well prove to bean unnecessary sacrifice of revenue by LDC 
governments. 
In SL, there was a strong possibility that some of the negative perceptions 
regarding the tax system among business managers could be due to the lack of 
open dialogue between taxpayers and the authorities. Though personal channels 
of communication between some taxpayers and the authorities were found to be 
very effective in resolving problems for the persons concerned, this practice 
itself can contribute to negative perceptions regarding the tax system among 
other persons. 
Moving outside the issue of taxation, a government intent on encouraging 
business development must be cognizant of the goals and attitudes of 
businessmen and the entrepreneurial potential of the various groups comprising 
the country's business sector. In SL, owner-managers of business were seen 
to be capable of higher growth achievement than professional managers. Yet 
such entrepreneurs do not receive any open encouragement from the government: 
on the contrary, SL society and its leaders are openly hostile to individual 
entrepreneurs. Again business firms adopting profit or similar task-maximising 
objectives were seen to grow faster than firms setting themselves survivalist 
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goals of maintaining going concerns. The former type of firm was, however, 
in a minority in SL. In contrast, firms in the other two LDCs studied 
overwhelmingly chose task-maximising objectives and also achieved higher 
average growth levels. It is very likely that the low priority placed on 
task-maximising objectives relative to survival in SL is the result of the 
greater hostility of the environment in which SL businesses operate, in 
comparison with Malaysian and Philippine firms. These findings imply a need 
for the authorities in SL to encourage development-oriented maximising 
objectives among its business sector and to take a more supportive attitude 
to the sections of society displaying entrepreneurial skills. 
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Appendix 1.3 
Revenue of the Government of Sri Lanka 
Some Comparative Statistics 
Year 1968/69 1969/70 .... 1976 1977 
Ratio of Government Revenue to GNP 24.1 22.1 20.4 19.3 
Ratio of Taxation to Government Revenue 78.3 83.5 82.2 82.3 
Common-Size Statement of Tax Revenue 
Taxes on Production and Expenditure 
BTT 
Selective Sales Taxes 
Import Levies 
Export Levies 
FEECs 
Other 
Income Taxes 
Capital Taxes 
5.6 10.8 15.1 12.0 
14.1 11.7 19.4 25.5 
23.2 13.4 10.1 9.4 
15.1 14.3 8.9 11.3 
14.4 20.4 22.7 21.0 
8.7 8.5 2.8 2.5 
81.1 79.1 79.0 81.7 
17.5 19.5 19.8 17.0 
1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Notes: 
1. Compiled from Reportsof the Central Bank and the 
State Accounts of Sri Lanka. 
2. Differences in totals are due to rounding 
of figures. 
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Appendix 1.4 
Estimates of Number of Taxpayers 
(Per assessments made *- excluding additional assessments) 
Resident Non-Resident Resident People's+ Non-Resident 
Year Individuals Individuals Companies Companies Companies 
1957/58 50,281 1,753 1,040 542 
1964/65 88,730 2,137 378 271 
1965/66 84,625 1,614 994 506 
1966/67 86,574 1,994 767 372 
1967/68 119,120 2,140 900 372 
1968/69 94,139 2,036 998 315 
1969/70 134,588** 1,821** 787 216 
1970/71 160,799** 2,424** 1,023** 267** 
1971/72 93,274 1,625 1,792** 360** 
1972/73 47,310*** 942 877 185 
1973/74 30,002 683 620 80 
1974/75 34,289 935 883 110 
1975/76 37,175 1,142 921 40 
1976/77 23,803 819 775 5 95 
1977/78 29,521 995 688 2 69 
1977/78 as 
percentage 
of 1957/58.58.7 56.8 66.3 12.7 
Notes: 
1. Source : Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue 
of Sri Lanka. 
2. * Variations in number of tax payers recorded from year 
to year are due to ad ministrative delays in the issue 
of asse ssments. 
3. ** "These were years of exceptional activity when the 
backlog of assessments due were cleared, prior to 
the introduction of the self-assessment scheme" - 
per Assessor, Statistical Division, 
Department of Inland Revenue, at-personal interview. 
4. *** The reduction in the number of taxpayers from 1971/72 
to 1972/73 is partly due to the requirement that individual 
taxpayers making PAYE payments and earning less than 
Rs 12,000 p. a. need not submit assessments. 
5. + Peoples' companies are resident public Limited companies 
with broad-based ownership; a new category of taxpayer 
created in 1975. 
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Index of Income Assessed (excludinq additional assessments 
Resident Non-Resident Resident Non-Resident Year Individuals Individuals Companies Companies 
Rupees '000 
1957/58 604,894 23,556 156,285 153,044 
Index 
1957/58 100 100 100 100 
1964/65 152.8 91.0 53.3 0.60 
1965/66 152.0 79.2 175.9 0.97 
1966/67 155.3 88.7 141.3 0.67 
1967/68 213.9 100.7 127.7 0.51 
1968/69 174.5 86.8 194.5 0.60 
1969/70 242.5** 85.3** 249.2 0.48 
1970/71 320.7** 113.4** 268.2** 0.75** 
1971/72 231.7 101.7 358.7** 0.75** 
1972/73 140.2 91.8 132.2 0.44 
1973/74 88.2 35.7 198.0 0.27 
1974/75 109.2 53.6 198.8 0.35 
1975/76 127.1 68.2 234.0 0.33 
1976/77 98.4 52.4 196.0 0.30 
1977/78 135.2 86.4 220.5 0.19 
Notes: 
1. Source: Annual Reports of the Comissioner of Inland Revenue; SL. 
2. ** as for Appendix 1.4. 
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Date 
30.9.58. 
30.9.65 
30.9.66 
30.9.67 
30.9.68 
30.9.69 
30.9.70 
30.9.71 
30.9.72 
31.12.73 
31.12.74 
31.12.75 
31.12.76 
Rs ('000) 
Income Tax in Arrear 
Appendix 1.6 
Payable Held-over pending 
settlement of appeals 
61,505 53,980 
119,323 45,024 
135,834 69,218 
185,516 91,784 
261,773 105,833 
264,009 143,873 
298,800 173,028 
392,154 198,949 
NA NA 
436,674 186,793 
476,419 158,453 
432,612 139,391 
405,093 114,927 
Arrears as percentage of taxes collected in the preceding year 
Date Payable Held-over Total 
30.9.65 40.4 15.2 55.6 
31.12.76 43.3 12.3 55.6 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue; SL. 
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Appeals against Income Tax Assessments 
Appendix 1.7 
Year. Lodged 
Outstanding at 
the end of the year 
1957/58 6,865 14,022 
1964/65 8.805 11,114 
1965/66 8,584 15,402 
1966/67 14,171 23,838 
1967/68 19,239 24,060 
1968/69 17,831 37,891 
1969/70 21,491 45,632 
1970/71 20,215 53,694 
1971/72 25,381 57,080 
1973 25,831 38,988 
1974 10,887 29,981 
1975 10,285 23,233 
1976 9,312 18,547 
1977 7,669 12,918 
Number of appeals lodged as a percentage of estimated number 
of persons in four main classes (Appendix 1.4) of taxpayer. 
1964/65 9.6% 
1976 30.0% k 
Source: Annual Report of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue; SL. 
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Appendix 1.8 
A. Amnesties Granted 
Particulars Year Number of declarants 
Amount Declared 
s 
* Income Tax Amnesty 1964 72 20,342 
Income Tax Amnesty 1965 596 138,210 
* Foreign Exchange/Income 
Tax Amnesty 1970 43 6,181 
Gems/Foreign Exchange/ 
Tax Amnesty 1973 NA NA 
* Income Tax Amnesty for 
Cash Holdings 1978 NA 30,000 approx. 
Demonetisation 1970 NA 21,362 
B. Sources of Tax-Evaded Income declared in the 1965 Amnesty 
Rs'000 
Textiles 42,091 
Hardware 17,550 
Gems and jewellery 10,949 
Motor spares 8,259 
Illegal trade 7,903 
Foodstuffs 7,134 
Manufacture 6,812 
Rent and Interest 6,488 
Paper and books 5,242 
Agriculture 1,794 
Export 1,758 
Professions 1,523 
Mixed and other sources 20,707 
T '10 
C. Disposal of tax-evaded income as declared in the 1965 Amnesty 
Rs'000 
Holdings of, Cash 66,108 
Stocks 40,045 
Debts 11,754 
Articles of value 6,580 
Personal expenses 10,723 
Other 3,000 
138,210 
Source: * Deputy Commissioner of Investigations, Inland Revenue 
at personal interview: 
Others: Annual Reports of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue. 
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Appendix 2 
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK 
SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND BUSINESS STUDIES 
Questionnaire to Business Firms in Developing Countries - Sri Lanka 
The confidentiality of your answers to this questionnaire will be respected. No one outside the research team at the 
University of Warwick, School of Industrial and Business Studies will see the completed questionnaire. If however, 
you do not wish to divulge the name of your firm, you may prefer to leave question I unanswered. 
Most questions can be answered with a tick (V) in the appropriate box. If you with to make any additional comments, 
please use the space below each question or that at the end of the questionnaire. If you have any queries on the 
administration of the survey in Sri Lanka, Mr. Chandra Jayaratne, (Telephone: Colombo 35594), will be able to 
help you. 
We should be most grateful if you would please return the completed questionnaire as soon as possible. We enclose 
a stamped addressed envelope. 
Thank you very much for helping us in our research project. 
1. Name of Firm ............................................................................................................................................ (if your firm is one of a group of companies, please answer on the basis of the group, if you think this is 
more sensible) 
2. Nature of Business ..................................... 
3. Commencement of Business Over 30 
years ago 
Between 10 & 
30 years ago 
Between 5& 
10 years a So 
Less than 5 
years a 
4. Form of Organisation 
a. Public limited liability company 
b. Private limited liability company 
c. Individual Proprietorship 
11 d. Partnership 
e. Other (specify) .................. 
S. Is the chief executive of your firm, either 
a. the proprietor, a partner, the major shareholder or a member of family of one of these 
or 
b. any other person 
6. Number of full-time employees Less than 25 26 - 100 101 -500 More than 500 (Part-time employees to count 
one-half full-time) 
7. Capital Employed Under Ra. 100,001 " Ra. 500,001 " Over 
(value of total assets) Its. 100,000 500,000 2,500,000 Its. 2,500,000 
8. It is usual for business firms to have one or more objectives, even if these are not formally set out. The 
following are some of the more common objectives of business enterprises. What do you consider are the 
main objectives (up to three) of your organisation? 
a. Maximising profits 
b. Maximising owners' wealth 
c. Maximising market share 
d. Maximising value added 
C. Maximising employee welfare 
f. Maintaining a going concern 
B. Other (specify) ................... 
h ........................ ................ 
. ............................................ 
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9. 
10. 
If from the list in question 8, you had to pick the most important objective, which would you choose? 
cde 
IIII 
tj 
Would it be correct to say that taxation is or has been a problem area making it difficult for your firm 
to achieve its objectives Yes [J NoE] 
11. If you answere Yes to question 10, would you say that taxation is a 
Major problem area Fairly important problem area Minor problem area 
12. Here are some other problem areas which often make it difficult for business managers to meet their 
objectives. Please tick those which you think cause you significant difficulty. 
a. Import controls e. Market limitations 
b. Price control regulations f. Shortage of Penance 
c. Shortage of technical or g. Others (specify) ............. 
professional skills ....................................... 
d. Labour relations In ....................................... 
13. If you answered Yes to question 10, where do taxation problems stand in relation to those listed under 
question 12? 
Compared with 
a. Import controls 
b. Price Control regulations 
c. Shortage of technical and professional skills 
d. Labour relations 
e. Market limitations 
f. Shortage of finance 
Others (if specified under question 12) 
g .......................................................... 
h .......................................................... 
a 
Less Important Equally Important More Important 
Problem Problem Problem 
14. Growth of business can be measured in terms of assets, employment, sales etc. Using whatever measure is 
convenient to you, would you say that your firm has grown in the past five years, by 
More than 100% 50 . 100% 10 - 50% Under 10% Not at all 
15. If your firm has not grown very much in the st five years, was taxation an important discouraging 
factor Yes 
ff 
No Q 
16. If the firm has grown in the past five years, Expansion of Diversification into 
has this been by old activities new, area 
17. If you have grown by diversification, .. 
a. Into what areas of activity have you diversified? ....................................................................................... 
b. Was taxation an important consideration in your decision Yes For some No to diversify into these activities? Activities 
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18. If you have grown by expansion, were you influenced 
by taxation considerations Yes 
F 
No 
19. If you answered Yes to question 18, was this because, at the time of the expansion, 
a. Tax conditions in your area of business continued to be good 
b. Tax conditions in your area of business took a turn for the better 
c. Tax conditions in other possible areas became much worse 
20. The following are some incentives offered by the Government for the promotion of private enterprise. 
Please tick those that you think have made a significant contribution to the growth of firms in your area 
of business 
a. Tax holidays 
b. Lump sum depreciation and other accelerated depreciation allowances 
c. Development Rebate on fixed assets 
d. Other investments reliefs 
C. Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificates on exports 
f. Convertible Rupees on exports 
g. Cash subsidies 
h. Guaranteed prices and State marketing services 
I. Other (specify) .................................................................................... 
j ............................................................................................................... 
21. Which One or Two of these would you say have been the most useful for firms in your area of business? 
abcdefghij4 
22. Sources of finance other than owners' capital are used to different extents in different firms. (Owners' 
capital for the purpose of this question is defined to include all reserves and retained profits). In your 
- firm's capital structure, is the contribution of other sources of finance 
a. Greater than owners' capital 
b. About the same as owners' capital 
c. Somewhat less than owners' capital 
d. Much less than owners' capital 
e. Negligible or nil 
23. Has taxation been a consideration in your general borrowing policy decisions Yes 
O 
No 
24. The following are some factors which may be relevant in deciding whether to borrow or to use owners' finance. Would you say that any of these apply to your fm n? __ 
a. It is quicker to borrow than obtain owners' capital 
b. Internally generated funds are usually adequate for 
the firm's needs 
c. It is policy to borrow as little as possible 
d. Collateral requirements of lenders are a major problem 
e. Interest rates are unacceptably high 
f. Borrowing is preferred to fresh equity in order to 
maintain owners' control 
g. Others (specify) ............................................................ 
h ....................................................................................... 
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25. Is taxation of the firm or its owners a relevant consideration in your distribution of earnings to 
proprietors? Yes 
[J No 
26. If you answered Yes to question 25, is taxation a 
Very Important 
consideration 
Somewhat Important 
consideration 
Minor 
consideration 
27. Here are some other factors which some firms may consider important in making 'distribution' decisions. 
Would you say that these were relevant to your fun? 
Important Relevant but not Irrelevant 
a. Maintaining a steady level of distribution 
b. Maintaining the proportion of earnings distributed 
c. Availability of liquid funds 
d. Uncertainty of profit 
e: Income requirements of proprietors 
f. Re-investing as much of the profits as possible 
S. Other (specify) ................................................... 
h .............................................................. ........... 
i 
28. In your view, how does the tax burden at resent for firms in your area of business compare with 
a. Taxes 8.10 years ago 
b. Taxes 2.3 years ago 
c. Taxes expected 2-3 years from now 
Much 
higher 
Somewhat 
higher 
About 
the same 
A little 
lower 
Much 
lower 
29. Would you be willing, if necessary, to complete another uestionnaire or to grant us an interview? 
Yesr 
1 
No 
1] 
30. If you answered Yes to question 29, at what address may we write to you? 
................................................................................................................................................. 
I 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
- 361 - 
Appendix 3.1 
Main Activities of Respondent Firms 
Activity No. of firms 
Manufacturing (including engineering 34 
services) 
Tourism (and related) 5 
Agriculture 4 
Export merchanting 3 
Financial 2 
Trade (other than export) 2 
Mixed activities 18* 
Miscellaneous 3 
Not stated 3 
74 
* Includes 13 in manufacturing, 13 in trade, 10 in export merchanting 
and 4 in tourism. 
Appendix 3.2 
Classification of Responses by Age of Firm 
Business Commenced No. of firms 
Over 30 years ago 32 
Between 10 and 30 years ago 23 
Between 5 and 10 years ago 14 
Less than 5 years ago 4 
Not stated 1 74 
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Appendix 3.3 
Form of Organisation 
No. of firms 
Public limited liability company 31 
Private limited liability company 35 
Individual proprietorship 1 
Partnership 4 
Mixed 3 
74 
Appendix 3.4 
Management 
The Chief executive is No. of firms 
The proprietor, a partner, 
the major shareholder or 
a member of family of one 
of these 52 
Any other person 22 
74 
Appendix 3.5 
Size Classification of Respondent Firms 
Total Assets No. of firms 
Less than Rs 100,000 4 
Rs 100,001 to Rs 500,000 10 
Rs 500,001 to Rs 2,500,000 22 
More than Rs 2,500,000 38 
74 
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Appendix 3.6 
Crosstabulation - Age v orig in of Firm 
Multinationals 
as Percentage Age Number of Multinationals Total in Group of Group 
More than 30 years 8 32 25 
10 - 30 1 23 4 
5- 10 1 14 7 
Less than 5 91 0 4 0 
Testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of multinational firms 
operating in SL amongst older (pre-independence) firms is not different 
to the proportion of multinational firms amongst newer (post-independence) 
firms; 
Contingency Table 
Type of firm 
Age 
More than 30 years 
Less than 30 years 
Multinationals 
8 
2 
10 
Others 
24 
39 
63 
Total 
32 
41 
73 
X2 = 6.16 with 1 degree of freedom (d. f. ) 
. '. The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.025 level of significance. 
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Appendix 3.7 
Crosstabulation - Age v Diversification 
%age in mixed 
Acme 
More than 30 years 
10 - 30 
5- 10 
Less than 5 years 
10 32 31 40 
5 23 22 23 
3 14 21 23 
0 4 0 0 
18 73 
Testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of mixed activity firms 
is independent of age for the two age groups - post and pre-independence 
firms: 
Activity 
Age 
More than 30 years 
Less than 30 years 
Mixed Activity Single Activity Total 
10 22 32 
8 33 41 
18 55 73 
X2 = 1.33 with 1 d. f. 
No. of firms in Total in %age in activities if 
Mixed Activities Group mixed known multi- 
activities nationals are 
excluded from 
age group 
The null hypothesis is rejected at 0.25 level of significance. 
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Appendix 3.8 
Crosstabulation - Organisational Objectives v Form of Organisation 
Organisation Public Private Individual 
Main Objective Ltd. Co. Ltd. Co. Proprietorship Parternship Mixed 
A Maximising Profits 9 13 0 0 2 
B Owner's Wealth 0 1 0 2 0 
C Market share 1 5 0 0 0 
D Value added 1 1 0 0 0 
E Growth 1 0 -0 0 0 
F Maintaining a going 
concern 18 9 1 1 1 
G Other 0 3 0 0 0 
Testing the null hypothesis that the choice of a task-related maximising 
objective as against a 'maintenance' objective is independent of form of 
organisation. 
Contingency Table 
Organisation 
Main Objective 
Maximisation of profit or 
similar task-related 
measure (A to E above) 
Maintaining a going concern (F) 
Public Ltd. Co. Private Ownership Total 
12 23 35 
18 11 29 
30 34 64 
X2 = 4.92 with 1 d. f. 
. '. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.05 level of significance. 
* One of the mixed ownership firms was privately owned while the other 
two were groups with both public and private ownership. 
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Appendix 3,9 
Crosstabulation - Most Important Objective v Type of Management 
Management 
Most Important Objective 
A. Maximising Profit 
B. Owners' Wealth 
C. Market share 
D. " Value added 
E. Growth 
F. Maintaining a going concern 
G. Other 
Owners 
No. of firms % 
21 40 
3 6 
6 11 
1 2 
0 0 
17 . 33 
4 8 
52 100 
Professional 
No. of firms % 
4 20 
0 0 
0 0 
1 5 
1 5 
13 65 
1 5 
20 100 
1. Testing the null hypothesis that among the firms who choose the two most 
popular objectives, the choice of objective is independent of type of 
management. 
Contingency Table 
Management Owner Professional Total 
Most Important objective 
Maximising Profit (A) 21 4 25 
Maintaining a going concern (F) 17 13 30 
38 17 55 
X2 = 4.77 with 1 M. 
. -. 
The null hypothesis rejected at a 0.05 level of significance. 
2. Testing the null hypothesis that the choice of profit maximisation or 
a task-related maximising objective similar to profit maximisation as 
against a maintenance' objective is independent of type of management. 
Continaencv Table 
Management Owner Professional Total 
Most Important Objective 
Task-related maximising objective 31 6 37 
(A +B+C+D+ E) 
Maintenance objective (F) 17 13 30 
48 19 67 
X2 = 6.00 with 1 d. f. 
. -. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.025 level of significance. 
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Appendix 3.10 
Crosstabulation - Objectives v Management v Form of Organisation 
Professionally 
Management and Organisation Owner Managed Managed 
Two most popular main objectives 
Private Public Private Public 
firms cos. firms cos. 
A. Maximising Profit 12 7 1 2 
B. Maintaining a going concern 6 8 3 10 
A-B 2.00 0.88 0.33 0.20 
1. Testing the null hypothesis that among owner-managed firms privately 
owned firms are just as likely as Public limited companies to pick 
either of the above objectives; 
Objective 
A. Maximising profit 
B. Maintaining a going concern 
Owner-Managed 
Private Firms 
12 
6 
18 
Owner-Managed 
Public Companies Total 
7 19 
8 14 
15 33 
X2 = 1.34 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.25 level of significance. 
2. The expected frequencies among professionally-managed firms are too 
small to give significant results on the X2 test. 
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Appendix 3.11 
Crosstabulation - Age v Type of Management 
Aqe 
Management Owner Professional 
Owner-managed firms 
as % of age group 
More than 30 years 16 16 50 
10 - 30 " 18 4 82 
5- 10 " 12 2 86 
Less than 5 years 4 0 100 
Testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of owner-managed firms to 
professionally managed firms is independent of age of firms; 
Contingency Table 
Management 
Aqe 
More than 30 years 
Less than 30 years 
Owner Professional Total 
16 16 32 
34 6 40 
50 22 72 
X2 = 10.3 with 1 d. f. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.005 level of significance. 
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Appendix 3.12 
Crosstabulation - Form of Organisation v Type of Management 
Management 
Organi sati on 
Public Limited Company 
Private Limited Company 
Individual proprietorship 
Partnership 
Mixed form 
Owner-managed firms 
Owner Professional as % of group 
16 16 50 
29 6 83 
1 0 100 
4 0 100 
2 1 67 
Testing the null hypothesis that the type of management is independent of 
the organisation of the firm for public or private ownership; 
Contingency Table 
Management 
Organisation 
Public Limited Company 
Private company, or 
proprietory ownership 
Owner Professional Total 
16 16 32 
34 6 40 
50 22 72 
X2 = 9.35 with 1 d. f. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.005 level of significance. 
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Appendix 3.13 
Crosstabulation - Environmental Constraints v Size of Firm 
Size (Capital 
Employed) 
Envi ronmental Factors 
Import controls 
Taxation 
Shortage of finance 
Price Control 
Market limitations 
Shortage of skills 
Labour relations 
1234 
Less than Rs 100,000 Rs 500,001 Over 
Rs 100,000 -500,000 -2,500,000 Rs 2,500,000 
08 15 34 
16 12 21 
34 12 16 
047 19 
135 11 
0536 
1255 
Number of firms in Size Class 4 10 22 38 
* Index of sensitivity, 1 1.5 3.2 2.7 2.9 
Ranking of Constraints 
Environmental Factors 
** 
Import controls 5 eq. 1 1 1 
Taxation 2 eq. 2 2 eq. 2 
Shortage of finance 1 4 eq. 2 eq. 4 
Price control 5 eq. 4 eq. 4 3 
Market limitations 2 eq. 6 5 eq. 5 
Shortage of skills 5 eq. 3 6 6 
Labour relations 2 eq. 7 5 eq. 7 
In 
total 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
*I_ Total of all constraints affecting firms in class Nu *er of firms in class 
** eq. = equal ranking. 
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Appendix 3.14 
Crosstabulation - Environmental constraints v Age of firm 
Age of firm 1 2 3 4 
less than 5-10 10-30 More than 
Environmental Factors 5 years years years 30 years 
Import controls 2 10 18 26 
Taxation 1 8 13 17 
Shortage of finance 3 7 9 15 
Price control 1 6 10 12 
Market limitations 0 4 7 9 
Shortage of skills 1 1 5 6 
Labour relations 1 2 4 6 
Number of firms in Age Class 4 14 22 32 
Index of sensitivity, I 2.3 2.7 3.0 2.8 
Ranking of Constraints 
Environmental Factors In Total 
Import controls 2 1 1 1 1 
Taxation 3 eq. 2 2 2 2 
Shortage of finance 1 3 4 3 3 
Price control 3 eq. 4 3 4 4 
Market limitations 7 5 5 5 5 
Shortage of skills 3 eq. 7 6 6 eq. 6 
Labour relations 3 eq. 6 7 6 eq. 7 
*I, as for appendix 3.13 
- 372 - 
Appendix 3.15 
Crosstabulation - Environmental Constraints v Type of Management 
Type of Management - Owner Professional 
Environmental Factors 
Import controls 39 18 
Taxation 30 10 
Shortage of finance 29 6 
Price control 19 11 
Market limitations 12 8 
Shortage of skills 10 4 
Labour relations 9 4 
Number of firms in Management Class 52 22 
* Index of Sensitivity, 1 2.8 2.8 
Ranking of Constraints 
Environmental Factors In Total 
Import controls 1 1 1 
Taxation 2 3 2 
Shortage of finance 3 5 3 
Price control 4 2 4 
Market limitations 5 4 5 
Shortage of skills 6 6 eq. 6 
Labour relations 7 6 eq. 7 
Testing the null hypothesis that shortages of finance affect owner managed 
firms and professionally managed firms similarly: 
Contingency Table 
Finance as a problem 
Management Yes No Total 
Owner 29 23 52 
Professional 6 16 22 
35 39 74 
X2 = 5.04 with 1 d. f. 
.. The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.025 level of significance. 
Other differences between management types are not significant on the X2 test. 
* I, as for Appendix 3.13. 
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Appendix 3.16 
Crosstabulation - Environmental Constraints v Two most important objectives 
Objective - Maximising Profits Maintaining a Going Concern 
Environmental Factors 
Import controls 17 23 
Taxation 17 15 
Shortage of finance 15 14 
Price control 12 13 
Market limitations 98 
Shortage of skills 37 
Labour relations 65 
Number of firms in 'Objective' Class 25 30 
* Index of Sensitivity, I 3.2 2.8 
Ranking of Constraints In 
Environmental Factors Total 
Import controls 1 eq. 1 1 
Taxation 1 eq. 2 2 
Shortage of finance 3 3 3 
Price control 4 4 4 
Market limitations 5 5 5 
Shortage of skills 7 6 6 
Labour relations 6 7 7 
Testing the null hypothesis that the firm's choice of objective does not affect 
its sensitivity to taxation: 
Contingency Table 
Objective Profit Maximisation Going-concern maintenance Total 
Tax as a problem 
Yes 17 15 32 
No 8 15 23 
25 30 55 
Z X=1.82 with 1 d. f. 
... 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.25 level of significance. 
*I as for Appendix 3.13. 
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Appendix 3.17 
Crosstabulation - Management v Objectives v Perceptions of Taxation 
A. Among Owner Managers 
Taxation as a Problem 
Objective 
Profit Maximisation 
'Going-concern' maintenance 
Yes No Total 
15 6 21 
7 10 17 
22 16 38 
Testing the null hypothesis that among owner-managers, perceptions regardin. g 
the constraining effects of taxation are not influenced by choice of organ- 
isation objective; 
On the above contingency table, 
X2 = 3.53 with 1 d. f. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.1 level of significance. 
B. Among Professional Managers 
Taxation as a Problem 
Objective 
Profit Maximisation 
'Going-concern' maintenance 
Yes No Total 
2 2 4 
8 5 13 
10 7 17 
The expected cell frequencies here are too small to permit meaningful 
results on the X2 test: but observation of the above table shows no 
apparent difference between the two groups. 
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Appendix 3.18 
Crosstabulation - Perceptions of Incentives v Type of Management 
Most Useful Incentives Types of Management - Owner Professional 
Tax Incentives 
Tax holidays 15 7 
Lump-sum depreciation 31 8 
Development rebate 12 2 
Investment relief 20 
Exchange Incentives 
FEECs 64 
CRAs 76 
Cash Subsidies 40 
Guaranteed Prices & State Marketing 20 
Other 20 
Testing the null hypothesis that the appreciation of tax-incentives 
relative to exchange-incentives is unaffected by type of management: 
Contingency Table 
Management - Owner Professional Total 
Useful Incentives 
Tax-related 60 17 77 
Exchange-related 13 10 23 
73 27 100 
X2 = 4.12 with 1 d. f. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.05 level of significance. 
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Appendix 3.19 
Crosstabulation of Perceptions - Incentives v Taxation as a Constraint 
Taxation as a constraint - Yes No 
Most Useful Incentives 
Tax Incentives 
Tax holidays 12 10 
Lump-sum depreciation 26 13 
Development rebate 12 2 
Investment relief 11 
Exchange Incentives 
FEECs 37 
CRAs 58 
Cash Subsidies 22 
Guaranteed prices and State marketing 02 
Other 02 
Testing the null hypothesis that the appreciation of tax incentives 
relative to that of exchange-incentives. is independent of perceptions 
of tax constraints on business: 
Contingency Table 
Taxation as a Constraint 
Useful Incentives Yes No Total 
Tax-related 51 26 77 
Exchange-related 8 15 23 
59 41 100 
X2 = 7.29 with 1 d. f. 
. '. The null 
hypothesis is rejected at a 0.01 level of 'significance. 
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Appendix 3.20 
Crosstabulation - (a) Environmental Constraints v Growth 
(b) Incentives v Growth 
Growth 12345 
Nil Less than 10%- 50%- More than 
10% 50% 100% 100% 
(a) Environmental Constraints 
Import controls 9 6 22 11 9 
Taxation 5 7 12 10 6 
Shortage of finance 2 5 13 7 8 
Price control 4 5 13 3 5 
Market limitations 5 2 7 1 5 
Shortage of skills 3 6 4 2 3 
Labour relations 2 2 5 2 2 
Number of firms in 
Growth Class 11 8 28 13 14 
* Index of Sensitivity, 1 2.7 4.1 2.7 2.8 2.7 
(b) Incentives 
Tax holidays 5 
Lump-sum depreciation 8 
Development rebate 5 
Investment relief 1 
FEECs 4 
CRAs 5 
Cash subsidies 2 
Guaranteed prices 
and State marketing 0 
Other 0 
6 12 7 11 
8 23 11 13 
6 16 8 12 
5 4 4 5 
5 12 7 6 
6 15 8 7 
2 2 2 1 
2 3 0 0 
0 3 1 2 
** Index of Sensitivity, I' 2.7 5.0 3.1 3.7 4.1 
*I is as for Appendix 3.13 
** I, _ 
Total of all incentives listed by firms in class 
Number o firms in class 
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Appendix 3.21 
Crosstabulation - Growth v Management 
Management 
Growth 
A. N. L. 
B. Less than 10% 
C. 10-50% 
D. 50-100% 
E. More than 100% 
Owner Professional 
2 9 
6 2 
21 7 
10 3 
13 1 
22 
Regrouping growth levels as low (A + B), Medium (C) and high (D + E) and 
testing the null hypothesis that achievement of business growth is independ- 
ent of type of management: 
Contingency Table 
Management Owner Professional Total 
Growth 
Low 
Medium 
High 
8 11 19 
21 7 28 
23 4 27 
52 22 74 
X2 = 10.39 with 2 d. f. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.01 level of confidence 
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Appendix 3.22 
Index(') of Growth of firms with reference 
to type of management. 
Management Owner Professional 
Age 
Less than 5 years 4 N(2) 
5- 10 3.3 1 
10 - 30 3.7 1.7 
More than 30 years 3.1 2.5 
Notes 
5 
E (i X number of firms in ith Growth class) 
Cl] Index = 
i=1 
Total number of firms in 'Age/owner' c ass 
12] N= No firms in 'Age/owner' class 
[3] Growth class 5= Growth > 100% 
4= Growth of 50-100% ............ 
.... 
1= Nil growth. 
(See able 3F) 
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Appendix 3.23 
Crosstabulation - Objectives v Growth 
Growth -12345 
Nil Less than 10% 10%-50% 50%-100% More than 100% 
Most Important 
Objective 
A. Maximising profits 22957 
B. Owner's wealth 01200 
C. Market share 00204 
D. Value added 00110 
E. Growth 00010 
F. Maintaining a 
going concern 83 12 43 
G. Other 01110 
Testina the null hypothesis that firms with the main objective of profit 
maximisation or the maximisation of a similar task-related objective are 
no different in their growth achievement from firms with the main objective 
of maintaining aý going concern: 
Contingency Table 
Growth - [1+2] 3 [4+51 
Low Medium High Total 
Objective 
Profit (or similar) 
maximising 
[A+B+C+D+E] 5 14 18 37 
Maintaining a going 
concern CF] 11 12 7 30 
16 26 25 67 
-(2 = 6.61 with 2 d. f. 
. '. The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.1, level of significance. 
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Appendix 3.24 
Crosstabulation - Main Objective v Extreme growth classes v Management 
Growth - 
Management - 
Main Objective 
Maximising Profit 
(or similar) 
Maintaining a going 
concern 
Nil More than 100' 
Professional Owner Professional Owner 
2 
6 
0 
2 
0 
1 
11 
2 
Appendix 3.25 
Crosstabulation - Management v Growth (among firms who have found taxation 
to be a constraint on growth) 
Growth Nil Less than 10% 10-50% 50-100% More than 100% Total 
Management 
A. Owner 1563- 15 
B. Professional 2 0.1 0-3 
18 
A= B' =5 
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Appendix 4. 
A. Goals of Business Organisation - England 
(57) 
Goal 
Organizational efficiency 
High productivity 
Profit maximisation 
Employee Welfare 
Organizational growth 
Industrial leadership 
Organizational stability 
Social welfare 
B. Aims of Management - Dent 
(42) 
Aim 
To make money, profit or 
Percentage of managers who 
consider goals to be of 
high importance 
81 
80 
72 
65 
60 
58 
58 
41 
Percentage of managers 
listing aim 
As first aim In first three aims 
a living 36 52 
To provide a good product; 
public service 21 39 
To grow 12 17 
To operate or develop the 
organization 14 
To provide for the welfare 
of employees 5 39 
To meet or stay ahead of 
competitors 5 13 
To be efficient, economical 4 12 
To pay dividends to stockholders 1 9 
Miscellaneous 7 18 
100 
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Appendix 5. 
INVESTMENT INCENTIVES IN SL 
CAPITAL ALLOWANCES 
Two sorts of capital allowances were available in SL at the time of 
the survey, viz. Lump Sum Depreciation and Development Rebate. 
Lump Sum Depreciation 
Lump sum depreciation is a once-and-for-all lump sum allowance for 
depreciation granted in respect of depreciable assets in the year of 
acquisition of an asset. There were four rates of depreciation, as follows: 
Short-lived equipment 
Normal machinery 
Durable machinery 
Industrial buildings 
80% of cost 
66 2/3% of cost 
50% of cost 
33'1/3% of cost 
The Department of Inland Revenue have issued detailed lists of assets 
falling under each of the above asset categories. Any asset not so classified 
will be placed in the appropriate category at the discretion of the assessor 
(subject of course to the usual appeal procedures). If income in any year 
is inadequate to set off lump sum depreciation allowances due in that year, 
any allowances not set off can be carried forward to subsequent years 
together with a premium of 4% per annum. 
The rates of depreciation were changed in 1978 and the entire scheme is 
to be withdrawn in 1981. 
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Development Rebate 
Development rebate is an additional capital allowance granted on the 
acquisition of fixed assets. The rebate is granted as a deduction in 
arriving at assessable income. at the following rates: 
Acquisition of new plant and machinery and construction 
of industrial buildings by an agricultural undertaking 
or an approved project 40% 
For all other business, acquisition of plant and 
machinery at commencement and construction of 
industrial buildings at any time 20% 
This rebate was merged with the lump sum depreciation allowance. in 1978. 
TAX HOLIDAYS 
A variety of tax holidays for many different activities have been on 
offer during the study period. A brief account of these are given below: 
1. Manufacturing industry -A5 year tax holiday for firms commencing 
business between 1951 and 1972, subject to the fulfilment of 
several conditions regarding number of employees, source of 
capital etc. From 1969, this holiday was conditional upon prior 
approval of Ministry. 
2. Deep sea fishing and undertakings carried on in land leased from 
the government - Tax holiday as for manufacturing industry for 
firms commencing business before 1968. 
3. Operation or construction of tourist hotels -A complete tax holiday 
for 5 years and a partial (50%) tax holiday for 15 years subject 
to ministerial approval. 
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4. Export of non-traditional products - 
a) An 8 year holiday for approved exporters if business is 
carried on by a limited liability company incorporated 
after April 1972. 
b) A5 year holiday on increased earnings of an approved export 
undertaking which increases its export of non-traditional 
products after April 1972. 
5. Gem trade - Profits on export of gems and on sale of gems to the State 
Gem Corporation are exempt from April 1972. 
6. Housing developers - Exemption of profits on construction of small 
houses from 1973. 
Note: Dividends declared by tax holiday companies were exempt from income 
tax in full upto 1974. After that date, exemption was subject to a 
ceiling on distribution. 
INVESTMENT RELIEF 
Investment relief was a deduction from assessable income available to 
persons (companies and individuals) making investments in 'approved under- 
takings'. The deduction was of the entire value of the investment or a 
proportion specified in the Law. This relief was available between 1967 
and 1973. 
CONVERTIBLE RUPEE ACCOUNTS (CRAs) 
Under the CRA scheme introduced in 1972, a percentage of foreign 
exchange earnings on export of non-traditional or minor export products and 
some services were permitted to be credited to a convertible rupee account. 
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A number of changes were made to the scheme from time to time - both in 
regard to the percentage of earnings to be credited to the accounts (varying 
between 2% and 25% of net f. o. b. earnings depending on the source of income) 
and in respect of the types of earnings entitled to CRA credit. In general, 
exporters with CRA credit could utilize such funds for foreign travel, and in 
paying for imports and overseas expenses of a non-capital nature, without 
being limited by the usual exchange and import controls. 
FOREIGN EXCHANGE ENTITLEMENT CERTIFICATES (FEECs) 
The FEEC scheme is the commonly used name of a dual exchange rate 
system in operation in SL from 1968. Under this scheme all earnings of 
foreign exchange from the export of goods and services other than the three 
major agricultural exports (viz. tea, rubber and coconut) were entitled to 
a premium on the official rate of exchange. Most imports into the country 
also came under the purview of this scheme and importers were likewise 
charged a premium on the official rate of exchange for foreign currency 
released to pay for such imports. This scheme underwent many changes 
during its life-time: the premium originally intended to be fixed by the 
interplay of market forces was within a few months of the introduction of 
the scheme converted to a fixed rate of 44%. At the time of the survey, 
the premium stood at 65%. Also from time to time, there were changes made 
to the types of transactions covered by the scheme. 
CASH SUBSIDIES 
Cash subsidies offered have been mainly to agricultural activities. 
The most important subsidies to the private sector have been given for 
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(a) replanting tea and rubber lands and (b) for the pur ase of 
fertilizer for rice growing. 
GUARANTEED PRICE SCHEMES AND STATE MARKETING SERVICES 
The most important scheme of Guaranteed prices/State marketing services 
has been operated in respect of rice-growing. As a service to peasant 
farmers and as an incentive for increased production of rice, the scheme 
offered local farmers prices well above that of imported rice. 
Marketing assistance schemes have also been operated for other 
agricultu products (by the Marketing Board), for manufacturing industry 
(by the State Trading Corporation) and for dairy products (by the Milk Board). 
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Appendix 6 
Investment Incentives favouring Limited Liability Companies 
Section of 
the Inland 
Revenue Act 
No. 4 of 1963 Provision 
1.7A - Provides for exemption of certain export 
profits of Limited liability companies 
after April 1,1972. 
2.16C - Provides for allowances in respect of approved 
investments made prior to April 1973, to be 
deducted from the assessable income of 
individuals. An undertaking will be approved 
under this section only if it is a limited 
liability company. 
3.16CC - Allows investment relief on approved investments 
after April 1,1973. The allowance is to any 
person (ie., a company or individual); but 
the investment must be made in a limited 
liability company. 
4.68A - Investment relief is allowed under this section 
only to limited liability companies and "bodies 
of persons". However parallel relief is 
available to individuals under section 69 of 
the Act. 
5.73A - 15 years partial tax holiday for tourism is 
available only to limited liability companies. 
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Taxation in Investment Appraisal 
Appendix 7 
This appendix will examine the treatment of taxation in the investment 
appraisal techniques commonly used by SL business firms. 
Accounting Return on Capital Employed (RCE) was the technique most 
commonly used by SL business firms surveyed. Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) 
techniques - net present value (NPV) or internal rate of return (IRR) - were 
used by a significant proportion of interviewees. The payback technique 
which was also in use, essentially as a subsidiary method, alongside RCE or 
DCF appraisal will not be discussed here. 
RCE, whether used as a decision rule in investment appraisal or as an 
ex-post performance measure, can be defined in a number of different ways, 
as more than one meaning can be attached to both the numerator and the 
denominator of this ratio, 
(41, p. 418) Investment returns reported on RCE 
would, therefore, be a function of the definition of RCE used, even if the 
issue of taxation is excluded. 
Several SL firms taking part in the survey provided brief descriptions 
of their investment appraisal techniques. As far as can be ascertained from 
such descriptions, the definition of RCE used by these firms is 'the ratio 
of the return of a typical year to the initial capital investment'. 
R 
ie. RCE _ .... (Def. A) 1 
where Rt = net profit for the typical year 
CEl = Initial capital employed. 
The example below compares the results on the above definition with 
another possible interpretation of RCE, viz. 
1nR RCE =nR. E (M) ,.. (Def. B) 
=1 j 
where R= net profit for the jth year 
CE = capital employed at the beginning of the jth year, and 
n= nrn. ject life in years. 
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Example 1. 
Assume a capital investment in a depreciable asset. If the investment 
produces equal annual profits after straight-line depreciation and if tax- 
effects are ignored, RCE will be as follows: 
Project life RCE on 
years Def. A. Def. B. 
2 10 15 
6 10 24.5 
8 10 28.6 
11 10 30.2 
25 10 38.2 
It is clear from the above example that the two definitions give 
different values of RCE and that the difference between results of the two 
methods is a function of project life. The disparity in ratios between 
different definitions of RCE is not merely a function of project life: 
patterns of profit flows and accounting conventions such as depreciation 
technique can also influence the ratios in different ways. 
The deficiencies of RCE as an investment appraisal tool stemming from 
(a) problems of definition, (b) vagaries of accruals accounting valuation 
to which it is subject and (c) its inability to take into account the time- 
value of money are well documented. 
(193, p. 48) Subject to these shortcomings, 
RCE can be calculated on post-tax figures of return, with no additional 
problems of taxation was levied as a percentage of book profits. However, 
under a tax regime incorporating accelerated depreciation allowances and 
tax holidays, there is no satisfying way in which taxation can be built into 
calculations of RCE, particularly on definition A referred to above. The 
interviewees attempted to get round this problem by accounting for tax as if 
it was a straight percentage levy on book profits and quite separately con- 
sidering the cash flow benefits of accelerated capital allowances. 
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The discounted cash flow methods of investment evaluation overcome 
some of the disadvantages of RCE in being uninfluenced by accounting 
conventions and in their ability to take into account the time-value of 
money, though many controversial issues relating to matching of DCF 
evaluations with objectives of the organisation and appropriate discount 
rates are without agreement among academic writers. 
(190, Ch. 5-8) Subject to 
these limitations, however, NPV and IRR - the two main DCF techniques - give 
the same accept/reject decision on the evaluation of a single project. But 
because of the differences in the substitution rate (or, as some authors 
call it, the reinvestment assumption) implicit in the two methods, they can 
produce different rankings when a choice has to be made between two or 
more projects; though incremental analysis can be carried out on IRR to 
produce the same ranking as on NPV. Both DCF techniques are equally capable 
of taking into account tax cash flows and of making due allowances for time 
lags expected in the payment of taxes. 
The major computational problems related to taxation arise out of the 
interdependencies between the project being evaluated and other existing 
and future activities of the taxpaying organisation. Often, with large 
accelerated capital allowances falling due at the inception of a project, 
the profits generated by the project may not be adequate to absorb all 
available allowances as soon as the entitlement arises. In such circumstances, 
if the tax-payer has other taxable profits against which capital allowances 
of the new project can be absorbed, the earlier receipt of allowances (in 
terms of tax payments delayed) can increase their present value. The follow- 
ing example (example 2) illustrates the effect of variation in timing of 
lump-sum depreciation allowances on the DCF internal rate of return. 
Example 2. 
Assume an investment of Rs. 27,000 in a depreciable asset producing 
annual operating cash flows of Rs. 10,000 for six years. If the asset has 
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no salvage value at the end of its effective life and if income tax is 
chargeable at 50% on operating profits with a one-year time lag, and if 
lump-sum depreciation (LSD) of 80% is available on the asset, the following 
results are calculated: 
IRR 
(a) If LSD can be claimed 
immediately against other profits 23% 
(b) If LSD is claimed against profit 
from the project 19% 
(c) If LSD is claimed against profits 
from the project, and development 
rebate is also available at 20% 21% 
It can be seen that the ability to claim LSD on existing taxable 
profits makes a difference of 4% ((a)-(b)) to the IRR of the above investment. 
This means that an existing company already in a profit-making position would 
stand to gain more from lump-sum depreciation allowances than a new company 
commencing business with the investment or an existing loss-making company. 
This advantage to an existing firm vis-a-vis a new firm, is countered to a 
certain extent by the availability of development rebate which at commencement 
of business is allowed (at 20% or 40%) on all investment in depreciable fixed 
assets. It will be observed from (c) above, that the difference in IRR on 
the project between a new and an old company is only 2% ((a)-(c)) where 
development rebate is available at 20%. Nevertheless, the fact that project 
IRR is influenced by the current tax status of the firm remains unaltered. 
A tax system that allows 100% initial capital allowances on an invest- 
ment will leave the IRR of the investment unchanged from a pre-tax position 
58) 
and is therefore said to be neutral in respect of the investment decision. 
Lump-sum depreciation allowances in SL are made at different rates - varying 
from 50-80% for Plant and Machinery and at 3a i% on buildings. The under- 
lying rationale for these rates of LSD is a desire to attain equality between 
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assets of different lives. The rates are designed to give depreication 
of 100% of asset cost if LSD is compounded at a 4% rate of interest up to 
the end of the asset's useful life. It must also be noted that depreciation 
schedules are not very detailed and much approximation is accepted. For 
instance, plant and machinery are divided into three categories of asset 
life - viz. lives of 6,11 and 18 years, and every item of plant and 
machinery should be allotted to one of these three categories. The 
department of inland revenue has issued lists of assets that fall into the 
different classes but any asset not included in the lists will be allocated 
to a class at the discretion of the assessor. 
The attainment of end-of-life equality of depreciation allowances has 
the consequence that the tax system is slightly biased in favour of short- 
lived assets as seen in the following example. 
Example 3. 
Assume an investment in a depreciable asset producing equal annual 
operating cash flows. If LSD can be calimed immediately (against existing 
profits), if the asset has no residual value at the end of its life, and if 
taxation is levied at 50% payable one year in arrear, the following results 
are calculated: 
If pre-tax IRR 
Post tax IRR, 
_AB T9°ö 15% 
(a) for an asset of 6 year life = 23% 
(b) for an asset of 11 year life = 22% 
(c) for an asset of 18 year life = 21% 
9.5% 
9.3% 
8.8% 
At all realistic rates of discount there will be a small bias in 
favour of short-lived assets if investment decisions are made on the basis 
of DCF evaluations. 
Another investment incentive used widely in SL, the tax holiday (mostly 
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short-lived projects as illustrated below. 
Example 4. 
Assume an investment with a pre-tax IRR of 29% and equal annual 
operating cash-flows. If taxation is levied at 50% payable one year in 
arrear and a5 year tax holiday is available, IRR of the project will be 
as follows: 
Project Life IRR 
frs Pre-tax Post-tax 
00 
6 29 28 
11 29 25 
18 29 25 
Finally, taxation with 100% initial capital allowances was said above 
to be neutral in that it would leave the IRR of investment unaffected. LSD 
in SL falls short of a 100% allowance and hence, IRR is reduced by taxation. 
However, the extent to which IRR is affected by taxation is much less for 
depreciable assets than for investments in working-capital or other non- 
depreciable assets. The relative positions are reversed: if the evaluation 
is carried out on RCE, as seen in the following illustration. 
Example 5. 
Assume an investment producing equal annual operating cash flows and a 
DCF return of 29%. If taxation is charged at 50% payable one year in arrear, 
the following results are calculated: 
Project Life Type of asset 
Yrs 
6 
11 
18 
Any length 
Plant and Machinery 
to 
Working Capital 
Rate of RCE on IRR with 
LSD initial capital LSD received 
% employed immediately 
80 10.2 23 
66? 10.9 22 
503 11.9 21 
None 14.5 17 
* with straight line depreciation 
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The above figures lead to the conclusion that 
(a) RCE shows lower post-tax returns than DCF on all types 
of and lives of investment, 
(b) whereas IRR on plant and machinery decreases with increasing 
asset life, the reverse is true of RCE. The differences 
between RCE for the range of asset lives considered are however 
not large. 
(c) IRR evaluation will show lower post-tax returns on a working- 
capital investment (where the initial investment is held as 
circulating capital for the duration of the project and recouped 
in full at the end of its life) as against investment in plant 
and machinery whereas opposite is true of RCE. 
It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that users of DCF evaluation 
methods will tend to favour investment in fixed assets relative to users of 
RCE. As diversifying investment is more likely to involve greater proportion 
of capital assets relative to working capital than expansionary investment 
(which might well be intended to increase utilisation of existing capacity), 
it is possible that the users of DCF evaluation techniques will tend to 
invest more in diversifying investment than users of RCE. This was indeed 
found to be true of the SL firms interviewed. 
In summary, then, 
(a) the treatment of taxation differs as between various methods of 
investment appraisal with the possible consequence of divergent 
project rankings, 
(b) tax related project interdependencies have the consequence that an 
investment proposal cannot be evaluated in isolation: the investor's 
tax status on other activities can make a significant difference 
to the returns on an investment, 
and (c) the main investment incentives offered in SL in the past two decades 
introduce an element of discrimination as between investments of 
difference lives. 
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Appendix 8.1 
Crosstabulation - Technique of Investment Appraisal v Growth 
Growth Class 12345 
less More 
than than Growth 
Nil 10% 10%-50% 50%-100% 100% Index (GI) 
Technique of 
Investment Appraisal 
RCE 1 1 42 3.9 
RCE + Payback 32 2 13 2.9 
DCF methods 4 1 3.2 
DCF + Payback 1 3.0 
Payback 1 3.0 
All three 1 3.0 
None 2 1 3.3 
5 
(i X Number of firms in ith growth class using jth technique) 
GI. = 
i=l 
Total number of firms using technique. 
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Appendix 8.2 
Crosstabulation - Technique of investment Appraisal v Growth Strategy 
Growth Not 
Strategy Expansion Diversification Both Neither known 
Technique of 
Investment Appraisal 
RCE 5 1 2 
RCE + Payback 4 1 2 
DCF 1 1 3 
DCF + Payback 1 
Payback 1 
All three 1 
None 1 1 1 
31 
Regrouping firms which use RCE or DCF (with or without Payback criteria) and 
(i) Testing the null hypothesis that the undertaking of diversifying 
investment is independent of whether RCE or DCF is used as the 
appraisal technique: 
Contingency Table 
Undertaking of Diversifying Investment 
Technique of 
Appraisal Yes No Total 
RCE 69 15 
DCF 516 
11 10 21 
2=3.23 
with 1 d. f. 
. '. the null 
hypothesis is rejected at a 0.1 level of significance. 
(ii) A similar test carried out for expansionary investment showed no 
significant difference between users of RCE and users of DCF. 
Crosstabulation - Factors 
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relevant in 
- 
Borrowing Polic y Decisions 
Appendix 8.3 
v Level of Gearing 
Level of Gearing 1 2 3 4 5 
Much less Somewhat About the Greater 
than less than same as than 
Negligible owner's owner's owner's owner's 
Factors Relevant or nil capital capital capital capital 
in Borrowing Policy . 
A. Quicker to borrow than 
to obtain equity 3 3 3 12 14 
B. Need to maintain 
owner's control 3 9 4 8 16 
C. Taxation 1 4 2 3 6 
Number of firms in 
Gearing class 10 18 8 13 21 
Regrouping the gearing classes as high geared (Classes 4 and 5 above) and 
low geared (Classes 1,2 and 3 above), and testing the following null 
hypotheses: 
(A) that the level of gearing is unaffected by the relevance in borrowing 
policy of ease of access to debt relative to equity: 
Contingency Table 
Easy Access to debt Gearing Low High Total 
Relevant 
Yes 9 26 35 
No 27 8 35 
36 34 70 
X2 = 18.53 with 1 d. f. 
. '. The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.005 level of 
significance. 
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Appendix 8.3 cont'd. 
(B) that the level of gearing is unaffected by the relevance of owners' 
control requirements in borrowing policy decisions: 
Contingency Table 
Owners' Control 
requirements 
Hearin - Low High Total 
relevant 
Yes 16 24 40 
No 20 10 30 
36 34 70 
X2 = 4.88 with 1 M. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.05 level 
of significance. 
(C) that the level of gearing is unaffected by the relevance of tax considerations 
in borrowing policy decisions: 
Contingency Table 
Tax considerations Gearing - Low High Total 
relevant 
Yes 7 9 16 
No 29 25 54 
36 34 70 
X2 . 0.49 with 1 M. 
, ", 
The null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a 0.25 
level of significance. 
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Appendix 8.4 
Crosstabulation - Factors Relevant in Distribution v Form of Organisation 
Organisation Public limited Private limited 
liability company liability company 
Factors relevant 
Taxation 18 20 
Availability of liquid funds 25 25 
Maintenance of a steady dividend 24 17 
Income requirements of proprietors 9 13 
Number of firms in Organisation class 31 35 
Testing the null hypothesis that the maintenance of a steady stream 
of dividends is equally important to public companies and private 
companies: 
X2 = 5.81 with 1 d. f. 
. '. the null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.025 level of significance. 
The differences in relevance of other factors are not significant on the 
X2 test. 
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Appendix 8.5 
Crosstabulation - Factors Relevant in Distribution Decisions v Management 
Management - Owner Professional 
Factors relevant 
Taxation 32 12 
Availability of liquid funds 38 17 
Maintenance of a steady dividend 26 19 
Income requirements of proprietors 22 3 
Number of firms in Management class 52 22 
A. Testing the null hypothesis that the maintenance of a steady stream of 
dividends is equally important to owner-managed firms and professionally 
managed firms; 
X2 = 8.58 with 1 d. f. 
the null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.005 level of significance. 
B. Testing the null hypothesis that the income requirements of proprietors 
are equally important to both types of management in making distribution 
decisions; 
X2 = 5.68 with 1 d. f. 
. ", the null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.025 level of significance. 
The differences in relevance of other factors are not significant on 
the X2 test. 
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Appendix 8.6 
Crosstabulation - Perceptions of tax burden v Budgetary Practices 
Preparation of tax inclusive annual budgets 
Taxation as a constraint 
on achievement of objectives 
Yes 
No 
Yes No Total 
6 10 16 
12 2 14 
18 12 30 
Testing the null hypothesis that perceptions of taxation as a constraint 
are not related to whether or not tax inclusive annual budgets are prepared; 
X2 = 7.23 with 1 d. f. 
. '. the null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.01 
level of significance. 
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Appendix 8.7 
Crosstabulation - Perceptions of Tax Burden v Determination of Product Prices 
Determination of Product Prices 
Taxation as a constraint 
By Internal By External 
on achievement of objectives Costs + pricing Factorsx Total 
Yes 95 14 
No 437 
13 8 21 
Testing the null hypothesis that business perceptions of taxation as a constraint 
are unrelated to whether product prices are internally or externally determined; 
X2 = 0.10 with 1 d. f. 
.. the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a 0.25 level 
of significance. 
9 Cost = operating costs + indirect taxes. 
x Market demand, Price control, Policy of State Corporations and Political factors. 
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Appendix 8.8 
Crosstabulation - Perceptions of Tax Burden v Practice of Tax Planning 
Practice of Tax Planning 
Taxation as a Constraint 
on achievement of objectives 
Yes 
No 
Yes No Total 
14 2 16 
8 6 14 
22 8 30 
Testing the null hypothesis that business perceptions of taxation as a 
constraint are not related to whether tax planning is practised in the 
firm; 
X2 = 3.52 with 1 d. f. 
. ". the null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.1 level of 
significance. 
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ADoend___i x9 
UNNERSITY OF WARWICK 
SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND BUSINESS STUDIES 
Questionnaire to Professional Persons in Developing Counrties - Sri Lanka 
The confidentiality of your answers to this questionnaire will be respected. No one outside the research team at the 
University of Warwick, School of Industrial and Business Studies will see the completed questionnaire. If however, 
you do not wish to give your name, you may prefer to leave question 1 unanswered. 
Most questions can be answered with a tick (v) in the appropriate box. If you wish to make any additional comments, 
please use the space below each question or that at the end of the questionnaire. If you have any queries on the 
administration of the survey in Sri Lanka, Mr. Chandra layaratne, (Telephone: Colombo 35594), will be able to help 
you. 
We should be most grateful if you would please return the completed questionnaire as soon as possible. We enclose 
a stamped addressed envelope. 
Thank you very much for helping us in our research project. 
1. Name ............................................................................................................................................................... 
2. Occupation ..................................................................................................................................................... 
3. From your experience of business activity in your country would you say that corporate or personal taxation 
has proved in the past to be a factor inhibiting business development? Yes 1-1 No 
4. If you answered Yes to question 3, would you say that taxation is a 
Major Constraint Fairly Important Constraint Minor Constraint 
S. Here are some other problem areas that business managers think form significant constraints on business 
development. Do you agree? 
a. Import controls C. Market limitations 
_b. 
Price control regulations f. Shortage of finance 
c. Shortages of technical or professional g. Others (specify) ..................... 
skills .............................................. 
d. Labour relations h ................................................. 
6. If you answered Yes to question 3, where in your opinion do taxation problems stand in relation to those 
listed in question S. 
Compared with 
a. Import controls 
b. Price control regulations 
c. Shortages of technical and professional skills 
d. Labour relations 
e. Market limitations 
f. Shortage of finance 
Others (if specified under question 5) 
g ....................................................................... 
h ....................................................................... 
More Important I Equally Important I Leu Important I 
Problem Problem Problem 
7. The following are some incentives offered by the Government for the promotion of business enterprise in selected fields. What is your assessment of the contribution made by these to business development? 
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Question 7 continued: 
a. Tax holidays 
b. Lump sum depreciation and other 
accelerated depreciation allowances 
c. Development Rebate on fixed assets 
d. Other investment reliefs 
C. Foreign Exchange Entitlement 
Certificates on exports 
f. Convertible Rupees on exports 
g. Cash subsidies 
h. Guaranteed prices and State marketing 
services - 
i. Other (specify) .................................... 
j............................................................ 
Major Somewhat Important Minor Negligible or 
Contribution Contribution Contribution No Contributio 
8. Which two of these do you think have been most effective in encouraging business development .................. 
9. Do you think in your country, tax considerations play a significant part in 
a. Borrowing policy decisions of 
business fume 
b. Distribution of business profits 
to owners 
In all 
firms 
In the majority 
of firms 
In some 
firms 
In a few 
f irms 
In no 
firm 
10. In your view, how does the tax burden ate[ on business in your country compare with 
a. Taxes 8.10 years ago 
b. Taxes 2-3 years ago 
c. Taxes expected 2 .3 years from now 
Much higher Somewhat higher bout the same A little lower Much lower 
1. The following are some of the amendments to the Inland 
Revenue Act introduced by the Inland Revenue (Amendment) 
Law of 1976. In your opinion, what effect, if any, are these 
amendments likely to have on growth of business in Sri Lanka? 
A. Exemption from income tax of travelling allowances 
received by an employee is withdrawn from the year of 
assessment 1975/76 
b. Exemption from income tax of an entertainment allowance 
received by an employee is withdrawn from the year of 
assessment 1975/76 
C. Earnings in foreign exchange in the course of any profession, 
vocation or employment, carried on or exercised abroad by 
a resident person, is exempt from income tax, with effect 
from the year of assessment 1976/77, provided such earnings 
less reasonable expenses are remitted to Sri Lanka 
= z 21 :I 9 oU a C 
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Question 11 continued: 
d. With effect from the year of assessment 1975/76, 
the income of any co-operative society from such 
business as specified by the Minister will be liable to 
income tax 
C. Changes to the exemption from tax of profits from the 
sale of gems through the Gem Corporation: 
I. Any company incorporated on or after 6th November 
1974, will not be entitled to exemption from 
income tax 
ii. Dividends declared after Ist April 1974, on shares 
other than ordinary shares will not be exempt from 
dividend tax 
W. Dividends declared after Ist April 1974, on ordinary 
shares will be exempt from dividend tax only up to 
a maximum of 10% of paid-up value of shares 
iv. Dividends declared out of earnings after I st April 
1975, will be liable to dividend tax 
f. Every person carrying on a trade, business, profession or 
vocation is required to close accounts on the 31st March 
each year 
g. The definition of an "Approved Investment" for purposes 
of investment relief under section 16CC of the Act, has 
been extended to include (among others) any sum invested 
on or after Ist April 1975, in the purchase of new 
ordinary shares in a company approved by the Minister 
and engaged solely in the construction and sale of houses 
h. A Company failing within the definition of a "People's 
Company", will be liable to income tax at a reduced rate 
of 40% of taxable income, with effect from the year of 
assessment 1976/77 
i. Subject to a specified upper limit, a company investing in 
any undertaking on or after Ist April 1976, in accordance 
with investment plans approved by the Authorities, will 
be entitled to a deduction from income tax payable for 
that year of assessment of an amount equal to the 
investment or 10% of taxable income for that year, 
whichever is lower 
j. Subject to a specified ceiling, where a person carrying on 
an undertaking in Sri Lanka has in the year preceding any 
year of assessment, commencing on or after Ist April 1976, 
brought foreign exchange to Sri Lanka for the purpose 
of that undertaking, he will be entitled to a deduction 
from the income tax payable by him for that year of 
assessment, of an amount equal to the amount of 
foreign exchange brought in or 20% of the income tax 
attributable to the income from such undertaking for 
that year of assessment, whichever is lower 
k. Where any person carrying on an undertaking in agri- 
culture, fishing, mining or manufacture or in the 
promotion of any of these, has after ist January 1976, 
increased the number of persons other than executives 
employed in that undertaking, such person can claim 
a deduction (of an amount specified in the Law) from 
income tax attributable to that undertaking 
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Question II continued: 
1. Changes to the upper slabs and rates of income tax 
payable by resident individuals: 
a. Increase in rates for the year of assessment 1975/76, 
with the maximum rate raised from 65% to 75% 
b. Reduction in rates from the year of assessment 
1976/77, with the maximum rate lowered from 75% 
to 50% 
m. Introduction of an Expenditure Tax 
iG i5 z 
U 
V 
1ä 
110 o 
S 
N 
EC ö 
c° 
12. Would you be willing, if necessary, to complete another 
questionnaire or to grant us an interview? Yes 
F] 
No 
If Yes, at what address may we write to you? 
........................................................................................................................................................................ 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Crosstabulation - Age of Firm v Country of operation 
Appendix 11.1 
Number of firms in Country sample 
Age of Firm SL Malaysia Philippines 
Less than 5 years 4 2 3 
5- 10 years 14 2 0 
10 - 30 years 23 10 2 
More than 30 years 32 4 2 
73 18 7 
Testing the null hypothesis that the age structure of SL firms 
does not differ from that of Malaysian and Philippine firms; 
Contingency Table 
Age of firm SL 
30 years and under 41 
More than 30 years 32 
73 
Country 
Malaysia and the PhilioDines Total 
19 60 
6 38 
25 98 
X2 = 3.09 with 1 d. f. 
... the null 
hypothesis is rejected at a 0.1 level of confidence. 
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Appendix 11.2 
Crosstabulation - Form of organisation v Country of operation 
Form of Organisation 
A. Public Limited liability company 
B. Private Limited liability company 
C. Corporation 
D. Partnership 
E. Individual proprietorship 
F. Mixed 
Number of firms in Country sample 
SL Malaysia The Philippines 
31 4- 
35 12 1 
--6 
41- 
1-- 
3-- 
Appendix 11.3 
Crosstabulation - Management v Country of operation 
Number of firms in Country sample 
Management SL Malaysia The Philippines 
Owner 52 7 5 
Professional 22 11 2 
74 18 7 
Testing the null hypothesis that the management structure of SL 
firms is similar to that of Malaysian firms: 
X2 = 6.2 with 1 d. f. 
. ". the null hypothesis 
is rejected at a 0.025 level of significance. 
- 412 - Appendix 11.4 
Crosstabulation - Organisation Objectives v Country of operation 
Organisation Objectives Number of firms in Country sample 
(Six most common items) SL Malaysia The Philippines 
Maximisation of Profits 51 14 7 
Maximisation of owners' wealth 16 7 - 
Maximisation of Market share 24 13 3 
Maximisation of Value added 9 2 2 
Maximisation of Employee welfare 26 9 2 
Maintenance of a Going concern 53 7 3 
Total of firms in Country sample 74 18 7 
The Most Important Objective 
A. Maximisation of profits 
B. Maximisation of owners' wealth 
C. Maximisation of market share 
D. Maximisation of Value added 
E. Maximisation of Employee welfare 
F. Maintenance of a Going concern 
G. Growth 
H. Consumer satisfaction 
1. Maximising employment 
J. Social Responsibility 
K. Providing for dependents 
25 12 6 
3 2 - 
6 3 - 
2 - - 
30 1 - 
1 - - 
- - 1 
Testing the null hypothesis that whether a firm chooses a task-related 
maximising objective or a maintenance objective is not related to the 
country of operation: 
Contingency Table 
Country 
Objectives SL Malaysia & Philippines Total 
Task related maximising 
objective [A+B+C+D+GJ 37 23 60 
Maintenance of a going concern 30 1 31 
67 24 91 
X2 = 10.12 with 1 d. f. 
,. 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.005 level of significance. 
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Appendix 11.5 
Crosstabulation - Environmental Constraints v Country of operation 
No. of firms in Country sample 
Constraints on business SL Malaysia"& The Philippines Total 
A. Irrort Controls 
Yes 57 10 67 
No 17 15 32 
74 25 99 
Testing the null hypothesis that the perceptions of import controls as 
a constraint are the same in the two country groups: 
X2 = 11.7 with 1 d. f. 
.. the null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.005 level 
B. Market Limitations 
Yes 20 15 35 
No 54 10 64 
74 25 99 
Testing the null hypothesis that the perceptions of market limitations 
as a constraint are the same in the two country groups: 
X2 = 8.89 with 1 M. 
.. the null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.005 level 
C. Shortage of technical and professional skills 
Yes 14 11 
No 60 14 
74 25 
Testing the null hypothesis that the perceptions of shortage of 
technical and professional skills as a constraint are the same 
in the two country groups: 
X2 = 6.23 with 1 d. f. 
. -. the null 
hypothesis is rejected at a 0.025 level 
25 
74 
99 
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Appendix 11.6 
Crosstabulation - Perception of Tax Burden v Management (Malaysia & The Philippines) 
Management 
Owner Professional Total 
Taxation as a constraint on 
achievement of objectives 
Yes 86 14 
No 47 11 
12 13 25 
Testing the null hypothesis that taxes are perceived as 
a constraint equally by owner-managers and professional 
managers. 
X2 = 1.07 with 1 d. f. 
.. the null hypothesis cannot be rejected at a 0.25 level 
of significance. 
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Appendix 11.7 
Crosstabulation - Perception on Incentives v Country of operation 
(a) Number of firms who feel that incentive has been useful 
Incentive SL Malaysia Philippines 
Tax Holiday 41 13 4 
Accelerated Depreciation 63 13 4 
Total in group 74 18 7 
(b) Number of firms who believe incentive to 
be one of two most useful incentives 
Incentive SL Malaysia Philippines 
Tax Holiday 22 12 4 
Accelerated Depreciation 39 81 
Using the response in part (b) of this schedule as a measure of appreciation 
of each incentive, and, 
testing the null hypothesis that the relative appreciation of the two incentives 
in SL does not differ from that in the other two countries combined, 
X2 = 5.61 with 1 d. f. 
... 
The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.025 level of significance. 
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Appendix 11.8 
Crosstabulation - Growth of firms v Country of operation 
Growth 
Class No. Level 
1 Nil 
2 Less than 10% 
3 10-50% 
4 50-100% 
5 More than 100% 
Growth Index, GI = 
Number of firms in Country sample 
SL Malaysia The Philippines 
11 2- 
8 -- 
28 63 
13 61 
14 42 
3.2 3.6 3.8 
Testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of low and. nil growth 
firms in SL is no different from that in the other two countries combined. 
Contingency Table Number of firms in 
SL Malaysia & The Philippines Total 
Growth Class 
Low (1+2) 19 2 21 
High (3+4+5) 55 22 77 
74 24 98 
x2 = 3.24 with 1 d. f. 
. '. the null 
hypothesis is rejected at a 0.1 level of confidence. 
5 
(nx Number of firms in nth growth class) 
GI* = 
n=1 
Total number of firms in Country sample 
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Appendix 11.9 
Growth Index with reference to type of management 
Management 
Owner Professional 
Country 
Sri Lanka 
Malaysia 
* Growth Index = 
3.5 2.3 
3.0 3.7 
5 
E (n x Number of firms in nth Growth Class) 
n=1 
Total number of firms in Management/Country sample 
where growth class is defined as in Appendix 11.8. 
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Appendix 11.10 
Crosstabulation - Business Gearing v Country of operation 
Contribution to Capital of 
sources other than owners' 
capital 
Gearing Class 
1. Negligible or nil 
2. Much less than owners' 
capital 
3. Somewhat less than owner's 
capital 
4. About the same as owners' 
capital 
5. Greater than owners' 
capital 
Number of firms in Country sample 
SL Malaysia The Philippines 
10 1 - 
18 4 1 
8 2 1 
13 3 1 
21 7 3 
Gearing Index, 1 3.3 3.7 4.1 
5 
E (n x Number of firms in nth gearing class) 
*I= n=1 
Total number of firms in country sample 
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Appendix 11.11 
Crosstabulation - Gearing v Relevance of Tax considerations v 
Country of operation 
Number of firms in Country Samp le 
SL Malaysia The Philippines 
Firms for whom tax 
considerations are relevant 
in Borrowing decisions/number 
in gearing class 
Gearing class 1 (low gearing) 1/10 0/1 N. A. 
2 4/18 2/4 0/1 
3 2/8 1/2 0/1 
4 3/13 0/3 0/1 
5 (high gearing) 6/21 2/7 3/4 
* N. A. = not applicable as there were no firms in gearing class. 
Appendix 11.12 
Crosstabulation - Relevance of tax in Profit 
Distributions v Country operation 
Taxation as a consideration 
on Profit Distributions 
Yes 
No 
Number of firms in Country Samp le 
Malaysia SL and The Philip pines 
8 48 
10 33 
18 81 
Testing the null hypothesis that the relevance of tax considerations 
in country samples is the same in both country samples.. 
2=1.32 
with 1 d. f. 
. ". The null hypothesis 
is rejected at a 0.25 level of significance. 
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Appendix 11.13 
Response of Professional Observers 
Malaysia Philippines 
(a) Total Number of Responses 99 
(b) The following are believed to 
be constraints on business 
activity 
Items listed in questionnaire 
Shortage of professional & 
Total 
technical skills 7 6 13 
Shortage of finance 5 8 13 
Market Limitations 7 4 11 
Taxation 6 4 10 
Import Controls 5 5 10 
Price Controls 3 5 8 
Labour relations 1 3 4 
Items added by respondents 
Excessive Government control 2 
Political Developments 1 
Attitude of government 2 
Land-ownership problems 1 
(Lack of) peace and order 1 
Dumping 1 
(c) Among the most effective incentives 
were included 
Tax Holidays 52 
Accelerated Depreciation 
allowances 10 
(d) Index of relevance of taxation 
considerations in decisions 
relating to 
Financing 3.4 2.7 
Distribution of Profits 4.0 3.6 
[(No. of observers believing tax considerations to be relevant to all firms)x5] 
Inder= +[(" is R it 
, 
it is "" to most )X47 ; Total 
+( ( « IS to 81 of " to some )X33 
number 
of 
+[ it It 
IS It It " at " to a few if )x2] res- 
+[( " 11 11 of It 81 to no firm )Xlj ponses 
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Appendix 12 
UNIVERSITY OF WARWICK 
SCHOOL OF INDUSTRIAL AND BUSINESS STUDIES 
Questionnaire to Foreign Investors in Developing Countries 
The confidentiality of your answers to this questionnaire will be respected. No one outside the research team at the 
University of Warwick, School of Industrial and Business Studies will see the completed questionnaire. If however, 
you do not wish to divulge the name of your firm, you may prefer to leave question I unanswered. 
Most questions can be answered with a tick () in the appropriate box. If you wish to make any additional comments, 
please use the space below each question or that at the end of the questionnaire. 
We should be most grateful if you would please return the completed questionnaire as soon as possible. 
Thank you very much for helping in our research project. 
1. Name of Firm ................................................................................................................................................. (If your firm is one of a group of companies, please answer on the basis of the group, if you think this is 
more sensible) 
2. Country of residence or registration of business .............................................................................................. 
3. Do you have investments in what are generally known as Developing Countries? Yes[] No 
Q 
4. In your experience have you found taxation in the host country to be a significant consideration in deciding 
to invest in developing countries? 
Always Often Sometimes Seldom Never 
5. Here is a list of difficulties that foreign investors sometimes face in developing countries. Have you found these 
to be relevant? 
a. Political uncertainty 
b. Administrative red-tape in obtaining approval 
c. Scarcity of technical and managerial skills 
d. Threat of nationalisation 
C. Inadequacy of financial and commercial services 
f. Currency exchange controls 
B. Import controls 
h. Difficult labour relations 
i. Others (specify) .............................. 
j......................................................... 
k ......................................................... 
In a 
Number of 
Countries 
In Two 
or Three 
Countries 
Rarely 
or 
Never 
6. Which one or two problems out of the litt in question 5 would. you say have caused you the most difficulty? 
1E1 
b. c. 
f 
d. 
f 
e. f. g. h. i. j. k. 
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7. Where would you place difficulties caused by taxation in developing countries in relation to those in question S? 
Compued with 
a. Political uncertainty 
b. Administrative red-tape 
c. Scarcity of technical and managerial skills 
d. Threat of nationalintion 
C. Inadequacy of financial and commercial skills 
f. Currency exchange controls 
S. Import controls 
h. Difficult labour relations 
Others, if specified in question 5 
i. 
J. ... ............ ............... ................... 
T tion is a 
More Important Equally Important Lese Important 
Problem Problem Problem 
8. Do you have investments in any of the following countries? 
a. Jamaica d. The Philippines 
b. Malaysia e. Sri Iunka 
c. Nigeria f. Zambia 
9. If you answered Yes to question 8 .............. would your establishment in....................................................... 
or someone at head office, be willing to complete a questionnaire relating to that country? 
10. If Yes to question 9, could you please give us their address 
11. If you have no investments in ................................................. is this because, 
a. You have not considered the possibility 
b. You have considered the possibility, but have decided against investment 
c. The possibility is now under consideration 
d. You had investments in the past, but no longer have any interests in that 
country 
e. Other (specify) ................................... ........................................ ............ 
12. a. Would you be willing, if necsawy. to clarify your answers to this questionnaire either by completing 
another questionnaire or by granting us an intervlew? Yes Q No 
b. If Yes, at what address may we write to you? 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Appendix 13 
UK taxation of foreign Income of companies 
The UK tax law relating to foreign earnings of companies is complex 
and includes a multitude of provisions to enable both assessment to tax 
and the granting of relief as well as to check tax-avoidance. This appendix 
summarises the main provisions of the law generally applicable to companies 
resident in the UK. 
1. A company resident in the UK is chargeable to Corporation tax on its 
trading profits wherever arising, whether or not such income is remitted 
to the UK. Similarly any losses incurred on trading in any part of the 
world may be set off against profits arising in any other part. 
2. If, however, foreign operations are carried on through subsidiary 
companies set-up outside the UK, only dividends (and interest and 
similar payments) paid to the UK holding company are chargeable to 
tax in the UK. Once again, whether or not these dividends are remitted 
back to the UK is irrelevant. As only distributed profits of an over- 
seas subsidiary are taxable in the UK any losses incurred by such a 
subsidiary cannot be set-off against other income in computing UK taxes. 
3. Double taxation relief is granted in the UK, both unilaterally and under 
treaties with foreign countries. 
4. Under provisions for unilateral relief, taxation paid in a foreign 
country on profits or dividends is allowed as a deduction against UK 
taxes payable on that income. 
Dividends received are therefore grossed-up in calculating UK corporation 
tax; the exact procedure however depends on the interest of the UK 
company in the foreign company. If the UK company has more than 10% of 
the voting power in the foreign company then to dividends are added all 
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foreign taxes paid on the dividends (i. e. withholding tax and other 
underlying taxes). Double tax relief is then allowed in respect of all 
underlying foreign tax. If, however, the voting power of the UK 
recipient of dividends in the foreign company is less than 10%, only 
taxes paid specifically on the dividend may be added to the dividend 
and claimed for double tax relief. The relief allowed in each case is 
however limited to the foreign tax added to obtain gross dividend or 
the UK corporation tax on the gross dividend, whichever is the lower. 
Double taxation relief cannot be carried over from one period to 
another: any foreign tax that cannot be relieved in the relevant period 
is not eligible for set-off against UK taxes of any other year. 
5. The UK has entered into double tax relief agreements with a large number 
of foreign countries (over 75 agreements were-in operation at the 
begin ring of 1980). These treaties may provide for additional relief 
over and above that given unilaterally or specify taxes to be included 
in the definition of underlying tax. Generally, they also provide for 
the free exchange of information between the tax authorities of the two 
countries. 
6. UK law provides for tax-sparing relief in the UK on foreign income where 
this is agreed in the relevant double taxation relief treaty. The effect 
of tax-sparing relief is that foreign tax forgone in a foreign country 
under an incentive scheme to provide industrial (or similar) development, 
is to be treated as if it were tax paid in that territory, for purposes 
of granting double taxation relief. 
7. A limitation on the recovery of double taxation relief can arise when 
the UK recipient of foreign dividends in turn pays out its foreign 
earnings as dividends in the UK. When the dividend is paid by the UK 
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company it has to also pay Advance Corporation tax at a rate determined 
by the basic rate of personal tax and this tax is recoverable from 
corporation tax before the computation of double taxation relief. 
Under such circumstances it is very likely that some double taxation 
will go unrelieved. (A UK company may, however, surrender its Advance 
Corporation Tax relief to a 51% owned UK subsidiary, thus increasing 
its ability to receive double taxation relief. ) 
Sources: (1) Prest(149) 
(2) Simons Taxes (163) 
(3) Pritchard(150) 
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Appendix 14 
LOC-Related Investment Appraisal Procedures of MNCs 
Appendix 14.1 
Main Techniques of Investment Appraisal used to evaluate LDC investment 
No. of firms 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) 2 
IRR + Net Present Value (NPV) 1 
IRR + NPV + Payback 2 
Payback 1 
Maintainable Return on Capital Invested 1 
7 
Appendix 14.2 
In the evaluation of developing country investment projects, the 
company looks at 
No. of firms 
(a) tax flows to the project in 
isolation 1 
(b) the project's impact on Group 
tax flows 2 
(c) both (a) and (b) 4 
T 
Appendix 14.3 
Tax related inputs to investment evaluations 
No. of firms 
Host Country taxes (Income and 
Distribution or remittance based) only 1 
Host Country taxes and home country 
income taxes 6 
7 
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Appendix 14.4 
Possible future changes in tax structure allowed for in evaluation 
of investments 
No. of firms 
Yes 1 
Yes if a specific change is 
virtually certain 1 
No 5 
7 
Method used 
Best estimates 
Sensitivity analysis 
Appendix 14.5 
Location of LDC Investment Evaluations 
Evaluations are carried out 
For Initial For expansion and 
Investment Replacement investment 
at Head Office 4 
at Head Office and local office 36 
at Head Office and local office 
with help of outside consultants -1 
77 
- 428 - 
Appendix 15.1 
Summary of factors Promoting or Constraining Corporate achievement 
Source Internal External Total 
Factors 
Promoting 87 37 124 
Constraining 6 237 243 
93 274 367 
Testing the null hypothesis that in reports of factors affecting 
corporate achievement, the proportion of promotional to constraining 
causes is the same for factors of an internal nature as for those 
originating from an external source: 
X2 = 20.1 with 1 d. f. 
:. The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.001 level of significance. 
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Appendix 15.2 
Analysis of Factors Promoting Corporate Achievement 
Area 
UK Other Developed Countries LDCs Total 
Source 
Internal 37[82%] 37[71%] 13[48%J 87 
External 8[18%] 15[29%] 14[52%] 37 
45[100%] 52[100%1 27[100%] 124 
Testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of internal to 
external variables among factors promoting corporate achievement 
is the same for all geographical areas: 
X2 = 9.3 with 2 d. f. 
:, The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.01 level of significance. 
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Appendix 15.3 
Analysis of All Factors Influencing Corporate Achievement 
Area 
UK Other Developed Countries LDCs Total 
Source 
Internal 37[37%] 43[28%] 13[12%] 93 
External 64[63%] 112[72%] 98[88%] 274 
101[100%] 155[100%] 111[100%] 367 
Testing the null hypothesis that the proportions of internal and 
external factors affecting corporate performances are the same in 
all geographical areas: 
X2 = 18.1 with 2 d. f. 
. ", The null 
hypothesis is rejected at a 0.005 level of significance. 
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External Factors constraining Corporate Achievement 
Other Developed 
UK Countries LDCs Total 
(a) Market and Resource related 
Market demand/supply/prices 16 33 13 62 
Industrial relations 14 4 8 26 
Shortage of supplies and services 1 4 11 16 
Difficult trading conditions 1 4 - 5 
32[57%] 45[46%] 32[38%] 109 
(b) General Country and Economy related 
State of the economy 
Fluctuations in currency ex. rates 
Weather/climate 
Political uncertainty/unrest 
Balance of payments problems 
Inflation 
Credit problems 
- 21 9 30 
7 10 3 20- 
5 3 3 11 
- 2 8 10 
- - 3 3 
1 1 - 2 
- - 1 1 
13[23%] 37[38%] 27[32%] 77 
(c) Government controlled 
Requirements for local participation 
Price controls 
Government intervention 
Taxation 
Devaluation 
Import controls 
Quality standards 
Exchange restrictions 
Dividend control 
Common agricultural policy 
Compulsory requisition 
Total 
- - 11 11 
4 3 3 10 
4 5 - 9 1 2 4 7 
2 2 4 
_ 1 2 3 
- 2 - 2 
_ 2 2 1 - - 1 1 - - 1 
- - 1 1 
11[20%] 15[16%] 25[30%] 51 
56[100%] 97[100%] 84[100%] 237 
Testing the null hypothesis that the possibility of occurrence of the above 
mentioned categories of constraint is the same in the three geographical areas 
studied, 
X2 = 9.5 with 4 d. f. 
... The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.05 level of confidence. 
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Appendix 16.1 
Analysis of Budget Proposals - 1965 - 1977 
Number of proposals 
A Reduction 
Type of Tax Measure in Taxes 
(+j 
Income Tax - Individuals Rates - lower slabs 
- upper slabs 
Personal and Family Relief 
Determination of assessable income 
Capital Gains Tax 
Compulsory Savings and Ceiling on Income 
Income Tax - Corporate Rates 
Bases 
Compulsory savings 
Capital Taxes 
Wealth Tax 
Gift Tax 
Estate Duty 
Capital Levy 
Other Taxes 
Business Turnover Tax 
Customs Duty 
Excise 
Foreign Exchange Tax 
Visa Tax 
Bank Debits Tax 
Foreign Exchange Entitlement Certificates 
Rice Subsidy Tax 
Licence Fees 
Stamp Duty 
Expenditure Tax 
1 
3 
5 
5 
5 
4 
3 
1 
4- 
2 
1 
2 
6 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
15 
leading to 
An Increase 
in Taxes 
(-) 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
8 
1 
3 
2 
4 
1 
1 
6 
9 
4 
3 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
2S 
Incentives 
Incentives for investment/production/ 
exports etc. 
Incentives for savings and remittances 
Accelerated Capital Allowances 
Amnesties 
18 
4 
1 
3 
11 
1 
3 
75 
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Appendix 16.2 
Budget Proposals and Business Reaction under different Governments 
Number of p 
A. Budget Proposals Decrease in 
Government Tax Burden 
* UNP 32 
** UF/SLFP 23 
55 
roposals leading to 
Increase in 
Tax Burden Total 
15 47 
30 53 
45.100 
Testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of favourable 
to adverse proposals is no different under the two governments: 
k2 = 6.13 with 1 d. f. 
. -. The null hypothesis is rejected at a 
0.025 level of confidence. 
B. Business Reactions to Budget 
* UNP 
** UF/SLFP 
60 18 78 
30 5 35 
90 23 113 
Testing the null hypothesis that the proportion of favourable to 
adverse commentsis no different under the two governments: 
k2 = 1.12 with 1 M. 
. ", The null hypothesis is rejected at a 0.25 level of confidence. 
* UNP =1965,1968 and 1977 budget speeches. 
** SLFP =_1970,1974 and 1975 budget speeches. 
Number of Taxpayer Comments 
Favourable Adverse Total 
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Appendix 17.14 
Pearson's Correlation Results - for Average Ratios 
1964-1974 
(Sample - All Firms) 
(N= 20 ) 
Variables r Level of significance 
TX v PBT 0.44 0.03 
TX v RTO -0.03 0.45 
LS v PBT -0.27 0.12 
LS v RTO -0.13 0.29 
LS v TX -0.33 0.08 
LS v TP -0.67 0.001 
LS v Cl -0.51 0.01 
LS v DRS 0.18 0.20 
Cl v TP 0.56 0.01 
TP v TX 0.58 0.004 
Cl v TX 0.37 0.06 
DOE v RTO -0.38 0.05 
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